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SCIENCE, METHODOLOGY AND RELIGION IN THE WORK OF ADAM SEDGWICK 
An abstract of a PhD. Thesis by V. Paul Marston.
Adam Sedgwick ( 1705-1873) was one of the leading geologists in 
the second quarter of the nineteenth century, and played a major part 
in establishing the geological column and applying it in the U.K.
This thesis examines the metaphysical, religious and methodological 
presuppositions implicit in his approach to science.
A prevailing view amongst historians (e.g. Cannon and Morrell) has 
seen Sedgwick as a 'liberal Anglican' and 'Broad Churchman'. This 
has been linked with a view connecting the vanguard of science in the 
period with liberal Anglicanism (e.g. in the BAAS), and seeing both 
Tractarians and to a large extent Evangelicals as a ' threat ' to it. 
This thesis presents evidence showing the inadequacy of the 'Broad 
Church' concept, and that Sedgwick is himself closer to an 
Evangelical position than has been imagined. It shows that his 
presuppositions about the nature of science and its relationship 
with religion were close to those of Scottish Evangelicals like 
Chalmers and Miller, and not dissimilar from the leading moderate 
Anglican Evangelicals who would have associated with the Christian 
Observer. The influence of Coleridgesm liberalism was small.
Sedgwick also contributed to the development of Natural Theology 
in a time when it was in ascent. Evidence shows that criticisms 
of Sedgwick for semi-deism (e.g. by Hooykaas) are unfounded, and 
that his natural theology was consistent with a full Christian theism.
Finsdly, the thesis examines Sedgwick's participation in the 
nineteenth century debates about scientific methodology. It shows 
that, having taken as his mentors on the issue Bacon and Newton, 
Sedg%dck*s thinking evidences a certain tension as he tries to 
interpret what he is actually doing in science in these terms.
NOTE
Frequent reference has been made in this thesis 
to the monumental The Life and Letters of the 
Reverend Adam Sedgwick, by John Willis Clark and 
Thomas McKenny Hughes (2 vols., Cambridge, I890). 
This has been referred to as 'Clark & Hughes' 
both in the text and in the notes. Frequent 
citation has also been made of various works of 
Sedgwick, and these may be referred to in a 
shortened form, e.g. 'Discourse' for A Discourse 
on the Studies of the University (Cambridge, I833) 
Full reference to these and other works may be 
found in chapter IO.3 of the Bibliography.
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(l) INTRODUCTION
The Reverend Adam Sedgi^ rick (I785-I873) was the Woodwardian 
Professor of Geology at Cambridge from I8l8-1873- He was one of 
the best field geologists of his generation, and in that heroic age 
of geology did perhaps more than any other individual towards the 
construction of a geological column. He was also active in founding 
the Cambridge Philosophical Society in 1819, and as one of the early 
leaders in the British Association for the Advancement of Science
founded in 1833* The present thesis concentrates on an analysis 
of his basic theological and philosophical position, relating it 
both to his science and to the background of his times. The latter 
bas inevitably involved some analysis of the various different 
philosophical and more especially religious parties of the period.
The approach taken in this thesis to analysis of contemporary 
viewpoints is '.instrumentalist» in the sense that viewpoints (as 
distinct from parties with a specific membership) need not be 
assumed to correspond with any kind'of 'external reality'. Terms 
like 'Deist' or 'Broad Church' or 'Evangelical' or 'Cambridge Net­
work' may be seen simply as instruments which may (or may not) help 
analysis of past situations, and sometimes predictions of positions 
which individuals might have been e^ p ected to take up. The approach 
is also in a sense 'actualistic' in that (with obvious qualifications 
and recognising the limitations) some present theological or metaphys­
ical contentions may help us penetrate the thinking behind some past 
ones. Finally, the thesis makes neither exclusively externalist nor 
exclusively internalist assumptions about historical processes.
Amongst modern historians of science who are interested in 
issues of science and religion in the nineteenth century, the
general trend has been to follow Conybeare's identification of
three main parties within the Church of England: High Church,
1 2 Evangelical, and Broad Church. Since at least 1940 Sedgwick
has been identified with liberal Anglicanism of the Broad Church.
Following this, Gillispie and Hooykaas, leading historians of
science (particularly of geology) in the 1950's and early 19dO’s ,
emphasized a supposedly strong distinction between the theology
of Sedgwick and of the Evangelical Hugh Miller.^ During the I960's
if
W.F.Cannon, himself critical of Gillispie and Hooykaas , made an 
emphasis on supposed 'Broad Church' influence on early nineteenth 
century science which continues to be evident in recent literature. 
Cannon associated with the 'Broad Church' a group he called the 
'Cambridge Network': 'a loose convergence of scientists, historians,
dons and other scholars with a common acceptance of accuracy,
5
intelligence and novelty.' These men were seen in various areas: 
'in religion as Broad Church leaders, in literature as propagandists 
for the Romantic poets, in historiography as "Liberal Anglicans," 
in education as University reformers, and in the history of cliques 
as related to the Cambridge "Apostles".*^  Cannon continues that 
in private communications: 'Robert Robson, Martin Rudwick, and I 
have agreed that these are all one set of people with the same 
ideals, operating in all these fields and in science as well.'
Whilst many might think that this really should have settled it,
n
there are some of us who doubt it. But the Cannon thesis has 
been influential. It identifies a 'scientific node' of the 
'Cambridge Network', consisting of Cambridge and ex-Cambridge 
scientists and a few others (sometimes called 'friends of 
the Network'), and a theological node' centred on Julius Hare.
The movement is supposed to have stemmed from Coleridge, taking
Niebuhr's approach to history but seeing Strauss as a poor 
application of that approach.
Following Cannon, Thackray and Morrell have emphasized the 
influence in the early British Association (BAAS) and in science 
of the period of this 'Cambridge Network' - identifying it as 'a 
set of liberal Anglican, or Broad Church, proponents of moderate
g
reform who found one spiritual home in Trinity College, Cambridge.' 
Thackray and Morrell assert:
'Trinity College was a seminary of the Broad Church or liberal 
Anglican Movement. J.C.Hare and Connop Thirlwall, who were 
Trinity tutors, helped to articulate that blend of Kantian 
idealism, toleration, and Coleridgean conservatism which came 
to characterize the Movement, and which appeared as much in 
the scientifico-moral tracts of Whewell as in the Movements s 
more directly theological and political writings. The liberal 
Anglican theology of the 'Cambridge network' rapidly became 
the unofficial credo of the BAAS, with important ideological
9
and practical results.'
John Hedley Brooke, in various papers, seems to assume the Cannon 
10concepts , and Brooke and Morrell have further developed the
idea that natural theology within BAAS served both to allay some
clerical criticism and to act as a mediating influence between
those of different church allegiences."*^  Others accept the
12Cannon thesis as established. The recent biography of
Sedgwick by Colin Speakman takes for granted the 'Cambridge Network' 
with its 'Broad Church' orientation, and portrays Sedgwick as a 
'Broad Church radical
Cannon, Thackray and Morrell rightly emphasize Sedgwick's 
importance. He was 'one of the world's best geologists' in 
sn era when the Caoxbridge Network's power base depended on the
geologists, and an axis of geologists 'was crucial in shaping a
15sense of oommon purpose among the Gentlemen of Science.' Moreover
the British Association (BAAS) 'depended heavily on its star
performers and orators of whom Sedgwick v;as the most renowned.
17He was 'the most vigorous liberal in the University' and 'a
principal agent in promoting Darwin. '
Now, as we have seen, the supposed 'Network' is repeatedly
19called 'liberal Anglican' and 'Broad Church' , with a 'liberal 
Anglican' or 'Latitudinarian' theology. Thackray and Morrell 
say:
'The leaders were not only practising Anglicans but were 
deeply embedded in Anglican life; no fewer than ten were 
ordained, and five of the ten were sons of Anglican clergy 
(Buckland, Hareourt, Lloyd, Peacock, Sedgwick). Their 
theology was that of a distinct party within the Church of 
England, the 'liberal Anglican' or Broad Church party.
Edward Stanley was a noted publicist of this party and 
became a widely influential bishop. Baden Powell was also 
active in the development of liberal Anglican theology.
Many other Broad Church ramifications can be traced within 
the core group, such as James David Forbes's enthusiasm for 
the ideas of Thomas Arnold and George Biddell Airy's sympathy 
for Bishop Colenso. The British Association's ideology of 
science was everyv/here formed by Broad Church sympathies.
Here we pass from Sedgwick to extreme radicals like the 
Powell and Colenso of the i860 Essays and Reviews, as though 
they were all one harmonious group. But then, Sedgwick is 
specifically called a 'liberal Anglican'
The movement is assumed (in Arnold's words) to have 'stemmed 
from Coleridge' Coleridge is stated to have been very important
in the earliest BAAS meetings, and significance is attached to his part
in V/hewell’s coining the term 'scientist’.^ T^he leaders of the movement
were 'ardent admirers of Wordsworth and Coleridge as intuitive
thinkers’ - which Cannon sees as the basis of Sedgwick’s attacks 
25on Payleyan ethics. Sedgwick’s Discourse on the Studies of 
the University (1833)’with its attacks on Locke and Paley, was of 
considerable importance in defining the new romantic-liberal- 
scientific stance; and Sedgivick kept up his interest by perusing 
writings of such younger men as Arthur Stanley, F.D.Maurice, and 
Leopold von Ranke, as well as those of his old friend Julius 
Hare.’^ ^
The present thesis makes and documents a number of assertions
about the prevailing Cannon-Thackray-Morrell assumptions. First,
the theological and philosophical position of Adam Sedgwick has
been radically misunderstood. It is misleading to describe him
either as ’Broad Church' or 'liberal Anglican', rather, his first
serious biographers Clark and Hughes were more accurate in having:
'Sedgwick, if he belonged to any party in the Church, an 
27
Evangelical.' His personal religion was Evangelical, and his 
approach to key issues of the atonement, the evidences for 
Christianity, natural theology, and the rejection of Payleyan 
ethics were all Evangelical rather than Coleridgean, and drew 
either on actual Evangelical sources or on sources favoured by 
Evangelicals. Sedgwick was widely read, was not a 'party man' 
ana would find stimulation in ideas and information from any 
source; but. his specific statements of theological agreement 
are usually to Evangelicals like Simeon, Hall and Chalmers.
But there are other points to be made, more general than the 
misunderstanding of one of the key figures in the analysis. Qhe
of these is the misrepresentation (albeit implied rather than
specifically stated) of Evangelical opinion as largely hostile
or at best indifferent to science. Evangelicalism is usually
only ascribed by Cannon or Thackray and Morrell to individuals
or periodicals at times when they are seeming critical of science
or scientists. Thus Cannon cites the pioneering work in science
29teaching in the Universities of Milner, Parish, Clarke and Walker 
- but does not tell us that Milner and Parish were leading 
Evangelicals, nor that Clarke chose to identify with them in 
the inaugural Bible Society meeting of Faraday is
'the contemporary scientist most admired by the Network' , but KiV
Verj religious views are passed over or noted as
an aberration of mystery. Thomas Arnold (whom virtually everyone
who applies the term 'Broad Church' within the period takes to 
be a central member of it) apparently did not think highly of 
32science. When arch-Evangelical Simeon expresses very similar 
views it is seemingly more significant.^  ^ Then, 'Evangelical 
Christians, given to a literal interpretation of Genesis, led 
the assault (on the BAAS)*^^  Nolan and Cockburn (who as we shall 
see were less orthodox in their Evangelicalism than Sedg\d.ck on 
certain issues, and certainly did not speak for the Simeonite 
leaders) are presented as though typical. On the other hand'the 
vindication of t^he liberal Anglican position' (my underline) is 
supposed to have come from Powell and Daubeny^^^ with Powell 
merely 'going further than any liberal Anglican divine had dared.
There is no indication here that Powell, far from simply being
enough to do what the others would have liked to had they 
been not too timid, went even further by i860 than most of the 
very radical contributors to Essays and Reviews in his apparent 
rejection of miracles. Yet Thackray and Morell cite the Evangelical
7
Christian Observer here just in its criticism of the radical Powell
- would gather that in fact it had consistently supported
maintream geology and been critical of so called Scriptu^ -al 
GeologistsEven poor Mary Buckland is introduced to laugh 
at Nolan - but with no mention of her own friendship with Pusey,
or attendance ,at an Evangelical Church#^ Chalmers Evangelicalism 
is noted , but then in the next sentence he (probably the most 
renovmed Evangelical outside Anglicanism) is slipped in as one of 
the authors who 'confirmed the close alliance between the British 
Association and the liberal natural theologians'.^ "^  In short, all the 
links with Evangelicalism of the supposed 'Gentlemen of Science' 
are ignored or played down, and a picture presented as though 
Evangelicals in general were ranting bibliolaters or at best 
indifferent to science. The relationships between moderate 
Evangelicals and science could be totally misunderstood by 
those reading such treatments.
A third major area of criticism to be made of what has been 
here called the 'Cannon-Thackray-Morrell' approach, is its use 
of the concept of the 'Broad Church'. The many caveats placed 
on the use of the term by earlier writers are glossed over, and 
the term used as though it really could be applied to a group of 
people with a common theology. But this retrospective 
application of a term invented in the 1850's to describe a highly 
heterogenous set of people in the 1820's and 1830's confuses the 
issue. The theology of (say) Thirlwall or lifhately differed 
radically from that of (say) Coleridge or Maurice - and the 
theology of Sedgwick (and probably others like Whewell) differed 
raaically from either. Moreover the term 'Cambridge Network' is 
itself of dubious value. Does it imply much more than the 
unexceptional fact that in years when there were but two
8
old established universities, many of England’s most conspicuous 
intellectual talents - especially in the Anglican Church - passed 
through or were affected by one of them ? If it implies much 
more that this - say to some shared philosophy or religion not 
found in other Anglicans - then it is probably better dropped.
Concepts are only instruments. On the whole, and especially 
with regard to some modern historians of science^^ this thesis 
is arguing for a change in perspective rather than acknowledgement 
of specific items of fact. One may be reminded of what Kuhn once 
said of Popper: 'How am I to persuade Sir Karl, who knows everything 
I know about scientific development, and has somewhere or other said 
it, that what he calls a duck can be seen as a rabbit.’^ * Yet 
this change in perspective is significant, and impinges also on our 
understanding of Sedgwick's opposition to evolution.
On another level, the thesis also examines in depth the methodol­
ogical presuppositions Sedgwick made in pursuing his science. These 
relate not only to his understanding of the relationship between 
religious and scientific knowledge, but also to his perception of 
what he was doing during what we might now describe as paradigm 
change and development.
This thesis, then, concentrates primarily on the philosophical
42and theological ideas of Sedgwick in relation to his science.
Yet, in doing so, it seeks to challenge a number of current ideas 
and perspectives on the relationship between science and religion 
in the nineteenth century. In particular, it may furnish some 
contribution to the recognition of the influence of moderate 
Evangelicals and their ideologies on the development of science.
(1) NOTES
1. W.D, Conybeare, 'Church Parties», in Essays Ecclesiastical and Social 
(5th Edn., 1855» PP- 57-164} is analysed in chapter 2.3 below.
2. D.A. V/instanley, Early Victorian Cambridge, p. 94.
3. C.C. Gillispie, Genesis and Geology ( 1951). and R.Hooykaas, The 
Principle of Uniformity in Geology, Biology and Theology (1963).
4. e.g. of Gillispie in 'The Problem of Miracles in the 1830's', 
Victorian Studies. 196O-I, 4, 5.32 (note 3).
5. S.F, Cannon, Science in Culture, p- 30, and see also 'Scientists and 
Broad Churchmen', British Studies. 1964, 4, 65-88.
6. Cannon, Science in Culture, p. 30.
7. Pietro Cosi pointed out to me his own scepticism that this was 
sufficient in his Isis review of the book (1979, 70, 593-5). J.B. 
Morrell's review in History of Science (1980, 18, 39-45) is much 
less critical, and Morrell's own work adopts Cannon's views. D.M. 
Knight's review (Nature, 1978, 276, 131-2) is more critical of its 
limitations but finds it 'illuminating' as an account of the
Cambridge Network'. Michael Ruse (in Victorian Studies, 1979-80, 
118-119) is more ecstatic, finding the essay on the Cambridge 
Network 'masterly'.
8. A.Thackray and J.B. Morrell, Gentlemen of Science, p. 21.
9. Ibid., p. 226.
10. e.g. in 'Natural Theology and the Plurality of Worlds», Annals of 
Science, 1977, 24, 221-286.
11. Brooke in his chapter in Images of the Earth (Ed. L.Jordanova and 
R.Porter), and Morrell in his review (ref. 7).
12. E.g. in R. McCleod and P. Collins (Eds.) Parliament of Science,
10
(1981) p. 8 and p. 16 n32; I. Inkster and J.B. Morrell (Eds) 
Metropolis and Province (1983) P* 199 nIO; D. Miller, 'Between 
Hostile Camps', BJHS, 1983, l£_, 1-4? (p. 13); T Cosslet (Ed.) 
Science and Religion in the Nineteenth Century (1984), p. 13 n51* 
The notable exception is N. Eupke, The Great Chain of Being (1983^ , 
which totally ignores Oannon^ s 'Cambridge Network^  and makes Oxford 
the centre of English Geology in the 183O's. I believe Rupke 
exaggerates Buckland's importance in this period, and to regard
Sedgwick after 1830 as in any basic sense a member of a 
Bucklandian 'Oxford School' in antithesis to a Scottish one, leads 
to anomalies. One obvious example of this is Rupke's contrast on 
p. 162 between the ideas of Buckland and those of Agassiz and 
Miller on progressivism. Sedgwick is unmentioned, but his 
clear self-alignment with the 'wrong' side on this issue is just 
one of a number. At the time of writing this thesis, however, 
Rupke's ideas, unlike the Cannon 'Cambridge Network', had not 
gained any wide support, and I have not analysed them in detail.
13. C. Speakman, Adam Sedgwick (I982), refers to the 'Cambridge
Network' (p. 90), and to Sedgwick's 'Broad Church radicalism'
(p. 35); but he also refers to a 'puritanical streak' (p. 31) 
and to a 'low church directness' in Sedgwick's sermons (p. 134)1
14. Cannon (ref. 6), p. 4o.
13. Thackray and Morrell (ref. 8), p. 27. ^
16. Ibid., p. 161.
17. Cannon (ref. 6), p. 34.
18. Ibid.. p. 36.
19. Thackray and Morrell (ref. 8), pp. 21, 25, 101, 124, 225, 228,245.
n
20. Thackray and Morrell use the terra ’Latitudinarian' on Ibid.. p. 28.
21. Ibid.. p. 25.
22. Ibid.. p. 245.
23. Cannon (ref. 6), p. 30.
24. Thackray and Morrell (ref. 8), p. 20 and 246. They state
'It is a point of some significance that Coleridge was lionized 
at the 1833 Cambridge Meeting of the British Association, where 
he forbad- the members to call themselves philosophers. In 
response, William Whewell coined the word 'scientist* to designate 
collectively those who studies material nature.' (p. 20)
23. Cannon (ref. 6), p. 39.
26. Cannon (ref. 6), p. 40.
27. Clark & Hughes, 1, p. 220.
28. Simeon, Chalmers and Hall are, arguably, the greatest amongst 
Evangelicals of the Anglicans, Church of Scotland and Baptists 
in the early part of the nineteenth century.
29. Cannon (ref. 6), p. 32-3, 36 and 42.
30. Though Cannon does repeat the story of Clarke's apparent 
preoccupation with his work in his final illness.
31. Cannon (ref. 6), p. 38._
32. Ibid.. p. 47.
33. Thackray and Morrell (ref. 8), p. 224.
34. Ibid.. p. 254.
33. Ibid.. p. 233.
36. Ibid., p. 237.
37. Ibid., p. 236.
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38. Ibid.. p. 233.
39. The full quotation is: Tin l833 at Cambridge, Sedgv/ick as President 
pressed the case for natural theology, being conveniently joined
by Thomais Chalmers, the Evangelical Scottish Presbyterian. No 
fewer than five authors of Bridgewater Treatises (Whewell,
Buckland, Clamers, Prout, and Kirby) were present at the 1833 
meeting, thus confirming the close alliance between the British 
Association and the liberal natural theologians.' (p. 237). The 
words 'being conveniently joined’ might be taken to imply something 
casual, almost accidental, when in fact the views of Sedgwick and 
Chalmers were quite similar - and neither should really be slipped 
in with the liberal Anglicans. Would Chalmers really have agreed 
that later Bridgewater authors including himself ’saw the task 
in liberal Anglican terms ?' (p. 227) Would he have seen his 
presence in l833 as 'confirming the close alliance between the 
British Association and the liberal natural theologians' ?
40. Particularly to John Hedley Brooke amongst those named.
41. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge,
p. 3.
42. The concentration of the present thesis on matters of theology and 
philosophy (including scientific methodology) has kept the subject 
matters manageable if still fairly wide. It must, however, be 
emphasized that much further interesting work remains to be done 
exploring the social and political dimensions of Sedgwick and
his circle, and the connections between these and the theological
and philosophical ones. Restriction of area is expedient to 
maintain thoroughness but manageability, but always remembering 
that the actual thinking of a multifaceted person like Sedgwick 
remains unitary.
13
(2) SEDGWICK ’ s BASIC THEOLOGY
2.1 Church Parties
2.1.1 Introduction
An aim proper to historical research is to see individuals as a part . 
of various movements and currents of thought in their ages and cultures. 
Sedgwick’s theological ideas, therefore, are not to be seen in a vacuum 
but are rather to be located against a situation of various church 
parties within the Anglican communion of which he was a member. In 
looking at church parties, however, we may accept Owen Chadwick's 
comment: 'Parties are never monolithic. Whenever they are powerful they 
are numerous, and whenever they are numerous they contain a wide range 
of opinion.'^  This diversity within parties often makes it difficult 
to determine what exactly identifies them and who exactly were associated 
with them - especially when there is no formal membership. Concepts of 
parties are, after all, only useful instruments used in analysis, not 
'real' entities.
Nevertheless there are two unsatisfactory features of recent . -
historical literature on Sedgiirick and church parties. Firstly, though 
the most common tendency has been to associate him with the 'Broad Church', 
comment varies wildly^ and he has even been called a 'fundamentalist*.  ^
Secondly, the concept of the 'Broad Church' is itself suspect. Thus the 
viev/point argued in the rest of the present section is that Sedgwick's 
position W£LS basically Evangelical, and that the term 'Broad Church' as 
applied to the period of Sedgv;ick*s hey-day has little discernible 
meaning and confuses rather than aids any analysis.
2.1.2 General Background
A basic familiarity will be assumed in this thesis with the various
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terms in common use in the first half of the nineteenth century to 
describe theological views or parW;es. Terms like 'Calvinist*, 
•Arminian*, and 'Noetic* are well explained in secondary literature, 
and there is much material on the rise of the Oxford Movement from the 
mid 1830's, Some points need, however, to be made, especially about 
those terms and movements most important to Sedgwick,
The historical origin of the term 'Evangelical' (derived, of course, 
from 'evangel' or 'good news' of the gospel) is obscure.^ Simeon noted 
that in his day (1811) it was still used in reproach.^  Confusingly, 
it may be used both of Dissenting groups (excluding the Unitarians^ ) 
hnd of a group within Anglicanism.' Indeed, it was the same stream of 
Evangelical revival that flowed into most bramches of Dissent which 
flowed through to Anglican Evangelicalism."^  What may be called the 
Wesleyan revival was its immediate source, with influences coming from 
mainstream Protestantism, Nonconformity (Wesley himself being influenced 
by the Moravians), and Puritanism. If Wesley and Wh\tefield epitomise 
the two theological extremes of the revival, it must be remembered that 
both were intimate with Henry Venn senior (1727-9?), author of The 
Complete Duty of Man. friend and spiritual guide to Simeon and a founder 
of the Clapham group. Wesley himself was a universal religious genius, 
drawing inspiration from the Moravians, William Law, and the Latitudin­
arian Stillingj.leet.'^  Wesley, however, no less than Venn, always 
remained a loyal Anglican; yet, even at this stage, they diverged about 
the extent to which mechanisms and structure outside established
Anglican ones (and sometimes involving Dissenters) might properly be 
{0
utilised. Only gradually, however, did these divergences lead the 
'Methodists' to be seen as a distinct denomination. Thus on the one 
hand through the first quarter of the nineteenth century a large group 
of Wesleyan Methodists regarded themselves as Anglicans*^ ', whilst on the 
other hand Anglican Evangelicals might be called 'Methodists' though
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izthey belonged to no Methodist Society.
Who were the Anglican Evangelicals ? In a movement, as distinct
from a sect, this kind of question is difficult. Of a later period
Toon wrote: 'No one doubts that Lord Shaftesbury, Edward Bickesteth
and Archbishop Sumner were Evangelicals, but other churchmen are less
33easy to categorise.' There seems, however, a general view that 'the
name, the influence, which characterises most deeply and broadly the
Evangelicalism of the first third of the century, in the ranks of the
Christian ministry, is certainly that of Charles Simeon (1739-1836).
In an often quoted letter Ifecaulay later wrote: 'As to Simeon, if you
knew what his authority and influence were, and how they extend from
Cambridge to the most remote corners of England, you would allow that his
real sway in the church was far greater than any primate.'"*^  Views of
Simeon, therefore, and to a lesser extent Sumner (from a slightly later
era) and Wesley himself (from an earlier) may be usefully compared with
those of Sedgiriok, The specific Evangelical theology (which has often
been caricatured or misunderstood) is well described by Toon and will not 
be repeated here.”'°
A term-which needs to be distinguished carefully from 'Evangelical' 
is 'Low Church'. It was coined in the early eighteenth century, 
describing clergy often sceptical of revelation and said by Balleine to 
be 'the chief persecutors of the Methodists and early Evangelicals'
In the early nineteenth century, therefore, 'Evangelicals' and 'Low 
Churchmen' may still be distinguished. With, however, the rise of 
Tractarianism within the High Church, the term 'Low Church' came around 
mid century to be applied also to Evangelicals, and less tro those whose 
'Latitudinarian' sympathy would now cause them to be called 'liberals' 
or 'Broad Church'. Thus, writing in 1 8 3 3 ,  Conybeare naturally 
categorises the Evangelicals as a species of 'Low Church', in distinction 
to the 'Broad Church' who would have been called 'Low' in a previous 
generation.
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Care also needs to be taken in recognising the relationship between 
High Church and Tractarianism. The term *High Church* arose in the 
late seventeenth century, denoting those who stressed the importance of 
the episcopacy and the sacraments, and who were correspondingly more 
antagonistic to Dissenters whom they saw as having rejected important 
elements of the faith# In the early nineteenth century the term 
implied one who was (in Chadwick’s phrase) ’stiff for the Church of 
England’. Generally High Churchmen opposed Catholicism, Low Church
or Latitudinarianism, and the Evangelicals - though the term was not 
always used exclusively^  and some Evangelicals around 1831 were content to
<1 Q
be called ’High Churchmen’# The Tractarian movement which arose from
the mid 1830’s aimed both at meeting the perceived threat to 
Establishment from the Dissenters, and at restoring spirituality within 
the Anglican communion. Its early appeal was therefore both to keen 
High Churchmen and to Evangelicals# By about l840 the Evangelical 
sympathy had largely evaporated, and Newman's infamous Tract 90 in 
l84l (arguing that the Articles of the Church of Enagland could be 
interpreted in a Catholic manner) raised suspicions amongst many High 
Churchmen# After Newman’s own secession from Anglicanism to Home in 
1843, Pusey continued to lead an Anglo-Catholic version of the movement 
whilst yet another stream of it flowed into Ritualism# Both of the 
latter could not help but influence and be associated with the High 
Church#
2#1#3 Periodicals
h^e Christian Observer was indisputably the mouthpiece during the 
i^rst half of the nineteenth century of the moderate Evangelical 
Anglican leadership# From l802 to 1816 it was edited by Zachary 
Macaulay, a leader in the Clapham Sect# From 1816 until 1830 it was 
edited by S.C.Wilks, a graduate of the Evangelical stronghold St#
Edmunds Hall and a friend of both Simeon and Hannah Moore#^^ The other 
main Evangelical publication. The Record, first appeared as a weekly in
17
1828. It was dominated by Alexander Haldane until his death in l882,
A proper perspective on its place and importance is essential for our 
present theme, since it differed greatly from the Christian Observer 
and has sometimes been taken as more typical of Evangelicalism.
Conybeai^  in 1833» put it at the extreme right (Calvinistic) wing of 
Christianity and the Record did not object to this general placing.
But what was the paper's real influence ? Chadwick simply wrote 
that for Evangelicals of the period: 'Of their two journals the 
Christian Observer practised charity and had few subscribers, the Record 
acted vituperative partisan and had many subscribers.»^ This, however, 
may be misleading. The Record appeared weekly (or even more freauently 
in its early years) and appealed to a popular readership without 
analysing in the depth of the Christian Observer. Circulation figures 
in themselves indicate neither depth of agreement nor the importance of 
supporters. On the former, leading Evangelical J.W.Cunningham wrote: 
'Though many take the paper as a matter of convenience, almost every 
reader of my acquaintance is loud in his complaints both of the temper 
and the logic of the leading articles.'^ 3 influential Anglican 
Evangelicals were often highly critical. As early as 1833 the Christian 
Obse^cer expressed its -sincere grief that a potentially good publica­
tion -should have impeded its usefulness by its violent party spirit,
its utter lack of good temper, its gross injustice, and its advocacy
24of whatever is arbitrary and bigoted...' Haldane's piety was never
doubted, but his dour Scottish Calvinism was not typical of English
Evangelical Anglicanism. Balleine comments: 'Haldane was never a
typical Evangelical: his dour tone and unceasing controversy were
25deeply distasteful to many.' Evangelical leaders disliked its tone.
Simeon is reported to have had an 'unconcealed repugnance to the tone
26and temper of the Record.' Archbishop Sumner declared: 'The conduct
27of the Record is execrable.' Henry Venn the younger reveals in his
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private journals his not infrequent dissatisfaction with its
28editorial utterances. We must, then, look to the Christian 
Observer rather than the Record for viewpoints on geologists like 
Sedgwick from leaders of Evangelical Anglicanism.
Two other publications need mention. During the 1850's the 
Christian Remembrancer spoke for a more High Church Position. The
/
British Critic was published as a quarterly from 1824. In the early 
1830*s it was less High than the Remembrancer, eulogising the Dissenter 
Robert Hall and more positively reviewing Chalmers' Bridgewater Treat-
29
s^e. During 1838 it came under the control of Newman and the Oxford 
group, and by 1843 the extremity of its viewpoint (in the wake of the 
following Tract 90) had cost it subscriptions of so many High 
Churchmen that it was forced to cease publication.
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2.1 Notes
1. 0. Chadwick, The Victorian Church, p. 440.
2. Sedgwick was designated a Broad Churchman at least as early as 19^ 0 by 
Winstanley (Early Victorian Cambridge, p. 94), also by Thackray and 
Morrell, Speakman and Cosslet (see section (l) n. 12, 15 etc).
3* See Paul E. Barrett, 'The Sedgwick-Darwin Geologic Tour of North 
Wales', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. 1974, 
p. l46.
4. G.E. Balleine, A History of the Evangelical Party in the Church of 
England, p. 40, cites some very early instances; the Shorter Oxford 
Dictionary associates it with the Methodist revival.
3. C. Simeon, Horae Homiléticae (Works). l6. Sermon 1835» pp. 40-4l.
6. The Unitarians dated as a distinct group in England from the 5770's. 
Other Dissenters (by now mostly Evangelical) tended (along with 
Evangelical Anglicans like Sedgwick) to regard them as beyond the 
pale.
7. Bee e.g. G.Best in A. Symondson (Ed.) The Victorian Crisis of Faith; 
Chadwick (ref. l), p. 5*
8. See C.J. Abbey and J.H. Overton, The English Church in the Eighteenth 
Century, p. l40; the entry in the Oxford Dictionary of the Christian 
Church, etc. , ■'
9. See e.g. F. Baker, John Wesley and the Church of England, p. l43.
10. On the various other differences,F.K. Brown in Fathers of the. 
Victorians perhaps overstates the case, but see D.N. Samuel (Ed.), 
Evangelical Succession, ch 3» and also C. Smyth, Simeon and Church 
Order especially p. 28l.
11. Chadwick (ref 1), 1, p. 79.
12. Thus Goreham, opposing Sedgwick for the Professorship, described
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Queens as a Methodistical College and himself as a Methodist (Clark & 
Hughes, P* 157).
13. P. Toon, Evangelical Theology 1833-1836, p. 4.
14. H.G. Moule, Charles Simeon, p. 8 (though others say similarly).
13. G.O. Trevelyan, The Life & lietters of Lord Macaulay. 1_* P* 8^.
16. Toon (ref. 13) has an excellent summary on page 3-
17. Balleine (ref. 4), p. 163
18. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (under 'Low Church') makes this point; 
G.W.E. JEhissell in A Short History of the Evangelical Movement p. 104 
associates a name change with decline and a reaction to Tractarianism.
19. J.S. Reynolds, The Evangelicals at Oxford 1733-1871, P* 3*
20. See the DNB on S.C. Wilks.
21. W.J. Conybeare, 'Church Parties' in Essays Ecclesiastical and Social
(3th Edn. 1833)* The Record reviewed it in l4th November 1833.
22. Chadwick (ref. 1), 1_, p. 448.
23. A. Blomfield, Memoir of C.J. Blomfield, 2, p. 47.
24. Christian Observer. December 1833.
23. Balleine (ref. 4), p. 163.
26. See Brown (ref. 7), p. 129.
27. A.R. Ashwell, Life of Samuel V/ilberforce, 2, p. 219.
28. E. Stock, The History of the Church Missionary Society. 4, p. 60.
29. British Critic, 1833, 292-338 and 239-282; this is in ^contrast
to the Christian Remembrancer on both counts which was critical of 
the Christian Oberver for printing Hall's sermons, and of Chalmers
as a non-Anglican choice to write a Bridgewater Treatise.
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2.2 Religious Issues and the Broad Church
2.2.1 The Origin of the Term
There is no doubt as to the origin of the term 'Broad Church' to 
denote a Church party. Though the phrase itself was first used around 
1830,its first use (e.g. in an article by Dean Stanley) was to describe
'I
the Church of England as a whole. In 1833, however, V/.J. Conybeare
published his famous article on 'Church Parties' in the Edinburgh 
2
Review. His identification of the various parties and their theology 
is summarised in Table 2.1. As may be seen, he distinguished three 
main parties: low. High and Broad, in each of which there were three 
types: moderate, extreme and stagnant. This was the first time the 
term 'Broad' was used in this way.
PARK: TïPE: DOCTRINES:
Low/
Evangelical
(3,300)
Moderate: 'Universal necessity of conversion' 
'Justification by faith'
'Sole authority of Scripture as the 
rule of faith'
(e.g. Milner, Martyn, Wilberforce, 
Simeon, Goode & J.B.Sumner)
Low
(2,500)
Extreme: Worthleaaness of morality 
(Recordite) Predeotinarian fatalism
Verbal inspiration of Scripture 
Faith rr belief that a man is to be 
justified by faith
Low
(TOO)
Stagnant 
(Low & Slow)
H ig V
Anglican
(3,500)
Moderate Justified by faith, but judged by 
wozics
Assent to sole supremacy of Scripture, 
but the Church has authority in 
controversies;of faith 
Baptismal Regeneration 
Apostolical Succession
(e.g. early Tractarians 
Bishop Wilberforce)
High
(1,000)
Extreme Apostolical Succession paramount 
(Tractarian) Mediatoral Priesthood
(e.g. Phillpotts)
High
(2,500)
Stagnant 
(High & Dry)
Broad
(2,800)
Moderate Conversion by Grace 
Justification by Faith 
Judgement by Works 
Scripture is the only rule of faith 
Believe all from Gorham to Bennett 
to have a place in the C. of E.
(e.g. Here, Maurice)
(20 ?)
Extreme
(Infidels)
(TOO) Stagnant
Table 2.J
Conybeare'a Class­
ification (1853 and 
1855) of parties in 
the Church of 
England.
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Our concern here is not with Conybeare*s undoubted inadequacies in 
his analysis of differences between Evangelicals and High Churchmen - 
for there were at least recognisable differences in emphasis for these. 
Our concern is with his newly invented term 'Broad Church*.
2.2.2 The meaning of 'Broad Church*
There has always been doubt about how far they constituted a 'party' 
in any meaningful sense. Even Conybeare himself wrote that they:
'Have so little organisation or mutual concert of any kind that they 
can scarcely be called a party at all.' R.E.Bartlett in 1878 said 
that the movement was a tendency rather than a party, and lacked any 
bond of 'dogmatic agreement' - lacking both literature and leaders in 
the sense of High and Low Churches.^ The Shorter Oxford Dictionary 
says that the term is 'not used in the same manner' as the terms 
'High Church' and 'Low Church' : 'The Broad Churchmen, so called, not 
having, like the High and the Low Church, a party organisation, and 
seldom acting together as a party.' Cornish (191O) emphasizes that 
they are 'men differing greatly among themselves' . Recent writers 
have, in theory, recognised this. Sanders admits: 'The Broad 
Churchmen did not form a compact and homogenous party or school, 
but frequently differed among themselves almost as much as they
differed from others...* ^  Chadwick admitted: 'The term is
vague. The group was not a group but scattered individuals
■7
working towards the same ends.' Crowther says: 'The Broad 
Church was not a party, but a set of individuals, many of 
whom disagreed with each other except in the idea that the 
authority of the Bible and the Church might be subjected to 
historical and scientific criticism.' ^  Even Thackray and 
Morrell admit: 'labels for parties in the Victorian church are 
notoriously imprecise and should be treated with caution.'
But this is a general caution, not specifically related to the
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so called 'Broad Church*, and they go on elsewhere to call the 
Conybeare analysis ’the best contemporary discussion’ and 
state of a group including Sedgwick: 'Their theology was that 
of a distinct party within the Church of England, the 'liberal 
Anglican* or 'Broad Church party.'
But if most writers before the Cannon-Thackray-Morrell era 
have been cautious over how far the 'Broad Church' constituted 
a j)arty with distinctive theology, what of its membership ?
This seems equally doubtful. Conybeare mentions Hare, Thomas 
Arnold, F.D.Maurice, Wilson, Dean Dawes, and Dr Jackson.
Bartlett gave as its most noteworthy members: Bishop Butler, 
Whately, Arnold, Maurice and Kingsley. Thirlwall named Hare 
and Jeremy Taylor as typical.'* Corriish included, Coleridge, 
Hare, Maurice and Thirlwall, and possibly by implication also 
Arnold, Whately, Powell, and Sedgwick.'"^  More recently, Chadwick 
names Maurice, Stanley, Jowett and Baden Powell.*^  Cockshut 
names Arnold and A.Stanley.'^  LeMahieu cites Arnold, Hare, 
Thirlwall, Maurice and Whately.'"^  Crowther gives Arnold, Hare 
Thirlwall, Maurice, Whately, Powell and possibly Hampden.*^ 
According to Cannon, its 'recognised leaders after the death of 
Arnold were Hare, I&urice, Thirlwall, and Arthur Stanley.*
The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church includes (in 
various places) Hare, Arnold, Stanley, V/hately, Hampden, and 
possibly Coleridge. Thackray and Morrell include very many 
names, e.g. Hare, Thirlwall, Herschel, Buckland, Sedgwick,
Lloyd, Hareourt, Whewell, Peacock, E.Stanley, Whewell,
Arnold, (Henslov ? p.237), and in verbally presented papers 
Morrell has even included Blomfield. Table 2*2 presents some 
of these selections, though it has, of course, to be recognised 
that an omission may not necessarily indicate a fixed opinion
Table 2.2
Table to show different individuals assigned to the 
'Broad Church' by various different commentators.
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Commentator:
PERSON:
0)
1oÜ
pq
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«
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I«H «HX o O
-p
1
iSOü
co
g
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•g
•H
1
irU
1
O
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•H
1
k Q)
1 k
E4
COLERIDGE y y ?
HARE y y y \/ y y y y
MAURICE y y y y y y y y
THIRLWALL
ARNOLD y y y y v/ y y 7 v/ y y
HAMPDEN y v/ y
V/HATELY y n y y y y
STANLEY (A) y y y y y
POWELL n y y y y
SEDGWICK n y
* NOTE: Sanders adds some qualifications about including them 
all under one umbrella.
+ NOTE: But Crowther notes that Hampden, Thirlwall and 
Whately all rejected Essays and Reviews,
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that a person was not a 'Broad Churchman'. Top of the poll 
comes Thomas Arnold. He died in 1842, eleven years before the 
term was invented, and so had no opportunity to comment on it.
In light of his views on the comprehensiveness of the church 
one can only guess the kind of reaction he might have had to 
being given a party name. Next come the Cambridge men Hare and 
Maurice. Hare died in 1833, before the term 'Broad Church' had 
really become established. Maurice wrote to Isaac Taylor in 
1869: 'I do not well know what the Broad Church is, I always 
took it to be a fiction of Conybeare's.* Maurice went on
to suppose that if the term meant anything 'it is a represent­
ation, under different modifications, of that creed which is 
contained in Whately*s books...' But Maurice would prefer to let the 
most extreme Evangelicals revise the prayer book rather than entrust the 
task to such a group. At least the Evangelicals, like Maurice, had 
definite views and emphasiz,ed relationship with God. But of the Whately 
group he says they evidence above all others; 'the greatest disease of
our time, that we talk about God and about our religion, and do not
19confess him as a living God...* His son's biography of him speaks of
Maurice's dread of the name 'Broad Church'and in l8?0 he spoke of
his feeling of isolation in the church but of very profound differences
from the Liberals; 'we are not a step nearer to each other in I87O than
we were in I833. They have acquired a new name. They are called
'Broad Churchmen' now, and delight to be called so. But their breadth
21
seems to me narrowness. ' It is hardly surprising then, that Masterman
22has emphasized Maurice's dogmatism , whilst Binns flatly denied 
that he was a Broad Churchman at all.^^
After Maurice in the poll of Table 2.2 comes the Cambridge 
contemporary of Hare and Sedgwick, Connop Thirlwall. He was 
certainly nearer in spirit to the Moetics, but refused to see
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'Broad Church' as a party term;
'Let others interpret it as they will, to me it does not 
appear an appropriate description of any existing "school", 
party, or body, held together by a common set of theologi­
cal tenets. I understand it... as a disposition to 
recognise and appreciate that which is true and good under , . 
all varieties and forms... I have hope and believe that 
there are numbers who have a rightful claim to it, among 
those who only profess to belong to one or other of the 
two great sections of the church.' (1873) ^
Of the four most commonly asserted members of the Broad Church, 
then, one died before the term was invented, one died around the 
time it was first used, one flatly denied membership, whilst the 
fourth objected to the term being used in the manner of Conybeare 
(and Cannon and Thackray and Morrell) to mean a party. Perhaps 
it was a Broad Church deacon who coined the phrase 'curiouser
and curiouser'.
Can more light be shed by looking for a common theology ?
Since Conybeare invented the term, we may begin by looking at the 
points which he raised as distinctive:
'The doctrines taught by this party are the same in which both
High and Low Church are agreed. The Incarnation and the 
Atonement, conversion by Grace, and Justification by Faith, 
Scripture is the only rule of faith; but hence they deduce 
a conclusion which many Low Churchmen would repudiate, that 
all who believe the Scripture are members of the household 
of faith.
As a distinction this is implausible. Evangelicals too would surely 
believe that anyone who really-believed and acted on the Scripture
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would be Christians - but the question centres on whether or not 
an who claim to believe and follow the Bible, do in actual fact 
*really' do so. In any case, Conybeare says only that many, not 
all Low Churchmen repudiate the idea - so it cannot be used as a 
distinguishing mark for Broad Churchmen. He then continues:
'With the High Church, they affirm the doctrine of Judgment
by Works; and thence infer that salvation depends not upon
the ritual but the life; that the fruits of the Spirit are
'Zio
the sole criterion of the Spirit's presence.'
This, however, is a position which Simeon or any moderate Evangelical 
would have accepted, assuming he is speaking of a criterion to be 
applied jjy others.
His next point concerns a Broad Church emphasis on the 'Visible 
Church; an idea ignored in the teaching of the Evangelicals.' This 
is contentious, but though it might be applied to Arnold, Hare and 
Maurice it surely cannot apply to those associated by such as Thackray 
and Morrell. Conybeare himself 'hedges his bets' by telling us that 
there are actually two kinds of Broad Church: 'theoretical and anti- 
theoretical sections.' These cooperate in actual good works, but 'the 
opinions which we have ascribed to the party are those of its theoreti­
cal members; and from these many of the other section would shrink with 
alarm.' in other words, it is not a real hallmark of the party.
He then goes on to their supposed toleration: 'They will not 
allow themselves to feel jealousy or suspicion towards any party 
which professes to fight under the banner of the Church...'
This surely says too much. In a church including viewpoints 
from Recordite to Tractarian even the most ardent defenders of 
latitude of thought found someone to be suspicious of - even if 
only because that someone opposed such latitude. Newman felt 
Arnold's suspicion. Hare accused a critic (probably Palmer)
2&
-2.5of bearing false witness , and so on. Conybeare ascribes 
the.looseness of the Broad Church to its tolerance: 'A common 
hate is the cement to consolidate a party.* But if we take 
'refusal to hate' as a hallmark of the Broad Church^then it 
would include both moderate Evangelicals (e.g. Bickersteth) and 
moderate Tractarians (arguably including the Anglican Newman).
On the other hand even Crowther, a believer in the Broad Church concept, 
admits that in controversy: 'some Broad .-Churchmen became embittered 
and as dogmatic as their opponents.Sedgwick was, in many 
respects, tolerant of other Christian viewpoints, but both Hare and 
Sedgwick were certainly outdone by (say) William Wilberforce. His 
sons in their biography (1838) tried to play down both his 
Evangelicalism and his connections with Dissenters. But Pollock 
in a recent biography states: 'Wilberforce built a bridge between 
warring camps in the Church of England', and cites a letter in 
which Wilberforce states his wish to see 'a rational and an 
honest zeal for fundamentals, in place of a hot party spirit.
Pollock also cites Wilberforce's lament: 'They ttiink I cannot be 
loyal to the Established Church because I love Dissenters.' and
notes his admiration of the spirituality and earnestness of the
3S
evangelical Dissenters. Unitarians, however, are excluded
from this because Wilberforce deplored their doctrines^^ _
though this did not prevent his friendship with fche Ua»tar\sr\
V/illiam Smith." Wilberforce was willing to aid Bentham on
prison reform, though would hardly have approved his religious 
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views. Another, more recent, biographer points out his 
connections not only with Dissenters including Unitarians, 
but that in I832 he engaged a Catholic tutor for a grandsonl 
I have cited these instances at length because no one doubts Wilberforce 
to be one of leading Evangelicals until his death in I833. Yet any
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attempt to make refusal to hate and friendship with those of other 
persuasion into a hallmark of a 'Broad Churchman' must include him.
Conybeare totally failed to give any real distinguishing features 
of the supposed school, and others have similarly failed. E.H. Plumptre, 
for example, in a preface to Hare's Victory of Faith, wrote of the key 
as a refusal to accept party character or shibboleths and courage to 
defend an unpopular but just cause. Yet this, surely, would have 
applied equally to the Anglican Newman, no less than to Simeon, . 
Wilberforce, both Sumners, Shaftesbury, Pusey or Phillpotts ? In any 
case, to use non-party membership as a hallmark of a party is a self 
contradiction.
The term 'Broad Church' as applied anackconistically to the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century has no ascertainable meaning, and 
leads only to confusion.
2.2»3 Coleridge and his School
Abandoning as misleading the term Broad Church for the period still
leaves us to examine the contention of Thackray and Morrell and others
(as outlined in my Introduction) that Coleridge and his followers were
influential in the thinking of Sedgwick and his circle. The
remainder of this chapter will therefore look briefly at some of the
ideas of the Coleridgeans in order to determine later whether Sedgwick
exhibits anything disHAchiVely Colcrlcl^ e
There is, of course, great difficulty in understanding exactly what
Coleridge himself was saying, and scholars both now and then often 
Have disagreed. Nevertheless there seem to have been a number of
areas where he and his followers have diverged from Evangelicals ;
(i) the nature of the atonement
(ii) The nature of Biblical Inspiration
h^e importance of Evidences for Christianity
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(iv) The importance of Physico or Natural Theology
(v) Epistemology (reflecting on the nature of Theological
knowledge)
Included in the first of these are questions about the Godhead.
Coleridge had gone through a 'Unitarian* phase, from 1796 to 1806 was
moving towards a more orthodox Trinitarianismj and was later a
vehement anti-Unitarian.^^ Nevertheless, contemporary critics such 
40 4las Traill and Rigg suspected that Coleridge never progressed much
beyond Pantheism or at best Sabellianism - though more modern
42commentators may have denied this, Rigg's view is especially 
interesting to us as he wrote from an Arminian (Wesleyan) Evangelical 
viewpoint around mid century. Turning from God to man, Coleridge had 
little in common with the optimism of late eighteenth century 'Low 
Churchmen', being at times overwhelmed by the gravity of original sin.^  ^
Like Arminian Evangelicals, Coleridge rejected the idea of inherited 
guilt and saw the fall in individual terms, but unlike them he went 
further to doubt the importance of the historic fall at all. Guilt 
itself is minimised, fallenness is reflected in dysfunction, and
44redemption is seen as making possible * re int e, grati on of personality.'
Coleridge made biting attacks on the idea of 'vicarious satisfaction*
of a debt owed to God, calling it a 'gross perversion of the sublime
idea of Redemption by the cross,' ^ taking, as Shedd indicates,
Biblical references to it as metaphorical. All this is in strong
contrast to the Evangelicals. It had also implications for the
incarnation (was it really necessary at all and for faith.
Rigg argues strongly on the latter that to Coleri%e it means an
enlightenment rather than true repentance and knowledge of sin forgiven.^
Coleridge rejects the extreme Calvinism of Edwards^ but also attacks • 
what he calls Arrainianism.^  ^ The free will issue he finally leaves
(in fact like Simeon^ "*) as a mystery.On hell though some argue that 
he hinted at universalism^^  the hint was not clear and Coleridge says:
.53*God has not promised Heaven finally to all men...’
Coleridge's actual attitudes to the Evangelicals were ambivalent.
His favourite works included Luther's Table Talk, Baxter's Life and
Southey's The Life of Wesley. H i s  notes in the latter, however, are
often critical of Wesley. He distrusted Methodist emotional appeals,
thought them to ignore Scripture in making thera^ ,^ and was critical
of the emphasis on the need for each individual to be called, converted
and chosen with the search for 'signs’ that this had happened.His
letters make little or no reference to leading Evangelicals of his day.
In one .Lay Sermon he says '... the Religion of best repute among us
holds all the trutns of Scripture and all the doctrines of Christianity
so very transcendent, or so very easy, as to make study or research
57either vain or needless.'-^  The Editor takes this as a reference to 
Wilberforce and his A Practical View..., and Coleridge did say he could 
'never feel any sympathy' with Wilberforce.^  ^ Coleridge and Chalmers were 
on cordial terms, though Chalmers found hifn unintelligible, whilst 
Coleridge in praising one of Chalmers' sermons adds 'Thinking so 
differently from him upon religion as I do.
The man who might perhaps seem to illustrate best the supposed links 
of Coleridge to a Cambridge Network is Julius Hare. Entering Trinity 
in 1812, a fellow in 1818, in 1832 he went to become minister in 
Hurstmonceux in Sussex. He was a friend of Sedgi/ick, even more of 
ifliewell, but would have claimed Luther and Coleridge as the two greatest 
influences on his theology. ®^ Some notes of caution must, however, be 
sounded. Several sources note his affinities with Evangelicals, even 
whilst calling him 'Broad Church' or noting more 'liberal' opinions.
Most interesting is the near contemporary view of Rigg, who as an 
Arminian Evangelical sees Hare in a radically different light from both 
Coleridge and Maurice. Rigg rightly complains about Conybeare*s 
designation 'Broad Church' as including men of 'radically different 
tendencies in philosophy', and restricts the term to the 'school of
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Coleridge (Hare, I-îaurice and Kingsley). Yet even then, whilst 
highly critical of Coleridge, Hare is 'a prince in intellectual wealth* 
but *a devout and humble Christian* who has ’left the world to find out 
its loss.’^  ^ Rigg writes in puzzlement about Hare. Though Hare claims 
to follow Coleridge, Rigg can not really see that this is so. Hare's 
writing 'breathe more of an evangelical spirit' and 'Often, indeed, he 
all but comes up to the full standard of explicit evangelical orthodoxy'. 
Though Hccre speaks highly of Maurice, Rigg can 'find no trace in all his 
works of agreement v/ith Mr Maurice's specific v i e w s . R i g g  speaks 
highly of Hare's refutation of Tractarianism and 'coipLete vindication* 
of Luther. Rigg finally speculates on the possible influence of 
Simeon on Hare, citing (though not quoting) the following remarkable 
passage of Hare:
'Bu, faith Simeon, preaching the word of God in this town 
through a long life of persevering activity, became the 
instrument of s<2,nding forth zealous preachers of Christ into 
all parts of the country, and thus contributed, under God's 
blessing, more than any other man, to that revival of true 
religion, v;hich has taken place of late years amongst us; 
and which, we hope and pray, will increase and spread, 
until in England at least the knowledge of God shall fill 
the land, as the waters cover the sea.'^ ^
Though conceding that Hare's philosophy is transcendental, Rigg finds 
him orthodox on the Trinity (unlike Coleridge) and on universalisa.
On the substitutionary atonement (a denial of which is taken as a 
hallmark of the Coleridgean school) Rigg finds Hare ambiguous.
As we look finally at F.D. Maurice we find a theology which 
recognises, like the Evangelicals, a problem of sin, but does not begin 
from this. Rather, Maurice begins from a universal fatherhood of God, 
with conversion experiences or baptism simply as ways of explicitly
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claiming and living out a sonship already a reality. Maurice’s 
universalism relates to this. Rigg, whilst recognising much in 
Maurice which is 'benevolent wise and beautiful', concludes that 
he does not preach repentance, faith and atonement in face of future 
judgement: 'he does not preach Christ's Gospel.'
This excursus into the thinking of Coleridge and the two most often 
cited as binding him to a supposed Cambridge orientated Broad Church, 
has been preparatory to a denial that Sedgwick was ever influenced by 
anything specifically Coleridgean rather than Evangelical. We shall 
find that Sedgwick’s own reactions closely parallel those of Rigg - and 
for the very good reason that Sedgwick was speaking from' a not dissimilar 
theological position.
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2.3 Sedgwick's Religion
2,3.1 Sedgwick's Background
We have already noted the difficulties of identifying who are 
members of a party within a church (rather than members of a sect 
which has some kind of official membership). Sedgwick did not like 
party labels, and did not declare himself in such terms. This 
means we need to look at various features of his religious life and 
beliefs in order to determine what affinities he had with the 
various church parties of his day. We begin with his religious 
background.
A person's religious upbringing and background are always
important in understanding his or her viewpoint. In Sedgwick's 
case it is all the more important since throughout his long 
life (and unlike, say, Connop Thirlwall) he showed little 
if any change in his basic religious position. He always spoke 
with greatest respect and love for both father and family, and 
the inhabitants of Dent. Clark and Hughes point out that 
this is, moreover, to be seen in the light of his father's living 
until Sedgwick was forty three, and implies a judgement made in 
9'ûulthood rather than a vague boyhood memory.^  What, then, can 
we know about Sedgwick's father and his religion ?
Richard Sedgwick had attended what was then called Catherine 
Hall (later St Catherine's College) Cambridge, from I736-6O. This 
means he graduated three years before Paley (though not from the 
same college). In I783 when Adam Sedgwick was born, his father 
had been vicar of Dent for twenty years, and continued in thie 
office until 1822. He died in 1828, when Adam was 43. The Parish 
records for the period are uniformative^, and for Richard 
Sedgwick's views on religion we have largely to rely on Adam.
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Adam says of his father's parishioners:
'They loved my father, because by birth he was one of 
themselves, and because of his kindness and purity of 
life... The influence he had over the minds of his 
flock rested on his humble teaching of Gospel truth; 
on the cheerful simplicity of his life; and on his 
readiness at every turn and difficulty, to be in true 
Christian love an adviser and a peacemaker.'^
All Adam's references Buggest a man of simple personal piety, 
pure but unseIfrighteous. He was not legalistic, and did not 
try to stop the ancient local custom of playing football on 
Sunday afternoons:
"he thought the contest, if carried on in goodwill, tended 
to health and cheerfulness... He dreaded too, the acts 
of intemperance and drunkenness which might arise out of 
the sudden suppression of a generous and healthy exercise 
in the open field:'^
Charles Simeon himself^ showed a not dissimilar pragmatic 
approach to the 'Lord's Day', though he was conscious that others 
differed. Later attitudes, both of many Evangelicals and of 
High Churchmen, hardened. Sedgwick notes and laments the 
'greater severity of religious rule' at the end of his life.^ He 
recognises that a 'formalist or stern high churchman' might blame 
his father for once refereeing a football match when called upon as 
peacemaker.^ Sedgwick often refers to his father's character.
In one letter he says:
'He was a good old man who believed as firmly in the truth 
of religion as if he saw his Saviour and the home of the 
blessed with his own eyes. At the same time he was a
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cheerful happy man...'
In the same letter he refers to the piety of his sister 
Margaret, who for the last part of her life was 'as near 
Christian perfection as is permitted anyone to reach in the 
trials of this world.' He speaks also of the faith of his 
brother, picturing his v.hole family as one of a simple
piety - though not without learning.
Of his father's beliefs we may glean little, but there 
are a couple of important pointers. The first comes in the
following words of Adam’s:
'Some years before I ever saw the light there was an
unexpected contest for the county of York. Mr,
Wilberforce, a young man of bright presence and great
eloquence, was then named as a candidate; and he had
even then become famous as an enthusiastic advocate
for the abolition of the slave trade. This fact set
9
every chord of my father's heart in motion.'
Sedgwick was writing this in 1868, and may be forgiven for 
some lapses of memory. Wilberforce first stood in Yorkshire 
in 1784, the year before Adam Sedgwick was born. At that 
time he was re.nowned neither for his Evangelical views nor 
for anti-slavery sentiments. By the second election in 1790 
he was known for both, and presumably this must be the 
election to which Adam r e f e r s . I t  may be that there was, 
as Speakman has suggested, some local influence on Richard 
Sedgwick, but it is clear that the main opposition to the 
slave trade came from those of Evangelical persuasion - with 
John Wesley himself as one of the first to take it up.^^
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In the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries serious
minded clergymen and Christian laymen would hold family prayers.
Smyth explains how many Evangelical ckrgy would throw open their
domestic worship one or more evenings in the week to those of
12their parishioners who cared to attend. Isaac Milner, for
example, was ‘always ready and willing to expound any passage
concerning which he might be requested to give his thoughts'
13though he had his favourite passages. High Churchmen might
also keep family worsKip, though stipulated that it should be
liturgical and from the Prayer Book, ‘whereas the Evangelicals
were better satisfied with extempore prayer and exposition or
l4with the use of any edifying book.*
So we find Adam Sedgwick writing of his father:
'There was often at the old Parsonage, on a Sunday 
evening, a small tea-party for those whose homes were 
distant from the Church; and, later in the evening, my 
Father read to a small assembled circle from some 
serious book (it might be an extract from one of Bishop 
Wilson's sermons); and the little service ended with a 
short family prayer...'
Sedgwick's father, from this report, clearly followed the 
Evangelical practice, and Adam himself in later years followed 
Isaac Milner's practice in asking his assembled household (in 
his case of servants rather than wife and family) if there were 
a passage they would like e x p o u n d e d . T h e  particular 
^edifying book' which Adam mentions his father using is very 
interesting - giving us the only hint we have of his father's 
theological views. So what do we know of Wilson ?
Thomas Wilson was Bishop of Sodor and Man from 1696 to 
1755. Various sources are available to us showing his life
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and work.^^ The system of church government in the Islands
was a strong one, more like the Moravian communities than the 
mainland Established Church, but Wilson administered it so well 
that he was idolised by the community. He stood up for the 
church rights against the state, and for a time was imprisoned 
by the Governor of the Island. He could not, of course, be 
classed as an 'Evangelical', for the term had not been invented, 
and his ministry essentially predates Wesley so he could not be 
called a Methodist either. Russell classes him as one of the 
'more devout adherents of the traditional theology' (in which 
he also includes Rorteous), and sees such theology as one of 
three streams which 'came together to make the river of the 
Evangelical Movement.He was, in the words of his biographer,
'a great friend of toleration'. Catholics attended his sermons and 
prayers. Dissenters came even to the Communion, Quakers esteemed 
him, and the Moravians made him the equivalent of a Bishop in their 
system*. lir was, in fact, 'only against opinions suspected of a
19rationalising tendency that his wide hearted charity was closed.*' 
Wilson's relationships with Dissenters and Moravians are very 
similar to Wesley's. So little, however, was he suspected of 
'Latitudinarianism' (or 'rationalising tendency*) that even John 
Keble wrote an appreciative biography of him.^^  Wilson's 
openness to other Christian denominations was based on awareness 
of commonality in essentials of the Gospel, not on vagueness.
Since Adam Sedgwick apparently often heard Wilson's sermons 
in family worship, they are worth close examination. They reveal
a man not a Calvinist, but with an Arminian theology similar to
21(say) Wesley or William Wilberforce. Thus e.g. we read:
'HE THAT BELIEVETH NOT SHALL BE DAMîŒD. These are not ours.
43
but the very words of the Son of God. You will say, 
perhaps, all Christians do believe the Gospel. Would to 
God we all did believe as we ought to do'. But to believe 
is not enough to justify us before God, unless our faith 
oblige us to live as becomes Christians. To love, to fear, 
and to glorify God; to be sober, chaste and temperate; to be 
just and charitable to men; and, after all, which is the perf­
ection of saving faith, to confess before God, that, when we 
have done all these things, it is all owing to the mere mercy 
of God, to his grace, his assistance, and to the merits of
Jesus Christ and his intercession, that God will accept and
22reward our faith, and our poor endeav/ourjj to please Him.,.’
Wilson continues to contrast the 'faith of too many pretended
Christians, who know the Gospel but live as if not one word of
it were true' and adds: 'to awaken and terrify such unhappy
sinners as hold the truth in unrighteousness, the Lord Jeivjs
Himself hath given us the very sentence that shall be passed
upon such, when He shall come to judge the world in justice:
"GOj ye cursed, into everlasting fire.'"
Wilson speaks of the invitation of Christ to 'come unto me';
'All, therefore, who will effectually close wihh this
gracious invitation of Jesus Christ, must receive Him as
our Lord, to govern us by his Gospel- as our only
mediator, to prevail with God for our pardon- and as our
23
only Redeemer, who laid down his life for us.'
24
Wilson specifically rejects the Calvinist doctrine of election , 
but accepts very clearly the substitutionary atonement of Jesus 
as Saviour. At the same time he emphasises holiness of life.
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much as Wesley was later to do.
Wilson's little work on The Lord's Supper emphasises the value
9 c
of the Bible** , the fall of man, the substitutionary atonement
then made by Jesus, the need for repentance, etc. The story
is well known how, in 1779, Charles Simeon first understood the
doctrine of the substitutionary atonement of Jesus (in the
picture of Jewish sacrifice) through reading this short
treatise of Wilson's - leading to Simeon's conversion without
26
involvement of any living counsellor. Moule suggests that 
the passage Simeon was reading might have been the following:
'As an Israelite, under the law, being obliged to lay his 
hand upon the head of the sacrifice, confessing his sins, 
and laying them, as it were, upon that creature, — &s he did 
easily understand that this was to show him that death was 
the due reward of sin; that this ought to humble him before 
God, and to give him the greatest abhorrence of sin, which 
could not be pardoned but by the loss of life of an innocent 
creature: - as this was plain to the meanest Israelite, even 
so the most unlearned Christian, when he considers that our 
Lord Jesus Christ became a Sacrifice for us, and that on Him 
all our sins were laid, on Him who knew no sin; - he will 
easily understand how sad our condition was which required 
such a Sacrifice: - that this therefore ought to humble us,
- to lead us to repentance, - to make us fearful of offending 
God, - and to abhor those sins which cost Jesus Christ his
27life before God could be prevailed upon to pardon them...'
This is in fact a very strong statement indeed of the doctrine 
both of substitutionary atonement and of propitiatory
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sacrifice. The Coleridgeans, and especially Maurice,
would have surely rejected it - though it was evidently
the basis of Simeon's conversion and was accepted by all
mainstream Evangelical theology. Simeon's own
Evangelical Churchmanship (and some said he was too much of a
Churchman) is his own, but is much in the tradition of Wilson.
We must here remind ourselves that in this period there was
little Evangelical religion of any kind at Cambridge. Simeon
fastened on to one of the few writers in anything like that
tradition who were available in the University circles. It
is the more remarkable that Richard Sedgwick seems (whether
also at Cambridge, or later, we do not know) to have aligned
himself with the same tradition. And it was this tradition in
which Adam Sedgwick was raised. Bishop Wilson's own emphasis
on the Bible may well have been reflected in Adam Sedgwick's
home. Richard Sedgwick evidently, like most Evangelicals,
practised extempore prayer, for Adam records a story of a
parishioner overhearing an apparent conversation which turned out
28to be Richard Sedgwick speaking in prayer to God. Adam, like
his father, later prayed extempore, fervently, and aloud in 
29private devotion.
Concerning relationships with Dissenters, Adam wrote that in 
the early days:
'there were no Dissenters in Dent, excepting the small 
well ordered Society of Christian Friends... but among them 
there was no feeling of bitterness and no outward conduct 
that interfered with the soft current of Christian love.' 
Sedgwick's father was on good terms with the Quakers, and we 
have already noted how he mobilised them to vote for William
46
Wilberforce. One of his father's particular friends was the 
Quaker, Robert Foster:
'Sometimes, but rarely, he and my father had discussions at
the vicarage on subjects of religious ordinances... They
agreed in many of the great essentials of Christian truth; '
and they agreed that the end of all religious ordinances
was to bring the heart - the fountainhead of all true
religious emotion - into conformity, both in thought and.
in outward act, with the revealed will of God.'*
When agedi 16-19 and at Sedbergh School, Adam boarded with a relative
31of Foster, *a kind Quaker family'. Sedgwick always retained his 
affection for the Quakers (who were strong in his home area), not 
because of any 'Latitudinarian* vagueness of doctrine, but because 
both his training (under the tradition of Wilson), and his father's 
example had taught him to appreciate their simple piety.
Adam's own education continued with tuition from John Dawson:
*a firm believer and a good practical Christian of the old 
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school.' Dawson was known as 'a devout Christian of the 
Established C h u r c h . H e  was also known as a brilliant 
mathematician, though choosing to remain in his life as a doctor.
During the nineteenth century Wesleyan Methodism rose 
in importance in Dent, and in 1868 Sedgwick wrote :
'if they have shown the light of Gospel truth to houses 
in darkness, and if they have given the hopes of heaven 
to some who were not reached by the more formal 
teaching of the Church of England, this is to me a 
matter of joy: and in making this acknowledgement I 
believe I am echoing a sentiment which had a former issue 
in my dear old father's heart.
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In 1832 Adam went to Dent for the commencement of building of
the (Church of England) Cowgill Chapel, of which he was a trustee:
'Men of many shades of opinion threw aside their differences
that day, and met together in a true spirit of brotherly
love. Churchmen, descendants of the early followers of
George Fox, Wesleyans of two divisions, and Independents,
. 3 5
all appeared that day to be of one mind.'
He records that many of Dissenting opinion had actually 
contributed generously to the building of the Church of 
England Chapel in a needy area.
Sedgwick's family background was one which was certainly 
far closer to Evangelical than to anything else, both in general 
temper and in theology. It was also one which was tolerant of 
Dissenters, not because of lack of conviction but because they 
were seen (as many Anglican Evangelicals saw them) as true 
Christian brothers in Christ.
2.3.2 Sedgwick's Personal Piety
There can be little doubt of Sedgwick's own personal piety 
and of the genuine qualities of his religious life. Writing
to a niece on the death of a friend at Scalby he says:
'OhI that 1 had St Paul's faith and could look on death 
and speak of it as he did! Oh that 1 had the quiet 
placid confiding faith which my dear old Father had for 
many years before he died'. 1 only have it not because 
God has not given me the grace to deserve it. For
Christian faith is God's gift, and is of God's grace,
and no living man ever had this grace by counting up 
his own poor deeds, but rather by asking for it in
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repentant humility and in the heartfelt words of the
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publican- 'God be merciful to me a sinner'.'
In a brief unpublished autobiographical sketch Sedgwick 
spoke of his religious attitude:
'I am convinced that joy and not gloom should be the 
normal condition of a Christian's life. He has so 
much to make him joyous to remain long depressed even 
by real sorrows. And to some natures God has kindly 
given such elasticity of spirit that they cannot
refrain from merriment when others would only see what
. , ,37
is serious and sad.
No one can be immersed in Sedgwick literature and meraorablia 
without feeling the man's great sense of fun (notwithstanding 
his undoubted hypochondria which appears in niany of hi-S publishod 
and unpublished letters). But any stereotyped picture of 
an Evangelical or 'serious Christian' as a gloomy kind of 
person is misguided. Milner of Queens was known for his
large appetite and for the fact that his: 'public dinners were
,38
very merry ones, but the private ones were quite uproarious.
Mme De Staël pronounced William Wilberforce the wittiest man in
England, and his asides in the House of Commons could have his
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near neighbour in stitches of laughter. The Tractarian
spirit was against this, and Tractarian Oxford contrasts with 
the Evangelicals. But whilst Sedgwick s natural gai&t^ of spirits 
would have made him a poor Tractarian, it was not unusual amongst 
Evangelicals. Moreover Sedgwick could also show a very serious 
side, a consciousness of sin, as when he writes to his Evangelical 
friend C.N.Wodehouse. The latter, as a fellow Canon at Norwich 
in 1837, had written to Sedgwick saying that he had heard
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criticisms of Sedgwick's sermons , and wondering whether 
Sedgwick might 'give us some good, well considered Theology from 
the Prebendal Chair'Sedgwick replied:
'My conscience tells me, in language my soul cannot 
misinterpret, that in the hourly conduct of my thoughts, 
and in the daily actions of my life I have not only 
much to repent of, but that which ought to sink me to
the earth and fill me with humiliation and shame. 1
1 * *  #41am now, at least, writing seriously ...
But he exclaims that he cannot 'tickle people's ears with 
fine sermons'. Indeed, reports given of his style by witnesses 
speak of his great feeling in reading Scripture, his 
eloquence in extemporary expansion on a theme, but not of his 
ability to write methodical sermons.
He could show simple pastoral comfort, as when he wrote about 
the death of his friend Armstrong, to the relative (Miss 
Blamire) who had informed him:
'May we learn, thro' God's grace, to say in our hearts, 
even in our hours of bitterness and sorrow. Not my 
will but thine be done. May God, my dear friend, be 
now your comforter- and enable you even in your present 
sorrow to feel the strength and comfort of Christian 
hope .... And may my God and Redeemer enable me to put 
my house in order before 1 die.
In that same year he wrote to Murchison, from whom he had 
long been estranged, a sincere letter of sorrow about the 
death of Mrs. Murchison:
'May God teach you to bear your sorrow like a man. Of
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this I have no fear; but more than this, may his grace 
be given you to bear it like a Christian. This sustaining 
power is his precious gift, and it must be humbly sought 
for... by prostration of heart whilst under God's 
afflicting hand. May he give you the comfort of Christian
hope; compared with it all other comfort vanishes into
_  . ,43mid-air ...
As a further instance one might note an incident in 1856.
Sedgwick stood, silent and deeply moved, at the bedside of 
the old geologist Jonathan Otley - now speechless from 
paralysis but quite aware of him. For a while he held the 
sick man's hand, and then, bursting into tears, knelt crying 
out: 'Jonathan, I'll pray with you.'^^ This simple reaction 
of heartfelt piety is more striking as letters in the Cumbria 
County Archives in Kendal show that Otley wrote to Sedgwick only 
three times between 1847 and January 1854 - they were not 
bosom confidants. Sedgwick's manner and approach contrasts 
with the cold detachment of, say, Thirlwall, or the awkward 
pastoral manner attributed to Hare.
Sedgwick's Christian faith, then, was not a purely formal 
or intellectual affair. It was a real force in his life, and
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his piety and prayerful life are attested by his own gemeratioH.
2.3.3 Sedgvfick's Theology
One of the fundamental aims of this thesis is to understand 
the metaphysical and religious standpoint of Sedgwick, and to 
establish the kind of stream or tradition, into which it fitted.
Before we look at any particular comments which he made upon
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various church parties, it may be useful to consider his own 
theological views on a number of issues. His views on 
issues like church tradition will be clear shortly when 
we consider comments on chVrch parties, but in the previous 
chapter we distinguished five areas in which the Coleridgeans 
had views distinguishing them from mainstream moderate 
Evangelicals (particularly Arminian Evangelicals). These
were. The Atonement
(ii) Biblical Inspiration
(iii) Christian Evidences
(iv) Natural (particularly physico) Theology
(v) Epistemology (reflecting on Theological Knowledge)
Numbers (ii) to (v) are important enough to the specific issue
of religion and science to be treated separately in future
sections. But at this point it will be useful to consider
point (i), the atonement. Though not directly connected with 
the science-religion question it was certainly the issue which 
Evangelicals themselves would have regarded as the most important, 
and was one of two on which the 'liberals' of various hues were 
most suspected.
Sedgwick's theology was Arminian in the tradition of Wilson, 
and in his Discourse he attacked an extreme Calvinist view of 
total depravity implying that natural man had lost all real moral 
sense. The first edition of the Discourse did not make it 
entirely clear whom Sedgwick was attacking, and the vituperative 
Henry Cole used the passage to accuse Sedgwick of setting up 
natural in place of revealed religion. The charge was absurd, 
and Sedgwick flatly denied it in the fifth edition of his
Discourse.^ Sedgwick was, however, concerned that however absurd 
Cole's charges, V\\s own words as misquoted by Cole had been
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misunderstood by more respected and more friendly commentaiors,' 
So Sedgwick, after seeking consultation on the note with the 
leading Evangelical Carus (who was Simeon's chosen successor) 
set out clearly his theology, especially on the atonement;
'Let me endeavour, so far as I am able within the narrow 
limits' of this note, to explain my words, which have 
been misunderstood and strangely tortured from their 
meaning. The following are among the great fundamental 
doctrines of our religion - That "man is very far gone 
from original righteousness, and is of his own nature 
inclined to evil" - that our Maker is pure and holy, 
and requires from us nothing less than perfect obedience 
- perfect both in will and deed. - That every son of 
man is, therefore, guilty before God, and under sentence 
of condemnation - That a remedy has been provided for 
us in the person of Jesus Christ- who not only showed 
in himself an example of perfect purity and holiness, 
but opened for us a way to future happiness, by the 
voluntary sacrifice of himself - thereby satisfying 
the severe attribute of God's justice, and blotting out 
the written sentence of our condemnation . - That a 
faithful acceptance of this doctrine is the principle 
and foundation of our forgiveness, and by inherent moral 
necessity fills the heart with thankfulness and love. - 
That a full perception of these doctrines is not enough. - 
That after we are forgiven and restored to our Maker's 
favour, infirmity and corruption still clings to us. - 
That we require, after admission to the covenant of 
mercy, through our whole lives continual support
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and renovation, - to be maintained only by communion with 
God and the sustaining grace of his Holy Spirit. - That 
in this way God may dwell in our hearts as our Maker, 
our Redeemer, and our Sanctifier. - That from first to last 
this scheme of salvation is the free gift of God: not pur­
chased by our oim works, or claimed by us on any score 
of self-sustained inherent personal merit of our own.- The 
proper effects of these great doctrines, when faithfully 
received in the heart, are an enlarged charity - a purity of 
life grounded on the highest sanctions - and a ready 
acknowledgement of the goodness and providence of God in 
all his dealings with us. - The film which dims our vision 
falls away - the passions which desolate the world become 
obedient to law and order - we see in everything around us 
the power and benevolence of our Maker - all the higher 
faculties, moral and intellectual, receive the noblest 
exaltation; and now at length subservient to the true 
purposes of our being, become "a rich storehouse for the
SD
glory of the Creator and the relief of man's estate.'"
This has been quoted at length because it is a key passage, amply
corroborating the theological position argued for Sedgwick in this
thesis. Sedgwick did not, of course, mean to imply that
a purely intellectual acceptance of the doctrine of atonement
was enough to admit a person to the covenant. Elsewhere
he makes it abundantly clear that a 'lively' faith is to
be distinguished from a faith which is purely intellectual
51and which is 'a mockery and a snare’. If his words lack the 
clarity of a Wesley or a Simeon in calling to repentance, we must 
remember that Sedgwick took for granted that he was speaking to
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instructed Christian men , and in any case there are few Wesleys
or Simeons in the Evangelicals of a generation. But we may note
two aspects clearly Evangelical and unlike Coleridge or Maurice. 
Firstly, the atonement involves the 'satisfying of God's justice'. 
Secondly, personal response is needed ('faithful acceptance' - i.e. 
an acceptance with implications) to partake of forgiveness.
For those in the Covenant, Sedgwick emphasizes the need for a holy 
lifSj lived through the 'new power of moral obedience* given by God.^  ^
As for ordinances, Sedgwick gives a warning:
we are no true children of our Lord and Master - 
we are no part of his flock - if we honour him not by 
the outward forms of allegiance he has himself enjoined...
- by acts of public devotion - by the earnest petitions
. . ,5 l fof private prayer... ^
His emphasis on habits, particularly the habits of prayer,
were again a part of an Arminian Evangelical emphasis on
holiness.
In Sedgwick's theology, then, of atonement and sanctification, 
we find a basic Arminian Evangelicalism, in the Wilson tradition.
On the key points where Coleridge or Maurice would have diverged 
from this tradition Sedgwick emphatically does not, and to 
associate him in a group with such Coleridgeans (under the title 
'Broad Church' or anything else) is quite misleading.
2.3.4  Sedgifick's Friends and Associates
I have argued at length for the inappropriateness of the terr 
'Broad Church', and noted that many even who accept it sound notes 
of caution. Cannon, however, abandons all such caution, and it is 
interesting to see why exactly he does so. He states:
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'Gonybeare noted that the Broad Church was not a compact 
body, had no newspaper or magazine or other rallying-point 
and in contemporary terms was hardly a "party" at all.
These kinds of facts have led Owen Chadv/ick, in his recent 
Victorian Church, to overlook the kind of approach used in 
this essay and state: "The group was not a group but 
scattered individuals working toward similar ends."
Chadwick is handicapped by the tendency of British scholars 
to look primarily at Oxford men as the central figures in 
intellectual movements... By looking at the prominence of 
churchmen in the Church itself, and then seeing how they 
were interconnected by personal, family, and Cambridge
can see that the leadership of the Broad Church 
was an actually existing group. Its background has now 
been sketched, for the recognised leaders after the death of 
Arnold were Hare, Maurice, Thirlwall and Arthur Stanley.
We have seen how Cannon's picture of an actual group with 
recognised theological leaders and 'theological' and 'scientific' 
nodes is unsupportable. Perhaps (to rephrase his criticism of 
Chadwick) he is handicapped by the tendency of American scholars to 
misunderstand the nature of personal, family and friendship links 
formed in the British University system and Anglican Communion.
We must, in fact, be careful to distinguish friendship or even 
admiration from agreement. There are obvious contemporary examples 
both of admiration^^ and of friendship or family ties^^ without 
agreement.
We must, also, beware of selectivity. Thus Whewell was 
certainly close to Hare and sought his advice. On the other hand, 
another member of Sedgwick's circle, Eomilly, seems in his Diary
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to indicate that he stood in an analogous relationship with the 
Evangelical Carus (like Hare with Whewell. a mutual friend of 
Sedgwick's). Cannon seensalmost embarassed that in a count of the 
frequency of names in Eomilly*s Diary Carus comes out fifth - lamely 
adding 'but several of these entries are notices of Carus sermons... 
Yet Eomilly's high place in Sedgwick's circle is undoubted, and on 
his death Sedgwick wrote to Whewell of our 'old and beloved friend' 
adding: 'he was upheld by Christian faith and he led a life of 
true Christian love. About his reception before the face of his 
God and Saviour there can be no doubt with those who knew him and 
loved him best.'^ ^
We find, in fact, that Sedgwick's various circles of friends 
include both Evangelicals and those called 'Liberal', but few 
High Churchmen. Sedgwick does refer to his friend Ainger as 
'too much of a high churchman for me.'^^ Ainger, however, was 
an old school friend of Sedgwick's, who prececfed him to Cambridge 
by one year, and was realty of a personal friend of
Sedgwick than one of his circle. Sedgwick was prepared, though, 
to twit his friend on his prejudices, and in urging Ainger's r 
vote for Palmerston adds: 'Goulburn is the idol of the Saints, a
prime favourite of Simeon's, and a subscriber to missionary societies.
/ 1
Moreover he squints...'^  Sedgwick himself was an admirer of Simeon 
and a later supporter of the Evangelical missionary David 
Livingstone (whose work took over where Powell Buxton's had stopped). 
But a High Churchman might object to all these things. Besides, 
Sedgwick had a great sense of humour - and we need no more suppose 
his own objection to Goulbourn to be'his Evangelicalism or mission 
activities than that the man squinted.
A genuine member of Sedgwick's circle was George Pryme. Pryme 
also came from Sedbergh, and had studied under Dawson (though five
57
years Sedgwick's senior). In 1863 Sedgwick wrote to him:
'You and I, my dear Pryme, have not long to live in this world...
I believe that you have the Hope given us through Faith in 
the power and love of our Redeemer... You are one of my 
oldest friends, and I have generally agreed with you in 
opinion: and even in points in which we differed I always 
honoured you as a man of principle.'^  ^
Pryme had gone to school under the arch-Evangelical Joseph Milner, and 
says: 'I was convinced of the truth of his views, and have ever
since adhered to them. He was, in fact, the Simeonite of that
ù3>part of the country...*' Recording later a visit from Simeon
Pryme Writes:
'I now attended Trinity Church, in which parish my house was 
situate. Mr Simeon, the vicar, called upon us, and sometimes 
invited us to his rooms in King's College. He was a 
celebrated extempore preacher, and was founder and head of 
the Evangelical party at Cambridge. I entertained similar 
views on some points of doctrine which I had learned from 
Dr Milner, but I ventured to differ from him as to the 
impropriety/ of theatrical entertainments and card-playing...
He candidly argued the matter with me; I maintained them to be 
objectionable only in their abuse...’
It is, then, notable that Sedgwick expresses not merely friendship 
but general agreement with such a man.
The Evangelical Carus has already been mentioned. He writes:
' I had the privilege of enjoying the friendship of Professor 
Sedgwick (our families having been long known to each other) 
from the commencement of my residence in Trinity in 1823.*'^  ^
Carus was actually present at the delivery of the famous sermon
58
forming the basis of the Discourse. From Carus* article we leam
that he visited the Dent vicarage and knew Sedgwick's brother well.
It may also be in a family context that Sedgwick speaks of the
'honoured personal friendship of William Wilberforce and 
66Clarkson* , for here there was not a Cambridge connection. In 
any event, we find the Cambridge circle with Evangelical connections 
(even in days when Cambridge known Evangelicals were few), as well 
as with liberals such as Thirlwall.
Turning now to Sedgwick's Norwich connections, we may note 
Thackray and Morrell's mention of Sedgwick's friendships there with 
the Dissenters and the Stanleys.In fact, however, the Norwich 
into which Sedgwick came in 1833 had as Bishop the aged Bathurst - 
the man who first ordained Sedgwick in l8l? and one of the few 
Bishops with Evangelical sympathies, who supported both Bible Society 
and CMS in Norwich.Sedgwick was friends with many at Norwich 
but the Quaker mentioned as his 'particular delight' was J.J.
Gurney. ^ Gurney was the brother of Mrs Fowell Buxton, and was a 
particular friend of both Wilberforce^^ and Simeon.Gurney's 
association with the Evangelical stream of Quakerism, and his 
closeness with the Clapham group are reflected in his Memoirs.?^  
Thackray and Morrell, who see the alliance between various 
denominations in the BAAS as founded on natural theology, assert 
that 'the liberal Anglicans found strong allies in those sections of 
the church least given to doctrinal formulas.This is supposedly 
true of Quakers, but in fact Gurney's Memoir contains an appendix 
giving a Declaration of Faith. Sedgwick's feelings of fellowship 
with such were not based on vague feelings of a God of nature but 
(as for any other Evangelical) on the basis of Christ's redemption. 
Sedgwick's 'liberality* was of the same kind as Wilberforces,noted 
on p. 28, though Sedgwick was less magnanimous to Unitarians. On
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one occasion Sedgwick dined with Evangelical Pryme and there met:
*a gentleman who belonged to a celebrated Unitarian 
family. In the evening he ventured on a controversial
excursion, little knowing who was listening. Sedgwick 
listened for a while and then broke out with great vehemence:
"Sir! rather than attack and mutilate the Scriptures as 
your Unitarian friends do, I would prefer to disbelieve 
the whole Book of Revelation as an Inspired Work, and to 
put myself at once on my moral conscience as a guide for 
life and conduct 
A fellow Canon at Norwich with Sedgwick was C.N. Wodehouse.
Around 1840 he began to argue that subscription to the 39 Articles
of the Church of England was a disgrace since so many clergy
disbelieved parts of them. He wanted to see subscription replaced
by assent to the three creeds, and wrote 'setting forth certain
passages in the Liturgy, which, in his opinion, required
74alteration from an evangelical point of view.' In l84? Bishop 
Stanley wished to offer Wodehouse an Archdeaconry, which refuelled 
the controversy during which Wodehouse (whilst writing in his 
defence) had some doubts as to the propriety^of taking office. 
Sedgwick's correspondence with him (some of which is quoted in the 
next p.irfc shows close sympathy and understanding.
Not long before we find Wodehouse writing to urge Sedgwick for 
some theology, Edward Stanley was appointed Bishop of Norwich. 
Sedgwick at first felt dissatisfied, but soon came to befriend him.*^  ^
Through this he was also friendly with so called 'Broad Churchman'
A.P. Stanley. But we may note that Stanley's Life and Letters 
place it in this light:
'It was at Norwich that (Stanley) became attached to Canon 
Wodehouse, and to his colleague Canon Sedgwick, of both of
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whom he always spoke with the warmest affection. It was at 
Norwich also that he laid the foundation of a friendship 
with Joseph John Gurney.
Stanley was a complex person who had links with a number of 
quite different schools of thought, but his friendship with 
various Evangelicals need imply no identity of viewpoint.
One point which is of great interest is that the knovm reactions 
of some of Sedgwick's Evangelical friends to his religion was that 
they saw him as a man of essentially simple faith. Thus Carus, the 
successor of Simeon and a family friend of Sedgwick, said that his 
writings reveal:
the religious side of his eminently Christian character, 
and show how a lively, steadfast and simple Christian faith 
v:as combined with intellectual gifts of the highest order.
On his death, the then Bishop of Norwich, the noted Evangelical 
Pelham, wrote to Canon Heaviside:
"His gifted intellect and strong common-sense, childlike 
simplicity of faith and loving warmth of heart, made him, 
to all homes and to all hearts where he was known to be 
much beloved.'
His contemporary Evangelical friends, no less than his biographers, 
would have surely been astonished to hear a man with such a simplicity 
of faith called a 'Broad Church Radical'Simplicity of faith 
stands in the traditions of Thomas Wilson or William Wilberforce, 
but it is the very antipathy of the sophisticated (and often 
unintelligible) approach of Samuel Taylor Coleridge.
A final point about Sedgwick's particular Christian friends and 
associates concerns those with whom he chose to be linked in 
Christian projects. One particular project with which Sedgwick
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was associated was the construction of Cowgill Chapel, completed
in 1838. There were five trustees including Adam Sedgwick,
three local people and the Reverend William Carus Wilson, who
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also made the address at its foundation. Par from any kind
of liberal churchman, Wilson was the son of the first gownsman 
converted under Simeon, and was' a Simeonite whose rigidity had 
been criticised by Simeon himself. " His blatant Calvinism 
had actually induced the Bishop of Chester to refuse to ordain 
him and his dour and somewhat uncharitable brand of Calvinistic 
Evangelicalism was mercilessly exposed by Charlotte Bronte in the 
character of Mr Brocklehurst in Jane Eyre A strange fellow
traveller for a 'Broad Church radical'.
But the greatest Christian project with which Sedgwick chose to 
identify himself was the work of the missionary David Livingstone. 
After a religious conversion at the age of seventeen, Livingstone 
felt a call to missionary work, and in l84l went to Africa as a 
missionary of the evangelically founded interdenominational London 
Missionary Society. Inspired by ideals similar to those of his 
eventual father-in-law Robert Moffat, and the noted Evangelical, 
Fowell Buxton^  Livingstone saw the evangelisation of Africa
as being linked to its being 'opened up' and 'civilised', and it 
seems to have been the conviction that God's plan for him in the 
enterprise was more in the latter activities (rather than any 
changes in religious viewpoint) which led him to decide during 
his first furlough (1837-8) to become independent of the L.M.S.
He did not wish to leave the L.M.S. open to criticism that
8  5Livingstone was not doing 'proper' missionary work,'*”' It 
was during this furlough that Livingstone delivered his Cambridge 
lectures, later published with a prefatory letter by Sedgwick. 
Livingstone was, by this time, a celebrated national figure. He
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was praised by Owen for his observations of fauna, Murchison for 
his contributions to Geography, and the Astronomer Royal for his 
celestial observations. Yet at Cambridge he upbraided his 
audience for its lack of support for the (mainly Evangelical)
C.M.S. 'one of the noblest of our missionary societies'. Whilst 
he might be lionised by (say) Murchison as an explorer-scientist 
(and Murchison liked to think of his own worldwide geological . 
exploration similarly'.) we should note that Sedgwick focussed 
rather on Livingstone's completeness in recognising and serving 
God as Creator and Redeemer. In a farewell letter to Livingstone 
Sedgwick promises his prayers that God may 'support him in all 
his coming trials.' He continues;
'There is bub one God, the God who created all worlds and 
the natural laws by which they are governed: and the God of
revealed truth, who tells us of our destinies in an eternal 
world to come. All truth of whatever kind has therefore its 
creator in the will and essence of that great God who created 
all things moral and natural... all art and science, and all 
material discoveries (each held in its proper place and
subordination), may be used to minister to the diffusion of 
Christian truth among men...'
Sedgwick rejoices in the great prospect of Livingstone’s work in 
civilising Africa, bringing material bene^ fit and abolishing slavery 
- but the 'greatest and true end of all' is to see the African's 
face turning heavenwards and 'after all his sufferings and our sins' 
calling him a Christian Brother. He concludes;
'May our Lord and Saviour bless your labours, and may his 
Holy Spirit be with you to the end of your life upon this 
troubled world. '
63
It is very much with the Christian missionary work associated with 
Livingstone that Sedgwick identifies himself.
2,3.5 Sedgwick on Church Parties
Sedgwick did not attach any 'party' label to himself and seldom 
talked in terms of church parties. He does, however, make some 
relevant comment, and in particular expresses views on some of the 
recognised 'leaders' such as Simeon, Coleridge and Newman, We 
noted in the previous part 2,3.4 the Wodehouse affair. As we look 
at Sedgwick's comments to him, we should bear in mind that Wodehouse 
believed that (because of human nature) it would always be possible 
to identify in the Church at any time three great categories of 
people: 'High Church, Liberal and Evangelical,,, under different 
historical names,,. Their principles have by turns predominated in 
the English Church,,,' Sedgwick uses the corresponding terms 
(in 1840 and 184?) 'high-church', 'low-church' and 'evangelical'.
Writing in 1840 urging Wodehouse to stay in the Church of 
England, Sedgwick said:
'The correpondence I have had with you has disturbed me 
more than I know how to tell you. Alas: I can only
repeat what I have written before. I wrote on the subject 
to Dr Arnold, and thought he perhaps might have been 
corresponding with you, but he tells me he is not. I 
think he will join you in your application. A very able 
and honest friend of mine, a kind and useful evangelical 
clergyman, talked over the points with me on Tuesday 
last. He wished the portions of the liturgy changed; 
but he added that he could not leave a church with which 
he agreed more nearly to the very letter, than with any 
other Church...'
64
Sedgwick went on to add that this clergyman 'could not adopt 
the views of any extreme party high or low, &c &c'. Many 
of the High Churchmen would have wished to see Evangelicals
like Gorham excluded, whilst Low Churchmen were reacting to
the aftermath of Tract 90 in reciprocated hostility to Ruseyites. 
Many/.moderate Evangelicals/disagree^ with the Tractarians but 
did not want a witch hunt.
Sedgwick's l84? letter to Wodehouse contains an important 
passage worth quoting in full:
'I advise you to take the Archdeaconry by all means. There 
are no duties of the office you may not do wihh a good 
conscience; and you will do them if God spare your life 
with a good conscience. The office may enable you to do 
the cause of honest Scriptural truth much good - and your 
peculiar views about certain unfortunate passages in our 
Liturgy (in which I agree with you entirely) will not,
and ought not, to interfere with your proper and
energetic Archdiaconal duties. Let not good Evangelical 
men flinch, and refuse office. Now is the time for them 
to take the front rank, that the ultra high-church have 
gone over to the enemy. Julius Hare has some views like 
your own. He is a low-churchman according to the vulgar 
abuse of words. I should call him and you very high 
churchmen - men who are not content to bathe in tkinted 
streams, but wish to steep themselves, soul and body, in 
the pure waters of life gushing": from the fountain head; 
Ordinances of men are, or may be, good things in their way; 
and they are necessary for diffusion of the waters of life, 
and for irrigation - all this is plain to common sense.
Hare had some scruples, and stated them to his Bishop
(Otter). The Bishop replied 'I can allow these objections
to be of no weight, for my opinions on these points are
just the same as your own. Therefore I again offer you
the office, and I hope you will take it.* Now this is
your exact position, if I mistake not. Act like Julius
g c,
Hare, and take the office.'
Sedgwick comes fairly near, in this passage, to identifying 
himself with the Evangelicals. Certainly he wishes 'good 
evangelical men' to take high office, though this is not 
necessarily to say he 'agreed with all their views. He is 
moire explicit in a further letter to Wodehouse two months 
later :
' ... I have finished Carus' Life of Simeon. It is a very
remarkable book, and likely to do much good. 'Tis the
history of a devout and faithful man, who stuck to his 
principles through evil report and good report, and ended 
by gaining the love and goodwill of all men about him.
Pray read it soon. There are in it several letters on 
cases of conscience not very different from your own.
Most of good old Simeon's views are wise and sound...
He had many small faults, but he knew them and was humble 
under them, and after all they were motes in the beam of 
light, which only serve to show the track of the light more 
plainly to the senses. What a grand Christian death'.
And what a fine, eloquent, and Christian summary by the 
Bishop of Calcutta'.
Many might, by 1847 and writing fourteen years after Simeon's 
death, profess some admiration for the man. But Sedgi^ick goes
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further than this and speaks of agreement with most of Simeon's 
views. Few Arminian Evangelicals could have said morel The 
Wodehouse correspondence amply illustrates the basic theological 
position which has been argued for Sedgwick in this thesis.
Carus own later ’Reminiscences of Professor Sedgwick’ in the 
Churchman of February 1889 quotes an even more significant passage 
^ letter from Sedgwick speaking of the Simeon biography2 
"In reading your book I have constantly been struck by 
Simeon's good sense; and there is hardly a sentence on some 
doubtful questions of Christian counsel in the numerous 
extracts in the latter part of the volume, to which 1 do 
not give the assent of my heart. Some remarks on human 
corruption seem to me very true and good. 1 was blamed by 
some religious persons for one or two sentences in my sermon 
... and 1 hope to consult you about an explanatory note (E)
1 have lately added. It seems to me that my statement, 
though it may be in less guarded language, is exactly what 
Simeon states in one of his letters (p.791). 1 once heard a
statement of Robert Hall’s quoted in conversation - 1 think it 
was at the rooms of my friend Musgrave (now Bishop of Hereford). 
Someone was using very strong expressions respecting the 
corruption of human nature. "True," said Hall; "take care 
that you go not beyond Scripture language and Scripture 
meaning. Totality admits not of degrees, and surely among 
men in a state of nature one may be worse than another." Our 
faculties of mind and body are in themselves good, for they 
are God's work. V/hat we want is a new governing principle 
to guiae them. If left to themselves they are implements of 
mischief; like an explosive engine without a safety-valve, and
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without a hand to guide its movements. And how do we gain
our governing principle ? From God Himself, not from
ourselves. If we have faith we shall have sanctification,
and holy purposes and powers. If we have them not, our
faith is hollow - a babbling and a mockery of our Father.
If we take a view in antagonism to what 1 have just stated,
we are sure, if we be sincere men, to end in asceticism, or
some form of monastic superstition... This was the great
folly of the early centuries after Christ. The good old
man, whose life is written in your book, said no such thing.
He told us -(1 cannot turn to the passage)- not to desert our
post in the world but so to conduct ourselves in the world as
shining lights; as men who, helped by God's Spirit, can turn
0, I
their faculties to their Maker's glory.'
Simeon was sometimes described as a 'Calvinist', but himself
disclaimed membership of any 'school' and was not one in the usual
sense of the term. Sedgwick here espouses similar views to
Simeon, also citing Hall, professing not merely admiration (which 
is one thing), but positive agreement and alignment. Had Sedgwick
really been some kind of 'Broad Church Radical' or 'Liberal Anglican' 
it would have been strange indeed to profess a heartfelt agreement 
with virtually all the pronouncements given on controversial 
religious questions by the acknowledged leader amongst Evangelical 
Anglicans of Sedgwick's generation. It must surely indicate that 
Sedgwick's sympathies lay elsewhere than current literature would 
suggest.
Sedgwick read widely and his writings quote a number of authors.. 
On theological issues, however, he does not seem to quote 'Liberal'
scholars, but old-fashioned High Churchman Marsh (on Tractarian
oL.
issues; , and Evangelicals Hall and Chalmers. '
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The Wodehouse correspondence also referred to several members of 
the supposed 'Broad Church', and to this we may now turn. Sedgwick 
indicates that he has been in correspondence with Arnold over the 
issue of subscription. Arnold was called by William Marsh 'an
' ■ AC
evangelical without knowing it' and some of his views (though 
not all) were similar to those of Evangelicals. In this instance 
Sedgwick is referring simply to his views on subscription - which 
were generally known to be liberal. Of Hare, who was a friend 
of Sedgwick's, more mention is made. Sedgwick's characterisation 
of his friend should be looked at with care. Hare is a 
'low-churchman', and possibly Sedgwick may be using this 
term as v;as then common in distinction to Evangelical.
But he is clearly aware of its inadequacy, for he testifies 
to the sincere spirituality of both Wodehouse and Hare — and 
in the case of Hare his judgement would have been heartily 
endorsed by the Evangelical Bigg. As we have seen, Sedgwick 
is entirely correct in saying that Hare had some views very 
like those of Evangelicals like Wodehouse. Incidentally, the 
Bishop concerned (Otter) was known to have at least some 
sympathy for Evangelical vie^s - and was a friend and biographer 
of E.D.Clarke, the man who stood with Parish on the platform 
at the first Bible Society meeting. But Sedgwick does not 
here claim to follow the particular views of Hare.
Around the time he wrote to Wodehouse (184?) Sedgwick also 
wrote a long letter to Hare, which is printed in Clark, and 
Hughes. Again we need to notice exactly what Sedgv/ick says 
he agrees with. He refers to Harefe 'Note W , a vindication of 
Luther, and says: '1 thank you for this admirable note'.*^^ He 
professes admiration for Luther, but adds: 'He was a man and not
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an angel. 1 wish he had been less coarse. In more than half his 
disputes with Zuingle he was either wrong-headed or wrong...'
Again, this is the kind of comment which might have been made by 
many an 'orthodox' Protestant Evangelical.
References to Coleridge in the letters or works of Sedgwick are 
very rare indeed. One of the few comes in a context of criticism 
of the schools of empiricism of Locke and Hume for their apparent 
neglect of the innate faculties of the human mind. Sedgwick 
writes :
'The very knowledge we first acquire by experience, forces us 
by a true logical necessity, towards a contemplation of 
certain indwelling faculties of the mind which must exist 
before all experience; and without which (as is well observed 
by Kant and Coleridge, and the whole modern school of Idealists,) 
experience itself would be impossible.'
But this is a very passing allusion (followed shortly by comments 
highly critical of Kant). The philosophers actually cited by 
Sedg\«/ick in opposition to the Loche.ans are Reid and Cousin - not 
Coleridge or Hare.
The only other reference of any significance (and indeed almost the 
only one whatsoever) comes as Sedgwick virulently attacks the 
'slight damp suffusion of pantheistic vapour' from German philosophy 
which has temporarily obscured the 'pure philosophical diction' of 
England. Sedgwick says in a note:
'Few men have had a power over the English tongue more magical 
than that of Coleridge: but in the latter years of his life
his philosophical essays sometimes become obscure and 
disagreeable, from his use of words, or turns of thought, 
he borrowed from the German philosophy: and there are some
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modern writers of great power, who seem as if they could 
never find it in their hearts to e^rpress themselves as 
Englishmen used to do. If the.Germans are before us in 
any parts of philosophy, we may be compelled to adopt some of 
their technical language; but we have no need to smother
qS
our ovm language under it...'
Since this is virtually the only reference made anywhere to Coleridge 
in extant works of Sedgwick, it is impossible to accept the kind 
of assertions we have seen (on p.5) about 'ardent admiration' for 
Coleridge, or a great influence of his thought on Sedgwick.
Sedgwick reacted like most Evangelicals - with suspicion that 
Coleridge’s language smacked of pantheism.
To Maurice, again, Sedgwick seldom refers. He states:
'1 have once or twice seen Mr Maurice, and 1 know some of his 
dearest friends. 1 have read several of his books. His 
volume on The Prophets and Kings, and his volume on Sacrifice, 
were his latest works which 1 have read. All his works have 
one great charm - they have the savour of an honest, sincere, 
and truth loving mind. They all contain original thoughts, 
and original matter, which is another charm. But 1 cannot 
always go along with them without halting and stumbling.
Sometimes 1 differ from him on points 1 think 1 understand; 
but, more frequently, 1 have a positive difficulty in 
understanding what he means. His thoughts run in a train 
so different from mine. 1 thinlc also that he is often at 
fault on matters of practical wisdom; and (independently of 
Bible interpretation where the words seem to be against him) 
why did he disturb the congregation by his doubts and 
surmises on the very point which led to his removal from the 
Professorship at Kin^ College ? There was a want of practical
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wisdom in this. And Sir James Stephen (our Professor of 
Modern History) committed the same blunder the year beforei 
If Fir Maurice could have proved that he was right and that 
others were wrong - good and welli Let truth be told. But 
I defy him to prove, out of the Bible, that the punishments 
of God in a future state are limited in time. I dislike the 
discussion altogether, and I owe no thanks to I4r Maurice for 
disturbing our faith by making Hell into an universal 
Purgatory...■
Surely Brooke is not being fair to the context in his comment on 
this :
’It had also been gentlemanlike not to disturb the faith of 
the orthodox ... Sedgwick, for example, had a keen sense of 
’practical wisdom’, which means that he was unhappy on the 
way in which F.D.Maurice and Sir James Stephen had spoken 
out on the duration of Hell. It was not in good taste to 
’disturb the congregation.’*^ ^
This makes it sound, perhaps unintentionally, as though Sedgwick 
is really unorthodox but thinks it ill mannered to speak out.
But this is surely not the case. Sedgwick would be happy for the 
’truth to be told’ - but thinks it unwise and unpastoral to disturb 
the congregation with speculation which cannot be substantiated.
The Bible is Sedgwick’s authority here, and he believes it against 
the doctrine. It is also ironical to note that James Stephen was 
a leading Evangelical - nephew and admirer of Wilberforce and a 
statesman of renown. In the epilogue to his Essays in 
Ecclesiastical Biography (l84$) he had expressed unwillingness 
to believe in everlasting torment, and claimed that ’Every argument, 
every narrative, every expostulation, every warning in the Bible 
would be as complete and as intelligible, if not emphatical without
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it.* Unlike other main truths of Scripture its disappearance
would leave the whole structure intact. A note in his diary
amongst the Stephen papers for 8th September 18^3 has him going
round to Maurice’s house ’to give him some advice about the
\0 |
scrapfe into which he has got.’ ' James Stephen was unable to 
help, and Maurice was dismissed a month later from his chair at 
King’s College. Though Stephen presumably had little sympathy 
for the rest of Maurice’s system, on this point at least it is 
interesting that Sedgwick is more ’orthodox’ than an Evangelical 
heir of Clapham’.
On a more general level, Sedgwick’s comments on Maurice are 
exactly what one might ' expect from an Evangelical viewpoint. He 
commends Maurice’s sincerity (who can doubt it ?), but often finds 
he disagrees with him. More important, he recognises that 
I4aurice’s thoughts ’run in a different train’ from his own. The 
Coleridgean way of thinking of Maurice is quite foreign to the 
basically Evangelical way of thinking of Sedgwick. This applies 
to the atonement, and may be reinforced later with attitudes to 
Payleyan Evidences and the Bible, and natural theology.
.Sedgwick, then, can be seen to have little sympathy with what 
is typically ’Coleridgean’.. He dislikes Coleridge’s Germanic 
philosophical influences (regarded by most people as Coleridge’s 
main contribution), and finds Maurice on what one might call 
a ’different wavelength’ from his own. His affinity for 
Hare may be explained by Hare’s own position being closer to the 
Evangelical one on many issues.
To return to the issues of the Wodehouse correspondence, we 
may now look at Sedgwick's attitudes to the High Church and to 
Biseenters. The two issues overlap considerably. In a letter
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to Ainger in I83O he says that Ainger is 'too much of a high 
churchman for me', and defends the right of 'private judgement'
Private judgement may be misused, like many other basic liberties,
I
but this is no reason to deny or suppress them. In any event,
'forced unity is not spiritual unity', and to Sedgwick the 
'good sincere Presbyterian is as true a member of the Catholic 
Church as is a member of the Church of England.' To Sedgwick 
this is the 'orthodox definition' of Catholic in the Church of 
England, but he adds:
'Don't think that I undervalue our church polity, and don't 
think it better than the Presbyterian. Tis not so. But 
Church polity is not Christianity; it is only one of the 
helps to it.'
In his 1868 Memorial about the Cowgill Chapel, Sedgwick outlines 
the sermon he gave at its founding in 1837* He says that the 
Church of England:
'...believed that their form of government and subordination 
of Church authorities was in nearest conformity with that 
which was sanctioned by the Apostolical teachers, and adopted 
by the earliest Churches of Christendom... there could be 
no doubt, 1 said, about our profession of doctrine. It was 
pure and evangelical. For every Minister of the Church of 
England had, before admission to his office, to declare, in 
public solemnity, his belief that the Holy Scriptures contain 
"all doctrine required of necessity for eternal salvation."*
Most of these ideas are repeated in the Preface to the t^h Edition 
of his Discourse. The great principles of the Reformers were the 
'supreme authority of Scripture' and 'rights of private conscience.'
The church liturgy and articles have no validity in themselves but
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what they derive from Scripture.’ The church is 'only infallible 
as she has drawn her doctrine? from the Word of God.^^^ ’She 
believes that her teaching is true - that her forms are apostolical 
and her doctrine evangelical.' -
With this kind of approach it is no surprise to find Sedgwick 
not sympathetic to the High Church. Of the Oxford School he was 
particularly critical, and when Newman and a number of others went 
over to Rome in 184-5 Sedgwick wrote:
' Shame on them that they did not do so long since '. ... 1 pity 
their delusion, 1 despise their sophistry, and 1 hate their 
dishonesty. Personally 1 know them not. It is not of 
persons but of principles 1 am speaking.’
Sedgwick attacked aspects of Tractarianism more formally in the 
Preiàce to the 5th Edition of the Discourse. He pleads not to 
be misunderstood:
'1 condemn not all the Oxford Tracts: for many of them are
straightforward, just, and true, and well fitted for the times 
in which we live.'^®^
What he particularly objects to is the infamous Tract 90. which 
brought storms of protest from Evangelicals and Low Churchmen, and 
led to the suspension of the Tracts. Sedgwick regarded its 
attempts to reconcile the 39 Articles to Roman Catholic doctrines 
as sophistry, but went further:
'It is not so much the subtility and sophistry, as the hideous 
immorality of Tr&ct 90» that 1 wish to lay bare before the 
Undergraduates of Cambridge.'**^
Newman is attacked personally, though not by name, Sedgwick says:
His severe and ascetic life — his great scholastic learning 
in the track he had chosen for himself - his ignorance of
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natural science, and his utter contempt fob it - his subtle
and entangled logic... all these had a seductive charm to 
il'1some minds...'
Sedgwick accuses Newman of long concealing his true views, and adds 
that now (i.e. 1849) Newman’s ideas of development are virtually 
pantheistic. He adds that:
'We have no right to blame, in a spirit of vituperative 
bitterness, a brother who changes his religious creed: but
we have a right to demand from him an observance of the vulgar 
rules of truth and honour.'
This is perhaps not altogether fair to Newman, but it shows 
Sedgwick's thinking. He had a plain dealing man's abhorence 
of anything which savoured of sophistry or deception. Thus, whilst 
he saw it as pastorally undesirable to disturb the congregation with 
unsubstantiatable speculation in the manner of Maurice, he would 
never countenance deliberate deception in simulating views which a 
person did not hold.
He was generally suspicious of the High Church, and writing to 
Livingstone in I865 makes reference to 'Ritualism' - the offspring 
of Tractarianism;
'1 greatly dislike the tendency to formal superstitious 
observances in the present day. Of course 1 am alluding to 
the High Church party in England. The idolatrous element 
is rife amongst, us. We want to lean upon our own works and 
merits, and count them up as though they gave us the right 
to draw upon our Redeemer's treasures.
Sedgwick's Memorial attacks those who reject the name 'Protestant'
(a feature of Tractarianism going back to Froude), and urges;
'Let us cling, my Christian friends and countrymen, to the 
grand teaching brought to the light of day by our Reformers
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— that every doctrine which is binding on the conscience 
as a rule of faith is to be drawn from the Bible - the 
fountainhead of all religious truth. Let us cling, on the 
same ground, to our common Protestantism, to the doctrine 
of justification by faith in the atoning sacrifice of the 
Son of God - a sacrifice at once sufficient, now and for ever, 
and admitting of no renewal and no supplement by any form of 
offering consecrated by the hands of man. But let not ours 
be an acquiescent and merely speculative faith (a mockery and 
a snare); but a lively faith, which under God’s Spiritual 
law leads through communion with Himself (upheld by the humble 
use of the means of grace which He has Himself, through his 
revealed word, appointed for us) to sanctification of heart 
and a life of holiness and brotherly love.'^^^
This, surely, is a basically Evangelical position ? There is no 
concept of priestly succession, or apostolic succession of any 
importance, anc( the Tractaxians are attacked for tendency to a 
doctrine of works and for superstition. His attachment to the 
Church of England is because (like Simeon) he regards its articles 
and ordinances as truest to Scripture; but his emphasis is on the 
Bible and on justification by faith in Christ's atoning sacrifice.
He emphasizes, however, that faith is not mere credal assent but 
personal response to^and relationship with^God, This, as we shall 
see, was also the basis of his relationship with Dissenters.
2.3.6 Sedgwick and Dissenters
Sedgwick's feeling of fellowship with the Dissenters was not 
based on some vague tenets of natural theology or feelings of the 
creatorship of God. Dissenters of various kinds came together
77
to celebrate and even contribute to the building of the Anglican 
Cowgill Chapel with which Sedgwick was much involved. He said of 
them:
'... that they were united with us in a common Protestantism 
and a common protest of separation from the idolatrous forms 
and the priestly domination of the Church of Rome; that they 
were united with us in the great fundamental doctrines of 
Christian truth; that we had the same Bible, the same God, 
the same Saviour, the same ground of faith, the same Comforter 
to guide and help us through the darkest turns of our present 
life.'
He expanded on the common debt to the Protestant Reformers, and then;
'If in outward forms we continue divided, let our common
Protestantism be our bond of Christian union in heart and love.
Outward forms (excepting the two sacraments commanded in Holy
Scripture) are but the fences and the scaffolding of God'-s
. U S
Temple, and may be removed if the general good require it.'
This feeling, however, did not extend to the Unitarians. On
pp. 6O-6I above we looked at Sedgwick’s relationships with the
Dissenters at Norwich - but also his strong reaction against
Unitarianism. His feeling of fellowship with the (largely
Evangelical) Dissenters was on a basis of common Protestant Biblical
Christianity. The differences he saw largely.as those of church
polity and outward forms.
This underlies his attitude to Dissenters vnLthin the University.
Xn the second quarter of the century Oxford did not admit Dissenters, 
whilst Cambridge would allow them to attend and study as long as they 
attended Church of England services, but would not allow them either 
to take a degree or hold a University post. In December
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Sedgwick’s friend and fellow Evangelical, Professor Pr^me, began a
“116move to seek to allow Dissenters to proceed to a degree.
Sedgwick soon became involved, both in letters and in petitions. 
Writing to The Times on 8th April 1834, he laid out his case. Much 
of his argument centred around the fact that before the time of 
James I religious tests were not requisite in order to take a 
degree. Sedgwick argues that James introduced them by an ’informal’ 
royal letter, in a high handed way, and ’grievously against the 
wishes of many of the then members of the Senate.’
In his letter, a second one of l8th April, and a letter to Bishop 
Blomfield of 2?th April, Sedgwick clarifies what he wants. Firstly, 
no Dissenter would have an unqualified right to attend Cambridge.
The requirement to attend Church of England services'is known:
A moderate, well-informed Dissenter will come up under such a 
system... and he will take a degree. A bigot - a man who 
would haggle about organs and surplices - will and must keep 
away, and we do not want him...’^ ^^
Commenting on this passage, Winstahley makes the puzzling statement: 
’Adam Sedgwick, like many Broad Churchmen, was extremely intolerant 
of religious scruples which he did not s h a r e . A s i d e  from the 
fact that according to many, ’toleration’ is the mark of a Broad 
Churchman, the criticism of Sedgwick is misleading. Sedgwick saw 
the reality of Christianity in a life in relationship with God 
through Christ based on a Biblical faith. Ordinances, of whatever, 
denomination (ano. though he himself thought the Anglican ones best) 
were on^y hexps to this - and to object to attendance at Christian 
services because of music or clothes seemed to him absurd. On the 
other hand, though he himself subscribed to the 39 Articles, he did 
recognise tnat they containeo doctrines beyond those necessary for a 
Biblical laiuh, and sympathised with Dissenters whose scruples
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prevented them aubscribing to articles of belief which they did 
not believe. His position in all this was both sensible and 
consistent.
Sedgwick also believes that Dissenters will have no objection to 
attending theology lectures. Characteristically, however, in 
controversy he overstates his case. Attendance is not compulsory, 
and (he claims) in any case no such lectures in the last 30 years 
have been such that *a Dissenter of any denomination would have 
scrupled to attend.' He cont i :
’... such lectures being studiously confined to a critical 
examination of various parts of the New Testament, to discussions 
on the evidences of Christianity, and so on... Paley’s Evidences, 
Butler’s Analogy, and Doddridge’s Evidences, have been for many 
years the subjects of college divinity lectures, in addition to 
the Greek text of the New Testament. The subjects of 
controversial theology have been carefully a v o i d e d ^ ^  
Sedgwick’s statements were challenged, e.g. by William Selv.yn v/ith 
whom Sedgwick engaged in polemics via the press. On I-îay 30th the 
Trinity Divinity lecturer, E.W. Evans, issued a statement asserting 
that his New Testament lectures went beyond the philological and dealt 
with doctrine. A oopy of this exists in the University library with 
a handv/ritten note in Sedgwick’s handwriting saying that the Divinity 
lecturer has failed to state that his lectures ’ were not compulsory 
- and that they were attended by a very small class...’ and so are 
irrelevant.
It is not clear at this time quite how far Sedg\;ick wished to 
allow Dissenters to hold posts in the University. To Blomfield he 
wrote:
By the Law of the Land no person without signing himself a 
member of the church of England can be admitted a Fellow of a
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College or a Professor of a University, The Petitioners
did not contemplate a change in this law. l4. Were this
law repealed, members of the University refusing to sign the 
tests of James X would be admissable to no fellowships except 
such as are now held by laymen. Of these there are comparatively 
few...'120
How far Sedgwick personally wished Dissenters to be allowed lay posts 
is hard to say. When the issue resurfaced in 1869 it was (with 
Sedgwick's support) clearly designed. Clark and Hughes saw no 
change in Sedgwick's position; though Garland has questioned this 
any difference does not seem very significant. Sedgwick never 
seems to have really contemplated the possibility that the University 
could cease to be fundamentally a Church of England institution _ let 
alone that it could become 'secularised'. At the same time, however, 
he recognised that should the intellctual life of the nation ever 
cease.to be Anglican in nature, then Cambridge could preserve its 
Anglican nature only at a cost of becoming an intellectual backwater. 
This touches, also, upon his view of science as essential to the life 
of a properly intellectual establishment like Cambridge. He notes 
that three quarters of !those who, as Professors, are employed in 
carrying on the scientific work of the University' are in favour of 
abolishing tests.^ He fears that, if not granted, the faculty of 
Medicine may be 'lopped off from us' -and bewails the catastrophic 
effect this will have on scientific c o o p e r a t i o n . H e  adds: 'the 
scientific character of Cambr-idge is not only its honour but its 
security. As a great learned and scientific University giving 
degrees in all the learned faculties... Cambridge may stand firmly...
But if she once be considered as a mere school for the Church 
Establishment her endowments will be thought out of all reasonable 
dimensions...' If this happens/before long the edifices will crumble.
In 1869 Sedgv,ick was reported to have said a similar thing: ' I
am a
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Churchman because I believe the Church of England to be right; but
I deprecate the University hiding itself in any little nook of
124prejudice out of the general spirit of the community.' If, 
then. Dissenters should command a predominance of the intellect of 
the nation, let them predominate.
In 1834, on April l8th, a Bill was introduced to abolish tests - 
it passed the Commons but not the Lords. In that year, however. 
Dissenter bitterness at Anglican privilege reached a peak.'*^  ^ Thus 
Sedgwick vxote to a friend on 28th I'fey:
'The Dissenters have now, if not unanimously, yet without... 
contradiction from any of their body, avowed that 'their great 
and ultimate object is the overthrow of the church... I do not 
see that you or I, or any member of the Church of England, 
can or ought to be called upon to do an act v/hich must manifest­
ly tend to our own destruction... I am sorry tliat the Dissenters 
did not meet the Churchmen in a better spirit... Now, I am 
^^ 2?ea.id, uhe coals of enmity are blown into a blaze by the ordeal 
on both sides - and we must wait till they have burnt out...'^ ^^
Though, however, Sedgwick might now feel it prudent to 'lie low' on 
the issue, his words were still causing alarm in some circles.
British Critic, in July I834, chose to review Sedgwick's Discourse 
amongst a set of papers dealing with the Dissenter i s s u e .  
does so because it sees his attitude to admission as in conflict ;m.th 
the idea of a university presented in the Discourse. Its opinion of 
Sedgwick IS high; 'his name alone gave to the Cambridge Petition the 
pernicious power it possessed,' Sedgwick has, it says, a high
reputation in the scientific world, an 'ornament as well of the 
University as of his college.' Sedgwick, 'although greatly zealous ■ 
in the pursuit of scientific truth' values far higher than all other 
religious truth, and would sacrifice his very existence rather than
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be a means of his listeners wavering in their attachment to 'the 
pure fadth of that Chui’ch whose doctrines he was then inculcating.'
The British Critic, however, doubts that Fellowships and College 
Offices will long be restricted to Anglicans once Dissenters are 
allowed Cambridge degrees. Then, it fears, there is strong 
likelihood of Arian and/or Unitarian Tutors * spreading around them 
a baleful influence', tnough Sedgv.dck may not want or envisage this.
The reviewer cites Sedgv-zick's own eloquent words about worshipping 
at the same altar where past greats v/orshipped. Only in a system of 
uniform worship and religious teaching is this kind of education 
possible. Thus Sedgwick’s wish to admit Dissenters contradicts the 
vision in his Discourse.
Strictly, of course, there is no contradiction. Sedgwick in fact 
believed that both uniform Anglican worship and uniform Anglican 
teaching would continue if Dissenters were admitted to degrees.
The British Critic clearly did not feel Sedgwick was realistic. The
same attitude, in fact, was heightened in the later British Critic 
review in 1839 of the BAAS, after the journal had come under the 
control of Newman and his circle. There was no quarrel with science 
as such, but as it happened the same group (of which Sedgwick was a 
leading figure) were involved in the BAAS and awarding honorary degrees 
to Dissenters, and agitating for the admission of Dissenters to degrees. 
Dissenters entertained in Oxford and Cambridge would form: *a desire 
to participate in permanent ownership of those institutions, - albeit 
this would only be brought about by secularising them, and severing
129from Christianity the general conduct of education within their walls.' 
Nev/man, wrestling later with the same problem, comes to the conclusion 
of the reviewer that universities should be denominational. Ultimately, 
of course, they were right in that secularisation was the result of the 
process begun when Sedgwick's wishes were fulfilled in I87I. But had
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Newman and his circle in I839 ultimately triumphed perhaps Sedgwick 
would have been right and Cambridge erased to be a leading 
institution of education. Ultimately, the controversy illustrates 
Sedgwick's optimistic view that truth (the Anglican version of 
Christianity) would hold its own in the intellectual world without 
artificial protection.
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3.1 Biblical Inspiration and Accuracy
3.1.1 Introduction and 'Ideal Types'
To those who believed that the Bible was in some sense a 
revelation of God, there were two basic questions. The first 
was what kind ef mechanism was involved in the 'inspiration' of 
the Scriptures. The second, which was related to this, concerned 
the kind of accuracy one would expect in the Bible on specific 
historical or scientific details.
On Biblical inspiration it will be useful to set out a 
number of what might be called 'ideal types' of view. Actual 
individuals may not fall exactly into these categories, or their 
position may be uncertain, but they are useful as a conceptual
framework. In actual fact in this particular instance there
usually are individuals, both historically and today, who fall 
fairly well into each category.
(a) The 'docetic view*
This is a view that God, as it were, dictated the Bible to 
those who wrote it down. Thus Hooker: 'They neither spake nor 
wrote any word of their own, but uttered syllable by syllable as the 
Spirit put it into their mouths,* By implication the Bible, as 
originally given, is not only free from all kinds of error, but 
details of its language will reveal facts about history and science
unknown to its human writers. The view has a long history, and
'Scriptural Geologists' have genrally arisen from amongst those 
who hold such a view, from the beginnings of geology until the 
present day. There is obviously a need to explain away 
any historical or scientific discrepancies, and this is often
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done by denouncing orthodox historians and scientists.^  An 
alternative name for the view is 'plenary inspiration', or 
sometimes 'verbal inspiration' (though either may be ambiguous).
(b) The 'inerrancy' view
This holds that the message of the Scripture writers was 
totally inspired, but that they used their own language to express 
it. In this view, God, in his providence, would have prevented 
any actual scientific or historical error from appearing in the 
Bible as it was originally given and written down; in this respect 
it could be taken as being as free from error (in Simeon's words) 'no 
less than if their very words had been dictated from above.' But
nevertheless it is couched in their own language, it is not literally 
by God's verbal dictation. Thus the writers used 'observer 
language', referring for example to 'sunrise' without implying a 
geocentric system. It is not meant to teach us science, and we 
may be suspicious of attempts to make it do so. There is still 
a need to explain any apparent contradictions with history or with 
science, but the Bible is not seen as a source book for science.^
(c) A 'selected area' view
This holds that the Bible is infallible on points of theology 
or morality but not on points of science and history. The Bible 
is still seen as, in some sense, a book through which God reveals 
Hiroself in an objective sense, but obvious difficulties exist as 
to exactly how much historically ia reliable. Judae-Christian
religion is based on a view of God acting in history - both in 
his dealings with Israel and supremely in the incarnation, death 
and resurrection of Christ. It is a historically based faith.
What then is to count as a detail and what as an essential ?
Within this view, then, there may be a whole continuum of
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positions, from those who accept errors in the details of names 
and places, to those who see the whole Bible in a context of an 
outdated cosmology and accept that major historical narratives are 
myths
(d) A 'subjective* view
This is a view that the Bible contains the Word of God but is 
not to be identified with it. Scripture witnesses to the reality 
of revelation, and is in some sense a permanent possibility of it, 
but is not propositionally reliable. Rather, it is the primary 
means which God uses actively to speak to individuals who read it, 
but illuminating them individually. Obviously, this removes any 
necessity to try to reconcile scientific or historical discrepancies, 
but it leaves problems. God is seen as an active agent in 
illuminating the individual, but the Bible remains a human product.
We are left with no methodology or source with which we might 
establish even a rudimentary reliable religious propositional system. 
Objective religious fact becomes impossible, or at best very 
difficult to defend. The key is rather what 'finds me' or 
'becomes the Word of God to me* as I read the Scripture. There 
are often several paradoxes involved in the view. First, although 
the Bible itself may not be seen as merely propositional, most 
theologians are unable to. move away from propositions into pure 
subjectivism - even the most extreme existentialists. Secondly, 
though there is a certain fuzziness about how far the Bible may be 
propositionally reliable, it is a highly venerated book - even 
to the extent where less is made of the use of reason in evidences 
and natural theology than (say) by Evangelicals.^
(e) A 'man-based* view
This holds that the Bible contains a record of some of man's
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searchings for religious truth. But in writing these down there 
were included a number of .legends, and also 'myths' in the sense of 
pre-scientific conceptualisations of primitive man of his religious 
experiences. Now that man has 'come of age' (in our present 
day of course) the Bible needs to be 'demythologised' in order to 
get at the kernel of religious experience and truth. Those who 
hold such a view often see miracles as contraventions of the laws 
of nature, and so assume they could not have happened in a literal 
sense. Rather, they are to be seen as 'valid' expressions 
in a pre-scientific culture of certain views about the nature of 
those to whom they are ascribed. To see Jesus for our own 
generation he needs to be 'demythologised’, i.e. to be reportrayed 
in the (non-miraculous) way we would see him if he lived the 
same life today.^
3.1.2 Reformers and Evangelicals on Inspiration
It is useful to set out various views as 'ideal types’, though it
is by no means easy always to identify a person with a particular
viewpoint. On the Reformers, for example, scholars disagree, and
range from A.L.Lilley who said of Luther: ’No Christian Doctor
of the front rank ever disparaged the revelational role of the
7
Scripture more consistently than the great Reformer ' to Barry
who accuses Luther and Calvin of 'bibliolatry'.  ^ Luther did speak
of the Bible as the 'Word of God' and believed it inspired. But,
as Warfield commented: 'The Reformers, though using the language
conformable to, or even suggestive of, the theory of dictation,do
not formally present that theory, as do the Systematists of the
9seventeenth century...' The Puritans, on the whole, tended to
accept view (a). John Owen, for example, wrote: 'They invented not 
their words themselves, suited to the things they learned, but only 
expressed the words they r e c e i v e d . ' M a t t h e w  Henry, commenting
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on 2 Peter 1.19-20, wrote: ’The Holy Ghost inspires and dictates
to them... so that the very words of Scripture are to be accounted
the words of the Holy Ghost...’
What was the view of the Evangelicals in the period of our
present interest ? Certainly there was no shortage of those
who accepted view (a), ’plenary inspiration’. In particular
the Recordites may be associated with such a view -'as Conybeare
himself noted. Conybeare notes the extremism of the Recordites,
but confuses and confounds what we have called view (a) and view (b)
above. Perhaps this has encouraged statements like that of
Thackray and Morrell that Evangelicals were 'given to a literal
12
interpretation of Genesis,' In any event, moderate Evangelical
leaders were more circumspect.
Wesley held strongly to the inspiration of the whole of 
13Scripture. But he seems not actually to specify any details of
the mechanism, and there is no proof that he held any theory of
d i c t a t i o n . S i m e o n  is unguarded in the way he expresses the
doctrine. Thus in one place he writes that the 'whole Scripture
was as much written by the finger of God as the laws were, which he
inscribed on the two tables of s t o n e . M o r e  carefully he
says that the Holy Spirit kept the apostles: 'free from error of
every kind, so that which they have spoken must be regarded as the
Word of God, no less than if their very words had been dictated
from above, yea, in all that they revealed, they were kept from
error of every kind and every d e g r e e . B u t  elsewhere Simeon
adds that though the Spirit preserved them from error, yet they
17
'still expressed themselves in their own way.' Simeon, then, does
not believe that God mechanically dictated the Scripture, but that 
in regard to being free from error they are as accurate as if he had.
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Simeon would not have tolerated any historical inaccuracy, but . ^
it is far more open how far he expected scientific accuracy rather
than a simple use of 'observer language’. His modern biographer
argues that his view was open, and cites his words: ’no error
in doctrine or other important matters is allowed- yet there are
inexactnesses in reference to philosophic and scientific matters
18because of its popular style.’ Simeon was not a systématiser,
and attempts to work out precisely a line between ’doctrine’ and
’scientific matters’ would not have appealed to him. He did,
however, appreciate Chalmers and Whewell, and was open to the
possibility of the ’gap theory’ (which incidentally was Sedgwick’s
own viewpoint).
If we look at non-Anglican Evangelicals, Chalmers actually
20commends the words of Owen. In practice, however, it is very
clear that Chalmers did not expect scientific language from the
Bible. He fully allows for the general nature of Biblical language.
Another interesting Evangelical is the Dissenter John Pye Smith.
At one time he actually doubted whether the Song of Songs and book
21
of Esther should be included in the canon at all though later 
he was convinced. On inspiration he says:
’’the essential seat of inspiration lies in the thought and
sentiments, whatever be the variety of phrase by which they be 
expressed... that though the inspired writers use the diction 
which is most familiar to them, according to their 
characteristic style and verbal habits, yet in all cases the 
original Hebrew, Chaldee or Greek is the best expression of the 
mind of the Spirit. For either the very words and phrases 
were suggested by the Holy Spirit (most probably so in prophetic
declarations and messages) or were accepted, so to speak, by Elm;
22
which two cases are precisely the same in practical effect.’
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In a series of lectures (published 1838) Pye Smith illustrated
the accounts of the creation and deluge with reference to modern
geology. He recommends the works of Ray and Derham, as well as
Whewell and Herschel and Buckland showing (as we shall again note)
full acceptance that the words of Scripture were observer language,
23and needed interpreting in the light of scientific knowledge.
3.1.3 The Broad Church and Coleridge on Inspiration
As we turn from Evangelicals to the so called 'Broad Church' 
we find an extremely heterogenous group of people. Copleston, 
the 'father of the noetics' was said by Simeon to be nearer his 
views of Scripture than anyone else he had ever met.^^ Even 
allowing that Simeon may not have understood Copleston fully, Simeon 
was not a simpleton and his remark must have some foundation. At 
the other extreme, Baden Powell espoused an opinion along the lines of 
view (c), which by the time of the Essays and Reviews had led him 
to see accounts of miracles as virtually an unacceptable embarassment. 
The Coleridgeans also present certain problems. In particular 
there is disagreement amongst scholars as to whether Coleridge was 
basically following a view along lines of (c) selected area, or (d) 
subjectivist.
It may be best to begin by seeing how far the orthodox and 
Evangelicals could go along with Coleridge in his views of 
inspiration. J. Robert Barth helpfully compares Coleridge's view 
with that of the orthodox Anglican William Lee who wrote The 
Inspiration of Scripture (1857). Lee, like Coleridge, distinguished 
between the work of the Eternal Word in 'Revelation' and the work
of the Holy Spirit in 'Inspiration'. Barth emphasizes the importance" 
of this distinction in distinguishing what in Scripture is known only 
by supernatural revelation (for example Christ's incarnation) and what 
is known by natural knowledge (e.g. that there was a census taken in the
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year oi Christ's birth). Lee believes: 'the subject matter of many 
portions of Scripture must have been supernaturally revealed, while,... 
other details of the sacred history have been derived from natural 
sources.' Everything, then, in Scripture is written under the 
gvAr'dance of the Spirit (i.e. 'inspired') but not everything 
revealed by God.^ ^
IS
Coleridge makes a similar distinction, though he develops it 
differently. Lee, whilst recognising that natural means are 
used, infers from the Spirit's inspiration that no errors have in 
fact been made. Coleridge does not make such an inference.
Lee, like Simeon and most moderate Evangelicals, recognises that
the Holy Spirit does not use mechanical dictation but:
'The actuation of the Spirit will not consist in the exclusion
of the Human element, but rather in illuminating and exalting
it, according to its several varieties, for the attainment of 
26the end proposed.'
Barth also refers to Coleridge's attacks in his letters on the 
practice of tearing verses out of their contexts without regard to 
place or dispensation, in order to create 'some new credendum. '
This criticism, surely, would have been entirely acceptable to 
moderate Evangelicals.
Neither would Evangelicals have necessarily been 'shocked' at 
Coleridgesuggestion that the Bible should be read 'like any 
other book', especially when he added:
'... the more tranquilly an inquirer takes up the Bible as 
he would any other body of ancient writings, the livelier and 
steadier will be his impressions of its superiority to all 
other books.
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Why should any Evangelical object to this ? It could be taken
simply to mean that reading the Bible alongside and in the same
’objective’ manner as reading other ancient literature would
convince anyone of its superiority. But Coleridge went beyond
this approach, for example in saying:
’In ray last letter I said that in the Bible there is more
that finds me than I have experienced in all other books
put together, that the words of the Bible find me at
greater depths of my being; and that whatever finds me brings
with it an irresistible evidence of its having proceeded from 
29
the Holy Spirit.’
Though often quoted to evidence Coleridge’s radicalism, even this
passage could be taken as orthodox. Coleridge’s contemporary
critics, however, took it to imply a subjectivism not simply
in arriving at the conclusion that the Bible was inspired (quite
an acceptable context), but in deciding which parts of it were
’revealed’ and which were not. Coleridge's language about parts
’finding’ him does not, of course, simply refer to the necessity
of the Holy Spirit illuminating and applying Scripture to the
individual. Both Wesley and Simeon would have agreed that this 
30was necessary. Coleridge was taken to be subjectively validating 
piecemeal. Thus e.g. Rigg (1857):
’Coleridge's view of inspiration, as implied throughout 
his writings, and explicitly stated in his posthumous work,
"The Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit," is that the Bible 
is only so far inspired to any man as it brings the voice 
of God home to his heart, and "finds him at his lowest 
depths." In this sense he denies, in his "Notes on English 
Divines," that there can be any "revelation ab extra." 
Throughout it is implied that only so far as the Reason in us
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answers to and authenticicates the contents of the Bible,
can they be considered as entitled to the authority of the 
■31
Word of God.’
EVen if Coleridge concluded, said Rigg, that all the Bible was
correct,in point of fact, he was still judging each part by
reason. Moreover, the Bible was then no more inspired than
any other book (e.g. Wesley’s hymns) which might 'find' people.
Barth records how the sympathetic Shedd, editing Coleridge's
works in the same year (1857)^vacillated over whether Coleridge
was finally a 'subjectivist' in the fashion which Rigg clearly 
32thought he was. Tulloch (1885) takes Coleridge to be suggesting
subjectivist criteria for determining which parts of Scripture
33
have 'Divine authority' and which do not. Coming into modern 
times, most scholars have emphasized Coleridge's subjectivism.
Thus Sanders (1942) presumes that in Coleridge's view The Bible 
was not one book, but a collection of books, some of which were more 
faithful to the message of the Holy Spirit than were others.
McDonald (1959) sees Coleridge's approach as highly subjective,
35making specific comparison with Karl Barth and Brunner. J.R.
Barth (1969) is critical of this, specifically referring to
McDonald as having exaggerated Coleridge's subjectivism.^^ In
the same year (1969), however, McFarland was also making comparisons
37of Coleridge with Karl Barth. Reardon (1971) again sees 
Coleridge's approach as subjective. Prickett (1976) sees
Coleridge as more radical in rejecting certain parts of Scripture
. 39as literal than he dared to show in print. . Pym '(1978) found 
'an inconsistency in Coleridge's understanding of the Bible; 'His 
interest in Higher criticism could not easily be wedded to a
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view of inspiration which allowed Scripture to be evaluated by 
a subjective process of the m i n d . T h e  ’inconsistency' 
perhaps appears in a different guise when Cooke (1979) sees as a 
statement of Coleridge'-'s 'mature position* the identical passage 
which had been seen by R.J.Barth as one where Coleridge was 
'careless or incomplete in making his position clear.
There is some evidence in Coleridge that he gave some kind 
of indication as to the kinds of passages which had definite 
divine authority. Thus Barth says of Coleridge that he accepts 
as unquestionably revealed (and hence infallibly true) 'whatever is 
is referred by the sacred Penman to a direct communication from 
God.. , Cooke takes him to believe that only the Pentateuch 
can, on the evidence of the Bible itself, be described as the 
word of God, directly imparted to man. The rest of the Bible, 
witten by holy men under God's influence, is rich in spiritual 
aid but cannot be taken for literal truth (except where we are 
expressly told in the Bible that the words are the word of Godl 
The general feeling, then, seems to be that there is a tension within 
Coleridge. He wants to preserve at least some parts as objectively 
true and revealed. But at the same time his overriding concern is 
that any truth of Scripture should be 'self-authenticicating'. It 
seems that finally his view comes down to a subjective approach.
Before looking at Sedgwick himself, we should note that in 
1835-6 D.F.Sfcrauss's The Life of Jesus Critically Examined 
was published. This was a very influential version of what has 
been called 'view (d)' above. Strauss regards all miracles 
(in the manner of Hume) as impossible. They are 'myths', but
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for Strauss, myth expresses or embodies various ideas which the 
early Christians had about Christ. There are’pure myths’, 
which have no historical foundation at all - like the feeding 
of the 5000 - which grew out of belief in Jesus' messiahship 
Then there are’historical myths’ in which an actual historical 
event has been given a ’miraculous’ symbolic scene - such as 
the miraculous draught of fishes which embodies Jesus’ teaching 
about being fishers of men.^ Strauss’ ideas led into a 
■programme of 'dcmythologizing’ - of seeking to reinterpret 
the story of Jesus in ’modern’ terms, having removed the outward 
form of myth in which it was wrapped by the first Christians. It 
also led to a ’quest for the historical Jesus' - a non-miraculous 
kind of teacher of righteousness and truth. The focus switched 
from the acts of Jesus largely to his teachings. This is not the 
place to comment on the success or otherwise of the movement or 
of Strauss h i m s e l f . B u t  orthodox Christians in the 1840's eyed 
such ideas with total abhorence. The Coleridgeans (and other 
liberals like Thirlwall) had a rather more complex relationship 
to the ideas. They shared some of the assumptions made in the 
critical historical methodology of Germanic scholarship, but thought 
that Strauss had not applied it well. Clearly, neither Coleridge 
nor his followers were anything like as radical as Strauss. 
Nevertheless, Coleridge's attitude to (say) miracle has some 
resemblance. In placing the accent on the observer rather than the 
actual act, he left it open to suppose that there was nothing real 
about the act itself - and a conclusion that for modern consumption
i
the accounts would be best ’demythologized .
3.1.4 Sedgv/ick on Inspiration
Turning to Sedgwick, we find that his general language about the
48Bible is Evangelical in tone. It is God's 'infallible Word',
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and in that sense all his letters and works refer to it. He says, 
moreover:
'If all our faith be not a mere mockery and delusion, we must
be led by it to drink daily at the fountain of sacred truth -
to study the Word of God - to accept it as teaching us the
. 4 9means of grace and the rule of life.'
What was Sedgwick's attitude to inerrancy ? It must first be 
noted that he virulently opposed and detested 'Strauss and all the 
lesser fry of his' s c h o o l ' T h e  Bible was basically historical 
and (as we shall see) Sedgwick rejoiced in the works of Paley and 
John Smith showing that it was. Sedgwick did not have any 
kind of sophisticated view of observation and truth. Strauss'
Life of Jesus shews us 'the extravagance of Rationalism pushed into 
the form of Pantheism,' The older and new Rationalists are 
compared:
'The Older Rationalists admit the historical character of the 
Gospel, but (on principles like those of Hume) deny its 
miracles. The modern or patheistic Rationalist turns the 
whole Gospel into a myth or poetic dream; and yet some of 
this school pretend, in their own mythical sense, to admit 
the miracles of the Gospel as symbols of the development of 
the human mind.'^^
Sedgwick thinks it unimportant which set of Rationalists win their 
present argument - both amount to atheism anyway. Strauss elevates 
human nature, rather than 'prostrating it to the dust' as does 
Christianity, and Strauss can never be a Christian in such a frame 
of mind. Any 'impartial student must conclude that the Gospel 
histories are 'artless, earnest and essentially true', anj Sedgwick 
recommends Paley's Evidences and Horae Paulinae as demonstrations
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of their essential accuracy.
On the question of inerrancy we might here distinguish historical
from scientific issues. On historical issues, Sedgwick reveals 
something of his attitude in a note to the section where he is 
virulently attacking Strauss' idea of myth. Some of the apparent 
discrepancies Sedgwick sees in fact as a pledge of the veracity of 
the accounts, for they 'prove that the primitive Christians 
were too honest, and had far too great a regard for the sacred 
text, to change so much as one word of it in the view of bringing 
the Gospels into a more literal and verbal accordance. His 
note refers to two claimed discrepancies: the dating of the Roman 
census recorded by Luke, and the different timing of the Crucifixion 
by John and the Synoptics. Sedgwick says :
'I will dismiss all the explanations of these difficulties, 
and suppose (for the sake of argument) that St Luke made a 
chronological mistake in stating a known fact of Roman history 
“ and that St Mark (who was probably not an eye witness) made a 
mistake in describing the hour when our Saviour's crucifixion 
took place. Do we, then, invalidate the truth of the Gospel- 
history, or its inspiration, by any such concession ? not,
I think, in the least degree. Inspiration implies an honest,
truth-loving^ spirit on the part of the sacred writers; and 
implies also a knowledge of religious truth and doctrine 
derived from supernatural and divine authority; but it by no 
means implies, that in matters of common history, or in events 
about which an Apostle could (like any other man) judge by 
the plain evidence of his natural understanding and his senses, 
he had any positive inspired guidance. If we hold a contrary 
opinion, and demand for the sacred writers nothing short of
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plenary inspiration, we become involved in most formidable 
difficulties, and virtually undermine the authority of 
miracles, which first appealed to the naturel senses for 
their evidence. The discrepancies, here noticed, have no 
bearing on any religious doctrine or sectarian opinion; nor 
can the shadow of any ground be shown why an Evangelist 
should have wished to misrepresent the facts out of which 
they have arisen.
Several things may be noticed about this. First, Sedgwick's 
argument is that mechanical dictation would negate the value of 
miracles as evidence - for then God could presumably have dictated 
something which did not happen. This has a certain validity - but 
inerrancy need not imply dictation. As we have seen, Lee would 
have fully accepted that Luke and Mark used their own resources to 
determine points of known history - but 'inspiration' to him meant 
that the Spirit would have so guided them in their researches that 
they would not, in point of fact, make any mistakes. Leading 
Evangelicals could, however, sometimes express themselves in ways 
bearing some resemblance to Sedgwick. Consider the following: 
'Inspiration, in my opinion, was of two kinds, according to 
necessity, yet ever sufficient to preserve truth:- plenary 
inspiration, to reveal those things which man could not 
know, of which the writer did not know: supervisory
inspiration, to watch over the things which the writer did 
know and to prevent him from going wrong. God did not change 
a writer's character: if of poetic genius, his writing was 
poetic; if prosaic and plain, such also was his writing.
Nay, perhaps some things might be allowed in the writer which
n o
are like error: thus one would give one order of minute
events, and another give another, for this is the fact 
as we see it. But whenever anything depended on 
chronological arrangement, then there will be found 
a perfect agreement 
Simeon, as reported here by Abner Brown, certainly seems to go 
a long way. Even to say that there were things which 'seem 
like error' is remarkable in so prominent an Evangelical as 
Simeon. Yet it is still a step from an 'unimportant' alteration 
in chronology, to an 'unimportant' detail of timing or of 
dating by contemporary history. Sedgwick's step would not 
have been acceptable to mainstream Evangelical leaders like 
Simeon, who believed in 'inerrancy' through the supervisory 
activity of the Spirit.
But a second point to maKe from the above note from Sedgwick is 
that it is unclear how far he himself accepts the reality of the 
discrepancies. He supposes 'for the sake of argument' that they are 
real, and proceeds to show that even if they were this would not 
invalidate the basic truth of the Gospels. Even supposing that 
there were minor discrepancies - we should not have to resort to 
concluding that the Bible was full of myths. But how far Sedgwick 
himself believed that the discrepancies were real rather than 
apparent is not clear from the passage. He diverges from the 
usual Evangelical position in being prepared to admit the possibility
but does not commit himself as to the actuality.
Thirdly, whilst Sedgwick's view is less strict than the usual 
Evangelical one, it has no hallmarks of what is typically Coleridgean 
either. There is no appeal to the subjective, to what 'finds' me.
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and so forth. The permissible errors are restricted to what is 
minor and incidental and affects no doctrine. .Nor is there any 
tendency to play down miracles - in the manner of some of the 
other (particularly later) liberals. One argument against 
mechanical dictation is that it negates the evidence of miracles.
On scientific issues Sedgwick says:
'But if the Bible be a rule of life and faith - a.record of 
our moral destinies - it is not (I repeat) nor does it pretend 
to be, a revelation of natural science.
Now this could be taken in two ways. As the British Critic 
commented around this time: 'We must beware of confounding the very 
dissimilar propositions that the main object of the Bible was not to 
teach physics or that it teaches false physics.' The traditional
Baconian approach spoke of the book of God's works and the book of 
God's Word - and said that neither could err. This is exactly 
the kind of interpretation which Sedgwick intended of his words, 
and the conclusion he draws (as indeed much of his Discourse)is 
couched in highly Baconian terms. He gives no indication that 
the science in the Bible might actually be in error, and comments 
later:
"That there are difficulties in the interpretation of the opening 
words of the Book of Genesis, we do not deny. To bring them 
into a literal accordance with all the phenomena in the past 
history of Nature would imply, on our part, a perfect knowledge 
of the past history of Nature; but such a knowledge we 
have not. The progress of science may clear up these 
difficulties...'^^
This was always his reaction - saying that we do not yet have 
sufficient knowledge to attempt the reconciliation. But what is
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significant is that he accepted the need to seek such a
reconciliation. Surely neither Coleridge nor the later Powell
Sq
would have thought it a necessary thing to do ?
There 1S) on this issue as on a number of others, a close parallel 
between the views of Sedgwick and the Evangelical Hugh Miller.
Miller also refers to Bacon's two books and of 'alleged discrepancies 
between the terms of Biblical history... and the positive evidence 
of science.' He says: 'All such discordances, vvhether real or 
apparent, will find the proper means of adjustment readily and 
finally in due time. ' Miller, unlike Sedgwick, later became 
more optimistic that enough information had become available to 
actually make that adjustment, but the spirit of this is the same.
Now Cannon asserts:
'Reconciling Genesis and geology was a hobby for some
Victorians, but it was openly renounced by the Catastrophist
.  ^ ,61scientists.
His footnote then cites Sedgwick as an example. But his comment 
is much too strong. Sedgwick did not openly 'renounce it . He 
openly repudiated Scriptural Geologists who used the Bible to 
construct their geology - but did not repudiate attempts to 
reconcile them. Indeed he thought reconciling them important, 
but that insufficient evidence was yet available to do so.
The tenor and framework within which Sedgwick approached the Bible 
was very similar to mainstream moderate Evangelicals. He does not
show any signs of the distinctively subjectivist Coleridgean 
anproach, nor a liberal rejection of the miraculous in the 
Bible. On the other hand his view of what is essential to the 
doctrine of inspiration of Scripture does not include strict
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inerrancy - even though his own personal position on inerrancy
is not made clear. This is virtually the single point on which
Sedgwick's religion is seen to diverge from mainstream
Evangelicalism. Ironically, he never seems to have applied it
in the area of science, and on scientific issues his views were
virtually identical to the kind of line accepted by Chalmers and
6^
Miller and the Christian Observer. Certainly the latter organ 
never saw fit to alter its view in 1834:
'we could wish that even Professor Sed^fick had been more 
guarded than he is in some of his expressions, though 
we do not believe for one moment that he meant to disparage 
the Divine inspiration, and consequent unerring truth of
any syllable of the Divine word. The Bible is as true
63in its physical as in its moral affirmations.'
Sedgwick never did seek to escape any apparent scientific
difficulties by a Powellian strategm of saying the Bible was 
accurate only on moral or spiritual issues. As the Christian 
Observer argues, physical statements do tell us of God's relationship 
to his world and us in it, and no such distinction is possible.
Sedgwick is neither setting up a subjective selection procedure, 
nor a radical division, but referring only and specifically to 
historical details which could have no bearing on doctrine.
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1. R. Hooker, Works, 2, p. 585.
2. Historically in the nineteenth century this was associated with the 
'Recordites', with 'Fundamentalism' from the 1920's and it lives on 
today amongst some of the so called 'Creationists'.It seems to 
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4. This is largely associated with those who would call themselves 
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English Evangelical, David Winter (ex-editor of Crusade magazine) 
advocated something similar in But This I can Believe.
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the Christian Existentialism springing from Dostoyevsky and 
Kierkegaard, and the neo-liberalism of Barth and Brunner.
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115
confounds together view (a) and view (b).
12. Thackray and Morrell, Gentlemen of Science, p. 234.
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Christians’. Since none are actually cited who expressed any 
disquiet, I am reduced to the comment that speaking personally as 
an Evangelical I find it unexceptional. M.M. Garland, Cambridge, 
Before Darwin, (p. 86), is misleading in citing Coleridge’s advice 
to read the Bible like any other book - Coleridge did not deny 
its special nature.
29. Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, p. 43.
30. Wesley stresses that the Spirit is needed to make the revelation 
of the Bible effectual inside the individual e.g. in Awake Thou 
That Slee-pest (Works, p. 22-31) he stresses that the question
is ’’Hast thou the witness in thyself ?" (see also sermon on pp. 104- 
125). Simeon emphasized that without the inner working of the 
Spirit the Bible is a ’dead letter’ e.g. Works. p. 373-
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p. 133 .etc.). But this is the other v/ay around from Sedgwick. 
Coleridge had no theological framework of belief in inspiration 
which would make him expect scientific compatibility - but through 
his study of science he came empirically to believe that it did 
have. Sedgwick, on the other hand, found problems through what 
he actually discovered in science, but because of his theological 
framework of belief in inspiration had a prior religious 
expectancy that ultimately the two would prove to be compatible.
éo. K. Miller, First Impressions of England and Its People.
61. W.F. Cannon, ’The Uniformist Catastrophist Debate’, Isis. I96O,
38-46.
62. These issues will be looked at in sections (3) and (6).
63. Christian Observer. June 1834, p. 373,
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3*2 Reason, Revelation and Faith
3.2.1 Christians and Reason
The relationship between reason, inner experience, external 
evidence, and revelation in various traditions of theology are 
complex and varied. Respective pairs can be seen either as compl­
ements or as substitutes. The Deists, for example, saw reason and 
evidence as alternatives to revelation, sometimes virtually reducing 
religion to belief in God plus morals.^ Others were critical of so 
high a view of reason, though none could deny some role for it. Of
vangelicals, Wesley, for example, rejected both the subjectivism of 
Dodwell and the Deism of Tillotson. Reason, to Wesley, was neither
all nor nothing: 'It is a fundamental principle with us that to
renounce reason is to renounce religion, that religion and reason go
3
hand in hand...’ Reason was a precious gift of God, and the
4
’candle of the Lord’ , but cannot create faith, hope and love of itself. 
The understanding of faith comes when God enlightens our minds ’and 
we then see, not by a chain of reasoning but by a kind of intuition, 
by a direct view.'^ This was actually n r e  r than many have 
supposed • to men like Butler and Paley,^
In Sedgwick’s own generation, it will be useful to compare his 
views on reason with those of some recognised leaders of groups, 
such as Simeon, Ckalmers, Coleridge and Newman. Iii the present 
chapter, however, we may leave issues more specific to the ’evidences’ 
and natural religion to be dealt with separately.
Simeon accepted reason if assigned a moderate role. He wrote
’The only use of reason as applied to revelation is to ascertain
whether the revelation, purporting to be from heaven, be indeed
of Divine authority, and what is the true import of that
?
revelation in all its parts.’ But the content of that revelation
is not irrational: ’though revealed religion is neither founded
120
on human reason, nor makes its appeal to it; yet it is perfectly 
consistent with reason and approves itself to the judgement of 
everyone whose mind is enlightened by the Spirit of God.’ We 
may note, however, the last phrase, for man’s fall and the resulting 
corruption has made natural reason unreliable in spiritual matters 
(even though it may be competent in areas like science).  ^ Spiritual 
understanding was not the same as scholarly knowledge.^^ Simeon 
often preached on ’wisdom’, which he distinguished from learning.
But he even says: 'Intellect is that which distinguishes man from 
the brute creation- and the enlargement of it with arts and sciences 
is that which elevates man above his fellows...’
Thomas Chalmers' approach was not unlike Simeon's. In 1817 
he wrote :
’We do not condemn the exercise of reason in matters of 
theology... Reason can judge of the external evidences 
for Christianity, because it can discern the merits of 
human testimony: and it can perceive the truth or the
falsehood of such obvious credentials as the performance 
of a miracle, or the fulfilment of a prophecy. But reason 
is not entitled to sit in judgement over those internal 
evidences which many a presumptuous theologian has attempted 
to derive from the reason of the thing, or from the agreement 
of the doctrine with the fancied character and attributes of
i 2
the Deity...’
Chalmers objects to the judgement of the Bible's doctrines by a priori 
ideas of necessary attributes of God, in the style of Samuel Clarke.
On the more basic question of Faith ye Belief, clearly no 
Evangelical would have thought mere belief sufficient, and both 
Simeon and Chalmers emphasized active Faith.
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The Coleridgeans drew, like Wesley, from the Cambridge Platonists 
and from Law, but also from Spinoza, Kant, and the German traditions. 
Care must be taken in making any comparison with Evangelicals, 
since Coleridge used words like ’reason’ in a technical sense, 
whereas so far in this chapter the word has been used in more.
normal sense. Coleridge’s more sophisticate philosophical 
analysis distiguished various kinds of reason - following but 
not identical to the scheme of Kant. Kant, in his Critique 
of Pure Reason, called ’understanding’ the ’faculty of cognition 
through concepts’. Concepts were a means used in the mind to 
interpret sensory experience. He distinguished this from 
’Reason’, which concerned Ideas transcending experience in the 
sense that no objects can be given within experience which 
correpond to them. They are Ideas arising in the human mind’s 
tendency to seek unconditioned unifying principles - not deducible 
from experience. In The Critique of Practical Reason Kant 
elaborated on a further distinction between Pure Reason (or 
Speculative Reason) which is concerned with objects of the 
cognitive power (science etc.), and Practical Reason which concerns
Ideas involved in determining the will and the principles of 
moral conduct. Kant’s religion (cf Religion Within the Bounds of 
Reason) was based on a cold categorical imnerative, and Colin 
Brown has gone as far as to call it a ’religion without God.’ 
Coleridge’s adaptation of this adds a massive ’God consciousness’.
Coleridge distinguished three powers in the human mind - sense, 
understanding, and reason - and in every act of the mind the 
three united.'4 Understanding is a power shared with animals 
but transformed by its unique combination in man with reason.
It is a power to receive impressions and sensations, a perception of
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the physical world of space and time leading to generalisation from
this empirical data.'^ On the other hand:
’It is the Office, and as it were, the instinct of the reason,
to bring a unity into all our conceptions and several knowledges.
On this all system depends; and without this we could reflect
connectedly neither on nature nor on our own minds. Now this
is possible only on the hypothesis of a One as the ground
and cause of the universe, and which, in all succession and
through all changes, is the subject neither of time nor of
change. The One must he contemplated as eternal and 
» I T
immutable.‘
Like Kant, Coleridge distinguishes two forms of Reason:
’Contemplated distinctively in reference to formal (or abstract) 
truth, it is the Speculative Reason; but in reference to actual 
(or moral) truth, as the fountain of ideas and light of the 
conscience, we name it the Practical Reason. Whenever by 
self-subjection to this universal light, the will of the 
individual, the particular will, has become a will of reason, 
the man is regenerate: and reason is then the spirit of the
regenerated man, whereby the person is capable of a quickening
ISinter-communion with the Divine Spirit.’
Coleridge’s ’Speculative Reason’ seems the same as Kant’s - but 
his ’Practical Reason’ goes far further. To Kant it was a moral 
felt need, but primarily was a detached realisation that the 
categorical imperative (somehow self-evident - though this is one 
of the least convincing parts of Kant) led to ethical obligations.
God is introduced as a convenient hypothesis to give unity to the 
ethical system. But to Coleridge, Practical Reason does imply the 
recognition of a moral need, but also enables an actual experience
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of God to commence in a personal relationship. Bringing the 
individual will into line with Divine will brings release and 
enlightenment. Kant might be regarded as a species of Deist, in 
whose system the Christian doctrines of Jesus and Redemption had 
no structural place. Coleridge, with the centrality of his 
philosophical trinitarianism (albeit bearing the slur of pantheism) 
rethought Kantian concepts and approaches in a profoundly Christian 
way - and his God is an acting and reacting Being.
But Coleridge’s change in the meaning of ’Practical Reason' 
does lead to some confusion. In one place Coleridge insists that 
all men possess Reason equally. But communion with God depends
upon an act of Will - in response to the Divine drawing -so:
'all the organs of sense are framed for a corresponding world 
of sense; and we have it. All the organs of spirit are 
framed for a corresponding world of spirit; though the latter 
are not developed in all alike. But they exist in all, and 
their first appearance discloses itself in the moral being. 7-0 
It would not be within the purpose of this thesis to examine the 
varous arguments surrounding Coleridge’s use of the Kantian concepts 
of R e a s o n , n o r  how far ’Practical Reason’ is to be identified 
with faith* But enough has been said to show the care that 
needs to be taken in comparing statements about ‘Reason’ made 
by Evangelicals and Coleridge. They are not using the same 
language.
Xt needs, however, to be remembered that they had certain things 
in common. Both were reacting against a purely Rationalist 
analysis of (and rejection of) God. Both were rejecting the 
materialism of Hume and the descendants of Locke. This is 
true of the Romantic movement generally. Sedgwick, of course?
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was introduced to the Lake poets through the Evangelical
Clarksons. But, more deeply, we find John Keble, the High
Church poet much beloved of Evangelicals for his The Christian
2.2>
Year, recognising his affinities with Wordsworth. The 
Tractarians, too, had a common enemy in the Materialists and the 
Rationalists.
To Newman, also, reason had a place but was not enough. In 1839
he says it is usual at this day:
'To say that Faith is a moral quality, dependent upon Reason -
that Reason judges both of the evidence on which Scripture is
to be received, and of the meaning of Scripture; and that
Faith follows or not, according to the state of the heart;
that we make up our minds by Reason without Faith, and then
we proceed to adore and obey by Faith apart from Reason; that,
though Faith rests on testimony, not on reasonings, yet that
testimony, in its turn depends on Reason for the proof of its
pretensions, so that Reason is an indispensable preliminary. ^
But Newman protests:
'Will any one say that a child or uneducated person may not
savingly act on Faith, without being able to produce reasons
why he so acts ? What sufficient view has he of the
Evidences of Christianity ? What logical proof of its
divinity 7 If he has none. Faith, viewed as a habit of the
mind, does not depend upon inquiry and examination, but has
its own special basis, whatever that is, as truly as
Conscience has. We see, then, that Reason may be the
judge, without being the origin of Faith, and that Faith
. ZS'may be justified by Reason without making use of it.'
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To Newman, no less than the Evangelicals or Coleridge, head 
knowledge was neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
Faith, for Faith involved a relationship. But Newman, of course, 
speaks of that relationship as a 'habit of minci in line with his 
(by then) Migh Church convictions and approach.
3.2.7. Sedgwick on These Issues
Sedgwick believed all religious knowledge to come ultimately by
God’s self-revelation:
... we know him only as he has thought good to reveal himself,
by the law written in the heart - by the laws of the material
1-6
world - and by the declarations of his word...’
We have already seen, however, that Sedgwick had a high view of 
the Biblical revelation, and will further see in subsequent chapters 
that he by no means saw natural theology as an adequate alternative 
to Scripture. As for interpreting Scripture, Sedgwick expects us 
to use our reason:
’Our classical studies help us to interpret the oracles of God,
and enable us to read the book wherein man’s moral destinies are
7.7written, and the means of eternal life are placed before him.’ 
Though he recognised the evidence of conscience, Sedgwick himself 
does not speak in the terms of his Quaker friends about the inner 
light. The role of the Holy Spirit is not emphasized in this.
On the associated question of Faith vs Knowledge Sedgv.dck says: 
'There is a belief of the heart as well as a belief of the 
understanding. If a man have the second, and not the first, 
he may be a good logician and a learned theologian, but he 
has no religious faith. If a man have the first and scorn the
"yo
second, he is a fanatic. But a good religious man has both.’
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Two things here are apparent. First, Sedgwick is clear that 
belief is not the same as faith, and would have totally rejected 
not just Tindal, but Browne. Secondly, he would have equally 
firmly have rejected Dodwell - real faith involves the reason and 
understanding. Sedgwick recognises, of course, that a person
29
may come to faith without having worked out the reasons for it.
But he recommends that Christian men, such es those he addresses at 
the University, should seek to understand those reasons. In doing 
so he recognises that philosophy in itself is not much use against 
temptation, and has already in the Discourse recommended one of
30
Chalmers^ sermons on The Expulsive Power of a New Affection.
The balance of Sedgwick’s approach is very similar to that of 
other Evangelicals of his period. His analysis lacks any of the 
sophistication of a Coleridge, and he uses the terms in an ordinary 
sense - much as Chalmers might have done.
In further chapters and sections we may now explore more 
specifically Sedgwick’s views on the use of Christian evidences 
(both from Nature and Historical ones), in relation to views of 
others in his times.
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3.3 Christian Evidences
3.3.1 The Eighteenth Century Background
One of the key ideas in Christian epistemology concerns the role
of "evidences' for the truth of Christianity. Strictly, these include
some of natural theology - but this aspect is important enough to need
treatment in a separate section of its own. The present chapter
relates to those evidences which might broadly be called 'historical'
- evidences for the general accuracy of the Bible and the Divine
authority of its message. Wesley, for example, was one of many who
appealed to the classic proofs of miracles, prophecies, and the moral
character of its writers and teachings, to support Biblical authority.
But by the late eighteenth century the Deists had raised questions
about its historicity, and attacked the traditional proofs from
miracles exactly because miracles were incredible and against their
conceptions of natural philosophy.
Against this background, Paley made his classic statements of
the Christian evidences in 1790 and 1794. First, he dealt with
Hume's objections to miracles, arguing: 'Once believe in a God and
2
miracles are not incredible.' Hume, he said, began from an
assumption foreign to his own sceptical philosophy, dogmatically
assuming a law of uniformity of nature. On the rarity of miracles,
Paley argued that if God uses them only to make some special
point (e.g. authenticating a revelation) then we should expect 
3them to be rare. Paley also pointed to the fact that the early 
Christians suffered for their faith, and that they abandoned 
older beliefs as a result of seeing miracles. Both these point to 
the fact that they really did believe they had seen them. He 
contrasted other accounts of miracles, where the ^ accounts are 
not first or even second hand, and/or they produce no change of i. 
life or belief, and/or they incur no persecution. So other ■
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religions’ claims to miracles are rejected. Historically (In 
Evidences and in Horae Paulinae) he looked for corroborating  ^
evidences within the New Testament as in any other book. The second 
of these, for example, lOohaA at the small incidental agreements 
on historical points between Paul's epistles and the Acts 
of Luke. He concluded that 'the Gospels' actually proceeded 
from the authors whose names they bear^ , and Paul's epistles 
were genuine. In this LeMahieu says he'anticipated the 
analytic methods of the Broad Church movement., the attempt to 
read the Bible like any other book".' This comparison 
is in some senses misleading. Paley was concerned with 
evidence to convince a rational mind that the acceptance of 
the New Testament as authentic was reasonable. Hare and 
his associates were concerned with the use of historical 
methods in interpreting rather than authenticating. .
3.3.2 Evangelical Leaders and the Evidences
Simeon saw the main role of reason in regard to revelation as
'to ascertain whether the revelation, purporting to be from heaven,
be indeed of Divine authority, and what is the true import of
7that revelation in all its parts.' Reason, then, must, judge 
whether a revelation was genuinely divine. Once, however, it was 
accepted as genuine, it was our duty to receive it in its entirety, 
and reason must not be used to select from it. Simeon 
concludes, however, 'It has pleased God to give us every evidence 
of the truth of our religion, that the most scrupulous mind 
could desire. The proofs arising from prophecies and miracles,
are such as to carry irresistible conviction to every candid
8enquirer.' Elsewhere he refers to its moral goodness, and to 
the moral effects it had on believers.^  Evangelicals did not 
deny the importance of evidences, but did not believe that
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analysing or accepting evidences were either necessary or 
sufficient conditions for faith. Simeon distinguishes 'the
theoretical religion' ('everything that is necessary to prove the 
truth of Christianity') and 'practical religion' ('whatever is 
required of those who embrace it'). But though knowledge of the 
evidences is neither a substitute for nor a guarantee of faith and 
commitment, it may be a useful stimulus to them. Simeon did not
deny this, and one of his proteges and intimate friend>produced a
11
two volume set on the Christian evidences in 1828-I83O.
Chalmers followed a similar line to Simeon. His l8l? work
The Evidences and Authority of the Christian Revelation looks at
evidences for the authenticity of the New Testament documents
very much in the tradition of Paley - and, like Paley, Chalmers
cites the works of the nonconformist Lardner. To Chalmers,
12too, miracles and prophecy are important. Chalmers, like
13Simeon, regards study of the evidences as neither a necessary
12i
nor a sufficient condition for faith, for faith concerns 
feeling, obedience and submission. This, however, is not to deny 
that they are a useful tool to aid and stimulate faith.
3.3.3 The Coleridgeans and the Evidences
If we now turn to the Coleridgeans we find a quite different 
attitude. Coleridge disliked the whole project of presenting 
Christian 'evidences', not merely because it was insufficient but 
because it was a positive distraction:
'I more than fear the prevailing taste for books of 
natural theology, physico-theology, demonstrations of 
God from Nature, evidences of Christianity and the like. 
Evidences of Christianity I I am weary of the word.
Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if you can.
132
to the self knowledge of his need for it; and you may
safely trust it to its own Evidence, — remembering only
the express declaration of Christ himself: No man
cometh to me, unless the Father leadeth him.'^ ^
In a letter to Derwent in 1826 Coleridge says:’when 1 read 
Paley, Watson, or indeed any one of the Evidence-mongers.- They
are outrages (on) Logic, ‘and insults on Common sense...
Boulger makes some suggestions for reasons behind Coleridge's
17
vehemence towards Paley. Boulger explains that Coleridge believed
such thinkers to be arguing about the wrong material in the wrong way.
'In this class must be placed most of the Barapton and Boyle lecturers
on the Evidences of Christianity and natural theology, as well as
many an individual divine. The progenitor of all this activity was
William Paley, the arch-enemy Coleridge appointed for himself.
Boulger sees Coleridge's opposition on a deeper metaphysical
foundation, in the context of his rejection of Lockian materialism.
Two specific foci of the evidences theme might also be
taken up. The first concerns miracles. Pym speaks of
Coleridge's conviction 'that miracle is not the foundation of
faith, as Paley had it, but a consequent. Now Coleridge saw
miracle as both a concrete occurrence and a spiritual turning
point in the present day believer.Barth adds that not
only is recognition of a miracle as such 'a result of faith
rather than its cause’, but Coleridge objected to speaking of
20miracles as 'suspension of the laws of nature.' Coleridge
does not like any semblance of a distinction between the supposed 
normal sphere of providence and the sphere of the supernatural.
The key to miracles is in their sign value, not in suspension of 
supposed laws. Pym concludes: 'Therefore what took place in 
Palestine two thousand years ago only becomes a miracle because
133an individual in the present decides that for him it conveys an
21important spiritual ’truth’.' Pym nay perhaps here be exaggerating
Coleridge's subjectivity, and likewise on the historicity of the
gospels as he states Coleridge came to believe 'that the Gospels
are not essentially factual accounts, but rather statements of the
22significance of Jesus for the writers living some time after...'
23
Pym picture)Coleridge as a precursor of D.F. Strauss which may be
extreme, but certainly he had less interest in the historical
24-nature of the Bible than most.
Julius Hare may show the influence of Coleridge in the passsige in 
his The Victory of Faith where he speaks of the rise of Rationalism 
after Luther had 'arisen with the spirit, and power of Elias' to 
proclaim faith:
'But the progress of knowledge and civilisation produced its 
usual effect. The pride of knowledge bred the lust of
knowledge; and the lust of knowledge pampered the pride of
knowledge: and again it became a very general opinion that
the belief of the understanding is one and the same thing with
Christian Faith; and that this belief is to be grounded on
testimony. Hence we were inundated with dissertations on
the external evidences of Christianity; in which it was
treated like any other historical fact, and witnesses were
sifted and cross examined; but without regard to the main
witness, the witness in the heart of the believer himself,
in his infirmities, his wants and his cravings,- the witness
along with which the Spirit bears witness in groanings which
cannot be uttered. This, the only witness on which a living
Faith in Christ can be established, was left out of sight :
and so it is little to be wonderqd at if the Gospel half
25
melted away into a system of philanthropical morality.'
134
This appears to be a kind of mixture of Evangelicalism and Coleridge, 
fairly unique to Hare. But the suspicion of the 'evidences' is 
marked, and shows a different perspective from (say) Simeon or 
Chalmers.
F.D.Maurice vnrites to Kingsley in 1863:
'I am glad you can speak so respectfully of Paley's Evidences 
as you do in your Preface. I have a sneaking regard for him 
as a good, tough North of England man, not spoiled by his 
cleverness as a lawyer. But 1 have been fighting against him 
all my days; 1 cannot help thinking he has done much to 
demoralise Cambridge, and to raise up a set of Divines 
who turn out a bag infidel on Sundays to run him down, fixing 
exactly where he shall run, and being exceedingly provoked 
if he finds any holes and corners which they do not happen 
to know of.'^^
In 1863 many of the battles had already been fought, and Maurice 
could afford some private magnanimity to Paley. But he had already 
said in the same letter:
'To me there is an overpowering evidence for the Resurrection 
in the concurrence of the testimony through all nature, and in 
my own being, that Death must have been overcome, that it 
cannot be my master as my downward inclination leads me to 
think it is - with the testimony of straightforward honest 
men, "We saw Him after he was risen, though we thought the 
thing too good to be true." But their testimony without 
the other could not affect me. 1 must cast it aside, let 
those who spoke it be ever so honest.'
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3.3.4 Nev/man and '.Vhateley
We have seen tiat the Coleridgeans, in disparaging the evidences,
differed from the Evangelicals. They differed also from Newman, who
in 1839 summed up what 'seems to me to be meant when persons disparage
the Evidences.' The critics, he says, may feel that religious minds
will embrace the Gospel anyway, and that on the irreligious the
27eVidenc.es are anyway wasted. But Newman argues that the evidences 
are of use to some. They test the honesty of unbelievers, a «ici Vie ip 
perplexed believers who may be harassed by objections by encouraging 
their faith. Moreover, 'even in the case of the most established 
Christians they are a source of gratitude and reverent admiration,
28and a means of confirming faith and hope.* Not even a perfect 
evidence would produce a living faith, but the 'probabilities' the 
evidences afford encourage- where faith exists^
Finally, it is interesting that although Whately has been placed 
by some in a 'Broad Church' with the Coleridgeans, on the 'evidences' 
issue they stood poles apart. Even LeMahieu (who accepts the concept 
of the 'Broad Church') admits that: 'Unlike many other members
of the Broad Church movement, V/hately felt neither alarmed nor 
mentally invigorated by German metaphysics and biblical criticism.'
His emphasis on logic and disputation is described by Tuckwell:
'In thus removing theological belief from the domain of authority 
and faith to the domain of well instructed reasoning, the Archbishop 
probably impressed the lesson he desired.Whately's logical 
and cerebral approach (which differed as much from the Evangelicals 
as from Coleridge) led him to appreciate Paley's Evidences, and he 
published a new edition in I839.
3.3.3  Sedgwick and the Evidences
We have seen that in Sedgwick's generation the Coleridgeans were
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distinctive amongst all t6e theological parties in disparaging the' 
evidences. What, then, was Sedgwick’s attitude, and how far was he 
a part of a ’Cambridge Network’ influenced by Coleridgean theology ? 
This question is the more significant because, as Garland well
30
spells out , Paley came to have an important place and influence in 
the Cambridge curriculum. Garland adds that the Coleridgeans, who 
disliked emphasis on the evidences, were ’not surprisingly, offended 
by the naive blend of Bible and Paley which passed for theology at
f
Cambridge. But a naive blend of Bible and Paley would probably 
characterise much of Sedgwick’s thinking. He says:
'I earnestly recommend the Cambridge undergraduates... to study
the Evidences of Paley. His work is short and clear, appeals
to the first principles of common sense and feeling, and forms
an established part of our academic course. It is not, however,
a very learned work, and may not on that account satisfy one
whose delight is in deep learning; and it gives us none of the
baseless visions of transcendentalism, and cannot therefore
satisfy a Pantheist... but truth is its aim, and common sense
its element, and it puts before the unsophisticated heart and
reason a far more convincing weight of evidence than is found
ytin any other English work.'
Sedgvrick goes on to recommend Paley’s other work, the Horae Paulinae 
saying that the reader: 'will see a proof nothing short of moral 
demonstration that the book called "The Acts of the Apostles," is 
substantially a true history of facts and opinions.' Writing to 
James Smith in 1855» Sedgvfick says that if he ever was drifting 
to Deism he was arrested in it by Butler 'who proved to me that 
there was no refuge in deism' . He continues:
'Still there were difficulties. Had we the Bible in its
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nurity ? Had it not been tampered with ? Was it not therefore 
mythical in part ? Paley's Horae Paulinae was the first work 
that on such questions set my heart at rest. He proved to 
demonstration that the Epistles of Paul and the Acts of Luke 
were real historical documents and substatially true... come 
back to your book. I would put it side by side with the 
Horae Paulinae as a demonstrative proof, so far as it goes, 
of the historical truth of the gospel narrative. St Luke 
and St Paul were true men and published what they believed 
true. We cannot separate the historical part of their works 
from the theological, or the natural from the supernatural.
They must stand or fall together.'
James Smith was a commi&ed member of the Church of Scotland, and 
from a thorough knowledge both of nautical questions and of critical 
and historical sources i-nrote his very detailed analysis to show that 
the gospels were early accounts of eye witnesses to many of the events
and that the details of Lulie's history of St Paul's travels were
) je c
3i
reliable. Its effect on Sedgwick was profound, and the sub t
of St Paul's travels formed a basis for some of his sermons.'
We have already seen (part 3»2»'l-) that Sedgwick did not mistake 
belief and knowledge for faith, and he was also clear that the signs 
of faith were exhibition of Christian graces - not abilities in 
tracing oui proofs of religious truth?'’ Nevertheless he does assign 
some importance to the evidences . much along the lines of other 
Evangelicals of the times. He shows no sign whatsoever of any of 
the distinctively Coleridgean approach or the. issue.
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(4) NATURAL THEOLOGY
4.1 The Nineteenth Century Background
4.1.1 The Intellectual Heritage
The present section deals with natural theology, both in its 
arguments from moral sense and in its physico-theology. But first 
v;e need to recognise the long heritage in English thinking on these.
Robert Boyle became concerned that the rising (though small) 
number of atheists might try to see in the 'mechanical philosophy' 
a basis for their infidelity. In I69O, therefore, he wrote The 
Christian Virtuoso  ^ arguing that a better knowledge of nature 
pointed rather to acknowledgement of a creator. He also founded a 
series of lectures (the first by Bentley in 1692) on this theme, and 
an extensive literature, particularly on physico-theology, developed.
The controversy increasingly centred on the Deists or semi-Deists 
rather than atheists, and works of Locke, Toland, Collins, and 
Tindal were seen as denying the importance of revelation and sometimes 
substituting a God—of—nature for the Biblical God. Butler, in 1736, 
wrote his famous Analogy, arguing that any Deist who accepted a God 
of nature could find nothing to object to in the Bible, since
I
analogies always existed in nature for the truths taught in Scripture. 
Butler remained of great importance to Sedgwick's generation, as did 
that later l8th centur^ r figure William Paley. Paley's refinement of 
the watch analogy argued that.the argument from design stood even if 
one had never seen a watch made and could not fully understand its 
working.^  From nature, he argued God's omnipotence, omniscience,
2
omnipresence, self existence, necessary existence, and spirituality. 
Both Butler and Paley were basically orthodox in theology.^ On 
most issues their respective v.ritings were complementary, but on one
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issue they were opposed. Butler had written:
'There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience 
in every man, which distinguishes between the internal / 
principles of his heart as well as his external actions ; which 
passes judgement upon himself and them, pronounces determinately 
some actions to be in themselves just, right, good, others to
If
be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust...'
Paley, however, said either such a moral sense did not exist, or
else it was too affected by prejudice or habit to be reliable.^
Paley's defence of Christian ethics was purely logical, prefiguring
the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham^ by portraying the way to find
God’s will as an enquiry into 'the tendency of the action to promote
n
or diminish the general happiness.' With the exception, then, of 
the 'plurality of worlds' issue (which is dealt with separately below), 
between them Butler and Paley had stated or restated all the following 
issues of natural theology which interested the early nineteenth 
century 'intellectuals:
(a ) The physico-theological argument that design implied a designer.
(B) The arguments from analogy against Deist objections to 
Christianity.
(C) The natural theological arguments for the morality of God:
(i) (Paley) from physical design of the world providing for
pleasure rather than pain CPaley tied this to 
his 'utilitarian' ethics).
(ii) (Butler) from conscience and a universal human experience. 
The remamder of the present chapter considers the reactions, these
issues,of the various nineteenth century church parties (examined as 
previously by looking at the views of selected leading members), 
as a context for consideratirn of Sedgwick and his immediate circle. 
Put briefly, virtually all cWrch parties favoured Butler rather than
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Paley on point (C), though Coleridge seems more indebted "^ o Kant than 
Butler for analysis of concepts like conscience. Leading moderate 
Evangelicals and the Newman school united in accepting (A) and (B;, 
though none saw such rational considerations as a substitute for faith, 
whilst Coleridge and his school were notable in their lukewarmness 
to any such ’rational’ arguments at all.
4.1.2 Evangelical Anglicans
The attitude of moderate Evangelicals to natural theology was
cautiously positive. Charles Simeon noted St Paul’s comments in 
Romans chapter 1 that the Gentiles are'without excuse’^ . From the 
creation they could have traced things up to a ’First Cause’. Simeon 
asserts that a Supreme Being is generally recognised, but feels that 
the Gentiles went little beyond this. He feels that natural religion 
has value only or mainly to those within the light of revelation:
'the variety and beauty of the things existing in this 
terraqueous globe, all so adapted to their respective offices 
and uses, and all subservient to one grand design, the glory of 
their Creator, evince that his wisdom and goodness are equal to
Ci'
his power...’
He accepts the watch analogy'^ (he had read Paley), and thinks the 
world shows signs of design. His words just quoted actually speak of 
the goodness of God. This might seem to reflect Paley (my point (C)
(i) above), but Simeon's is an unsophisticated argument based on the 
beauty of creation (Simeon, after all, made no claims of a profound 
philosophy). In any event, to Simeon (as to other Evangelicals) the
arguments of natural theology (like the 'evidences' looked at 
e&rlier) were of limited value. The real basis of Christianity was 
faith in God, and Simeon remains ambivalent on how far any such 
objective arguments may lead to this.
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Simeon's fellow leading Evangelical Anglican, J.B. Sumner, seems 
rather more enthusiastic for natural religion. In I816 he wrote: 
'When, however, the genius of this illustrious age had set up 
the Protestant faith and the rule of life belonging to it, on 
an immovcakit basis, the attention was naturally directed, in 
the next place, to those without the pale of Christianity, 
Accordingly, its agreement on all points with the universal 
tenets of natural religion, botbto inform and to sanction the 
acquaintances we derive from reason with the Creator and his 
attributes, and the conformity of the appearance of the universe 
with the conclusions at which reason arrives; these subjects of 
perpetual interest have called forth talents worthy of their 
importance and have received an accession of light from learning, 
genius and industry, through the successive generations of 
Stillingfleet, Butler, Warburton and Paley. It is hopeless to 
look for a vacant spot in a district so fully occupied,.,’'^ 
Sumner's book proceeded to a kind of 'evidences' theme concerning 
the superiority of the Hebrew records over those of other nations.
This sets the scene for moderate Evangelical Anglican views on
natural theology for the first three decades of the nineteenth
century. The Christian Oberver maintained this approach in its
reviews of respective Bridgewater Treatises. Natural theology had
some • (even though limited) value - as long as kept in its proper
place. But, as the editorial commented on Brougham's Discourse: 'A
work on natural theology may be essentially either a Christian book
2_
or a Deistical one - a useful auxiliary or'an insidious rival.''
4.1.3  Evangelical Dissenters
Amongst Evangelical Dissenters, the leading Baptist of the very 
early nineteenth century was certainly Robert Hall. He was, in fact,
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a resident minister in‘Cambridge from 1?91-1804, and then moved to 
Leicester from l807 from whence he occasionally revisited Cambridge,
He was basically a non-calvinist Evangelical - though ironically 
not on goou terms with Simeon after one of the latter's rare unguarded 
comments on a religio-political issue. His eloquence was generally 
regarded as unparalleled, and his reputation stood high amongst 
both Dissenters and Anglican Evangelicals.'^
In theology, one can see why his moderate Evangelicalism struck a 
chord with Sedgwick. He defended the Anglican Evangelicals against 
Locke's charges of 'enthusiasm'''^ , and thought Laud a bigot and the 
High Church a 'thinly disguised popery'.*^
On Biblical inspiration he warns against too great deviation 
from Scripture words, for the apostle Paul says that he used words 
taught him by the Holy Spirit:
'We do not, indeed, contend that, in the choice of every
particular word or, phrase, he was immediately inspired, but we
think it reasonable to believe, that the unction vjhich was on 
his heart, and the perfect illumination which he possessed,
led him to employ such terms in the statement of the mysteries
of Christianity, as were better adapted that [sic] any other to
57.
convey their real import ...'
Of Paley's Evidences he says that they are:
'probably, without exception, the most clear and satisfactory
statement of the historical proofs of the Christian religion
(g
ever exhibited in any age or country.'
He himself repeats Paley's arguments about the watch, the structure 
of the eye as evidence for design, etc. He argues that the suggestion 
that there was never a beginning, but an eternal succession of mortal 
creatures, is absurd. There must be some eternal Being. In all this 
he is Quite Paleyan.
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On morality, however, he attacks the Paleyan ideas of expediency.,
He refers to:
'The simplicity of our ancestors, nourished by the sincere milk
of the word... was content to let morality remain on the firm
basis of the dictates of conscience and the will of God. They
considered virtue as something ultimate ... never sunposed for
a moment there was any thing to which it stood merely in the
2-0
relation of a means ...'
'How is it ... we have ... undertaken, after the lapse of six 
thousand years, to manufacture a morality of our own, to decide 
by a cold calculation of interest, by a ledger book of profit 
and of loss, the preference of truth to falsehood, of piety 
to blasphemy, and of humanity and justice to treachery and 
blood?' .... In executing this plan, the jurisdiction of 
conscience is abolished...*
'by a strange inversion, the indirect influence of Christianity, 
in promoting the temporal good of mankind, is mistaken for its 
principal ena...'
Hall's attacks are witty, eloquent, and from a Christian point of 
view devastating. He mentions Hume as the one who first brought the 
principle 'into public notice'; but adds: 'It has since been rendered 
popular by a succession of eminent vnriters; by one especially, (I 
doubt not with intentions very foreign to those of I4r. Hume), whose 
great service to religion in other respects, together with ray high 
reverence for his talents, prevent me from naming.' This was 
obviously Paley.
The Pauline use of the word 'conscience* (syndeisis) made it 
natural enough for Evangelicals to reject Paley on this point, and 
Hall was not the first. As early as I789 Gisbourne, in his 
Principles of Moral Philosophy, had attacked 'expediency' as a basis
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for morality, and William Wilberforce, fdr one, agreed with him.
But Hall attacked it the most eloquently, and it was his influence, as 
we shall see, which affected Sedgwick.
We have seen that leading moderate Evangelical Anglicans tended 
to be sympathetic to natural theology (whilst emphasizing its 
limitations) but not sophisticated in its application. The 
Scottish Evangelicals were not only sympathetic but had.amongst 
their leaders figures like Chalmers, Brewster and Miller, whose 
interest in science and in natural theology was deep rooted and
profound. Chalmers, the most important of them, showed an interest 
soon after his Evangelical conversion, writing in 181?:
’It is truly a most Christian exercise to extract a sentiment of
piety from the works and appearances of nature. It has the
authority of the Sacred Writers on its side, and even our
Saviour himself gives it the weight and authority of his
example: 'Behold the lilies.,.' He expatiates on the beauty of
a simple flower, and draws from it the delightful argument
2.5
of confidence in God...'
How far these Discourses are truly 'natural theology' is 
doubtful, David Cairns has suggested that they are really 
more a tracing out of physical illustrations of prior theo­
logical beliefs Yet they do reflect his manifest interest 
in natural theology, which blossomed in later works.
Without going into Crosbie Smith's distinction between natural
history and natural philosophyl'^ we may note his conclusion that
'for Chalmers, God's natural attributes of omniscience, power,
omnipresence, unity, eternity and self-existence were known through
25
both natural theology and revelation.' But some further points 
need also to be made.
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First, Chalmers was sceptical of the possibility of discerning
the morality of God through physico-theology. In the l8l?
Discourses he wrote:
'Without the testimony of an authentic messenger from heaven,
1 can know nothing of heaven's counsels. 1 never heard of a
moral telescope that can bring to my observation the doings or
the deliberations which are taking place in the: sanctuary of the 
21
eternal.'
He rejected Paley's vision of happy shrimps, together with
its associated utilitarian ethic: the world showed many natural
disasters, 'wasteful volcanoes' and 'sweeping hurricanes and 
10
floods' . Thus 'When the good and the ill of life are looked 
to in themselves, they seem wholly in-capable of being turned 
to any theological conclusion which can at all be depended on.'
Yet Chalmers did believe that natural theology (as embracing more 
than physico-theology) could reveal something of God's moral 
ntkvre. Professor Rice has emphasized Chalmers'belief that the 
most powerful and convincing argument in nature for the existence of 
God is in the universality and sovereignty of conscience. He sees 
in this Bulter's influence, noting Chalmers' words that 'It was 
Butler's Analogy which made me a Christian.'^*' His Bridgewater 
Treatise was v/ritten from a viewpoint that an appropriate study 
of man's moral nature, even without revelation, reveals much 
of ethics. Our God^given consciences are such that we auto­
matically experience pleasure when acting virtuously and pain 
when acting wrongly; a. society, moreover, whose members 
act virtuously, will prosper Thus he saw arguments for the 
wisdom and goodness of God as manifested in the creation - 
as the Bridgewater series indicated by its title. Butler is
acknowledged as 'the first who made [conscience] the subject
IP)of a full and reflex cognisance' , and Chalmers argues very
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strongly that the God-given 'faculty* of conscience is where 
'Nature offers to us far her strongest argument for the moral 
character of God,'^^ On moral philosophy, then, Chalmers (like, as 
we shall see, Whewell and Sedgwick)accepted Butler against Paley, 
with little or no discernable influence from Coleridge.
On Natural Theology in general, however, Chalmers placed 
limitations. First, it should never be used (as Chalmers 
accused Samuel Clarke and his followers of doing) to pre-
'3>5
determine or pre-judge God's character as given in revelation. 
Objective reason might test the credentials of a divine messenger, 
but not judge of the content of his message. Chalmers links 
this to 'Lord Bacon's philosophy', adding that science 
flourishes because 'her votaries have learned to abandon their 
own creative speculations, and to submit to e v i d e n c e T h i s ,  
again, parallels Sedgwick's attitude to such issues, though 
(as we shall see) Sedgwick was perhaps more consistent in 
his application of them in areas like the 'Plurality of Worlds' 
debate. But the true empiricist does not prejudge what 'must' 
be true either in science or theology.
The second limitation concerns how far natural theology 
can lead. In this context it has two basic functions. First, 
it can function (as in Butler) by removing the objections of 
Infidels or Deists. Secondly, and allied to this, it can 
show a man clearly the human predicament and problem^' So 
Chalmers asserts:
'In vain do we listen for one authentic word of comfort 
from any of its oracles ... It can state the difficulty - 
having just as much knowledge as to enunciate the problem 
Natural theology may see as much as shall draw forth 
the anxious interrogation, 'What shall I do to be saved?'
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1 G.
The answer to this comes from a higher theology.'
Chalmers'whole approach is in the same milieu as Sedgwick's, 
and it is no surprise to find him expressing appreciation of 
Whewell's Bridgewater^^ and of Sedgwick's D i s c o u r s e A  
comparison of Chalmers with Brewster and/or Miller would be 
interesting, but beyond my present scope, though I shall later 
make some comments on a specific issue.
4.1.4 The Goleridgeans
I have already quoted the words of Coleridge: *I more than 
fear the prevailing taste for books of natural theology, 
physico-theology, demonstrations of God from Nature and the 
like. Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word.'^^
In chapter 3.5 we contrasted attitudes of Evangelicals and Coleridge 
to Christian evidences in general. Here his words are repeated 
to emphasize that he specifically applied his criticisms to the 
areas of natural theology. In contrast to the cautiously favourable 
attitude of Evangelicals, Coleridge saw natural theology as a 
positive distraction. This is important to remember when we consider 
recent claims that the natural theology within the BAAS was allied to 
a supposedly * Broad Church’ theology. We may also note that
i
Coleridge's emphasis is not particularly Kantian. Kant had attacked 
the ontological proof as invalid, and had gone on:
'Thus we see chat the physico-theological proof, baffled in its 
own undertaking, takes suddenly refuge in the cosmological
y
proof, and this is only the ontological proof in disguise.
But Kant himself went on to argue God from necessity arising 
out of the logical 'practical reasoning' based on the self- 
evident categorical imperative - a line different from
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Coleridgean idealism. Coleridge shares Kane's rejection of 
physico-theology, but on different grounds.
Coleridge also rejected Paley's utilitarian ethics, but 
again not along particularly Kantian lines. LeMahieu 
summarises Coleridge's view:
'(Paley's) ethics and politics were an open declaration 
of moral bankruptcy. Narrow, superficial, and external, 
the doctrine of expediency was heathen rather than 
Christian ... his passionate complaints against Paley 
bore a remarkable resemblance to the earlier denunciations 
of the Evangelicals. Both substituted an ethic of inward 
conscience and spiritual obligation for the abstract, 
rational, and moral system of Paley.'
4.1.3 Newman and Whately
Nei^an, in 1830, confusingly acknowledges debts both to 
Coleridge and Butler in a sermon on natural and revealed 
religion.Within 'natural religion’ Newman (like Chalmers et 
ah) emphasizes the importance of the evidence of indwelling 
conscience. In this way his 'natural religion' differed from 
Paley's. But his conclusion is:
'Natural Religion teaches, it is true, the infinite power 
and majesty, the wisdom and goodness, the presence, the 
moral governance, and in one sense, the unity of the 
Deity; but it gives little or no information respecting
y.5
what may be called his Personality.'
Later (1846) Anglo Catholic and early member of the Oxford 
Movement W. Palmer produced a book called : The Doctrine of 
Development and Conscience considered in relation to the Evidences
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of Christianity. Baden Powell rather gleefully reviewed this, 
expressing his satisfaction that Palmer had realised the only 
alternative to being rational was to be mystical, but declining 
Palmer's particular conclusions.4^)
Neximian himself, in maturity, wrote (1859):
'Ward thinks I hold that moral obligation is, because 
there is a God. But I hold just the reverse, viz. there 
is a God, because there is a moral obligation. I have 
a certain feeling on my mind which I call conscience.
When I analyse this, I feel it involves the idea of a 
Father and a Judge, - of one who sees my heart, etc 
It is interesting, incidentally, that in the same year (1859) 
Whately, who accepted most of Paley, made it clear in his new 
edition of Paley's Principles chat he accepted the Butlerian 
concept of conscience rather than Paley's moral philosophy.
It really does seem to have been a widespread Christian 
reaction to reject Paley's principle of expediency in ethics.
What we have seen, therefore, is that virtually all schools 
of nineteenth century Christian thought rejected Paley’s ethical 
system. The Goleridgeans went further in also depre dating his 
natural theology.
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1. Paley, Natural Theology, pp. 2-4.
2. Ibid., p. 293.
3. See Yule, PhD Thesis, The Impact of British Religious Thought in 
the Second Quarter of the Nineteenth Century for comment on both.
See e.g. Gladstone's Butler: Subsidury Studies (1896) p. 109 on
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Butler's orthodoxy, and D.L. LeMahieu, The Mind of William Paley 
p. 27 on Paley. Both men's Sermons are also of particular interest.
4. Sermons, cited in Austin Duncan-Jones, Butler's Moral Philosophy.
3. Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy.
6. Bentham, having discovered Priestley's phrase 'greatest happiness
of the greatest number', published his book in 1789. Bentham, of
course, refers to a personified 'Nature* rather than to God.
7- Paley (ref. 3), was published in 1783.
Î, E.g. Works, 13, p. 17 fv
Works. 6, p. 126,
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Hennell and Pollard (Eds,), Charles Simeon, p.33).
U. Sumner, A Treatise on the Records of Creation. 1_» P* 97.
12. Christian Observer, 1833, Ü »  p. 697. Other periodicals were
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example, reviewing Chalmers' Bridgewater Treatise, (October l833, i5, 
%40-2SZ) defends, with Chalmers, the right use of natural theology 
in spite of the danger that 'the majesty and supremacy of Revela­
tion should be compromised by all this bustling indagation 
throughout the regions of Natural Theology.' Noting the infection
1&3
of Rationalist ideas and those around us who are ’sinking into 
the stagnant ’’oblivious pool" of unbelief’, they ask: ’Is natural 
theology, then, forbidden to stretch out a hand for their 
deliverance, lest, peradventure, she should land them on the 
barren shores of Deism...?’ The British Critic thinks not.
Hopkins refers to this controversy (Charles Simeon, p. 192), though 
gives a version perhaps rather coloured by Simeon’s viewpoint. The 
letter Hall wrote is printed in The Works of Robert Hall - with a 
brief memoir of his life, Ed. O.G. Gregory, p.332.
The Anglican Christian Observer' printed a series of sermons from 
Hall, and in 1833 reviewed Gregory's book (ref. 13). It speaks of 
• his ’extraordinary talents and eloquence', and says that 'whoever 
went to Cambridge, whether Whig, Tory or Democrat, must as a 
matter of course' go to hear him (p. 96). The British Critic 
likewise eulogised him in April 1835 (pp. 292-538).
15. Gregory (ref.l3J, p. 324, etc.
,1. Ibid., pp. 297 and 313.
i7 . Ibid., p. 283*
12. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
7.0. Ibid.
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7,1. Ibid.
Ibid.
See above, chapter 4.1, note 33.
The Life of William Wilberforce, 2, p. 233.
Chalmers, A Series of Discourses on the Christan Revelation
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’Thomas Chalmers’ Astronomical Discourses’, Scottish Journal of 
Theology, 1956, £, p. 410-421.
’From Design to Dissolution’, JBLHS, 1979, 12, p. 59-70.
ZS. Ibid., p. 6l.
Ibid., p. 90.
30. On the Defects of Natural Theology, Works, 2, pp. 338-420.
3V. ’The Thought of Thomas Chalmers’. Scottish Journal of Theology,
1971, 24, p. 35.
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35. The Evidence and Authority of the Christian Revelation, pp. 274-3.
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377. For their two points see Rice (ref. 31), p. 37-39. '
38. Chalmers (ref. 30), 2, p. 417.
38. Works, 1, 193n.
EC. Letter to Whewell, Trinity Collection Add Ms a 202.23.
lf,\ • See above p. I80 f; quotations are also given to show similarities 
in the approaches of Hare and Maurice.
1^ 2* Critique of Pure Reason, Div 2; 3.6.
Zj_3. LeMahieu, The Mind of William Paley, p. 157; other books on
Coleridge (e.g. Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine, p. 195; 
Boulger, Coleridge as a Religious Thinker, p. 33; Garland chs.
3 and 4) also comment-this. The quotation has been given fully to
155
illustrate the irony that, whilst specifically recognising the 
similarity of attitude to Paley of Coleridge and the Evangelicals 
before him, LeMahieu (as we shall see in part 4.2.1) appears to 
miss the Evangelical influence on Sedgwick on this issue, and 
speaks of the inspiration of Coleridge.
Uif!,. The Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion Respectively 
p. 23n; p. 31.
45. Ibid., p. 22.
. Edinburgh Review, Oct. l84?, p. 397-4l8.
47. Unpublished paper given in The Argument From Conscience to 
the Existence of God According to J.H. Newman by Boekraad and 
Tristram. From a rather less ’High' position, the British 
Critic, reviewing Abercrombie's The Philosophy of the Moral 
Feelings (published 1833, reviewed with Whewell's Bridgewater 
July 1833, vol. p. 72-113) states: ’It was the achievement 
of Butler to assert the supremacy of conscience and to expose 
the calumnious sophistry which resolves all our best dispositions 
and actions into mere modes and manifestations of selfishness.’
(p. 83). It then continues to attack Paley’s 'Low and defective 
representation of moral goodness.'
1564.2 Sedgwick and Natural Theology
4,2,1 Introduction
As we have seen, a number of modern writers assume that Sedgwick 
(amongst others such as Whewell) shared some kind of 'Broad Church' 
membership with a group amongst whom Hare and Maurice were leaders 
and who were much influenced by Coleridge. Cannon actually goes 
as far as to portray Sedgwick as part of a 'scientific node' which, 
with a 'theological node', comprised one set of people he calls the 
'Cambridge Network'. Coleridge's supposed influence has also 
been specifically connected with Whewell and Sedgwick's rejection 
of Paley's ethics. LeMahieu, who^as we saw^noted Coleridge's 
similarity to the Evangelicals on Paleyan ethics, was nevertheless 
specific on the inspiration of Sedgwick's views on the issue:
'What finally broke the hegemony of the Principles [i.e. Paley's 
on morality] was its repudiation by a small but enormously 
powerful group of Cambridge thinkers who, inspired by the 
rising star of Coleridge, despised utilitarianism and wished 
its influence swept from the university. Their antipathy 
found one of its most powerful expressions in Adam Sedgwick's 
Discourse on the Studies of the University...^
LeMahieu's book is interesting on Coleridge, but his main cited
sources for Sedgwick appear unreliable. From Winstanley he
has derived the contentious view that Sedgwick was 'Temperamental
2
and often outrageously unfair' , from Cilljspie he has some 
not very accurate comments about Sedgwick's controversy with 
Lyell, and the comments on ethics contain a footnote to Cannon's 
1964 article on 'The Cambridge Network'.
Martha McMackin Garland, in Cambridge Before Darwin, though
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more careful in the way she phrases it, still seems (in page 88, note 
107) to imply that ’Coleridge’s influence was important’ in the views 
of the Cambridge scientists who contributed to ’the University’s 
rejection of Paleyan thought in favour of a more organic social view.’
t
Thackray and Morrell are much less careful:
’Trinity college was a seminary of the Broad Church or liberal
Anglican Movement. JVC. Hare and Cocmop Thirlwall, who were
Trinity tutors, helped to articulate that blend of Kantian
idealism, toleration, and Coleridgean conservatism which came to
characterize the Movement, and which appeared as much in the
scientifico-moral tracts of Whewell as in the Movements more
directly theological and political writings. The liberal
Anglican theology of the ’Cambridge Network’ rapidly became the
unofficial credo of the BAAS, with important theological and
3
practical results.’
The assertion of this thesis is that the Coleridge connection, if not 
the whole concept of the ’Cambridge Network’, is largely myth. Our 
particular concern here is with Sedgwick, and the present chapter 
focuses on him. But he has been linked particularly to Whewell, 
especially in their common rejection of Paleyan ethics, and so some 
comment on Whewell’s position on these issues will also be helpful.
It must be said that Whewell appears less Evangelical in tone than 
Sedgwick, and certainly stood closer to Hare in personal terms. Yet 
even his natural theology was not Coleridgean in tone, and (as we shall 
see) his moral philosophy was consciously related to Butler rather ■ 
than Coleridge. As for Sedgwick, far from sharing any supposed 
’liberal Anglican theology’ in the BAAS, his theology was nearer to 
a ’naive brand of Paley and Bible* which (as Garland says) the 
Coleridgeans deprecated. His moral philosophy and rejection of 
Paleyanism (again as we shall see) was consciously based on the
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Evangelical critique of Robert Hall. Both in moral philosophy and . 
in natural theology Sedgwick stood much closer to the Evangelical 
traditions than to Coleridge.
The evidence for these assertions will be presented presently, 
but it will be useful to note at this point the way in which 
the dominant idea of supposed 'liberal Anglicanism' within 
Thackray and Morrell leads to a total obscurity of the 
moderate Evangelical position (as represented by the Christian 
Observer and the Scottish group around Chalmers). Frederick 
Nolan is taken^  as typical of 'Evangelical Christians given 
to a literal interpretation of Genesis'. The 'enchantment' 
of Chalmers with the 1833 BAAS meeting, the fact that he was 
'particularly impressed by Sedgwick' and became intimate with 
Sedgwick and Whewell, the fact that he as the leading Scottish 
Evangelical met there the leading English Evangelical Simeon 
(though not for the first time as they seem to imply) are 
all mentioned . Yet on p. 237 we read:
'In 1833 at Cambridge, Sedgwick as President pressed the 
case for natural theology, being conveniently joined by 
Thomas Chalmers, the evangelical Scottish Presbyterian.
No fewer than five authors of Bridgewater Treatises 
(Whewell, Buckland, Chalmers, Prout and Kirby) were 
present at the 1833 Meeting, thus confirming the close 
alliance between the British Association and the liberal 
natural theologians.'
The irony of putting the leading Scottish Evangelical theologian 
of his period in with the 'liberal natural theologians' is 
immense. But the phraseology makes it sound as though 
Chalmers' presence was almost fortuitous - a lucky accident for
the theological liberals (under the spell of Coleridge) who 
led the BAAS. This is simply not so. The traditions on 
which they drew, and especially in the case of Sedgwick, were 
primarily Paleyan and Evangelical, and the presence of 
Chalmers was because he stood in a similar tradition.
4.2.2 Sedgwick’s Natural Theology
Sedgwick first published his University sermon Discourse on 
the Studies of the University in 1833 (just before Brougham's 
1835 edition of Paley's Natural Theology) . In it he divides up 
study into 'the study of the Laws of nature', 'the study of 
ancient literature', and 'the study of ourselves' (including 
ethics, metaphysics, and moral and political philosophy). He 
is writing, of course, on the assumption that his readers 
are Cambridge students - who are therefore already committed 
to the Christian religion. He defends the study of science
’The laws by which God has thought good to govern the universe 
are surely subjects of lofty contemplation... studies of this; 
kind not merely contain their own intellectual reward, but 
give the mind a habit of abstraction... and a power of
g
concentration of inestimable value...’
Sedgwick also feels, and cites Job 38 as illustration of the Biblical 
principle, that to study nature is humbling - for v\>e can contrast 
our own ignorance with the wisdom and power of God.^ He continues:
'A study of the Newtonian philosophy ... teaches us to see 
the finger of God in all things animate and inanimate, and 
gives us an exalted conception of his attributes, placing 
before us the clearest proof of their reality- and so 
prepares, or ought to prepare, the mind for the reception 
of that higher illumination, which brings the rebellious
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faculties into obedience to the divine will.'
In an appendix (C in 1st Edn.^  F in 5th) Sedgwick considers the 
role of Natural Religion:
'It has been sometimes objected to natural religion that 
it misleads men by a dim and deceitful light, on matters 
clearly put before them in the word of God. The objection 
is sound, so far as it applies to those who set un 
natural, in the place of revealed truth: but it is 
invalid in any other sense, as it strikes at the root of 
all knowledge that »S not religious. If the conclusions 
of natural religion be true, then must they well deserve 
our study; and they are of no small moral worth, provided 
they be kept in their proper place, and in subordination 
to truths of a higher kind. Were all men honest believers 
in the word of God, then could the inductions of natural 
religion add nothing to the strength of their convictions 
of his being and providence. But to doubting minds, 
entangled in the mazes of a false philosophy, or lost 
perhaps in sense, and unused to any severe exercise 
of thought, the ready inductions of natural religion 
may bring convictions of the greatest moral worth - 
at moments, too, when proofs of a different kind would be 
denied all access to the understanding. Moreover, the 
habit of contemplating God through the wonders of the 
created world, and its adaptation to the wants of man, is 
not only compatible with firm religious belief, but with 
the highest devotional feeling; as is proved by passages,
Salmost without number, in the sacred poetry of the Bible. 
The interesting thing here is that, whilst Sedgwick thought 
natural theology might prepare someone for Biblical revelation,
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he sees a greater role as enhancing the Christian's whole view 
of nature. Brooke's sentence; 'It almost evaporated xnto the
9
spirit in which the natural sciences should be pursued’ is
true - but such a statement could very easily be misunderstood.
The spirit in which the sciences should be pursued was more than
’cheerful sobriety’, it was an intense ’God-consciousness which
permeated Sedgwick’s own study of nature. Brooke’s article
later comments on Pye Smith’s reaction to Lyell’s use of the word
’nature’ instead of God as active agent: ’0 why did not his heart
grow warm within him, and bound with joy at the opportunity of
10
doing homage to the God of glorious majesty ?’ The answer,
surely. Is that whilst Lyell believed in a God, his correspondence^^
does not exhibit the kind of personal piety a n d  personal experience
12
of God one finds in Sedgwick - or, in Kingsley whom I^ell
regarded highly. The Evangelicals of all schools, the
Coleridgeans, and Oxford school, mostly shared this kind of 
'God-consciousness'. The passage, cited from Sedgwick above, 
reflects ,this. He does (unlike the Coleridgeans) think that 
Paley's argument has logical validity - but more than that 
he hopes that the students will catch Paley's own God- 
consciousness as they read it. It is an experience of God 
in his creation to which, as Christians, he urges them.
In fact, Sedgwick included within the term ’natural 
religion' three distinguishable elements. These are (i) religion 
according to Reason (ii) the innate capacity of the human 
mind to receive and conceptualise religious terms (iii) the 
common pre-christian religions. Thus to begin with:
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'No wonder that the truths of natural religion should 
have oftener been pressed by Christian than by heathen 
writers. The Christian makes them not the foundation of 
his faith. He seeks them not because he doubts but 
because he believes : for they are the external means of 
communion with a being whom he is taught to love, and
13in whose immediate presence he hopes hereinafter to 'dwell.’
In the next paragraph Sedgwick says: 'let us suppose some one 
to ask how we came by the knowledge of God.' There are two 
alternatives: by his works and by revelation. If someone 
tries to insist that God speaks not through his works but 
only through revelation:
'We may then ... ask, what knowledge could mere sounds 
like these convey through the ears to the heart, were 
there not placed already within it some knowledge of 
the being of a God ; or at least were there not in the 
soul some natural and inborn power of rising to the 
apprehension of a general religious truth when presented 
to it in the form of a mere abstraction^'
But this kind of innate capacity is to be distinguished from 
a logical reasoning out of the basis of religion. Thus 
Sedgwick also says:
'The logical order and the historical order of our belief
f
are two things widely different; and this is true in every 
department of our knowledge : we believe first on authority 
and we examine afterwards ... what we call natural
religiofi did not, I think, in any distinct and logical form,
l4historically precede revealed religion, but followed it.'
Ke continues to affirm that our religion will stand up bp our
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'most searching examination of reason', but that we first 
believed on authority and later looked for the logical 
grounds of belief. When we look for a starting point to 
reason from,we find it in: 'the truths of natural religion 
(or, which comes to the same end, the elements of a religious 
nature within ourselves).
This kind of approach is surely of the same ilk as that 
of Chalmers and Miller ? Experience of created things makes 
the concept of a Creator meaningful - yet a consciously 
explicit 'natural theology' is not a necessary pre-requisite 
nor a substitute for faith.
4,2 ,3  Natural Theology and Moral Philosophy
We saw in chapter 4.1 how Paley rejected 'moral sense* as a basis 
for ethics, and used instead a principle of 'utility' or 'expediency' 
as it came to be called. It was Paley's system which, 5‘oorv^^, 
was adopted in Cambridge. In the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century, however, both Sedgwick and Whewell were in the forefront of a 
reaction in Cambridge against this. Some recent historians of science, 
(as quoted at the start of this chapter), have emphasized a supposed 
influence on the Sedgwick circle of the 'rising star of Coleridge'.
Is there, then, any evidence for or against such an influence ? The 
remainder of the present chapter will consider this question.
As far as concerns Sedgwick the evidence seems very clear that the 
main influence on this issue was a man who was far from fitting into 
any theory of a supposedly liberal Anglican 'Cambridge Network': 
none other than the Evangelical Dissenter Robert Hall. We have his 
own testimony on this in a footnote to a section dealing with the 
objection that natural theology is no use because man is totally
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corrupted (a view which an extreme Calvinist might take), Sedgwick
says that the works of men like Chalmers and Robert Hall showed 'how
possible it is for man to feel a deep conviction of the natural
depravity of his heart, at the time that he has sublime and
philosophic views of those moral and intellectual capacities he
derives from G o d , ' I n  a footnote to Hall he adds :
'In mentioning the name of Hall, I may, I hope, be permitted
to state that on reading (now many years since) some of his 
wonderful discourses, I first learned to doubt the truth of 
that system which regards utility as the test of moral right.
At a time when the doctrine generally prevailed in England, he 
set himself against it, with a power of moral reasoning - with 
a subtlety and fervid eloquence, which placed his works at 
once amongst the hipest productions of the human mind.'
He then goes on to eulogise Hall's Modern Infidelity Considered (18OO) 
and Sentiments Proper to the Present Crisis (1803)• Sedgwick, in 
fact, wrote to the Evangelical Moule in 1868 of his recollections of 
Hall. The latter had ceased to live in Cambridge before Sedgwick's 
year, but Sedgwick went to hear him whenever he came to preach and 
says he had 'a power of eloquence such as I have never felt or
18witnessed in the speaking of any other man. ' We cannot, of
course, know exactly when Sedgwick first read Hall, though he says
'many years since' in 1833* But Sedgwick's turn of phrase clearly
resembles Hall!?» Hall wrot& of Paley's system that morality was:
'... by a cold calculation of interest, by a ledger book of profit 
19and of loss...'
Sedgwick likewise complains that under Paley's system:
'Virtue becomes a question of calculation - a matter of profit and 
loss; and if a man gain heaven at all on such a system, it must
20be by arithmetical details... the balance of the moral ledger...''
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On the same page Sedgwick asserts hie belief that Paley would not
have been capable in his later years of such sentiments. He khen
denies that moral sentiments come either by tracing out the results
of wrongdoing, or by teaching - for the moral sense is often strongest
in very early life. Neither logical ethics, nor even revealed ethics,
could be effectual without an 'inherent moral capacity]
Paley, in his Lockean empiricism, had denied an innate moral
knowledge. Sedgwick responds: 'No one now speaks of an innate
knowledge of morality; an innate moral sense or faculty, defining
and determining the quality of our moral judgements, is all for
21which we contend...'
Sedgwick confesses his incomprehension at how any Christian can 
resolve all actions into the effects of mere selfish passion:
'If we suppress the authority of conscience, reject the moral 
feelings ... the sinner is no longer abhorred as a rebel against 
his better nature - as one who profoundly mutilates the image 
of God; he acts only on the principles of other men, but he 
blunders in calculating the chances of his personal advantage...' 
SedgVidck also cites Butler in his Discourse (and elsewhere),and 
stands in the same tradition as Butler, Hall, Chalmers et al. It 
would not be useful, for present purposes, to go into more detail.
Two comments on Mill's critique^^ of this part of the Discourse 
may be relevant (Mill used the 3rd Edition which is virtually unchanged 
from the 1st). Firstly, Mill begins by admitting that he believes 
the main object of universities is to 'keep alive philosophy'. He 
tries to read Sedgwick's Discourse as though it was intended as an 
original treatise to advance philosophy - and finds it untechnical 
and too simple (citing only Locke and Paley amongst the utilitarians)?"^  
But the Discourse as originally conceived (before the 5th édition 
included massive preface and appendices) was a pastoral one.
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Sed^ .fick was concerned not for the philosophical shooting stars which 
concern Mill, but for raising young Christian men of character.
He dwells on Locke and Paley because they are the set reading for 
students - and if early Cambridge students are at all like their 
modern counterparts then probably few went beyond the set reading. 
Secondly, it would seem tiat Mill's whole inductive, utilitarian
philosophy was unlikely to find conducive any formulation which was 
at once Kantian in its reaction to Locke-Hume, and intensely Christian. 
Thus, for example, Mill laughs at Sedgwick for expecting a work
19-
(Locke's) on human understanding to include imaginative powers.
'Hhat place, what concern, could it have had there?' he asks. None, 
of course, if the process of obtaining understanding is purely 
passive - but that is exactly the point at issue. Sedgwick is 
arguing that:
'It is certain that the glories of the external world are so 
fitted to our imaginative powers as to give them a perception 
of the Godhead, and a glimpse of his attributes.'
Viewed thus, what Sedgwick calls 'imaginative powers' a ^  a source of 
understanding - not merely a creative force 'as a course of enjoyment, 
and a means of educating the leelings' as Mill seems to suppose.
To Mill, Locke's essay was 'the beginning and foundation of the modern 
analytical psychology'.To those of us who do not share Mill's 
assumptions, Locke, and even more Hume, are precisely at their 
weakest when dealing with the meaning of mind and consciousness 
- and Baconian induction is at its weakest when concepts of 'cause' 
are based (as Mill tried without consistency to do) on some kind of 
law of uniformity rather than a neo-Xantian presumption of a mind 
looking for patterns. This is not , of course, to say that none 
of Mill's criticisms of Sedgwick were justified - but that they were
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of such fundamentally different approaches that misunderstanding
was only to be expected.
Before bringing this chapter to a close I would like to add some 
comments on Whewell. We have seen how Whewell is linked to Sedgwick 
by modern commentators on the anti-Paleyan-ethics reaction, and we 
know also that both were attacked by Mill, Certain things may be
said about WhewellÎ
(a) He was one of the few in Sedgwick's circle who really understood
and was familiar with Kant,
(b) His philosophy of science was more sophisticated than both / 
that of Sedgwick and that of Mill (see below in chapter
(c) His writing was less obviously Evangelical in tone than 
Sedgwick's, and he also stood closer in personal terms bo Hare.
If anyone in Sedgwick's immediate circle might have been expected to 
exemplify this supposed 'Coleridgean' link it is surely Whewell,
What is the evidence ? First, Whewell's Bridgewater Treatise in 
1833 is very much in the Paley/Hall kind of tradition* It shows
30
little affinity with Coleridge's approach. On the specifically 
moral issues, Whewell wrote the famous Elements of Morality (18 5^) 
and Lectures in the History of Moral Philosophy in England (1832)
But he had already set out his views in the earlier Sermons (l837). 
After criticising Paley's moral philosophy as having 'had a very large 
share in producing the confusion and vacillation of thought 
respecting the grounds of morals, which is at present generally 
prevalent in England’, Whewell continues:
'The writer whom I have adduced as the principal representative
31of a better system than Paley's is Bishop Butler,'
Whewell admits that Butler did not write systematically on the subject, 
nor did he do what Paley's work professes to do: 'point out the 
rational grounds of the good institutions which prevail in organised
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societies.,, and thus invest those institutions with the sanction of
morality as well as law,»^^ Whewell says that no such systematic
treatment then exists, but he trusts that his sermons in illustrating
Butler's principles 'might be of great use in the absence of a more 
complete system,'
Whewell, like many contemporaries, fastened in his exegesis on the 
Pauline concept of 'conscience' The created world, he says, 
may show the Creator to be powerful, but at this level natural 
theology tells us nothing of the moral nature of God, We discover 
this through the inner functioning of a God-given conscience. The 
conscience is central throughout Whewell's sermons, and his treatment 
resembles both Butler and Chalmers, Not, of course that Whewell is 
advocating obedience to conscience and self effort as the 
essence of Christianity:
1C IS not the approval of our conscience, but the mercy 
of our Redeemer which is to be our final stay and support'
But Whewell is treating of morality in a 'natural theology' 
context - as he understands St Paul to be doing in Romans 2.15 
etc. - of conscience as an indication to a person (before any 
revelation) of the existence of a moral God.
Whewell makes no reference to Coleridge in his sermons, and the 
language of his objections to Paley's moral philosophy is quite 
different from that of Coleridge, Even, then, where we might have 
expected a 'Cambridge Network' Coleridge connection to be the most 
obvious, we find instead that (although he recognises common cause 
with his friend Hare against utilitarian ethics) Whewell's system is 
built on a Pauline term elaborated by Butler, If there is indeed any 
further 'mediation' of the concepts, it would be more plausible to 
look for it in the areas where links may so clearly be established 
for Sedgwick - amongst the leaders of Evangelical Dissent,
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1. LeMahieu, The Mind of William Paley, p. 159; >e already noted 
(p. 3) Cannon’s implication that it was admiration for Wordsworth 
and Coleridge which formed the basis of Sedgwick's attacks on 
Paley's ethics.
2. Ibid., p. 159.
3. Thackray and Morrell, Gentlemen of Science, p. 226.
4. Ibid., p. 234.
5. Ibid., p. 173.
6. 1st Edition Discourse, p. 10.
7. Ibid., p. 11.
8. Sedgwick is here recognising the dangers in using natural theology 
as an alternative to Revelation, rather than as an encouragement 
to accept the God of revelation. His words are very similar both 
to Chalmers and to the Evangelical Christian Observer, as well
as to the British Critic of the same period (early l830's).
9» Brooke : 'The Natural Theology of the Geologists..,', in Images
of the Earth (Eds. Jordanova and Porter), p. 42.
10. Ibid.. p. 49.
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12. See F.E. Kingsley, Charles Kingsley: His letters and Memories^  
of his Life.
13. 1st Edition Discourse, Note D.
14. 3th Edition Discourse, ccli.
13. 5th Edition Discourse, cclii.
16 Garland, Cambridge Before Darwin, ch. 4 describes this. The
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moral philosophy of Paley was actually introduced into the 
curriculum by Sedgwick's old Tutor Thomas Jones. Sedgwick's regard 
for Jones (Clark & Hughes, 1_» P» 91), and his first experience of 
being charmed by the book, did not prevent his later total 
rejection of its concepts under the influence of Robert Hall.
17» 1st Edition Discourse. Note D, p. 34.
18. Clark & Hughes, 1_, p. 80. Hall was, of course, a highly educated 
man who had studied at Aberdeen University. He was familiar with 
Butler by the age of nine (see Gregory in Works of Robert Hall... 
p. -4). In a sermon he might, for example, cite Bacon on reason 
and revelation (as in a Fast-Day Sermon, October 19th I803), and 
the chord struck in Sedgwick is not surprising.
19. Works of Robert Hall, p. 134, and see chapter 4.2 above.
20. 1st Edition Discourse, p. 37.
21. Ibid.. p. 30.
22. Ibid.« pp. 62-63.
23. Ibid., p. 97n.
24. Mill's Critique appeared in the London Review, I833.
23. Garland (Cambridge Before Darwin, p. 68) sees the Cambridge Dons' 
reactions eigainst Paley as part of the 'Victorian Spirit' with 
its 'earnest and serious' approach. She adds: 'It is thus not 
surprising that Sedgwick and Whewell contributed little that was 
original to the progress of moral thought in England...' Garland, 
of course, emphasizes the 'Broad Church' links and totally 
ignores Hall and the Evangelical ones. But she seems here to 
miss the point that Sedgwick did not suppose that he was making 
any contribution to the 'progress of moral thought', and that 
not everyone shares Garland's evidently liberal optimism that
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moral thought progressing or, in deed, can progress.
26. See e.g. 1st Edition Discourse, p.7«
27. Mill, Essays, p. II8.
28. 1st Edition Discourse, p. 18; (3rd Edition identical).
29. Mill (ref 27), P- 120
30. It was also well received in Christian Observer circles, e.g. 
being Simeon's favourite work (after the Bible) during recovery, 
from an iELness (Carus, Memoirs of the Rev Charles Simeon, p. 722); 
the British Critic (1833, l4, 92-115) eulogised both it and Whewell.
31. Sermons (Preface), p. vii; Whewell*s contemporaries recognised 
his sources; thus e.g. Pryme (sometime Professor of Political 
Economy) says that Whewell rejected Paleyan ethics and. 'built 
apew 3l system founded on the existence of a moral sense, as 
supposed by Bishop Butler, author of the Analogy.' (Bayne, 
Autobiographical Recollections of George Pryi^, p. 552).
Whether he was also influenced by Hall is hard to say. He wrote 
in 1823: 'Robert Hall, the great Baptist minister of Leicester, has 
lately been here, and I heard several of his sermons. I certainly 
consider him one of the most eloquent and striking preachers I ever 
heard or hope to hear.' (Life of Dr Whewell, Ed. Douglas, p. 95)
In general, however, Whewell's attitude to Evangelicals was less 
uniform than Sedgwick's. ■ In the same letter he is critical of
a sermon of Simeon's, for whom his sympathy is evidently less than 
Sedgwick's. He does, however, like Chalmers' work (p.74), and calU, m  
an 1828 letter, the Evangelical J.B. Sumner (newly appointed Bishop 
of Chester) a: 'most excellent person. His books are very good.'
Whewell was more sympathetic to Evangelicals than is often realised.
32. Whewell, Sermons, p. x.
33. Ibid., p. 19.
172
4.3 Natural Theology and the Plurality of Worlds Debate^
4.3.1 The Nature and Significance of the Debate
An area of natural theology which flared into controversy was 
the question of whether or not other 'worlds* were inhabited by 
rational creatures. In l833 Whewell, in an anonymous work argued
1that they were not, whilst Brewster, in l8^ 4, took the opposite view, 
Sedgwick published only a brief note on the issue and most of his views 
on the matter are privately expressed. Nevertheless, the debate is 
of interest to us, for it is yet another aspect of Sedgwick's 
metascientific milieu which some modern scholars have seen in terms 
of the 'Cambridge Network' and its supposedly liberal Anglican 
theology. John Hedley Brooke, in an article which contains much
interesting detail, asks why the two leading protagonists took the
2
sides that they did. He notices their uneasy relationship of
suspicion, and also their respective interests in astronomy and
geology as potential sources of difference, but he says:
'I have tried to show that the positions which Brewster and
Whewell adopted on the question of extra-terrestrial life and,
associated with those positions, the respective genre of natural
theology which each defended, were dependent on the religious
tradition to which they were most closely affiliated.'^
Brooke makes similar emphasis in his summary, adding that it
6Ingests a 'fragmented and disordered state of natural theology' at
the time.^ The caveats Brooke places on this generalisation^ may
not be noted if his conclusion is cited elsewhere; and he himself
cites it without the caveats in Images of the Earth.^  He has chosen
to emphasize not the idiosyncrasies of Whewell and Brewster, but their
respective associations with 'Broad Church' or 'liberal Anglican'
and 'evangelical' traditions. This, coupled with Brooke's apparent
n
acceptance of a Cambridge 'Broad Church Network' leaves an impression
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that the natural theology of the Network members (presumably including 
Sedgwick) differed from that of the Evangelicals. The present chapter, 
therefore, attempts to answer two questions. Firstly, what were the 
attitudes of various church parties to the plurality of worlds issue, 
and did the views of Whewell and Brewster respectively reflect those 
of their religious traditions ? Secondly, what were Sedgwick’s views 
on the issue and with whom (if anyone) did he align ?
Let us, therefore, first consider Brewster and the Evangelicals, 
and in particular whether his views were in any sense representative. 
Brooke’s article itself contains a wealth of references to different 
Evangelical commentators, though his overall perception of the 
situation appears to differ somewhat from my own. Brooke admits that 
Brewster's 'proof text' for his doctrine was unconvincing ,^ and that 
the Chrktian Observer (still a mouthpiece for the most highly placed 
Anglican Evangelicals) found Brewster's approach to exegesis similar
Q
to that of the Mormons. Ee is unable to cite any important
Evangelical, in England or Scotland, who supported Brewster's extreme 
position. With a footnote again to the Christian Observer he agrees:
'... there,was general agreement among other apologists that the 
safest strategy was to show that it mattered not one jot to Christian 
doctrine whether there were other worlds or not.'^*
Brewster's position was not supported by English Evangelicals, but 
it supported by the leaders of his own Scottish denomination ? Two 
of the most important of these were Chalmers and Miller. Chalmers, in 
his 1817 treatment of the issue, had not been arguing that the plurality
of worlds was essential to Christian faith. Rather, taking it for 
granted that life and intelligence existed elsewhere^ "', he was 
concerned to show that this presented no problems to Christian 
theology. Chalmers deals with objections based on the uniqueness
of the atonement, and also against arguments that man is beneath 174 
God’s concern. The latter suggestion, he says, belittles God.
Miller took up this same question in 1846:
•"Does not the largeness of that field which astronomy lays open
to the view of modern science throw a suspicion over the truth
of the gospel history ? and how shall we reconcile the
greatness of that wonderful movement which was made in heaven
for the redemption of fallen man, with the comparative meanness
12and obscurity of our species
Miller does not state Chalmers' answer, but asserts that geology 
has 'completely annihilated' the objections 'with which Dr. Chalmers 
grappled so vigorously'Miller argues that geology has shown that 
for most of earth history there have been no 'accountable creatures' 
or a 'rational being, born to anticipate a hereafter'. Thus, he 
argues, there is no reason to suppose that other worlds necessarily 
have rational and moral beings on them.
It is useful to note several things about this. First, Miller
(and, though more tentatively, Chalmers) admits the real force of
the infidel argument - he is prepared to admit the reality o'f the
doubt even though later claiming that geology has 'completely
annihilated' it. Like Brooke's description of Whewell, Miller is
'admitting doubts in order to assuage them' - and does not share the
apparent aversion of his fellow Evangelical Brewster to admitting
any doubts at all. Secondly, Miller does not merely tKat
geology removes the proof or probability that other worlds contain
rational and moral beings - he says this in a context of answering
objections that man is not important enough for God to take trouble
over him. In other words, man is important as he may be the unique
rational and moral agent at present existing. A similar line of
argument in Whewell is contrasted by Brooke with: 'an evangelical
iq.
stress on the depravity of man and the condescension of God'* .
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A third point is that Miller is not, of course, arguing that other 
worlds must al>*ays remain without rational life. This would not be 
necessary for his purpose of arguing the importance of man.
Now Whewell, as Brooke makes clear'argued a more extreme position 
than this. He was generally taken to mean that other worlds would 
never boast intelligent life - and the analogy from geology simply 
could not imply this. Surely, however, Brooke's summary is too
strong: 'Though he anticipated Whewell's central argument, Miller did 
not stretch it in the same direction,Miller dM take it in 
the same direction- he, like Ifhewell, was arguing that man was not 
so insignificant as the Deists claimed. It is as though Miller was 
saying 'Man is not insignificant, as he may be the only rational 
being at present in existence', and Whewell added 'and always will 
be'. This is not a change in direction, it is a matter of degree.
In actual fact even this must be qualified, for on page 330 Whewell 
conceded that there may be other realms with 'subjects and servants 
of God' as many pious souls have thought - but they must not be 
placed on the planets or stars.
Whilst the direction of argument of Miller and Whewell seem to 
be the same, one might agree with a statement that their respective 
traditions coloured the language they used. Brooke quotes Whewell 
as saying of man: 'God.may think him worthy of his regard and govern­
ment'. Other language of Whewell's book (e.g. his reference to 
'moral trial' of man on earth) is not Evangelical in tone. But 
this does not constitute a fundamental difference in natural theology.
Miller, then, was closer to Whewell than to Brewster. Yet, as 
Brooke himself admits, Whewell found little support for his extreme 
position in any quarter - Evamgelical or liberal - and Brooke is 
unable, in fact, to find any prominent 'liberal Anglican' who even 
sympathised with it.^^ What was Whewell really about ?
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This question, it seems, puzzled Whewell's contemporaries, and the
various suggestions of modern scholars are not convincing. Brooke
suggests Whewell was obliquely attacking Chambers, who saw plurality
as an argument for transformation of sp e c ies.But in assessing
this we must ask whether there is force in Chambers' objections to
multiple creations: 'Is it conceivable, is it a fitting mode of
exercise for creative intelligence that it could be constantly moving
19from one sphere to another...?'  ^ Not only had Chalmers answered 
this yearsbefore, but in this form it is so fatuous a caricature of
the views of a progressive creationist belief in an omnipresent God
that Sedgwick, for example, could hardly believe that anyone could
be so silly. He wails:
'Who but a man whose mind had been cramped by the fetters of a
rank materialism would dare to write... such irreverent nonsense ?
... Who is it that anthromorphises his Maker, and thinks him weary
20
whilst journeying from one organic creation to another ?...*
Sedgwick is surely right. To anyone who believes in the power of a
God who can (for example) listen to millions of prayers simultaneously
to suppose any difficulty in Him operating simultaneously in different
world? is utter folly. Yet Brooke supposes Whewell to have taken this
21
seriously, and to obliquely challenge Chambers' premise. He
suggests that Whewell rejected a direct Sedgwickian attack on Chambers*
* 22 
scientific absurdities because its readership was ill informed , and
then himself attacked it with a theory which (a) he knew few scientists
would accept anyway, and (b) depended on esoteric distinctions in the
23senses in which the nebular hypothesis could be used. Brooke's ■ ’
24 'Suggestion was only very tentative , and it simply is implausible.
Yeo provides an alternative suggestion that Whewell wished to 
argue from the uniqueness of man's mind to its similarity with God's^^, 
though does not make clear the logical connection. Hefferman suggests
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Whewell was trying to remove fantasy elements and promote clear
26thinking , though most readers thought him anything but clear.
Whatever, however, the motives of Whewell and Brewster, one thing 
should be clear to us. Their attitudes cannot be seen as indicative 
of deeper underlying rifts between the raturai theology of Evangelicals 
and liberal Anglicans (assuming, for the present, that the latter is 
adequate as a description of Whewell). Whewell gave an extreme 
version of Miller, whilst Brewster gave an extreme version of Chalmers. 
Thus Whewell refers to Miller's earlier work as having 'presented an 
argument from geology very much of the nature which I have employed' ànd 
Miller, whilst critical of both men's views, refers to 'our position'
and finishes with a 'very admirable* passage from Whewell:
'Let the difficulty be put in any way the objector pleases. Is 
it that it is unworthy of the greatness and majesty of God, 
according to our conception of Him, to bestow such peculiar 
care on so small a part of his creation? But we know from 
geology that He had bestowed upon this small part of creation 
- mankind - this special care. He has made their period, 
though only a moment in the ages of animal life, the only
period of intelligence, morality, religion. If, then, to 
suppose that He has done this is contrary to our conceptions 
of His greatness and majesty, it is plain that our concepts 
are erroneous: they have taken a vrrong direction. God has not 
judged as to what is worthy of Him as we have judged. He 
has found it worthy of Him to bestow upon man his special 
care, though he occupies so small a portion of time; and why 
not, then, although he occupies so small a portion of space?'
This is in the Butlerian tradition of Chalmers and Miller. The 
strongest argument for God (said Chalmers) was the conscience.
It was natural enough with this view (which they shared) to see
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morality and religion in man as a mark of special care for man.
Man in this sense is unique in earthly history - so why should.he
not also be unique in space? And if so the special position of man
in the scheme of Christianity (with redemption etc) becomes plausible.
Surely Miller was not mistaken in quoting this passage as 'admirable*
and along the lines of his own thinking ? Chalmers, in fact, seems
himself sympathetic to Whewell, writing to him of his 'surprise* at
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Brewster's review, and the 'injustice and severity' of periodicals.
Whilst, then, there was little support for Whewell's extreme 
position. Evangelicals were at least as sympathetic to him as to 
Brewster. We have seen this for Brewster's own close associates, 
and we earlier noted the Christian Observer's criticism of Brewster's 
article which it found 'surprisingly full of errors* and took a middle 
path?^ Thus, although the Brooke article has provided us with a wealth 
of useful detailed material, the overall framework within which these 
detailed facts are perceived is not convincing.
4.3.2 Sedgwick's Views on the Debate
Sedgwick, as Brooke asserts, was rather more conservative
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theologically, and more biblically orientated than Whewell. In any 
event, he did not share Whewell's views on the plurality 01 worlds.
In a letter to Herschel^^ he asserts that, having read Whewell's
book; 'I was much amused by it, but not convinced.' A copy of the 
work is extant in the geological museum of Cambridge with marginal
notes in Sedgwick's handwriting. Sedgwick is highly critical of
Whewell's arguments, though he himself does not come down on one
side or the other. On the religious side: 'No one says that a belief
Gif.
in a plurality of inhabited worlds is an article of faith'
On the scientific side: 'From the nature of its case - positive 
evidence (either + or -) is out of question' Thus it i.s a
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matter of -speculative probabilities'Whewell insists that 'We 
need no speculations about the inhabitants of other worlds to make 
this world our place of moral probation.» Sedgwick asks »why on that 
account say that other worlds have no beings under an analogous
probation*? When Whewell insists that 'one theatre of moral
action, one arena of moral contests for the highest prizes is a 
sufficient .centre for innumerable hosts of stars and planets*'
Sedgi-rick comments; 'SufficientÎ Yes, if the Creator has thought so; 
but has he so thought?' This is really the point. Sedgifick felt, 
as a confirmed empiricist of the Baconian school, a dislike for the 
forms of natural theology which worked out a priori what God must 
have done. It was in a similar vein that he had earlier said in 
reviewing Chambers Vestiges: 'We dare not, like our author, go at 
once to the great First Cause, and tell our readers what he MUST 
have done ... in reasoning of creation we dare not, we repeat, tell 
beforehand of what God must have done.' Sedgwick s scientific 
Baconianism and piety are linked. It is from actual empirical study 
of the book of God's works and the book of God's word that we know 
what he has done - not from a priori reasoning."
Sedgwick also maintained his 'open' position on the question in a 
brief aside in his published 5th Edition Discourse around this time.
He says;
'But among the million worlds, of which we see the germs in
the sparkling atoms of the sky, organic creation may (for ought we
know) be in continual activity; aqd the creative power may be shewn
continually, both in upholding laws that began in times past, eind
in ordaining laws which beforehand existed only in the prescient 
4omind of God.•.'
Sedgwick argues from humility. All creation takes place according to
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an..archtype pre-existing in the mind of God - but we see so
little of that overall pattern from our own small part of the universe*.
On a personal level, we may note, Sedgvrick spoke in highest 
terms of both the persons and the work of Chalmers and Miller, but 
found it harder to like Brewster. He records his first meeting
with Brewster: ’so sensitive and thin-skinned that you cannot 
touch him without making him wince. In I835 Brewster wrote his 
Report in the Edinburgh Review on the first three meetings of the 
British Association. This presented a very slanted view of the 
origins and purpose of the BAAS, together with Brewster's assumptions 
about the decline of science (not popular with some of the Cambridge 
Dons, nor tactfully presented to them), and an irritatingly self 
glorifying insistence on his own importance in founding the Association. 
Thackray and Morrell in Gentlemen of Science have thoroughly analysed 
Brewster's role, and his controversy over the declinist issue, and 
there is no need to expand on these here. Sedgvrick evidently 
found the article most irritating, and wrote to Phillips:
'It is clever and misch/avous, full of vanity, being born of a selfish 
brain, half stifled and half repressed sentiments; and of the selfish, 
narrow and impracticable views of a man who with all his wonderful
cleverness as an experimenter, is without true wisdom or moral
42
dignity. These are hard words but I think he deserves them.'
Mrs. Gordon in The Home Life of Sir David Brewster (I869) suggests 
that his commitment to Evangelicalism was more formal than typically 
Evangelical in devotional fervour during this earlier period P" If 
this is so, one can see why a man of a comparatively simple piety 
like Sedgifick would be drawn more to the kindred spirits of Chalmers 
and Miller than to Brewster. Brewster's apparent arrogance (though 
Brooke makes penetrating comment on this) would irritate Sedgwick,
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and his way of thinking was along different lines. Surely, however, 
this cannot be traced to Brewster's Evangelical theology, but rather 
to the personalities of the two men. The totally different relationships 
between SedgVvdck and Chalmers and Miller bear this out.
4.S.3 Conclusions - Divergences in Natural Theology ?
No complex idea held in common by a group of people is likely to 
be viewed identically by all of them. It would therefore be naive 
to suggest that there were no differences between different natural 
theologians in the mid-nineteenth century. Amongst them there were, 
after all, people ranging from strict Evangelicals to liberals like 
the mature Powell. Yet the unanimity does seem to have been greater 
in this period than it had been (say) in the time of Paley. In Paley's 
day it could have been genuinely described as 'fragmented' - with 
Paley's moral philosophy (based on elements of his natural theology) 
at odds with that of Butler, Hall, etc. But, as we have seen, 
by the second quarter of the nineteenth century virtually all 
Christian groups had rejected this aspect of Paley and emphasized 
conscience as a natural theological basis for morality. Whilst 
some (like Whewell) linked this to a more idealist philosophy than 
others, the agreement is notable. It even finds the Evangelicals 
finding, to their agreeable surprise, much more in common with the 
liberal Brougham than one might have supposed. The plurality of 
worlds debate does not indicate any deep seated fragmentation of 
natural theology based on religious affiliations, but is an 
emergence of the two extreme views (in men neither of whom had any 
surfeit of humility, and who cordially disliked each other) within 
a broad spectrum of belief.
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(3) N A T U R A L  T H E O L O G Y  A N D  G E O L O G Y
3*1 God and Nature
3.1.1 Introduction
VJith the development of a strong idea of 'natural lav', questions 
arose for the Christian about the relationship between natural law 
and God. It was an early recognition of the orthodox that nature 
did not exist independently of God. Thus Buridan, discussing the 
possibility of God giving each of the 'celestial spheres' an initial 
 ^ impetus: 'has therefore no longer to move these spheres, except
in exerting a general influence similar to that by which he gives 
his concurrence to all phenomena.' The presence or concurrence 
of God, in some way, in created things,was also a theme taken up 
by Boyle and his contemporaries, in their very strong conception of 
'natural law' which the 'mechanical philosophy’ implied. Boyle 
speaks of the variety of creatures in the world as 'so many distinct 
engines',and says all these;
'as well as the rest of mundane matter are every moment sustained, 
'> • guided, and governed, according to their respective natures
and with an exact regard to the catholic laws of the universe 
there is a Being that does this every where and every moment, 
and That manages all things without aberration or intermission.'^  
Boyle then goes on to speak of: 'those most signal and manifest 
interpositions we call miracles acted on by a supernatural way ...'
He believed in the Biblical miracles, though stressing that miracles 
were 'very rare' events. In general:
'it seems very congruous to his wisdom to prefer ... catholic 
laws .. and uniformity in his conduct before making changes
186
in it according to every sort of particular emergencies; and, 
consequently, not to recede from the general laws He at first 
most wisely established to comply with the appetites or 
needs of particular creatures ... etc.'^
What is interesting is that Westfall, who cites the above passages
4 '
amongst others of Boyle does not seem to follow the basic
consistency of Boyle's position. While Boyle spoke of 'interpositions',
'receeding from general laws' and 'changes in conduct', Westfall
paraphrases to talk of 'violating the natural order' and 'establishing
a machine that requires no intervention.'  ^ So Westfall concludes;
'Boyle's opinion about miracles stood in absolute contradiction to
the rest of his thought.' But this is simply not true. Whilst a
Deist might think of the world as a machine created by God but
running independently of him, a Christian like Boyle saw 'natural
laws' as God's habits of conduct. A miracle on such a view is not
an 'intervention' in an externally existing machine, but a change in
pattern of behaviour which is usually uniform. As to the reason
for it, Christian theists from Paley to C.S. Lewis have argued
coherently on this - Paley, for example, saying that one would expect
God to authenticate a revelation by miracles, and he would logically
make miracles the more rare in order to make this authentication the
more apparent.^  What Westfall seems to be doing is to read back
into Boyle a modern naturalistic view of natural law, rather than
a Christian theistical one of God acting consistently in creation,
upholding the world, and dealing with mankind; then he complains
that grafting onto it a Christian idea of miracle is inconsistent.
These comments have been both to show the tradition into which 
5e.d^ wick fitted, and to sound a note of caution in interpreting it.
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3.1.2 Sedgwick on God and Nature 
Sedgwick states his views thus:
'God ordained natural laws, and while he continues to uphold 
them, material nature moves on in harmony; but were this sus­
taining power withdrairn, law would be at an end, and nature 
would relapse into confusion.'
The phraseology of this is odd, reminding one of a Platonic concept 
that laws are somehow impressed on brute matter, and it does sound 
as though 'nature' has some kind of independent existence. But the 
meaning of the phrase is surely more likely to be that already 
given to it by Buckland in the following passage written in 1820:
'many who admit these proofs £i.e. of original design in creatrton 
doui>(: the continweti superintendence of that intelligence, 
maintaining that the system of the Universe is carried on by 
the force of the laws originally impressed on matter, without 
the necessity of fresh interference or continued supervision 
on the part of the Creator. Such an opinion is indeed founded 
only on a verbal fallacy; for "laws impressed on matter" is 
an expression which can only denote the continued exertion of 
the will of the Lawgiver, the prime Agent, the first Mover: 
still, however... we perceive that the secondary causes producing 
these convulsions have operated at successive periods not 
blindly and at random, but with a direction to beneficial 
ends, we see at once the proofs of an overruling Intelligence 
continuing to superintend, direct, modify, and control the
Q
operations of the agents which he originally ordained..*
Sedgwick, in general, speaks only of God's 'creative power' and 
'sustaining power'of the possibility of prediction because
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'the Author of nature is unchanging'. On miracles he follows Paley; 
'If, on the other hand, we do believe in a God of nature, then 
can we conceive it possible, or even probable, that he should 
suspend what we call his laws, or manifest his power under some 
new form, to carry out the purposes;of his will; and the 
question of a miracle thus becomes a question of fact to be 
decided on its proper evidence.
The laws, We note, are 'what we call his laws', to God they are 
just patterns of working. He shall see later that the view of 
God as 'sustainer', and natural laws only operating because of 
continual exertion of God's will, was a view shared by others of 
Sedgwick's scientific circle, when we look at the question of 
'semi-deism'.
Sedgidck writes even more clearly in 1843:
' I'Jhat know we of the God of nature (we speak only of natural 
means) except through the faculties he has given us, .rightly 
employed, on the materials around us? In this way we rise 
to a conception of material inorganic laws, in beautiful 
harmony and adjustment; and they suggest to us the conception 
of infinite power and wisdom. In like manner, we rise to a 
conception of organic laws - of means (often almost purely 
mechanical as they seem to us, and their organic functions well 
comprehended) adapted to an end, - and that end only the well 
being of a creature endowed with sensation and volition.. Thus 
we rise to a conception both of Divine Power and Divine goodness; 
and we are constrained to believe, not merely that all material 
law is subordinate to His will, but that He has also (in the
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way he allows us to see His works) so exhibited the attributes
of His will as to show himself to the mind of man as a personal
and superintending God, concentrating his will on every atom 
12of the universe.'
From this viewpoint, Sedgirick sees a basic division of 'miracles': 
'There are two very distinct views of miraculous power. 1st,
It may be shevm in the suspension or-violation of a positive 
law of nature, long established and comprehended by experience. 
Or, 2ndly, it may be shewn in a new creative act; such, for 
example, as the formation of a new Class of animals, which 
may be in strict co-ordination with the established laws of 
nature, and therefore in a certain sense be no more miraculous 
than the generation of a new sentient being of a knovm species..* 
Sedgi-dck goes on, of course, to say that there is the difference 
that a kno’Ti creature is generated according to knovm laws, whereas 
we do not know any law for commencement of new species.
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1915.2 The Background of Geology
9
5.2.1 Background and the Eighteenth Century
During Sedgvdck’s lifetime the most important treatment of 
geological history was in Lyell's Principles, published in the 
1830s. Whe>sell's History of the Inductive Sciences (1837) seems 
to have relied heavily upon it, as did most of the following
histories. A landmark in the modern study of that history must
be Gillispie’s Genesis and Geology (1951)» followed by contributions 
by Cannon and Kooykaas in the early 60's, Rudwick and Porter and 
others in the 70's. Many of the earlier misconceptions have been 
corrected by these later works, so only a very brief and unoriginal 
background sketch will be attempted here.
The late l8th century saw a situation of hostility between the 
rival schools of Werner (sometimes called 'Keptunists') and of 
Hutton (sometimes called 'Vulcanists*). The precise differences 
between their systems do • not concern us here, except for one feature. 
This was that the system of Hutton was a 'steady state' theory.
The agency of rivers and erosion constantly deposited new material 
in the sea, forming new strata; whilst simultaneously the action of 
internal heat forces caused new land masses to rise out of the 
water. The geological cycle is therefore endless, and 'The result, 
therefore, of our present enquiry is, that we find no vestige of a
beginning, - no prospect of an end.'^  It was not, of course, that
Hutton or his disciple Playfair said that there had been no beginning, 
but simply that science could discover no trace of one,
5.2.2 Geology in the Early Nineteenth Century
The nineteenth century saw three main developments. The first 
was the establishing of the Geological Society of London in 1807 which 
saw its task to leave aside speculation and concentrate on empirical
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research. The second was the publication in I8I5 of William Smith's
map of the 'Strata of England and Wales' (though Wales is actually
nearly all the same colour:). But his method of dating strata by
fossils came, soon to be widely accepted. The third was the publication
of Cuvier's Discours sur les revolutions de la surface du globe in I8II,
with other works. In the Paris Basin Cuvier had found alternate
layers of alluvial deposits, and concluded that there had been a
series of universal floods. The work was translated by Jameson
in 1817, but with an added emphasis on the identification of the
last of these floods with the Noarchian one. This was taken un
by the newly appointed Reader at Oxford William Buckland in his
Vindiciae Geologicae (1820). Sedgwick adopted the same basic idea,
along with Wernerian ideas about the deposition of strata.^  Not
everyone accepted this. In Scotland Dr. John Fleming argued that
the idea of such catastrophic revolutions was against both the
3evidence a ^  Scripture.^ On the continent, Scrope and Prévost
4argued against it in different ways. Sedgwick apparently lost 
his diluvial views in 1829. Lyell wrote to Fleming; 'Sedgwick and 
Murchison are just returned, the former full of magnificent views.
Throws overboard all the diluvian hypothesis; is vexed he ever lost 
time about such a complete humbug, says he lost two years by having 
started a Wernerian...'^ His address to the Geological Society 
in taking over as President in I830 contained an emphasis that many 
i^f G^rent origins could exist for valleys, and that in some instances 
the elevation of land masses was the only explanation.^ On retiring 
from the post in I83I his address contained a clear recantation of 
his former diluvian views.^ In the previous year the first volume 
of Lyell's Princinles had come out, arguing against both diluvialism 
and any form of alteration in the rate or kind of forces forming
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geological strata. Following Sedgwick's review of this in his 
Presidential Address to the Geological Society, Fleming promptly 
wrote to him 'as an honest enquirer after truth', complaining at
8lack of recognition for priority in Lyell's uniformitarian principles'.
But, new or not, the ideas were gaining ground. Buckland soon
followed Sedgwick, and in I836 quietly withdrew his diluvialism in 
.0
a footnote»'
Now in the same Presidential address of I83I in which he read 
his recantation, Sedgi-;ick reviewed Lyell's Principles. He accepted 
'nineteen twentieths' (p.3II) of the work, but had one major criticism. 
Lyell had assumed not merely that the same kind of forces in operation 
now should be used to explain past phenomena, but that these operated 
at the same intensity throughout geological history. This, in 
Sedgwick's view, would be acceptable if based on actual observation, 
but in fact it has been made as a purely arbitrary assumption.
Diluvialism was dead. But there remained a new form of controversy 
between those called 'uniformitarians' and those called 'catastrophists' 
Although much has been written in recent years to clarify the issues 
here, it is still possible to find in a recently published book a 
statement that Whewell believed 'God intervened in the course of 
nature with catastrophic alterations to its geology and complement 
of species.It  may, therefore, be worth outlining the real issues 
here.
(a) Actualism: This was the belief that forces now in operation 
should be used to explain observations made of evidences showing 
past alterations.
(b) Uniformitarianism: This was the belief that not only the same 
forces had always operated, but that they had operated at the 
same intensity.
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(c) steady State Theory; This was the belief that there was no sign
of any kind of progressive change in the geological past, i.e.
there was no trace of any beginning to the process.
There has to be a distinction made in examining attitudes on these
issues, between the respective spheres of geological history (i.e.
rock formation) and organic history. On the geological history,
both the Lyellian uniformitarians and the catastrophists agreed
on (a), but differed on the other two points. Thus, for example,
Sedgwick in his I83I Presidential address reviewed Lyell's Principles
. 1 1
and said that he accepted 'nineteen twentieths' of its material.
But he went on:
'According to the principles of Mr. Lyell, the physical operations
now going on, are not only the type, but the measure of
intensity of the physical powers acting on the earth at all
anterior periods: and all we now see around us is only the
last link in the great chain of phenomena, arising out of a
uniform causation, of which we can trace no beginning, and of
which we can see no prospect of the end. And in all this there
is much that is beautiful and true. For we all allow, that
the primary laws of nature are immutable - that all we now see
is subordinate to those immutable laws - and that we can only
judge of effects which are past, by the effects we behold in
progress... But to assume that the secondary combinations
arising out of the primary laws of matter have been the same
in all periods of the earth is an unwarrantable hypothesis
wdth no a priori probability, and only to be maintained by an
12appeal to geological phenomenae...'
In a letter dated ?th March 1037^^ Lyell complained to Hhewell that
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Sedg-.'ick had misrepresented him. He claimed firstly that he haa 
made an exception for man (which was true), and also that he had 
advocated uniformity only as an approach to scientific research.
There is no necessity for our present purpose to go further into
14
the precise differences between catastrophism and uniformitarianism 
Certainly Sedgwrick thought Lyell had arbitrarily assumed point (b) 
with regard to rock formation, and that (c) was unlixely. It ignored, 
for example, the cooling of the earth.
On the organic question, the divergence was even more marked.
Here Sedgwick and his circle (Buckland, Conybeare, Murchison,
Whewell and practically every one else) denied all (a), (b) and
(c). They knew of no process now going on which could account for 
the sudden appearance of new species in the strata. In 1845 Sedgwick
wrote to Agassiz:
*I say we have successive forms of animal life adapted to 
successive conditions (so far proving design), and not derived 
in natural succession in the ordinary way of generation. But 
if no single fact in actual nature allows us to suppose that 
the new species and orders were produced successively in the 
natural way, how did they begin? I reply by a way out of and
above common, known, material nature, and this way I call 
15creation.'
In actual fact Lyell himself seems to have been vague about the 
mechanism of the sudden appearance of new species - for he rejected 
the then current theories of evolution no less than his critics, 
put what marks him out as what Bartholomew has called a singular 
figure' was his view that apart from man no new kind of genera had 
appeared throughout geological history."^ There had been no
196
kind of progression of animal forms, and the absence of higher forms 
from the earlier strata were to he explained because of the rarity 
of conditions for fossilising.
It is one of the strange ironies of geological history, that in 
spite of the often repeated assertion that Lyell (or Hutton or both) 
"founded modern geology" and that it is "based on uniformitarianism , 
there was actually no major issue on which he was right and his 
opponents were v.Tongl But that is not really part of our present 
concern.
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5.3 Geology and Natural Theology
5.3.1 The Background Issue
A natural theology argument from design could be made at two 
levels:
(i) Design of any kind, even if it has always been there, implies 
the existence of a designer.
(ii) Design in an object which is known at one time not to have . 
existed, implies the existence of a designer to make it.
Careful study of Paley*s argument shows that he, at least, actually 
argued (i) but the psychological force of the argument depended on 
(ii). In chapter 1 section iv of Natural Theology he says:
'Nor is there any thing gained by running the difficulty further 
back, i.e. by supposing the watch before us to have been produced 
from another watch, that from a former, and so on indefinitely. 
Our going back ever so far brings us no nearer to the least 
degree of satisfaction upon the subject. Contrivance is Suill 
unaccounted for. V© still want a contriver ...
Paley argues that to increase the causal chain to an infinite one 
makes no difference. The whole series still retains marks of 
design, and this reauires a designer. This is perhaps interesting 
in-.the context of the later Darwinian debate - for strictly logically 
Paley's design argument is left by the evolutionary hypothesis
exactly where it was before
It must be recognised, however, that the psychological force Oj. 
Paley's argument probably stemmed not from (i) but from (ii).
The force of the analog comes in an implicit assumption or feeling 
in our minds that the watch arose or began at some point in time, 
and order and purpose was introduced into a situation o± none.
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5.3.2 The Contribution of Geology
Now the 'steady state' theory of Hutton (or for that matter of 
Lyell) gave no firm indication that there was such a beginning in 
time for the causal sequence of reproduction as we know it. The 
evidence as read by the catastrophists did. Thus Buckland in 1820 
wrote ;
'When our minds become thus familiarised with the idea of a
beginning and first creation of the beings we see around us, the
proofs of design, which the structure of those beings affords,
carry with them a more forcible conviction of an intelligent
Creator, and the hypothesis of an eternal succession of causes
is thus at once removed. We argue thus - it is demonstrable
from Geology that there was a period when no organic beings
had existence: these organic beings must therefore have had a
beginning subsequently to this period; and where is that
•beginning to be found, but in the will and fiat of an intelligent
and all-wise Creator?’... if some writers on Geology in later
times have professed to see in the earth nothing but the
marks of an infinite series of revolutions, without the
traces of a beginning; it will be quite sufficient to answer
that such views are confined to those writers who have
presumed to compose theories of the earth, in the infancy of
*
the science, before a sufficient number of facts had been 
2
collected...*
If geology goes further and shows that the * present system of this 
planet is built on the wreck and ruins of one more ancient, there 
is nothing in this inconsistent with the Mosaic declaration.* There 
was no need for Mosed purpose to tell us of these things. Buckland 
backs this view up by quoting Sumner 'a divine whose rational and 
sober piety no person will venture to dispute.'
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In IB36, although no longer a diluvialist, he can still -t-rrite:
'Geology has rendered an important service to Natural Theology, ' 
in demonstrating by evidences peculiar to itself, that there 
was a time when none of the existing forms of organic beings 
had appeared on our Planet, and that the doctrines of the 
Development and Transmutation from other species, or by an 
Eternal Sucession from preceding individuals of the same species, 
without any evidence of a Beginning or prospect of an End..'^ 
Sedgwick, in his Discourse, takes the proof from contrivance in two 
distinct ways. The first^ he argues 'addresses the imagination';
'It is certain that the glories of the external world are so 
fitted to our imaginative powers as to give them a perception 
of the Godhead, and a glimpse of his attributes ... The heavens 
declare the glory of God and the firmament sheweth his handy work. 
Here is a direct assertion - an appeal to the heart, and not 
to the understanding,^
But the appeal to the reason is different from this. It sees that 
'contrivance proves design in every organic being we survey.'^
SedgT-rick continues;
'It is in vain that we attempt to banish an intelligent Creator, 
by referring all changes organic and inorganic, to a succession 
of constant material actions, continued during an eternity of 
past time. Were this true, it would not touch our argument: 
and every instance of organic contrivance or material adaptation, 
would be a phenomenon unexplained, except on the supposition of 
a contriver. It would only prove that, in a certan portion of 
space, God had thought fit to give a constant manifestation of 
his wisdom and power through an indefinite period of duration.
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The eternity of material forms is, however, but a dream of
vain philosophy, unfounded in reason or analogy; and at least
as far as organic nature is concerned, contradicted by the
7;
•plainest physical records of the past world.'
'Geology gives its aid to natural religion ... It tells us that
God has not created the world and left it to itself, remaining
ever after a quiescent spectator of his work: for it puts before
our eyes the certain proofs, that during sucessive periods there
have been, not only great changes in the external conditions of
the earth, but corresponding changes in organic life ... It
shews intelligent power not only contriving means adapted to
an end: but at many successive times contriving a change of
mechanism adapted to a change of external conditions; and thus
affords a proof, peculiarly its oim, that the great first cause
S
continues a provident and active intelligence.'
So did Sedgwick at this time believe that the demonstrations (as 
he ,§aw them) of geology were essential to Christianity? This seems 
highly unlikely. His own Christian faith predated both his o>m knowledge 
of geology, and any general realisation in scientific circles that 
fossils showed species not to have been eternal. As we have seen, 
even the Paleyan argument from design does not depend strictly on an 
assumption of geological demonstrations of beginnings for species.
As for demonstrations of God's continuing interest in his creation, 
Sedg-rick says only that geology offers 'a proof, peculiarly its ora..' 
Other proofs (e.g. miracles and prophecy) he would not have denied. 
Conscience would have remained a key concept in the natural theology 
of a moral God. Thus the geological demonstrations of species creation 
in the past ages was essential neither to the revealed religion of
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Christianity nor even to important elements of his natural theology.
we have seen that the modern tendency to place Sedgwick in a 
supposed 'Broad Church' is misleading, and that on essential points 
his views were far closer to the moderate Evangelicals like Simeon 
and Chalmers. But there have been other ascriptions of views to 
Sedgwick on natural theology and creation which have been even more 
misleading. 1% particular there is the contrast made by both Hooykaas 
and Gillispie between Sedgrick and the important Scottish Evangelical 
geologist Hugh Miller. In actual fact Killer's attitude to geology 
and natural theology was virtually identical to Sedgwick's. Writing 
of his first impressions on a visit to England in 1844 he commented:
'There is, I doubt not, a day coming when writers on the evidences 
of the two Theologies, Natural and Revealed, will be content to 
borrow largely from the facts of the geologist... Infidelity 
has toiled hard to obviate the necessity of a First Great 
Cause, by the fiction of an Infinite Series; and Ketaphysic 
Theology has laboured hard, in turn, to prove the fiction untenable 
and absurd. But metaphysicians, though specially assisted in 
the work by such men as Bentley and Robert Hall, have not been 
successful. They have, indeed, shown that an infinite series 
is, from many points of view, wholly inconceivtable, but they 
have not shown that it is impossible... Metaphysic Theology 
furnishes no real argument against the "Infinite Series" of the 
atheist. But Geology supplies the wanting link.
Miller returns to this theme a number of times elsewhere, e.g. in 
The Testimony of the Rocks ch.5*» published in 1857. Here he cites 
Paley as well as Robert Hall and Bentley as providing insufficient 
argument against the infinite succession idea.^ **^  After speaking Oj
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Paley he says:
'Geology takes up the master volume of the greatest of the natural
theologians, and after scanning its many apt instances of. palpable
design, drawn from the mechanism of existing plants and animals,
authoritatively decides that not one of these plants or animals
had begun to be in the time of the Chalk... In fine, metaphysic
geology furnishes no argument against the infinite series oi
II
the atheist. But geology does.'
Here we find the same kinds of influence, particularly Robert Hall, 
and the same insistence as in Sedgwick that now geology has enabled
natural theology to go a step further.
Whewell, incidentally, though less explicit (as one might expect)
than the specialists in geology, advances similar views. Reviewing 
the first volume of Lyell's principles, he notes that Lyell's 'steady 
state theory' makes no attempt to account for the arrival of new 
species:
'to give even a theoretical consistency to his system, it will 
be requisite that I-tr. Lyell should supply us with some mode 
by wrhich we may pass from a world filled writh one kind of animal 
forms, to another, in which they are equally abundant, writhout 
perhaps one species in common ... We conceive it undeniable (ana. 
Mr. Lyell would probably agree with us) that we see in the 
transition from an earth peopled by one set of animals, to the 
same earth swrarming with entirely new forms of organic life, 
a distinct manifestation of creative power, transcending the 
loiown laws of nature ; and it appears to us, that geology has 
thus lighted a new lamp along the path of natural theology. 
Gillispie^^ saw this as a 'lust for the catastrophic and miraculous’.
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and Gannon • criticised him for this and pointed out that the word
'creative' is also used by Darwin and Lyell and does not imply the
supernatural. This is true, but Cannon omits the last clause about
geolog]/ lighting a new lamp along the path of natural theology.
There seems no likely explanation of this clause except that >jhewell
has in mind a similar argument to that of Sedgwick et al. Whewell
says that the manifestations 'transcend' known laws, which does not
seem to imply that he expected extensions of these to explain them.
In 1837 in his History of the Inductive Sciences VIhewell spoke of
the 'impossibility of accounting by any natural means for the production
of all the successive tribes of plants and animals which have peopled
the world in its various stages, as geology teaches us... but when
we enquire whence they came into this our world, geology is silent.
The mystery c5f creation is not within the range of her legitimate
15territory; she says nothing, but she points upwards.' Cannon's 
comment that in I83I 'Whewell had not allied himself with the miraculous', 
and that later he 'committed the Catastrophists to the task of 
furnishing at least a description of what a miracle looks like 
to a scientist' does not seem to be a plausible interpretation of 
these passages. Vfhewell does remain vague about the nature of a 
'creative' act, but his early phrase 'transcending ...', and his 
insistence that creation is 'not within the legitimate territory' of 
geology seem to indicate that some kind of miraculous event is in mind.
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5.4 The Meaning of Creation
5.4.1 Sedgwick on Creation
We have seen Whewell's vagueness about acts of creation; what 
now of Sedgwick ? There seems no discernIble movement in 
Sedgwick's views on either the nature or chronology of creation 
during his long life. He did change his mind on the antiquity of 
man (at the incredible age of 83 )i^  but this was not central.
Sedgwick held that:
... before the creation of all worlds, there was an archetype
of Nature (dead as well as living, past as well as present)
2in the prescient mind of God.*
In Sedgwick's view it was this which explained the similarities in 
anatomy of different species - not (as the evolutionists argued) 
a common ancestry. Sedgwick held a view of successive creations, 
quoting approvingly from Agassiz .on the-matter:
'H  faut nécessairement remonter à une cause plus elevee, et 
reconnoitre des influences plus puissants, exerçant sur la 
nature entière une action plus directe, si l'on ne veut pas 
se mouvoir etemellment dans une circle vicieux. Quant 
a moi, j'ai la conviction que les especes ont ete créés 
successivement a différentes repris ...et que les changemens 
qu'elles ont subis durant une epoque géologique ne sont que 
très secondaires, et ne tiennent qu'a leur plus ou moins
N - V
grande fécondité, et a des migrations subordonnées a des influences 
de l'époque.
Translated this reads:
'It is necessary to ascend to a higher cause, and recognise 
more powerful influences exerting on the whole of nature a more 
direct action, unless one is to enter an eternal vicious circle.
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As for me, I am convinced that species have been created 
repeatedly and successively .,. and that the changes which 
they have undergone during any one geological epoch are no 
more than very secondary and are related only to their greater 
or lesser fecundity and to the migrations resulting from the 
influences of the period.'
He also wrote to Agassiz on April 10th 1845, and Agassiz replied in 
June. In his reply he stated:
'I find it impossible to attribute the biological phenomena, 
which have been and are still are going on upon the surface of 
our globe, to the simple action of physical forces. I believe 
that they are due, in their entirety, as well as individually, 
to the direct intervention of a creative power acting freely 
and in an autonomic way... the differences between animals do 
not constitute a material chain, analogous to a series of 
physical phenomena, bound together by the same law, but present 
themselves rather as the phases of a thought, formulated 
according to a definite aim. I think we know enough of compara­
tive anatomy to abandon forever the idea of the transformation 
of the organs of one type into those of another^
Sedgwick, in the 5th Edition of his Discourse pages xciv to cxxviii, 
outlines the evidence to show that Fish, Reptiles, Birds and Mammals 
were created - often the highest forms of the class appearing suddenly 
and first in the record. He says, e.g.:
'How then were Birds called into being? We reply that they 
were created. The word expresses the exact condition of our 
knowledge. It assumes the existence of an Intelligent Power 
in nature acting with prospective wisdom: and it tacitly affirms, 
as a negative fact, that we comprehend not the manner in which this 
form of organic life began. It was exactly like reasoning from the
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Class of Fishes that Agassiz arrived at a similar conclusion*.
'These Mammals... have no zoological base to rest upon. They were 
therefore not called into being by any known law of nature, but by 
a power above nature. They were created by the hand of God, and 
adapted to the condition of the period. This is the conclusion of 
Agassiz and Owen on better evidence than Cuvier possessed; and this 
was, in substance, the grand conclusion of Cuvier.'
On the actual mechanism of creation we can, he says, know nothing:
'In one view we see the great animating First Cause in the laws 
impressed by Him on the vast bodies of the material universe.
In another view we see Him in positive acts of creative power 
shewn in the organs of successive animated beings brought into 
life during long successive periods. ... We know that God 
has created; but how he creates, we can form not the least 
conception; for external nature is known to us only through 
its established laws, and their manifestation to our senses; 
and these laws imply a past, not a present creative act. It 
may be that in the mind of God there is no greater or different 
' exercise in Creative Power in the continuance of a law than
7in its commencement. But it is not so in the mind of man ...'
In other words, today we can only observe laws operating which God 
set up in the past - we cannot observe fresh creative acts. Therefore 
we cannot form a conception of how He does them. This does not 
concern Sedgwick unduly, for he recognises the time-bound nature 
of our minds, suid does not think we need to know much about Creative 
acts. He is quite clear, however, that these acts are of a different 
order from the ordinary succession of second causes. He states 
this in a speech reported in the Athenaeum of 1844, and also thus in 
in a letter to Agassiz already mentioned;
'But if no single fact in actual nature allows us to suppose
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that the new species and orders were produced successively 
in the natural way, how did they begin? I reply, by a way 
out of and above common known, material nature, and this way 
I call creation. Generation and creation are two distinct
S
ideas, and must be described by two distinct words 
There are positive and negative aspects of the word creation. The 
negative aspect is that our knowledge of God's dealings through 
nature's laws;
gives us no conception of the mysterious operations of 
his everlasting will, which moved him either to create or to 
withold his creating power.'
In the positive sense;
'the word creation ... implies our belief in a fact; and it
» -
also implies our belief that such fact was the offspring
of prescient thought and design - it implies, in one word,
0
the personality of the Godhead.'"
'We know that God has created: but how he creates, we can form
not the least conception ... The movements of his Will are the 
beginnings of every material cause, and these movements have 
no limitations in time and space. It is then utterly beyond 
the reach of human thought to comprehend what creation means as 
contemplated in the mind of God. But we do see the proofs of 
a creative energy within that spark of the universe wherein 
we dwell; and these acts of energy are defined in time and
limited in space or they could not be the objects of our 
10contemplation.'
In 1860, in his anonymous review of Darwin's Origin of Species, 
Sedgwick's position seems unchanged. He says:
'Species have been constant for thousands of years ... Change
212
the conditions and old species would disappear; and new species
might have room to come in and flourish. But how, and by what
causation? I say by creation. But what do I mean by creation?
I reply ... a power I cannot imitate or comprehend; but in which
I can believe, by a legitimate conclusion of sound reason
drawn from the laws and harmonies of Nature. For I can see in
all around me a design and purpose, and mutual adaptation of
parts, which I can comprehend - and which prove that there is
exterior to, and above, the mere phenomena of Nature a great
prescient and designing cause. Believing this T have no
difficulty in the repetition of new species during successive
epochs in the history of the earth.
But Darwin would say I am introducing a miracle by the
presupposition. In one sense, I am; in another I am not. The
hypothesis does not suspend or interrupt an established law of
Nature. It does suppose the introduction of a new phenomenon
unaccounted for by the operation of any known law of Nature;
and it appeals to a power above established laws, yet acting
l\in harmony and conformity with them.’
The language here reflects the distinction made between the two kinds
of ’miracle* in the Discourse (cited above, p. ccxxx). There seems 
to be no change of view. At the same time Sedgwick wrote to Owen:
*I want to learn your views about Creation's law. It is clear
that there has been a law governing the succession of forms. But 
here, by law I mean order of succession, and not a law like that of 
of gravitation, out of which the actual movements of our system 
follow by mechanical succession. In that sense I do not believe in
any law of creation. The highest point we can, I think, ever reach
is a law of succession of forms, each implying a harmonious refer­
ence to an archetype and each having indications of the action of a
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final cause - i.e. of-intelligent causation or creation...’
What Sedgwick seems to mean is that with hindsight we can see how
God is relating all the forms to archetypes (this was an idea developed
by Owen and Agassiz in particular), but (unlike gravitational laws)
it would not enable us to predict when, where, and what would be
created next. There seems, then, some movement of view from his
earlier ones. But it is more a belief that we can discern some pattern
in God's working (and surely Sedgwick would never have suggested that
he had no such pattern, only that we could not know it); it is not
a belief that natural law as such could comprehend it. A similar idea
seems to be implicit in Hugh Miller's words:
'The foreknown archetypal idea of Owen, - the immaterial link
of connection" of all the past with all the present, which Agassiz
resolves into the fore-ordained design of the Creator, - will
yet be found, I cannot doubt, to translate themselves into one
great general truth, namely, that the Palaeozoic, Secondary and
Tertiary dispensations of creation were charged, like the
patriarchal and Mosaic dispensations of grace, with the "shadows
..13of better things to come."’
This, indeed, raises the question of the relation of the ideas of 
Sedgwick (and Agassiz and Miller) to those of Owen. Adrian Desmond, 
in Archetypes and Ancestors, has analysed Owen’s ideas in relation 
to the context of the times. Desmond sees the basic conflict as 
being being a Platonic idealism (as of Owen), and an implied materialism 
(as of Huxley). My own perception of the situation, though arrived at 
independently, would be along similar lines, though with the obvious 
proviso that to be a member of the Darwin circle was not Jiecessarily to 
verge on a materialistic monism in the manner of Chambers. Those
who might sympathise with Owen were in fact a wide and distinguished
In­group. Clearly, however, there were differences between Sedgwick and
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Owen, but the precise analysis of these is hampered by the obscurity of
what exactly Owen did believe - in spite of Desmond’s recent work.
Desmond takes Owen’s attitude to the Vestiges, and his comment on
’sarcedotal revilers’ in the review of the Origin, both to relate to a
belief in creation by l a w . ^ t  the only actual hint Owen seems to
give of this is reference to metagenesis]^ Paradoxically, however,
Owen (who was no geologist) differed from Sedgwick in minimising the 
17fossil gaps, whilst if the mechanism really were analogous to 
metagenesis then presumably very large ’gaps’ could be accomodated.
He also seemingly differed from Sedgwick in emphasizing the continued
18working of the creative process, though no details are given of new
species, and it is unclear as to how this relates to the arrival of man
in a privileged position. Finally, if Desmond is right in suggesting
that Owen reacted against the Origin because of an association with 
19materialism rather than its inherent implications, this would make his 
reaction analogous to that of Sedgwick. Further comparison is made too 
difficult by lack of sufficient detail of information.
5.4.2 Sedgwick a ’Nomothetic-creationist’ ?
There is much interesting comment on the meaning of ’special creation’ 
and its relationship with Darwinianism in a recent book.by Neal C. 
Gillespie Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation. His treatment 
of Sedgwick on this question, however, is puzzling. He gives a 
list of those mentioned by Darwin in 1859 as being ’foes of the 
mutability of species', including Agassiz and Sedwick. Then he 
comments: 'not one, with the exception of Agassiz ... believed in
miraculous creation in 1859'.^  He later says: 'Close to the still
powerful biblical tradition in conceptualisation, and, usually, 
in personal religious faith, were those who felt confident that the
i q \
evidence of science confirmed their belief in a miraculous creation -..
In the late fifties he classes with these Miller and Agassiz - Sedgwick
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is notable by his absence. Thenlater he says: Sedgwick: ’exceeded
most nomothetic creationists in his nescience as well as in his 
divergence towards miracle...' following this with quotations from the 
5th Discourse."'^ Why is Agassiz but not Sedgwick said to believe 
in miraculous creation and in science’s confirmation of this? Why 
is Sedgwick classed with the 'nomothetic creationists' (i.e. who 
believe creation is by laws)? Surely his comments to Owen (all that 
QUiespie cites) do not so mark him? Agassiz himself in an earlier
reply to Sedgwick, said:
'I would even say that I believe the creation of man has closed
creation on this earth, and I draw this conclusion from the
fact that the human genus is the first cosmopolite type in
Nature. One may even affirm that man is clearly announced in
the phases of organic development of the animal kingdom as the
,<13
final term of this series.
Sedgwick was certainly no more nomethetic than Agassiz. Gillespie 
follows this with some misleading comments about the methodology 
of Sedgwick (and others) and only just seems to conclude that the work 
of one--of the gs’^s^ s.lly acknowledged best field geologist of his
generation cannot be treated 'merely as a form of theology or biblical 
criticism'. Then he finishes- by saying that the 'nescient approach to 
the problem of origins' is in a sense 'a halfway point on the road 
to a fully positivistic view of biology'. Even aside from the 
ambiguous way in which he has defined the term 'positivist', this 
seems unlikely. Sedgvdck only declines the term 'miracle* because 
he defines two senses for the term - he is no nearer 'positivism*- than 
Agassiz. Hiller, it is true, seems in one place to imply that creation 
of many fish species was instantaneous.put how central this really 
was to his approach seems uncertain.
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One other interesting point concerns Lyell. His modern biographer 
has recorded how the reader of the Principles *is left entirely in 
suspense’ about the question of how new species might arise in his 
steady state system.^ Contemporaries like i/hewell noticed the same 
thing. Tn a now famous correspondence Herschel wrote to him in I836 
from Capetown suggesting that God might operate in replacing extinct 
species by others ’through a series of intermediate causes & that j.n 
consequence, the origination of fresh species ... would be found to 
be a natural in contradistinction to a miraculous process.
Lyell replied saying that he ’left this to be inferred’ from his work.
Now Gillespie says of this:
’"natural," I would suggest, meant to (Herschel), not positivistic 
or secular causes as it would today, but rather nomothetic 
creationism: "natural" in the sense of being within nature, 
but not divorced from theological causality.’
This is curious. Surely to any theist, all natural causation (however 
invariant) is ascribed to the ultimate agency of God? Yet on page 
153 he says: ’Scientists who were theists could also be positivists.’
So what is the difference between a nomothetic creationist and a thevstic 
positivist? Both might believe that the natural law sequence was 
invariant, and both surely would believe that invariant natural law/ 
sequence to be ultimately ascribed to God? Were one to describe 
Lyell and Herschel, at this stage, in Gillespie’s terms one would 
call them ’nescient theistic positivists’. The fact that he does not, 
seems to reflect a confusion in his terms, in particular in the 
meaning of the word ’positivist', but further exploration of this would 
be beyond our present scope in dealing with Sedgwick.
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28. J.R. Moore, in a long review of Gillespie (BJHS. I98I, l4), is also
critical of the contradictions in the book. He also recognises its
‘positivist or whiggish standpoint’ (p. 192), and the author’s 
failure to reckon sufficiently with the ’historically long lived 
integration of positivism with theistic metaphysics.’ (p. 194). These 
are valid criticisms - though the use of the term ’positivistic’ is 
probably misleading because of its present connotations.
2195.5 Deism and Semi-Deism
5.5.1 Sedgwick, Miller and Semi-Deism
To Gillespie Sedgwick is a ’nescient nomothetic creationist’, to 
Hooykaas he is a ’semi-deist’. Hooykaas distinguishes four basic
positions:"^
(1) Atheism: 'the Necessity of immanent law rules over nature. No 
design, or plan, no final causes are admitted.’
(2a) Deism: 'God created matter and endowed it with laws from which 
the world and all its inhabitants ensued according to the plan 
originally contrived in order to be realised in the future.’ 
(This may either be seen as contrived mechanically or teleologi- 
cally),
(2b) Semi-deism: ’nature runs its constant ’natural’ course unless 
God intervenes in a supernatural way'*
(3) The 'biblical view': 'God created the world and designed'it 
according to his free will and not by following a rational
or ideal pattern to which he felt himself bound. God sustains 
the world in its minutest details, so that nothing happens 
without his "intervention".' (He goes on to quote Newton).
'In His providence, God usually guides the world according to 
constant rules, but, as He is a free agent. He gives order 
as well as deviation from order.'
(4) The supranaturalistic view: 'God (or the gods) acts in a rather 
capricious way in this world.’
These categories have some useful distinctions, but it does seem 
strange that they are defined with no reference to attitude to 
redemption and revelation. However regularly or irregularly natural 
phenomena are, one would have thought that Deism and the 'biblical 
view' would have differed primarily in THE great act of intervention
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in human history in Jesus Christ, and in giving the biblical revelation 
about him. Perhaps Hooykaas is not intending to make these particular 
issues distinguishing marks of the positions involved, but 
merely stating the implications regarding the relationship of God 
to creation for each one. So if we take this limited field, what 
exactly is p.eism? On p.179 he seems to ascribe to at least some 
peists the idea that creation was bound to a plan of inner necessity. 
But he goes on to add: 'A less rigorous form of deism advances the
doctrine of a creation by which permanent laws were bestowed upon 
nature; these laws continue in operation by a subsequent divine 
sustenance of the universe.' So where does this leave any distinction 
between this 'less rigorous form of deism' and the 'biblical view'?
It is difficult to see how any 'biblical view' could not see 
e.g. in Genesis chapter one the idea that God created a world to 
behave in a law-like way. Any scientist, moreover, in asserting the 
possibility of science at all must believe that most of the time 
the operations in the physical world are law-like - and Hooykaas 
is presumably not denying that a scientist can have a 'biblical 
view'. So what is the distinction?
Having said that it: 'may appear odd to place a large number of 
orthodox Christians (Buckland, Sedgwick, Conybeare, and 
Murchison^ ) into this group of Deists, he says: 'The
Shibboleth by which they may be recognised is "divine intervention 
in the course of nature".' Catastrophists, according to
Hooykaas, 'only grafted a "theistic" branch on the deistic tree' 
because they assumed that God's intervention in nature's regular course
marked off natural from supernatural. He later, and in apparent 
contradiction, says that Buckland and Sedgwick held the catastrophes 
to be God's intervention but not supernatural.'^  Only Miller, he says.
221
'is a type that might hardly he reckoned semideistic', for 'his 
religion was essentially based on other grounds than those afforded 
by the study of nature'^ , and only Miller did not see natural 
theology as a scheme to which every reasonable man should consent, 
and which should be crowned by special revelation, accepted through
divine graced
This distinction between Miller and Sedgwick is even stronger in 
C.C. Gillispie’s Genesis and Geology. Miller 'required a divinity 
rather than a landscape gardener for his God, and whose Christianity 
centred around the redemption, salvation, and immortality of the
individual soul.'^  Hugh Miller 'was the only one whose conception
q
of divinity contained many elements of spirituality*.
The evidence surely does not bear out these statements* Sedgwick 
is just as concerned as Miller with redemption and salvation of the 
individual; his conception of God is spiritual, and (at least in
some places) he shares Miller's Baconian emphasis on the independence
10
of science and theology. Miller said he 'never tired' of Bacon , and
Sedgwick quoted him many times. The only definitely pre-revelational
role of natural theology in Sedgwick is in his assertion that our
experiences must enable us to form a conception of God otherwise
revelation would have no meaning to us. Unlike some Deists, he says;
'in reasoning of creation, we dare not, we repeat, tell beforehand
of what God must have done. This is rashly and irreverently to
anthropomorphise God.''', and this was his ground of disagreement
\2_
with both Whewell and Brewster in the plurality of worlds debate. 
Sedgwick's Baconian induction was linked to his piety - both the book 
of God's works and the book of God's words had to be read humbly and 
inductively.
As for the 'shibboleth', Sedgwick seems generally to prefer the 
word 'interposition' rather than intervention, and Miller uses the
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phrase 'direct interference on the part of the Deity in the work of
12)
creation' in one place. Now one may agree with Hooykaas that there 
is a conceptual difference between an external but occasionally 
'interfering' Deity (like Zeus), and an immanent Deity to whom a 
'supernatural miracle' is simply a variation in this pattern of 
working. But a search for 'shibboleths' is not a reliable way of 
telling who believed which. To illustrate this, one might note that 
Cannon in his article on miracles paraphrases Buckland s words 
about God 'continuing to superintend, direct, modify, and control 
the operations ....' to speak of 'God the Interférer'. But, strictly 
speaking, to 'modify' ones pattern of working is not the same as to 
'interfere' with something, and this is not, in the context, the 
emphasis Cannon himself was making. The verbal change is not 
significant.
5.5.2 Sedgwick, Miller and Kingsley
Objection has been made to any distinction between the
supposed 'semi-deism' of men like Sedgwick, and a 'Biblical view'.
The objection is not lessened towards the slightly altered position 
Hooykaas adopts in his part of the 19?4 Open University book; New 
Interactions between Theology and Natural Science. In this he retains 
the basic framework of the five views cited at the start of this 
chapter, but now classes Miller and Sedgwick both as semi-deists.
We are not now told explicitly a name of anyone who holds the 'Biblical 
view', though it might be inferred that Charles Kingsley 'on the 
orthodox side' does''^ . Kingsley, admittedly, is less like Sedgwick 
than Miller is in theology, but the overall classification is no less 
unsatisfactory. Hooykaas defines 'the Biblical position' thus;
'God created the world as an expression of His free will, and he 
sustains it in its minutest detail, so that nothing happens
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without his 'intervention* in this sense. In His providence, He 
usually guides the world according to constant rule; but as He is 
a free agent, He may give deviations from order, as well as order. 
There is nothing in this with which Buckland, Sedgwick, or Miller 
would have disagreed. Buckland's words in l820, already quoted above, 
specifically recognised that the term 'interference' was only a manner 
of speaking, for really all cause is a product of God's continuing will 
and exertion. Buckland is not asserting in any sense a kind of 
independence of natural law, but simply extending the 'traditional 
proofs from miracles and prophecy (i.e. from things not usually 
seen under 'natural law') accepted both by Paley and (as we have seen)
by orthodox Evangelicals. Ironically, it would be Coleridge in this
period who disliked talk of miracles as 'suspension of natural law'
ISand emphasized instead their sign value. Perhaps this is why 
Hooykaas chooses Kingsley, who stands partly in the Coleridge tradition,
for his 'biblical view'. But it would be irony indeed to claim that
Coleridge rather than (say) Wesley or Simeon represented the 'Biblical 
view'. But)on this,any differences between (say) Sedgwick and Kingsley 
are apparent rather than real. We have quoted Sedgwick: 'The movements 
of his Will are the beginnings of every material cause...' Kingsley 
speaks of: what 'we call the Laws of Nature, though really they are 
no Laws of Nature, but merely customs of God; which he can alter as 
and when He will. Sedgwick's language differs, for he is usually
dealing not only with the truth, but with epistemology. He is concerned
with the way in which we come to know and recognise the agency of
God in our world. Thus he says:
'The kingdoms of nature are presented to our senses in a success­
ion of material actions ... All these changes and movements 
among the things around us seem to be produced by powers of 
nature we call second causes: but the mind of man cannot and
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will not rest content with second causes, and is constrained to 
look above them to some First Cause ..."we are naturally led 
to a conception of an intelligent First Cause capable of 
producing all the phenomena of the visible world.
When we speak of 'second causes' then 'our language defines correctly 
the manner in which the phenomena of nature are reflected in the
human mind'. But then we ask how they began and so 'are we led to 
speak of the creative power, as well as of the sustaining power of 
God.' Both, to Sedgwick, are equally dependent on the continuing 
free will of God.
Sedgwick thinks it an 'utter confusion of thought' to confuse
creative with sustaining power, though elsewhere he emphasizes that
the differences between the two in the mind of God will always
2.fremain beyond our comprehension. But there is a real difference as
far as our human knowledge is concerned - and this is what Sedgwick
is concerned with. Kingsley, in the passage cited by Hooykaas 
is emphasizing his own feeling of awe in scientific exploration, 
and the Godward view of miracles. But how far did he really differ 
from the so called semi-deists? Interestingly, the cited passage 
begins with a reference to Buckland;
'... the part of your letter which deserves a long answer,
longer than I can give, is what you say about natural science 
and Dean Buckland. It is exceedingly comfortable to me, who 
knew nothing of him, as proving him to have been the wise man 
I believed him. ... my doctrine has been for years ... that 
below all natural phenomena we come to a transcendental - in 
plain English, a miraculous ground. .. This belief was first 
forced upon me by investigating the generation of certain polypes 
of a very low order. I found absolute Divine miracle at the
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bottom of all; and. no cause save that of a supremely imaginative 
(if I may so speak) as well as Almighty mind, carrying out its
own ideas; but gravitation, or the simplest law, will show the
same truth.'
Buckland and Sedgwick used language different from Kingsley, but all 
three were at base saying that only God's continual and active 
sustaining power could explain the existence of secondary laws.
Sedgwick too knows that when he refers to 'what we call God's laws' 
he speaks from our point of view - the whole of science being 
directed to the discovery of those laws.
Sedgwick, believing in the scientific falsity or improbability 
of evolution, believed also that through geology one could prove 
God active in a manner different from the argument from the existence 
of law. Kingsley, in contrast, was more reluctant to emphasize such
'gaps' in .knowledge, from fears of what might happen if they were
later filled in. Sedgwick believed it impossible to refer 'all changes 
organic and inorganic, to a succession of constant material actions, 
continued during an eternity of past time. ^ But he continued:
'Were this true [my italics] it would not touch our argument; and
every instance of organic contrivance or material adaptation would
be a phenomenon unexplained, except upon the supposition of a contriver.'
Kingsley, even in 1871» could say;
'... if it be said that the doctrine of evolution, by doing away 
with the theory of creation, does away with that of final 
causes - let us answer boldly. Not in the least. We might 
accept what Mr. Darwin and Professor Huxley have written on 
physical science, and yet preserve our natural theology on 
exactly the same basis as that on which Butler and Paley 
left it. That we should have to develop it I do not deny.
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That we should have to relinquish it I do.,.*^ *^
Kingsley, unlike Sedgwick, thought evolution plausible - but 
both men denied that it destroyed natural causes in itself. Both 
men, moreover, were dualists. Thus Kingsley believed that 'souls 
secrete their bodies as snails do s h e l l s a n d  would have objected 
no less than Sedgwick to a confusion of moral and physical.
No one, of course, would pretend that the views of Sedgwick and 
Kingsley were identical. Sedgwick, realising that materialism needed 
evolution even if evolution did not strictly speaking imply materialism, 
attacked materialism through attacking evolution. Kingsley, 
loathing materialism no less, feared to make a battle ground over 
evolution lest a failure by the anti-materialists in this area might 
seem to give the materialists an overall victory. In I863 he 
writes; 'Darwin is conquering everywhere, and rushing in like a flood, 
by the mere force of truth and fact... But they find that now they 
have got rid of an interfering God - a master magician, as I call 
it - they have to choose between the absolute empire of accident and 
a living immanent, ever-working God The 'master magician'
is, of course, a gross parody of the position of men like Sedgwick 
- but Kingsley's anxiety is that no one mistake a victory over the 
'interfering' God for a solution of the real question. Therefore, 
he says in this passage, he is working out natural theology in the 
light of Darwin and Huxley. Later indeed, in I87I, he is more 
explicit. He fears not so much pantheism as positivism.^ "^  But 
fighting evolution had long since ceased to him to be a practicable 
way to combat it.
Is there, then, any sense in which either Kingsley or Miller 
could be said to follow a 'Biblical view’, and Sedgwick not to do
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so? The writers of the Bible, of course, distinguished the usual 
from the unusual. The first chapters of Genesis moreover, presented 
a God who worked according to laws: 'let each bring forth after its 
kind.' But this did not result in so strong a concept of 'natural 
law' as to lead to a distinction between 'natural' and 'supernatural'.
In any case, it would probably have struck them as irrelevant. But 
a Christian who is a scientist of any kind must presume that God 
is not capricious but has customs or habits which are sufficiently 
regular for us to construct 'natural laws' to describe them. This 
must be as true for a Newton, a Miller or a Kingsley as for a 
Sedgwick. Some kind of distinction between 'natural' and 'supernatural' 
(whatever terms are used) is then unavoidable. Unless one wishes 
to deny the occurrence of 'supernatural' miracles altogether, this 
in turn means that (whatever it implies in the mind of God) to our 
eyes we may distinguish between 'miraculous' acts in which God alters 
His usual pattern of working (which we call natural law), and acts 
in which he does not< Since neither Sedgwick, Miller nor Kingsley 
would have wished to make any such denial, this distinction must 
be implicit or explicit in the theological systems of all of them, 
as it certainly would for any Evangelical. The care with which 
words are chosen to present this is more indicative of personality 
and literary style than theology.
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5.6 Sedgwick and Evolution
5.6.1 Background and the 'Vestiges'
The eighceenth century legacy had not only left the evolutionary 
ideas of Buffon, but Linnaeus had stated his final view in 1779 
in his Amoenitates Academicia 'that species are the work of txme.
In the early nineteenth century, however, the only actual 
schemes on offer to the scientific world to do this were 
those of Lamarck and St Hilaire (excluding that of Erasmus 
Darwin which was more a poetic vision). In English science 
both were regarded as rather old fashioned and mystical, although 
in certain specific areas their contributions might be recognised. 
Cuvier, amongst their contemporaries, was seen as a more 
actualistic and positivistic scientist - which indeed in many 
ways he was. There was an increasing recognition of the 
intricacv of mutual dependence and balance of organs, making 
species transmutation seem unlikely. The geological record 
showed sudden arrivals of new species. Thus, whilst Sedgwick 
in his Discourse in 1833, recognised that transmutation
of species' could hypothetically explain new arrivals, he 
called it 'no better than a phrensied dream'. . In this
nearly all naturalists of repute at that time would have
agreed with him.
Into this relative harmony there dropped in 1844 an anonymous 
publication (later found to be by Robert Chambers) The Vestiges— of^  
the Natural History of Creation. It sold 2.0 ,000 copies, being 
amended in subsequent editions (three came in quick succession) to 
remove some of the worse naivities. From 1845 onwards Chambers 
appended the Explanations (largely stimulated by Sedgwick's 1845
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review) which was scientifically much more sophisticated than 
the original. Its philosophical framework was stated: 'The Eternal 
One has arranged for everything beforehand and trusted all to the 
operation of the laws of his appointment, himself being present in 
all things.'* Chambers, in fact, said:
'It has been one of the most agreeable tasks of modern science 
to trace the wonderfully exact adaptations of the organisations 
of animals to the physical circumstances amidst which they 
are destined to live ... design presided in the creation of 
the whole - design again implying a designer, another word for 
a CREATOR.
He then says that he needs not repeat all this since: 'The Natural 
Theology of Paley, and the Bridgewater Treatises, place the subject
in so clear a light ....'
However, in line with his general approach, organic evolution 
is introduced after an explanation (based on the nebular hypothesis) 
of the earth's origins:
'during the deposition of all the rocks, a gradual change of 
physical conditions was going on ... such variations in the 
ancient seas might be amongst the causes of that constant chance
of genera and species in the inhabitants of those seas to
i3which the organic contents of the rocks bear witness.'
4-
Chambers introduced the term 'missing link' and made some suggestions .
He noted the jumps in fossil species, but explained them away (as
Darwin did later) by imperfections in the sequence.^ He was
actualistic but without making uniformitarian assumptions. He 
•7
denied vitalism and saw form as arising naturally in matter -
for which crystallisation is given as an example. In fact, one of
the major faults in the book is its reliance on superficial resemblances.
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as critics showed. Electrical forces were given great generative
a -
powers. No real mechanism was given, and naive identifications
were made, e.g.; 'it was announced some years ago by a French
physiologist, that globules could be produced in albumen by electricity.
If, therefore, these globules be identical with the cells which are
not held to be reproductive . . . ' Various old wives tales were
presented about spontaneous generation. He suggested a version of
embryonic recapitulation," with length of gestation as some kind
of altering mechanism.
5.6 .2  Reactions to the Vestiges - Miller and Sedgwick
The Vestiges contained obvious absurdities (e.g. dogs-inheriting
12 13skill at dominoes , rooks rearing orphans because of reason , and
l4rats hatching out from goose eggs ). Scientifically it was shallow,
thoughChambers* sequel Explanations was less so. It attracted,
however, much attention, and many leading scientists reviewed it,
with varying degrees of hostility.*'^  Huxley, for example, was
furious with it because he regarded it as an aberration of true
science. Owen's rather more ambivalent review has aroused an amount
17of speculation on his real attitude. The two critics, however,
at whose comments we shall particularly look are Miller and
Sedgwick, : and these have been chosen because Sedgwick's review 
has been unfavourably compared with Millers and may be generally 
misunderstood. We will not, of course, be particularly interested 
in the scientific absurdities of the Vestiges (of which all critics
pointed out manyj but in the broader issues.
Miller asks •
'Has Nature , during the vast geologic periods, been pregnant, 
in like manner, with the human race? and is the species, 
like the individual, an effect of progressive development.
2 3 3
induced and regulated by law? The asserters of the revived
hypothesis of Maillet and Lamarck reply in the affirmative.
Nor, be it remarked, is there positive atheism involved in
the belief. God might as certainly have originated the species
by a law of development, as he maintains it by a law of
development- the existence of a First Great Cause is as
perfectly compatible with the one scheme as with the other;
and it may be necessary thus broadly to state the fact, not
only in justice 'to the Lamarckians, but also fairly to warn
their non-geological opponents, that in this context the old
anti-atheistic arguments, whether founded on the evidence of
design, or on the preliminary doctrine of final causes, cannot
be brought to bear.'
IThaz Miller sees as the real problem is:
'If, during a period so vast as to be scarce expressible by
figures, the creatures now human have been rising, by almost
infinitesimals..., until they have at length become the men
and women we see around us ....'
Then either we must conclude that 'all the vitalities' of lower
\C\
creatures are immortal, o|* that 'human souls are not so.
He also rules out the suggestion that God might have intervened directly
to breathe immortality into the first human (though Lyell later 
seems to have favoured this) because he assumes that such intervention 
is expressly renunciated by authors of such schemes. This then 
is his objection and: 'If I be in error at all, it is an error into 
which I find not a few of the first men of the age,-represented, 
as a class, by our Professor Sedgwicks and Sir David Brewsters, - 
have also fallen.
Now contrary to what recent commentators have said about Sedgwick, 
his point of departure is exactly the same as Miller's, as he himself
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claimed in a letter to Miller irt 1 8 4 9 The main differences are 
that Sedgwick's is a more philosophically sophisticated critique, 
whilst Miller's is written in a very much clearer style.
To begin with we must remember Sedgwick's views Cgiiven in chapter 
5 A  above) of God's relationship to the world. We might also note 
some further words in the 1st Edition Discourse in 1833:
'If, then our planetary system was gradually evolved from a 
primeval condition of matter, we may well believe, that every 
material change within it, from first to last, had been but 
a manifestation of the Godhead - Or we may suppose, that new 
powers have, by an act of creative interference, been impressed 
on it at successive epochs of its changes- and that these new 
powers, working together with the old, may have brought about 
the next system of material conditions. Qiere Sedgwick inserts 
a footnote comparing this to the repeated changes in organic 
species which 'can only' be accounted for in this kind of way] . 
Or, if it be thought more in conformity with what we see of 
the modes of material action, to suppose that the primeval 
system contained within itself the elements of every subsequent 
change, then is the primeval matter to the natural system of 
the world as the seed to the plant, or the egg to the living 
creature ... [in this event he says] far from ridding ourselves, 
by our hypothesis, of the necessity of an intelligent first 
cause, we give that necessity a new concentration, by making 
every material power, manifested since the creation of matter, 
to have emanated from God's bosom by a single act of omnipotent 
prescience.
Why, we might ask, should God not have done something similar with
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organic creation? Granted that Sedgwick (quite rightly) saw that 
on a purely inductive basis one would conclude that evolution was 
scientifically improbable, why should it have been also theologically 
unacceptable? The classic interpretation of Sedgwick (as we shall 
see) does not answer this question. The correct answer is really that" if 
was But we need first to follow through carefully Sedgwick's
review of the Vestiges (the first he wrote) in the July 1845
Edinburgh Review^
The review begins (p.1-2) with a one page outline of the thesis 
of Vestiges, and its general structure and appeal. T h e n ^ M -  
Sedgwick gives his own brief view of the work, everything is 
touched upon, while nothing is firmly grasped ...'-The author 
does not understand scientific principles, and builds impossible 
hypotheses like castles in the air. So how then, he asks, can we 
account for its popularity? The general population are unable, 
as can scientists, to discern the shallow nature of Vestiges^ but 
Sedgwick affirms that he knows no reputable scientist who accepts it.
But the unsuspecting public:
'must therefore be plainly told that the philosophy of the author 
is borrowed from a false and shallow School- and that the 
consequences he dares to draw from it, so far as they are new 
in the scientific literature of our country, are nothing better
V
than mischftvous and antisocial nonsense.'
Recent commentators, seemingly unable to see in all this anything 
but the doctrine of transmutation of species, seem to take Sedgwick 
to be talking of the philosophy of transmutation. But this surely 
is mistaken. He is referring to the wider issues of materialism, 
the identification of mind and consciousness with material elements,
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and the reduction of morality and human responsibility. This will 
become clearer as we progress. There then follows a particularly 
obscure and (for today's taste) unfortunate passage, full of 
fulminations about 'glorio\j.s maidens and matrons and good taste, 
about the quaintest and most 'Victorian' part of the whole Review. 
Perhaps it is this which has so influenced commentators (though it 
was, after all, 1845 ). But towards the end of the paragraph he 
alters tenpo CO get into the real point of departure of his objections 
to Vestiges. He laments that those glorious maidens and matrons 
he mentioned will read in Vestiges :
'that their Bible is a fable when it teaches them that they 
were made in the image of God- that they are the children of 
apes and the breeders of monsters - that he has annulled all 
distinction between physical and moral - and that all the 
phenomena of the universe, dead and living, are to be put before 
the mind in a new jargon and as the progression and development 
of a rank, unbending and degrading materialism.'
What is important here is that this particular aspect comes at the 
end of Chambers^ book - but Sedgwick picks it up first. It is the 
particular position of man, and the mind-brain problem which he 
begins with. This is significant, for it indicates that Sedgwick's
basic objection was not so much the organic evolution as such, but
that, like Miller, he thought Chambers' work contradicted the
27
Christian view of man as uniquely in God's image*
What exactly, then, was the theory of Chambers on issues of mind and 
morality which Sedgwick found so objectionable ? Chambers writes: 
'Cannot the first cause of all we see and know have wrought 
matter itself from its very beginning, with all the attributes
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necessary to develop into mind ...?*
'The statistical regularity in moral affairs fully establishes 
their being under the presidency of law. Man is now seen to 
be an enigma only as an individual; in the mass he is a mathema­
tical problem. It is hardly necessary to say, much less to 
argue, that mental action, being proved to be under law, passes 
at once into the category of natural things. Its old meta­
physical character vanishes in a moment, and the distinction 
usually taken between physical and moral is annulled. This 
view agrees with what all observation teaches, that mental 
phenomena flow directly from the brain. They are seen to be 
dependent on naturally constituted and naturally conditioned 
organs, and thus obedient, like all other organic phenomena, to 
law. '
By this Chambers explains consciousness, going on to argue for the 
'absolute identity of the brain with a galvanic battery' - though he 
does add that electricity is 'almost as metaphysical as mind was ever 
supposed to be.' Chambers states: 'The difference between mind in the 
lower animals and in man is a difference in degree only - it is not a 
specific difference.Thus: 'Conception and imagination appear to be
only intensities, so to speak, of the state of the brain in which 
memory is produced.'
A most important corollary is that human moral responsibility 
is illusory. Criminals (Chambers concludes) are victims either of 
their social conditions or their inherited characteristics, and 
criminal jurisprudence should be addressed exclusively to reformation 
and not to punishment. ' The question as to whether morality
has any meaning at all without responsibility is not faced.
238
Sedgwick's point of departure and passionate renunciation of 
all this has already been given above. His fundamental objection 
to Vestiges is that it confuses mind with brain, consciousness 
and will with material causes. So he comments:
'"Electricity is almost as metaphysical as ever mind was 
supposed to be"..."and yet electricity is a real thing, and 
actual existence," or in other words, a material existence.
In the same passage he tells us "that the brain is absolutely 
identical with a galvanic battery 1" As well might he say that 
the human will and the point of a needle are identical, 
because each of them can produce the contraction of a muscle. 
Allowing that some of the functions of the brain resemble 
galvanism, are we to conclude that all its functions are 
galvanic?
Sedgwick's point here is basic to his rejection of Vestiges. To 
Sedgwick, as to many others, mind is not the same as brain.
'IThat we call mind is that principle which binds our thought 
together, and makes us intellectually what we are- giving us 
a unity of consciousness not transferable to another or 
separable into parts - a unity of knowledge, a unity of
,34-
responsibility, and a unity of aspiration after future good.'
Sedgwick was a kind of dualist, he saw 'mind'and 'matter' as 
different kinds of thing. So he says:
'the mind is immaterial, though mysteriously connected with 
matter and its laws, (should any one affirm that they must for 
ever remain connected, we have no dispute with him, for the 
subject is far above our knowledge) ...
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Man has been'driven to invent a new language, the symbol of pure
abstraction, the fit instrument of reason', moreover 'there is an
immeasurable difference between instinct and reason' . The
mind of man, then is different in kind from that of animals according
to Sedgwick, in the kind of its consciousness. And consciousness
is not material. On its connections with matter he expresses
what might be termed agnosticism or nescience. He is a cautious 3a<4
‘2>1
sophisticated dualist, and his dualism is basically consistent.
His dualism apparently entered his lectures, for in the Sedgwick 
collection at Cambridge University there is a set of notes taken 
by a Mrs. Tovey speaking of a great gulf between man and beast:
'A man can form an abstract notion, give it a name, and make 
it a material for abstract reasoning ... It is that gift of 
the Almighty that makes the gap between man and the brute 
creation.'
He described the skull as:
'containing the mechanism which elaborates thought, but which 
is no more thought itself than the pipes of the family organ 
are the music of Handel.'
This does not, of course mean that he is defensible on all details, 
nor that he is always consistent in working out implications of 
his position. His style, moreover, was sometimes unclear - he 
was writing in passion and anger. He was, however, no less certain 
than Miller of why he objected to the Vestiges, and his overall 
system was more philosophically sophisticated than Miller s. That 
Miller's style was better is hardly surprising for Miller was an 
acknowledged master of prose. Sedgwick, in anger, often exaggerated 
as he did in other controversies such as the Beverley affair and 
the controversy with Dr. French,
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Now by page 17 of his review Sedgwick has made his preliminary 
fulminations against the Vestiges , and he has outlined (p.5-16) his 
reason for objecting to the whole conception and classing it as 
'rank materialism' . He then proceeds to a more orderly critique, 
more in the order of the Vestiges itself. The Nebular Hypothesis 
has been taken by Chambers as fact. To Sedgwick it is a 'splendid 
vision' which may or may not turn out to be true. This is interesting. 
Sedgwick uses the over-dogmatism of Chambers((which incidentally 
was toned down in the 5th Edition of Vestiges) to attack him. But 
it is not because he regards the Nebular Hypothesis as of itself 
any theological significance. It is because any weapon will be 
useful to discredit the Vestiges. So Sedgwick calls it 'the raving 
madness of hypothetical extravagance ^
When he comes next to the refutation of the transmutation of 
species as accepted by Chambers, it seems to be in similar spirit.
From p.29-49 Sedgwick is mostly simply outlining geological history, 
but on p.31 he quotes;
"'The first step," he tells us, in the creation of life upon 
this planet was "a chemico-electric operation by which simple 
germinal vesicles were produced." The next step was "an advance, 
under favour of particular conditions, from the simplest forms 
of being to the next more complicated, and this through the 
medium of the ordinary process of generation." All this is 
confirmed by an appeal to Mr Babbage's calculating machine, 
and by a geometrical figure- and our author adds, very pleasantly 
and with a logic, we hope, peculiar to himself, "though this 
knowledge were never to be clearly attained, it need not much 
affect the present argument; provided it can be shown that there
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must be some such influence within the range of ^ natural things'.'*
We reply, show this and we have done. We have nothing but 
bare assertion; and we defy him, and all the materialists on 
the face of the earth, to prove this single point ...'
It is important to note the context of this. Sedgwick does not 
say that because Chambers believes in transmutation of species he 
must be classed as a materialist. Sedgwick has already shown that 
Chambers is a materialist from his comments on mind. Sedgwick's 
assumption is (rightly) that transmutation is a necessary (though 
not sufficient)tenet for materialism. To the materialist the 
hypothesis is essential, and in the fact that all geological observation 
is against it Sedgwick finds a weapon to attack the materialists.
On p.50 Sedgwick returns from details of geology to broader 
issues. He reaffirms his actualism ~ and challenges Chambers to 
prove or show probable the development hypothesis from living 
nature. But over and again he emphasizes that transmutation is 
anti-inductive, based on circular reasoning not on observation, 
etc.
On p.62 Sedgwick turns to deal with Chambers' claim that a view 
of God as creating by fiat 'anthropomorphised God' and 'it is no 
fitting mode of creative intelligence that he should be constantly 
moving from one sphere to another.^’ Sedgwick meets this on 
several levels. First, he totally rejects Chambers' caricature of 
the theist position as God the interférer: if the inductions of 
science do show us progressive creations:
'Does the conclusion at which we have arrived degrade our notion 
of the Godhead and of his creative power? We think far other­
wise . The law of creation is the law of the Divine Will, and
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nothing else besides- and, as the children of nature, how are 
we to know that will, except by honestly reading the book of 
nature? The fiat of the Almighty was sufficient at all times, 
and for all the phenomena of the universe - material and moral.
It may be true, that in the conception of the Divine mind there 
is no difference between the creation of dead matter and its 
unbending laws, and the creation of organic structures subservient 
to all the functions of individual life. But such views are, 
and must be, above our comprehension, and only lead us from 
the right way of ascending, step by step to the conception of
natural laws, governing the kingdom of nature, organic and
inorganic. Each organic structure is a miracle as incomprehensible 
as the creation of a planetary system... What know we of the 
God of Nature (we speak only of natural means) except through 
the faculties he has given us... [Sedgwick then continues as 
already quoted above on p.
All force is will force. To a genuine Christian theist it is certainly 
not degrading to imagine God sometimes varying his patterns of 
working, in 'miracles' or 'fiat creation'. And Sedgwick reacts in 
horror to Chambers' suggestion that such a view implies 'blemishes 
and blunders* in creation. God is not ’interfering* to patch up
mistakes, but acting as part of an overall creative strategy.
As for anthropomorphising;
'we can have no help for it. We have no conception of God, nor 
can we ever have, except through such faculties as he has given 
us. Humanize his attributes we therefore must, or express 
ourselves in mere negations . '
Here Sedgwick is defending the theistic view against attack. He 
therefore points out both the grandeur of its concepts and the
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problems of the alternative system which can easily lead to atheism 
or pantheism. Finally, he objects to the Deistic tendency in 
Chambers to 'go at once to the great First Cause and tell our readers 
what he MUST have done ' A proper inductive humility is to study
God's works and his word and find out what he has in fact done.
The interpretation which has here been suggested is borne out 
by the way in which Sedgwick returns to the issues in the preface 
and appendices to Discourse . After a few paragraphs
introduction. Sedgwick says that all of us see in nature around us 
harmony and order. But 'the mind of man cannot and will not rest 
content with second causes, and is constrained to look above them 
to some First Cause'4^ " He contrasts this with the school of
St Hilaire, who deny the possibility of ascending to general laws
of nature. Sedgwick's basic argument is 'contrivance proves design'. 
His discussion of this, and of dangers seen by Bacon in the mis­
application of final causes lasts until page xvii. He then has a 
new heading : 'Theory of Spontaneous Generation, Transmutation of
Species, etc.' He suggests that those who introduced the theories 
wished to escape the conclusion that there was a Designer. After 
briefly describing the theories of spontaneous generation and 
transmutation he continues:
'The authors and early defenders of this theory were, perhaos 
without exception, unbelievers in every form of Revealed Truth. 
They were materialists in the rankest sense of that term. They 
denied all distinction between material and moral phenomena - 
regarding them both as nothing more than the varied manifestations 
of the powers of second causes. Most of them formally denied 
all proofs of design in nature, and in all indications of an 
overruling Providence- and thus struck at the foundation of
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Natural Religion. But a doctrine may be true and yet may be 
turned to evil purposes. The first questions for discussion 
are the following - Is the doctrine true? Has the animal 
kingdom been first produced by spontaneous generation and 
afterwards perfected by transmutation and progressive develop- 
ment :.. .
We note Sedgwick's objections. He places the school's rejection of 
revealed religion before any comment on natural religion. He objects 
secondly to their 'rank materialism'. This, surely, is not merely 
that they believed in transmutation, but that they denied the reality 
of the spiritual. Then he objects to their regarding moral 
phenomena as epiphenomenal to matter. ONLY THEN, does he speak 
of their attitude to the argument from design. Moreover, he goes 
on specifically to say that the transmutation doctrine could still 
be true though misused by Chambers and his school. In his view, 
though, there is not much point in discussing this if the doctrine 
itself is demonstrably false anyway. Since, as we know, he thought 
it was, he chooses to consider this first. The hundreds of pages 
of argument against the Vestiges with which the 5th Edition 
Discourse is packed, should not obscure the basic point of 
departure. It is the underlying materialism of the school out 
of which the idea arose, rather than the idea itself, which he 
finds objectionable. Natural religion is just one of the things 
this school deny - and that not, by any means, the first which 
Sedgwick chooses to mention.
5.6 .3  Modern Scholars. Sedgwick, and the Vestiges
A number of modern commentators have analysed Sedgwick's 
attitude to Chambers, in varying degrees of depth. One of the 
first was C.C. Gillispie (in Genesis and Geology), whose analysis
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makes several basic assumptions which are questionable or invalid. 
First (as we saw above on p. 2^ 1) Gillispie makes a sharp distinct­
ion between Sedgwick and Miller. This distinction is also applied 
,to their respective reactions to the Vestiges. Sedgwick's 'rather 
incohate opposition to the idea of development' is contrasted 
with that of Miller who: ^
'...knew exactly why he stood where he did...[he"] derived 
his opposition to development from values older and sounder 
than any Sedgwick felt, expressed, or understood.'
Further, Sedgwick's whole approach is seen as materialistic:
'For Sedgwick and his school... truth had first to be found in 
materials apprehended by sense, and then it had to be "ennobled" 
into morality. One might think that this "annulled the 
distinction between material and moral" as effectually as Chambers 
had, but not so.
Does the conclusion at which we have arrived degrade our 
notion of the Godhead and of his creative power ? We 
think far otherwise... ^Gillespie here quotes the words 
of Sedgwick already given above on pp. -2J ...
In order to invest their materialism with moral quality, the
scientist theologians for whom Sedgwick spoke called in what was
essentially a series of miraculous dispensations to account for
the ultimate dispositions of the materials which were their
most certain reality... The trouble really lay in the
difficulty of relying primarily on the material evidence for
the existence and continuing activity of the Deity without
accepting materialism - a dilemma which pious and good-hearted
men of limited imagination could dodge only by denying self-
48sufficiency to the cosmic order...'
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The very essence of physico-theology, of course, lies in arguing 
from the physical to characteristics of a Designer, i.e. to 
spiritual truth. But this need not imply that those who accept it 
(whether Sedgwick, Miller, or any other Evangelical) see it as the
only or primary way to such knowledge. Gillispie, in quoting 
Sedgwick^ omits an important parenthesis: 'What know we of the
ito
God of nature (we speak only of natural means)...' ' Sedgwick is 
answering the taunt that his physico-theology would imply an 
inferior kind of God - he is not implying that it is the primary 
means to know of such a God.
A second point is that the essence of materialism (as Sedgwick 
understood it) was a denial of a difference in kind between moral 
and material. Chambers had done exactly that by arguing that since 
mental action was under law it was of the category of natural things, 
and the distinction between physical .and moral thus annulled'. But 
physico-theology does not imply mind to be of the same order as the 
physical. The jump of inference is from our own. internally experienced 
volition causing rearrangement of material things in design, to the 
general existence of a Designer where design is manifested. But this 
nowhere amuls the very basic distiction between material and moral. 
Neither does it imply that all truth has 'first to be apprehended by 
sense', for the unity of consciousness is not so apprehended.
Since, however, Gillispie sees Sedgwick (though not Miller) as
CO
'really' a materialist, he sees Sedgwick's 'hysterical' outburst 
against the Vestiges as being because he was
'a scientist upon whom had suddenly flashed the full implications 
of his own endeavourjj and who refused to understand them...
There are a number of objections to this kind of 'suppressed guilt^  
theory. Firstly, as we have seen, Sedgwick did not base his
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Christian belief solely on physico-theology. Secondly, his 
objection was primarily to the philosophical materialism, which 
is not a direct implication of evolution.. Thirdly, physico-theology 
itself does not depend on provable 'gaps' (though it may be 
strengthened by them). Finally, only with a great deal of 
hindsight can evolution be seen as a 'logical* implication of 
Sedgwick's geology, even on a purely scientific level. Sedgwick's 
'hysteria' surely relates rather to his character, for he exhibited 
it in 'Other controversies where no 'suppressed guilt might be supposed.
A decade after Gillispie's book, Hoo.yKaas published similar
51-views on Sedgwick and Miller on this issue. More recent
analyses have tended to add elements of Gillispie's analysis
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to concepts of a liberal Anglican 'Cambridge Network'.
Brooke, for example, explains the unpopularity of the Vestiges 
amongst scientists:
'partly... by the philosophical and scientific naivity of the 
book, partly by the fact that Chambers theodicy cut straight 
across the argument from adaptation to design as it was understood 
by Sedgwick or Whewell. But it is perhaps more fully explained 
by the fact that Vestiges represented a reductio ad absurdum 
of the mediating role of appeals to design. By launching such 
appeals in the context of a development hypothesis that smacked 
of both materialism and determinism, the author of Vestiges 
had sold the pass. On this point the perception of R .W. Church 
is as revealing as the ire of Sedgwick^ **^ or the judicious 
ambivalence of Herschel.'^ ^
In chapter 6.4 we will consider whether there is any evidence that 
natural theology did or even could play a 'mediating role' in 
this way. But Brooke's article again concentrates on the
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transmutation issue, and the damage to natural theology as the 
central issue. In fact, as we have seen, Chambers^  theory not 
merely 'smacked of materialism, but was blatantly materialistic 
- and it was this which was Sedgwick's more basic objection.
Thackray and Morrell seem, affected by Brooke (repeating his 
phrase 'sold the pass') but are less careful:
'The Bucklands and Sedgwicks encouraged science as a secular 
pursuit, while claiming that it led savants not towards 
materialism and determinism but towards God. That was why 
Robert Chamber's Vestiges of Creation, published anonymously 
in October 1844, roused their fierce anger; by taking the logical 
step of associating design with materialism and determinism, 
Vestiges showed the vanity of proclaiming that science led 
naturally to religion^ and it undermined the notion that science 
and religion were in ultimate diapason. If Vestiges sold the 
pass , the liberal Anglicans in the British Association had 
already smoothed the way. In the context of the Association 
their Christianity amounted to 'nothing more than a series of 
pious or polemical remarks upon the physical world viewed 
religiously'. There was indeed little doubt that gathered 
together in the British Association, the liberal Anglicans 
worshipped at the shrine of science rather than at that of the 
Christian God.
Whilst appreciating the wealth of researched material in this book, 
the religious analysis, as we have already seen, appears confused 
and misleading. We have already noted above the apparent classification 
of Chalmers as a'liberal natural theologian'. This passage just 
quoted raises a number of further questions. To call Chambers' 
materialism the 'logical step' is indefensible even with hindsight.
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What Sedgwick objected to was the confusion of spiritual/moral
terms and physical ones. There are many people to whom some 
form of dualism is self evident, and Chambers* step is anything 
but logical. Secondly, the author of the Vestiges makes clear 
his own belief in a God and the validity of design arguments 
so the Vestiges cannot be said to show the "vanity of proclaiming 
that science and religion were in ultimate diapason.' Sedgwick 
did not object because the author of Vesitges was irreligious, but 
because his materialism clashed with Sedgwick's Christian dualism.
It is questionable how fax organic evolution as such would have 
clashed with this, but the confusion of moral and physical did. It 
was, moreover, no surprise to Sedgwick to find that science could be 
linked with materialism in this way for he (like others in his 
group) were well aware that continental scientists had so linked 
it. Neither evolutionary Deismnor scientific materialism were 
new, and it is difficult to see exactly what 'pass' Chambers was 
supposed to have 'sold'. Sedgwick nevertheless thought that 
materialist scientists were wrong, and that science led more 
naturally to a theistic dualism in which experience of the natural 
world pointed to a creator God, and the experience of conscience, 
consciousness and the moral, pointed to a moral God. The two 
categories cannot be equated (as Chambers tried to do) at the level 
of immediate experience, but are linked at the ultimate level as the 
two 'Gods’ are recognised as identical. Evolution, as such, would 
not have in any way demolished this schema (though it might present 
some problems of interpretation for a Christian who went further and 
identified this God of natural theology with a God self-revealed 
in Scripture). The presence of an evolutionist as such in the 
BAAS was no more threatening than the presence of a Unitarian.
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The penultimate sentence of the above quotation is in a sense 
true. A multi-denominational meeting of scientists to discuss 
scientific issues (i.e. issues about physical laws) is not a 
meeting for religious worship. Neither liberal Anglicans, evangelicals, 
Tractarians, nor anyone else imagined that it was, and two things 
properly limited it to this. The first was that no one claimed that 
study of physical phenomena could lead further along the path of 
doctrine than the recognition of a creator God - with the additional 
fact (according to the Chalmers tradition) that he was moral in 
disposition. The implications of the physical study could not lead 
to the doctrine, for example, of atonement or Trinity - neither the 
apostle Paul in Romans 1, nor anyone else, imagined that it could.
The BAAS limited themselves to what they (as, in the main, Christians) 
saw as the implications of their study. Secondly, whilst interdenomina­
tional meetings for business (e.g. in the Bible Society) were not
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unknown, those for worship were rarer. ' To have held them at a 
scientific gathering would have been to court tremendous criticism.
But to phrase this as: 'their Christianity amounted to nothing 
more ...' is unfair. To an Evangelical like Chalmers (or Walker at 
Oxford), what he learned of God's physical creation he could assimilate 
in his mind as the work of the God he knew to be the Trinity with 
Christ as his Redeemer. That others might not see it so was irrelevant.
Thackray and Morrell's final statement about 'worshipping at the 
shrine of science' is emotive and misleading. Neither Chalmers, 
Brewster, Walker, Simeon, Sedgwick, nor any other of Evangelical 
sympathy who attended the BAAS was 'worshipping at the shrine' 
of science. They all saw redemption rather than knowledge of 
physical laws as ultimate, and most (including Sedgwick) explicitly 
said so. T.H. Huxley could well be argued from the way he speaks
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of science in his letters and writings, to have substituted it for 
God, but there are many things which although they are not inherently 
idolatrous can be made so. Evangelicals valued science, but neither 
worshipped science nor set the God of natural theology in place of 
the God of the Bible.
It would seem, finally, that if my interpretation of Sedgwick is
correct, then it has a bearing on the issues recently raised by
Robert Young, when he comments on the apparent preoccupation in the
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period with geology in discussing man's place in nature. "People 
like Sedgwick (and one could parallel e.g. Brougham's discussion of 
mind, brain and materialism in his Discourse^^) did show a concern 
for the mind-brain problem. But Sedgwick simply did not believe 
that understanding of the physical parts of the brain (e.g. on the 
phrenological system) would 'reach the philosophy of m i n d . I t  
is at least a plausible hypothesis that the apparent preoccupation 
with geology was because people like Sedgwick thought that there 
they could on a clear empirical basis knock out a prop from the 
materialists - and the rather more cautious approach of Whewell 
(which Young records) could partly stem from being less certain than 
his colleague Sedgwick that the geological data was indeed against 
evolution. But this is hypothesis.
5.6 .4  Sedgwick and Darwin
Darwin published his Origin of Species in 1859, and Sedgwick 
reacted critically. In Dar^ dn, of course, unlike in Vestiges, he 
recognised a respected scientist and personal friend. Darwin's work,
unlike the Vestiges, is purely scientific. It does not pronounce on 
the nature of man, or the identification of morality with epiphenomenal 
effects of material development. Sedgwick's review of it in the 
Spectator^  is also basically scientific. He objects (and quite
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validly in view of the evidence then available) that it is non- 
inductive, and non-actualistic. In a private letter to Darwin
he says that Darwin has deserted the inductive path and then.
'We all admit development as a fact of history- but how came 
it about? Here, in language, and still more in logic, we are 
point-blank at issue. There is a moral or metaphysical part 
of nature as well as a physical...'Tis the crown and glory of 
organic science that it does, through final cause, link material 
to moral; and yet does not allow us to mingle them in our first 
conception of laws .... You have ignored this link, and, if 
I do not mistake your meaning, you have done your best in one 
or two pregnant cases to break it...
Sedgwick fears that Darwin is set to deny the independent reality 
of morality, and the fact that the universe is designed. This is 
what, surely, he means by 'linking material to moral' through final 
cause. Interestingly, Sedgwick goes on to say that
'If your development produced the successive modification of the 
bee and its cells (which no mortal can prove), final cause
would stand good as the directing cause under which successive
%
generations acted and gradually improved.
Final causes (i.e. design) need not be ruled out by transmutation 
or even natural selection. But Sedgwick feared that Darwin was 
moving to a denial of these (which denial would; of course, be a 
metaphysical, rather than a physical statement) Sedgwick also 
seems sometimes to see Darwin's theory through the distorting 
medium of the philosophical position of the Vestiges. Thus he 
wrote to Miss Gerard:
'Darwin's book... is the system of the author of the Vestiges 
stripped of his ignorant absurdities, It repudiates all 
reasoning from final causes; and seems to shut the door upon
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any view (however feeble) of the God of Nature as manifested 
in His works. From first to last it is a dish of rank 
materialism cleverly cooked and served up...
This is not very fair to Darwin, though one wonders how far
Sedgwick simplified the issues to someone who could perhaps not 
be expected to follow the philosophical niceties. In a letter 
around the same time to Owen, Sedgwick is more circumspect, 
arguing that Darwin's work is non-inductive, but saying only that 
it 'savours of rankest materialism'.^^ Put thus, Sedgwick is 
correct, for by then the theory of evolution itself had long been 
associated with (in Sedgwick's terms) materialism.
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(6) CHURCH PARTIES’ ATTITUDES TO SCIENCE
6.1 Attitudes to Science and the BAAS
6.1.1 Recent Theory on Natural Theology in Early BAAS
The 1830’s were very interesting and exciting years for anyone 
interested in the relationship between religion and science. It 
was really a heyday for natural religion. The Bridgewater Treatises 
were coming out, including Chalmers' and Whewell's (both 1833), and 
Buckland's (1836). Brougham published his Discourse (1835), and 
Sedgwick his Discourse on the Studies of the University (1833).
Some of the land's acknowledged intellectual leaders were, in other 
words, arguing strongly for .natural theology.
The second feature which makes the period interesting is the 
emerging self-consciousness of science as an activity. The 
British Association for the Advancement of Science (or BAAS) was 
founded in 1831, bringing an aspect of the travelling circus to 
science which had never been matched in the more sober discussions 
of (say) the Geological Society of London (founded l807).
In geology there was a certain feeling that the science had
’come of age’. Accredited practising geologists formed an indenti-
fiable group, with accepted paradigms. Though controversy, both
theoretical and on specific issues, continued, any ’outsider’ would
find ranks closed against him. Wernerism was a spent force, and
the old style cataatrophism in the style of Buckland and Cuvier
was dying (Sedgwick renounced it in 1831, Buckland in 1836). The
Principles of Lyell, whilst few geologists might accept his h^er-
uniformitarianism, made geology readable to the general public, and
heralded a new phase in the debates on the issues of Genesis and 
geology.
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Now it seems to be assumed or argued by some recent writers that 
a growing self perception of scientists (as represented by the 
BAAS) as a group engaged in a godly but autonomous activity, was 
accompanied by a feeling of being under threat from religious 
quarters* Such writers may explain the emphasis within the BAAS 
on natural theology as an attempt to counter this perceived threat. 
Thus Thackray and Morrell write:
'Another important function of natural theology was that it 
could be used to defend the Association against religious 
critics. All Christian and clerical opposition could safely 
be ascribed to 'bigotry', as long as the BAAS had its own 
forms through which loudly to extol the Deity. Natural 
theology thus blunted criticism while serving to rebut the 
allied charge that science led inexorably to impiety and 
atheism.'^
The implication seems to be that these early nineteenth century 
scientists felt under threat^  they had to watch themselves very 
carefully and make as many pious pronouncements as possible to 'draw
the fire' of critics.
The continuing emphasis on natural theology within early BAAS 
has, then, been suggested to have two functions, as we have seen 
above and in the last section:
(i) Blunting possible clerical criticisms
(ii) Acting as a 'mediating influence' between different 
denominations in BAAS.
The present section of the thesis aims to examine the 
plausibility of these suggestions, with particular reference to
Sedgwick as one of the leading early BAAS figures.
To answer the first suggestion we shall have to ask a number
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of questions about each theological grpup's attitudes:
(a)l^at was their attitude to science itself ?
(b) What was their attitude to specific aspects of science, in
particular to the theories of geologists concerning origins ? 
Was there any call to limit or ban geological researches
or to ’unfrock' geologists who were ministers ?
(c) What was the attitude of the group to the BAAS as distinct
from science as such during this period? On what was any
opposition based?
(d) In what sense might a natural theology (or more properly a 
physicp—theology) blunt or deflect the group s criticism 
either of BAAS, geologists, or science?
The question of the supposed 'mediating influence will be dealt 
with separately^ in chapter 6.4 below.
6.1.2 Alternative Attitudes to Science. Geology and the BAAS
The rest of this chapter aims to set out some possible alternatives 
of view on these three topics, which different church parties might 
have taken.
(a) Attitudes to Science Itself
Science could have been regarded as a danger to state or religion 
which ought to be discouraged. At the other extreme it could have 
been seen as a laudable study of God’s works in creation, telling 
more of his wonderA* At neither extreme it might be seen as an 
activity harmless in itself, but a possible distraction from the 
real business of religious life. Needless to say, opinion might 
in reality vary along a scale on which these three are simply points.
(b) Attitudes to Geology
Here there are a number of alternative views. Yule has given
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2.a good breakdown of the possibilities, thus:
1. Deny the truth of Genesis and get on with geology:
1.1 Positively deny Genesis (few authors)
1.2 Practically ignore Genesis (many secular geologists)
2. Deny the truth of geology and be left with Scripture (Cole)
3. Deny that there is any connection between Genesis and Geology:
3.1: absolutely - 3.11 and see Genesis as myth (Geddes & Powell) 
3.12 and retain both (’schizoid reaction’)
3.2 but allow that there is a general analogy between both 
(Winning, Miller, in general vogue after 1840)
4. Fit geology to Genesis ’Scriptural Geologists’
5. Fit Genesis to geology: ’Geological Hermeneuts'
5.1 adopting F-thesis (after Faber) (i.e. the ’age-day’thesis)
5.2 adopting I-thesis (after Chalmers) (i.e. the ’gap’ thesis)
In general this schema (copied exactly but with one or two explanations 
added from Yule’s own text) is useful. One might wish, however, to 
question some details, e.g. the positioning of Miller who was surely 
saying something more than mere ’general analogy’. It is also rather 
puzzling as to who (in England at any rate) the ’many secular 
geologists’ were in this period. Most of them seem to have been 
clerics or at least expressed some interest in the problem (e.g. Lyell) 
At this point a few brief comments may be relevant. First, the 
schemes of the Scriptural Geologists varied, but most included a 
universal flood.^  Usually they did not attack science as such, but 
rather said that the geologists were wrongly applying it. More 
subtly, many accepted the geological ’facts’ (i.e. the strata) but
264
denied the ’interpretation' (i.e. the time periods). Often they 
would deny that they were fitting geology to Genesis, claiming that 
even independently geology would give rise to their schemfc. Yule 
is not, therefore, giving a description based on what they thought 
they were doing, but on what væ judge them to have been doing. On 
the other hand ’fitting Genesis to geology’ was broadly what Chalmers 
and Faber in section 5 thought they were doing. The age-day theory 
is traced by Millhauser' back to Buffon, but it had been made available 
to our period in G.S.Faber’s Genius and Object in 1823. The theory 
that geological strata were to be fitted into a ’gap’ somewhere in 
Genesis 1-2 came from Chalmers; The Evidence and Authority of the 
Christian Revelation (181*7)* The ’gap’ theory was more popular than 
the age-day theory, being supported by Buckland- and Pusey from I836, 
Sedgwick, Phillips and later Faber himself (though Miller supported 
the age-day). Both theories (and there were various versions of 
each) implied either a localised flood or one which was purely 
miraculous and left no traces.
(c) Attitudes to the BAAS^
It seems clear that someone could approve of science but dislike 
the BAAS, depending on his perception of its intended function. In 
particular I suggest three basic possible attitudes to it:
(i) Love it all, seeing the razzmatazz of the BAAS as an essential 
part of popularising science (e.g. Brewster),
(ii) Like jbhe idea of a scientific association, but regret the 
circus element of the BAAS (e.g. the Times ?)r
(iii) Dislike the razzmatazz, but, more significantly, question the 
need for any such meeting of scientists, and see dangers to 
religion if such a meeting be inter-denominational (e.g. Bowden 
and Newman).
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6.1 Notes
1. Thackray and Morrell, Gentlemen of Science, p. 229*
2. J.D.Yule, The Impact of British Religious Thought in the Second 
Quarter of the Nineteenth Century, Table 9.1 (p« 524).
5. In this thesis I use the phrase 'Scriptural Geologist' after the 
manner of Yule (ref. 2) and M. Millhauser (e.g. 'The Scriptural 
Geologists, An Episode in the History of Opinion*, Osirus, 11,
63-68). A recent book by T. Cosslet (Science and Religion in the 
Nineteenth Century) classes Sedgwick, Buckland, Chalmers and 
Miller unequivocally as 'Scriptural Geologists' (e.g. p. 4).
Not only is this likely to be confusing in view of the previous 
usage of the term, but it is not in any case very satisfactory.
Would we today (for example) call someone like Professor C.A.
Berry a 'Scriptural Geneticist* because he seeks to reconcile . 
his work on genetics with a belief in the Bible ? Surely this 
would be very misleading; but it is no less misleading to call 
men like Sedgwick, Buckland and Miller 'Scriptural Geologists', 
and so I shall not do so but will keep to the previous use of 
that phrase. As for Chalmers, he surely would not have claimed to 
be any kind of geologist, nor to be making any contribution to 
geology.
4. M, Millhauser, Just Before Darwin, p. 42.
3. References to the views of those named in brackets will be made 
in the course of the rest of section (6).
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6.2.1 Recent Scholarship and the Issues
Brooke, in an article concerned with mid nineteenth century- 
natural theology, made the following comment:
’In works of considerable sophistication the evangelicals are 
still dismissed en bloc as bibliolaters who viewed the sciences 
with suspicion.’
Brooke was concerned with works making explicit generalisations 
about Evangelicals. Other works, however, may be less explicit 
and yet leave an impression that Evangelicals had little interest 
in or commitment to science, other than in inventing schemes of 
Scriptural Geology. This point may be illustrated from Gentlemen
of Science by Thackray and Morrell. Their section headed. ’Science
and Religion' is prefaced by a quotation from Simeon ’the leader of
2
the Evangelical Revival in the Church of England’. The quotation 
is ’Investigate the works of creation; it cannot do any harm. But 
beware of feeding upon science, lest your souls be starved.’
Thackray and Morrell give no further explanation of the views of 
Simeon çr his Evangelical Associates on science, and pass on 
to portray the early BAAS (in the 1830'b) as ’dominated by liberal 
Anglicans’. They state;
’Those Christian groups professing a firm commitment either to the 
literal words of Scripture or to the magisterial tradition of 
the Church were notable both for their absence from the British 
Association and for their growing attacks on it. In contrast, 
the liberal Anglicans found strong allies in those sections of 
the church least given to doctrinal formulas. The Quakers and
the Unitarians each provided one among the twenty-three
3
Gentlemen of Science.’
The first sentence of this quotation makes deliberate reference to
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'Christian groups’, and the alternative commitments mentioned are 
presumably intended to identify such ’groups* or ’parties’. In such 
a context we must surely be intended to take a commitment to ’the 
literal words of Scripture’ to refer to Evangelicals, and one to 
’the magisterial tradition of the Church’ to the High Church ? 
Evangelicals, therefore, as a Christian group, are notable for their 
growing attacks on the BAAS. There is no indication from Thackray 
and Morrell that a powerful section of moderate Evangelical opinion, 
in England as well as in Scotland, was highly critical of such 
attacks.
Thackray and Morrell continue their account in similar style.
When BAAS spokesmen have made their case for ’science as a Godly, 
yet autonomous, intellectual pursuit'^  then: ’The first reaction 
Ccune from an evangelical Scriptural Geologist, Frederick Nolan.
A few pages later Thackray and Morrell put it more generally: 
’Evangelical Christiajis, given to a literal interpretation of 
Genesis, led the assault [on the authority of the BAAS]. On 
the next page, after describing Buckland’s efforts to get Sedgwick 
to reply to Nolan, they state: ’In practice, vindication of
liberal Anglican views and of the BAAS came from Powell and .
Daubeny...’ This sounds as though the views of Powell and 
Daubeny epitomised those of ’liberal Anglicans’ in general, 
including Sedgwick. After describing the attacks made by Powell 
and Daubeny on Nolan, Thackray and Morrell write:
’However, the evangelical Christian Observer pointed to the 
absurdity of arguing that divine revelation is to be credited 
in its moral but not in its physical statements, and accused 
Daubeny of doubting the inspiration of the Old Testament.
The Reverend William Conybeare, vhio had presented a report on 
geology to the I832 Meeting, sprang to Daubeny’s defence with
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an epitome of the liberal Anglican position: ’the Bible is
7
exclusively the history of the dealings of God towards men.’
A very clear impression is created here of the Christian Observer, 
the mouthpiece for the most important section of Anglican 
Evangelicals in the period, making an attack on the views of the 
liberal Anglicans of the BAAS, and meeting a counter attack from 
Conybeare. We shall consider later in the chapter how true a 
picture this is of the incident concerned. Thackray and Morrell, 
however, continue their chapter with the apparent implicit assumption 
that opinions on the issues divided very much along (church) party 
lines - with liberal Anglican opinions set against Evangelical ones. 
Thus, when Powell’s response to the Scriptural Geologists was to 
suggest that ’Genesis could not be regarded as a historic narrative’,
Thackray and Morrell see no basic difference between his position 
and that of other liberal Anglican divines (presumably including 
Sedgwick). Rather, they treat the matter merely as a question of
g
’tactics’ and greater daring on Powell’s part. Thomas Chalmers 
is the only identified Evangelical whom Thackray and Morrell present 
as having a positive attitude to science, and even his presence is 
somehow presented as a confirmation of ’the close alliance between 
the British Association and the liberal natural theologians.'^
In summary, therefore, the impression left by Thackray and 
Morrell is surely this: Evangelicals as a group, and including the
Christian Observer as the mouthpiece of moderate Evangelical 
Anglicans, took the side of the Scriptural Geologists and were 
hostile to the BAAS; on the other hand the leaders of the BAAS 
were united in their liberal Anglican theology and differed only 
as to ’tactics'.
The present chapter of this thesis will present some of the
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evidence from which it may be judged whether this is an impression 
which truly portrays the situation in the early nineteenth century..
6.2.2 Evangelicals’ Attitudes to Science
In chapter 2.1 we considered the origins of the Evangelical
revival in the eighteenth century, with Wesley and Whitfield among
the key figures. A recent work by C.A.Russell has illustrated
how positive were the attitudes of these Evangelical pioneers
10towards natural philosophy. But what of Evangelicals at
Cambridge, and in particular in Sedgwick’s formative years there ? 
Sedgwick arrived in l8o4, and for the first two decades of the 
nineteenth century the three most influential Evangelicals in the 
university were probably Isaac Milner, Simeon and Farish. These 
will therefore now be considered.
Isaac Milner was Senior Wrangler in 1774, and
became an Evangelical on a continental tour with Wilberiorce 
in 1785. In 1781 he became the president of Queens, which he 
ruled despotically and turned into a recognised Evangelical 
centre, He also became Jacksonian Professor of Natural .
Experimental Philosophy 1783-92. Gunning described his lectures:
'He did not treat the subjects under discussion very 
profoundly, but he contrived to amuse us, and we 
generally returned laughing heartily at something...
His experiments in Optics were very little more than 
exhibitions of the fagic Lanthorn on a gigantic scale...
I cannot say that I benefitted much by my attendance at these 
lectures. I was subsequently nominated by my college to 
attend his Chemical Lectures (he being deputy for Dr 
Pennington). These, I understood from persons much 
better qualified than myself to judge of his merits, were 
very excellent...''’
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Though Milner was a brilliantman, he made no profound contribution
to research. It is, however, significant, that in days when
many Professors failed to lecture at all, one of the two leading
Evangelicals at Cambridge (the other in this period being Simeon)
was committed to the teaching of science in the university.
Milner continued to exert an influence (though he resigned from his
his Professorship} until his death in 1820.
We must remember, again, that in the late eighteenth century
Evangelicals at Cambridge were very few. Yet, when Milner
resigned in 1792, one of the two candidates for the Professorship
was the Evangelical Farish. On that occasion he lost, but he then
became Professor of Chemistry from 1794 to l8l3, and later held
the Jacksonian Professorship as well. He held lectures to exhibit
'the application of Chemistry to the Arts and Manufactures of
Great Britain’ from at least l802, and Sedgwick (then age 29 but
not yet a Professor himself) attended these lectures in Spring 
; 2.1813. During this period, however, Farish was also the close 
friend and confident of Charles Simeon. In I809, for example,
Simeon was attacked in a pamphlet by the Christian Advocate Dr 
Pearson. Carus, in Memoirs of the Life of the Rev Charles Simeon, 
says:
’'Mr Simeon prepared a reply. But previous to its publication
he submitted it to the judgement ci his faithful and clear
sighted .friend, the Rev. Wm. Farish... then Professor of 
(3
Chemistry...'
After receiving Parish's advice, Simeon apparently amended his reply.
Farish, again, was one of the key figures in establishing the
14Bible Society in Cambridge in l8l2. All this shows Farish to have 
been one of the inner circle near to Simeon.
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Farish continued to lecture, and his 'highly curious and useful 
course' is mentioned by the British Critic in its 1831 defence of 
English science in the 'declinist' controversy. In 1833 he 
attended the BAAS, and gave an address;
'Professor Farish explained to the meeting the advantages 
which he conceived would be derived from applying the power 
of steam to carriages on undulating roads in preference to 
level rail-ways.*
We have seen, then, that two of Simeon's closest and most
important Evangelical associates at Cambridge were, for some time,
Professors who lectured on scientific subjects. This must colour
our understanding of his own attitudes to science, especially
since his explicit pronouncements on it were few, and often come
to us second hand. We also need to bear in mind that Simeon
himself was a single-minded person who was devoted to his special
calling in Cambridge, yet he is aware that his own station
may have obligations in it which do not apply to those placed by
17God in other situations. In a letter in 1822 Simeon states that 
he considers Chalmers as 'raised up by God for a great and peculiar 
work'.^^ In the same letter, Simeon confesses; . 'Religious 
people are apt to overlook secular matters, instead of giving them 
a due measure of attention.' He adds, however, 'My province is 
just to attend to the little things that are before me.'
Comments of Simeon specifically on science are rare. He admired 
Kewton (though presumably knew nothing of Newton's theology), and 
in a letter of 12th June 1822 expresses satisfaction that he had 
been able to furnish Whew ell with an original portrait of Newton 
to hang in the college.'*^  In l833 Simeon (aged 73) attended some , 
of the BAAS meetings in Cambridge. He commented casually m  a 
letter shortly afterwards:.
272
'We have had a large assembly of philosophers here, both British
and Foreign, and their exhibitions have gone off well. But
one atom of heavenly science is in ray estimation preferable
to all that they brought forth. And so St Paul thought, when
he counted all but dross and dung for the excellency of the 
,1.0
knowledge of God.
At first sight this might seem a puzzling comment for a man
whose close friend and confident for over twenty years held a
Chair in the sciences and had actively participated in the
aforementioned 'exhibitions'. But two things need to be noted.
Firstly, the quoted words of St Paul come from a passage where
the latter is arguing that natural advantages, though good in
themselves, are worse than useless if they are seen as an
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alternative to faith in Christ. In another place, as Simeon
would well have known, Paul answers the question: 'What advantage
22then has the Jew' by saying 'Much in every way...' Simeon is 
not denying the usefulness of science, but setting his priorities.
The second point is that Simeon may be intending a pun. The word 
'science' means 'knowledge', so Simeon is saying that 'heavenly knowledge' 
is preferable to all that brought forth. But 'knowledge of God' as 
Paul meant it referred, of course, to far more than intellectual 
knowledge about God; it included e xp e ri en ce .S i me on certainly 
is not saying that he would rather see a British Association for the 
Advancement of Theology instead.
What is interesting, also, is that his first biographer and 
fellow Evangelical William Cams, writing in the later 1830's and 
as Simeon's successor at Cambridge, felt it best to soften the 
apparent severity of the above quoted remark by a footnote as 
follows:
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’Mr. Simeon, however, was by no means indifferent to the advance­
ment of science, and had great pleasure in attending these 
meetings of the British Association. In his occasional 
seasons of leisure he had peculiar pleasure in reading works 
of a philosophic character; and when recovering from a severe 
illness, a year after this, the volume which he enjoyed most, 
next after the Holy Scriptures was the Bridgewater Treatise 
by Dr Whewell, on Astronomy and General Physicsywhich was 
read over to him more than once, as he was able at intervals to 
hear it.V
Caras, who was in fact also a friend of Sedgwick, shows by this 
that he himself was certainly favourable both to science and to 
natural theology; this in itself is important. But it is 
difficult to believe that Cams, writing at a time when many of 
Simeon's circle were still living, would have made such a comment 
without at least some foundation of tmth.
Simeon also commented specifically upon geology.
'Geologists take too much upon them. They have too few 
facts to reason from, and the subject is as yet too little 
known for them to make such confident assertions as they do.
They have examined only the surface of the earth, and only 
parts of that surface... We are fond of any favourite 
system, and good men have got hold of geology and ridicule 
any attempt to reason them out of it. But mere plausibility 
must not carry all before it... Investigate the works of 
creation; it cannot do any harm. But beware of feeding 
upon science, lest your souls be starved. Faber's idea of 
each day of creation being a thousand years seems little 
better than nonsense. Some would explain the opening of
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Genesis by saying that God first created the substance of 
the earth; and that while it was 'void', or in a state of 
confusion (which it is asserted the word means), darkness 
brooded over it, and then God created the light. This 
interpretation may be true, though if it be the Christian 
gains myüniig by it. But if it iw^be asserts that the 
contrary of this view is not necessarily true, we take from 
the sceptic one of his weapons; and therefore the idea, if
'24
correct, is valuable.'
This passage, based on much later recollections, seems to be making 
reference to the age-day and the gap theories. Simeon does not 
seem to reject the gap theory (if this is his meaning) as 
unscriptural. But he was not, personally, greatly interested.-^
His follower and successor. Carus, made it clear in his 
1889 article on Sedgwick that he for one was unprepared to
reject the assurances of his friend Sedgwick that geology was
2 L
compatible with Christian faith.
It might, perhaps, be conjectured that Simeon, in spite of his 
friends' commitments to science, might by his negative attitude 
discourage his disciples from pursuit of science. The plausibility 
of this conjecture is, however, called in question by the case 
of Charles Cornelius Gorham. Gorham became an Evangelical whilst 
at Queens, and was third wrangler in l809* His Evangelical 
commitment was strong even at this stage , and Gorham, who was 
evidently very much prepared to stand up for his beliefs, .later 
championed the Evangelical cause in his famous controversy in 
1847-8 with the High Churchman Phillpotts. Yet, in I818, he 
stood against Sedgwick for the post of Woodwardian Professor of 
Geology - with the promise that, like his friend Farish, he would
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give a course of lectures if elect ed ,H e also claimed: *I feel 
a conviction that few people in the University have followed up the 
Science more sedulously than I have..,’, and had formed a valuable 
collection of plants in a Swiss tour in The case of
Gorham shows that a young man of considerable talent, who associated 
himself with the Evangelicals in Cambridge, could find it quite 
natural both to pursue science and to seek a scientific Chair. 
Evangelicals Farish and Pryme both voted for Gorham, as did the 
Professor of Mineralogy, E.D.Clarke, at whom we shall presently look.^  ^
All this makes it clear that the Simeon circle regarded commitment 
to scientific study as a worthy one.
A final person who requires consideration is E.D.Clarke. In 180? hfe
began a course in Mineralogy, the first of its kind but well
attended, and he was appointed to a Chair of Mineralogy from 1808-
1822.^  ^ He spoke extempore and enthusiastically, and Sedgwick
attended his course, later testifying: 'E.D.Clarke was a benefactor,
32-and how. He gave a start - he kept us awake etc...’ It is
difficult to say exactly what religious position Clarke had. He 
did not al±gf\ himself with Evangelicalism in as clearcut a way as 
Milner, Farish and Gorham. What is interesting, however, is that 
in 1812 he risked criticism and possible loss of preferment by 
firmly supporting, with Farish, the establishment of a Bible 
Society at Cambridge.The Bible Society was mainly supported 
in those days by Evangelicals, and in this respect at least Clarke 
was willing to identify himself with them.
Let us remember that at this time Evangelicals in CambTidg,e were 
not numerous. On the other hand, neither were those who actively 
practised or taught natural science. Thus Cannon writes:
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'Isaac Milner as Jacksonian Professor of Natural Experimental 
Philosophy did much, from I783 to 1792, to demonstrate 
electrical, chemical, and mechanical devices and experiments; 
and the tradition was continued hy William Farish from 
1793. Farish lost the election for the Jacksonian chair 
and had to be contented with the chemistry one; but as the 
Jacksonian winner, F.J.H.Wollaston, wanted to lecture on 
chemistry, Farish lectured on machines and mechanism. "It 
seems fair," says the historian of Cambridge engineering,
"to claim this as the first real course in mechanical 
engineering in any British university.
Another of these individual enthusiasts was Edward D.
Clarke...
Cannon fails to note that of the four he mentions, two were leading 
Evangelicals, and a third had sympathies with the largely 
Evangelical Bible Society. Those of Cannon's viewpoint have 
tended to emphasize the (largely speculative) interest of Coleridge 
in science; they tend to pass over without comment the level 
of Evangelical involvement with science which (considering the 
numbers of declared Evangelicals) is quite astonishing. They 
also tend to ignore the fact that Sedgwick's own formative 
contacts with empirical science were at the hands of Professors 
with Evangelical sympathies, and his rival for his own post was 
also an Evangelical.
One last point concerns the Cambridge Philosophical Society, 
started in 1819. The early leaders in this were Sedgwick, Henslow, 
Farish and Clarke.' Of these, again, we know the Evangelical
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connections of Farish and Clarke; this thesis has argued those
for Sedgwick, and Henslow never seems to have been associated with
3Gany kind of ’liberalism' in theology.
With Oxford University we are less immediately concerned, but 
some comment may be useful as we build up a general picture of 
Evangelical attitudes to science. In this period there was no 'Simeon
at Oxford, and both Evangelicalism and science were weaker than 
at Cambridge. J.S. Reynolds counts a total of only 37 Evangelicals 
admitted to fellowships during 1807-1845 and comments: 'The 
majority of fellows of colleges at this time were high churchmen 
of the traditional kind.'^ '" Science, also, had never been as strong 
as at Cambridge, and in the 1830's was in decline. F. Sherwood 
Taylor says: 'Thus in the later 'forties the scientific instruction 
of the (Oxford) University was given by four men, Daubeny, Buckland, 
Walker and Acland.'^^  What is interesting is that in a time when 
Evangelicals were few in number, one of these four was an Evangelical,
Robert Walker.
Born in 1802, Walker took a first in 1822, M.A. in 1825 and 
from 1826-31 was a chaplain in the Evangelical stronghold of Wadhatn 
college. He was also a tutor and from 1828-48 a frequent examiner 
in mathematics in this period. He was Professor of Experimental
Philosophy 1839-65.
Interesting parallels might be drawn between Walker and the
earlier Milner, Farish and Clarke at Cambridge. Like them, he made 
no major contribution to research, and his value (again like theirs) 
was in the introduction of science teaching into university life.
Thus William Tuckwell says of him:
'(he) constructed and exploded gases, laid bare the viscera 
of pumps and steam engines, forced mercury through wood blocks
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in a vacuum, manipulated galvanic batteries, magic—lanterns,
air guns... Walker was a man of great ability, the first, I
believe, to introduce into Oxford the analytical as distinct from
the geometrical, treatment of higher mathematics. He was also
a notable preacher of the Evangelical school; his sermons
pure in style, and reflecting strong personal piety.’
He also addressed a pamphlet in 1848 to the Vice Chancellor on the
need for all students to attend a compulsory science course. This
shows the depth of his commitment to science.
Walker played no great part in the BAAS, though this could
partly be explained by his contribution being in teaching rather
than in research. When the BAAS met at Oxford in its second meeting
(1833) its Report contains in its Committee of Mathematics and
General Physics the name of the Rev. R. Walker FRS, so he clearly
had some sympathy with its aims. Canon, again, mentions Walker
'By the l840's the new methods were even slipping into
Oxford, through the teaching of the notable evangelical
preacher, and reader in experimental philosophy, the
. L.O
Reverend Robert Walker.'
Again, then, though Evangelicals were few in number we find one of 
them pioneering in the teaching of science in universities.
Of the others of the ’four men of science’ mentioned above, 
Buckland’s connections are also of interest. His friendship with 
the High Church and Tractarian leader Pusey is well known, and 
Pusey’s support for his geological views was given in a lengthy 
footnote in his Bridgewater Treatise.^ * Buckland also refers to 
some ’excellent articles’ on the issue in the Evangelical Christian 
ObserverIndeed, his family connections seem to have included
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both Pusey and Evangelicalism. His wife received ’much comfort 
from Pusey’s spiritual ministrations on the death of her nine year 
old son in 1847.^ "^  The church the Buckland family attended, however, 
was that of an 'excellent evangelical preacher' Rev. F.Waldegrave 
and Mrs. Buckland was ’an assiduous worker in Mr. Waldegrave’s 
poor parish'.^
In the period, then, up to the l830*s and into the l840*s there 
is evidence that, far from any suspicion or animosity, known 
Evangelicals were in the forefront of bringing science teaching 
to universities. The virtual leaders of Evangelicalism in 
Scottish and English academic circles (Chalmers and Simeon) both 
, attended the 1833 BAAS meetings, and Simeon's close friend Farish 
participated. Would Sedgwick (who was a friend of Simeon's 
disciple and later successor Carus, and associated with Farish 
as a co-founder of the Cambridge Philosophical Society) really 
feel that either the BAAS or science had anything to fear from 
such moderate Evangelicals ?
6.2.3 Genesis and Geology
In the quotation made from Thackray and Morrell at the beginning
of the present chapter, mention was made of the 'Scriptural 
Geologists', said by Thackray and Morrell to have 'enjoyed a 
vigorous phase in the l830'si' Thackray and Morrell (as a 
number of others) associated Scriptural Geology with the Evangelicals 
and seemed to imply that it was a fairly general Evangelical 
viewpoint. For this reason the issues of Scriptural Geology have 
been placed in this chapter on the Evangelicals, though (as we shall 
see) any association of "^ Scriptural Geology with Evangelical orthodoxy 
would in fact be misguided.
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Yule's scheme defined’Scriptural Geologists’ as those who fitted 
geology to Scripture. Some of them may, in fact, have accepted 
that they were doing this; others, however, might have denied it 
and claimed rather that, independently of Scripture, the observed 
facts of geology would lead naturally to their system. They were, 
however, united in a rejection of ‘orthodox’ geology, and the 
espousal of some ’new’ radically different schema. Most of them 
involved the agency of a universal flood or floods to lay down 
large thicknesses of strata - a theory abandoned by ’orthodox’ 
geology many years earlier.
The following are some of the most important works of 
Scriptural geology;
Andrew Ure: A New System of Geology (1829)
Sharon Turner: The Sacred History of the World (1832)
W.M. Higgins: The Mosaical and Mineral Geology Illustrated and
Compared (1832)
Frederick Nolan: The Analogy of Revelation and.Science (1833)
Henry Cole: Popular geology subversive of Divine Revelation (1834)
George Young: Scriptural Geology (1838)
Dean Cockburn: A Remonstrance to the Duke of Northumberland (1838)
A Letter to Professor Buckland (1838)
The Creation of the World (1840)
(dedicated to the geological society)
ThefBible Defended Against the British Association
(1845)
A New System of Geology (1849)
(Addressed to Sedgwick)
Of particular interest to us are those of Ure, Nolan, Cole and 
Cockburn, because they have direct or indirect links with Sedgwick; 
all these will be considered later. To begin with, however, let
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US consider the general attitudes of the Evangelical world to the 
issues.^ "'Yule has pointed out that the Calvinistic The Record, 
tended during the period to support Scriptural Geologists, whilst 
the moderate Christian Observer did not. But it will be useful
to begin the present study by looking in more detail at the exact 
position of the Christian Observer, remembering its importance as 
a voice of moderate Evangelical Anglicanism. Then we may consider 
the actual theological and scientific positions of each of the 
Scriptural Geologists important to our theme, and how they related 
in particular to Sedgwick.
The Christian Observer first reviewed Chalmers’ ’gap theory’ 
as it appeared in his Evidences and Authority of Christian Revelation 
in April 1 8 1 5 in the very earliest part of Wilks' editorship.
The review was favourable, and the gap theory became one acceptable 
belief amongst moderate Evangelicals. Also influential in this 
period was an appendix to John Bird Sumner's Records of Creation 
(1814) on geological issues. Sumner carefully advanced the point 
that Moses did not intend to teach geology, and the version of the 
gap theory he suggests is consistent with Scripture, and is one 
which incorporates the then geologically accepted Cuvierian diluvialism. 
During the 1820’s the Christian Observer maintained its balanced and 
non*-dogmatic approach - even hesitating at whether Buckland claimed 
too much for his diluvial theoryl
As we get to the 1830's, we find little about science in the 
1831 numbers. In October 1832 it laments the death of Cuvier:
'he refuted certain naturalists, who, to overturn the doctrine 
of final causes teach that there was originally but one kind 
of animal, a mere chance in the infinite mutations of matter
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in eternal ages, and that from this have arisen all others.... 
Man is thus associated with a mere worm, or polypus, which 
happens by chance to have been more developed than his kindred 
worms, or polypi, and owing all his superiority to a happy 
accident. Cuvier’s demonstrations overturned this absurd 
theory, and formed an excellent cause of natural theology, 
the more valuable as being the result of independent science.’ 
This passage shows no disposition to bind science to Scripture, 
but rather a rejoicing that science independently has cut the 
physical grounds away from a wrong metaphysical system.
In its November 1832 issue, the Christian Observer reviews 
W.M. Higgins: The Mosaical and Mineral Geology Illustrated and 
Compared. In the course of the review the editorial recounts the 
two main theories (i.e. the age-day and the gap theories) referring 
back to previous reviews of Faber’s arguments. The editorial 
makes no recommendation between them, but notes that in either case 
geology does confirm Genesis in making an assumption that man is 
recent. It goes on:
’These important corroborations being furnished by the science 
of geology, we are not to be alarmed because the same science 
also intimates certain difficulties, which seem to require some 
correction of the popular arguments on the first chapter of 
Genesis - not any alteration in the text but a variation in the 
interpretations... The narrative (of Genesis) is much too 
succinct to ground on it all the physical details of the
144creation.
The Christian Observer was still prepared to print letters from
readers of other persuasions (e.g. in l833 it printed a letter from 
a Hutchinsonian^) but it had made its sympathies clear. %n 1833 it
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contained little which related to science.'
In 1834 there arose the controversy which was referred to by 
Thackray and Morrell in the section quoted from them at the 
beginning of this present chapter. In April the Christiæi 
Observer carried a letter from 'Layman* 'On the Infidel Tendency 
of Certain Scientific Speculations.' This defended Nolan 
and attacked Daubeny's article in the Literary Gazette; it also 
made an attack specifically on Sedgwick, quoting his 183O 
Presidential Address to the Geological Society of London.
'Layman' regards Daubeny as a 'sort of paraphrase' of Sedgwick.
'Layman* carried no more authority than any other porrepondent; 
but was it (as Thackray and Morrell) seem to imply, the editorial 
line as well ?
The editorial line is actually very careful:
'A more daring and absurd proposition was never invented, than 
that a Divine revelation is to be credited in its moral but 
not in its physical statements; and we do not believe that 
any man who so asserts has the slightest faith in the Bible as 
a Divine revelation in either department. A large number of 
geologists, as well as of other scientific and unscientific 
men, are, we feel, infidels - or at least sceptics - either 
avowed or concealed; but a broad line of distinction ought 
to be made between such men and those who, agreeing with them 
in their physical facts, yet differ from them in their sceptical 
opinions ; and who consider that the word of God may be, and 
ought to be, so construed as without violence to reconcile the 
scientific theory with the sacred text. Our correspondent's 
paper, if read without this fair distinction... would class 
the sceptical writers and writings to which he alludes, with
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the writings of many uncLouhted Christians, including the 
geological lectures [sic] at both our Universities. We may 
doubt certain alleged physical facts, or certain theories 
supposed to result from them; but if another man, who believes 
both, thinks that the word of God, rightly interpreted, is 
perfectly reconcilable with them, he... cannot in justice be 
, treated as an infidel.’
We may note a number of things here. Firstly, the Christian 
Observer does not see the issue either as the authority of the 
BAAS or as the truth (or otherwise) of the theories of geology.
Its disagreement with Daubeny (who is not specifically named) is 
about theology, not about science, and it concerns whether or not 
physical statements of the Bible are trustworthy. The Christian 
Observer is very careful to emphasize that theological scepticism 
on this point may be present in both scientists and non-scientists, 
and the science is incidental. It further maintains that others 
(and it instances Sedgwick and Buckland) ^  accept that physical 
statements in the Bible, rightly interpreted, are trustworthy, and 
that these others may well accept the same geological facts as 
the sceptics. After the passage quoted it expresses fear that 
’Layman’s* failure to make the correct distinction ’might give pain 
to some of the most pious and excellent men of the age’ to whom his 
criticisms do not apply. It also defends the age-day theory against 
Layman's criticisms.
In May the Christian Observer carried some comments on these 
issues by W.D. Conybeare.*^  Conybeare had noted Layman’s ’marked 
reference* in introducing his topic to those ’who are even servants 
of the church of God.’ He refers this to Buckland, Sedgwick and 
himself, it is these particularly whom he wishes to defend.
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His defence is basically to deny that any of them ever held such 
a position as Layman suggests. If (say) Buckland did not believe 
Scripture to be trustworthy in its physical statements, then 
he would have been inclined ’to disconnect his geological 
speculations from the records of Scripture.* Such an accusation, 
to Conybeare, is absurd. Layman, moreover, has ’completely 
misapprehended’ Sedgwick’s Presidential Address. Sedgwick meant 
only to assert what Layman himself believes, i.e. Scripture employs 
’common language’ and is not meant to teach us scientific fact.
Conybeare then refers to possible areas of conflict between 
geology and the Scriptural narrative. He says:
’...it is surely nowise inconsistent with the fullest reception 
of Revelation to maintain that it professedly confines itself 
to the exposition of the Great Creator as they concern his 
final intellectual creation: that, in a word, the Bible is 
exclusively the history of the dealings of God towards men.’
In its context, the clause at the end of this passage suggests only 
the possibility of time dispensations before those of mankind, gver 
which the Bible passes in silence: in essence the ’gap' theory.
Conybeare then specifically goes on to defend both the gap and the 
age-day theory as 'methods of conciliation, either of which will 
obviously remove every appearance of discrepancy^  between the record
of Genesis and our assumed geological periods.’ We might, 
incidentally, note that had Conybeare really believed that the 
Bible was ’not to be credited in its physical statements’ then such 
reconciliation would have been entirely unnecessary to him.
Finally Conybeare gives a somevyKat half hearted defence of the 
anonymous writer in the Literary Gazette. Conybeare is ’convinced
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that the writer intended only to state the views he himself 
holds: ’though his expressions may possibly require to be more
eg
guarded. He is evidently no professional divine...’^
The Christian Observer again here makes editorial comment. It 
accepts most of Conybeare*s comments, and refers back to its own 
distinction between Christian and sceptical geologists. It does, 
however, deny that the passages in the Literary Gazette can bear 
the interpretation Conybesure suggests, and it quotes two passages 
to illustrate this. It contrasts what is said about God witholding 
’any extraordinary assistance from such portions as relate to 
phenomena in which man has no vital concern.’ with a passage in 
Conybeare’s own recent manual in which Inspiration implies ’not only 
are there ’’great truths” divinely revealed, but also ’’all the 
minutiae of things which they mention.” ' In short, Conybeare
and Daubeny are poles apart.
The same issue of the Christian Observer carried a further attack 
by ’Layman*, this time on Sedgwick. The editorial note, however, 
adds that ’Layman wholly misapprehends, in our idea, his meaning...’
It also publishes a longer defence of the geologists by another 
(anonymous) correspondent.
At this point, then, we may briefly consider whether the passage 
quoted from Thackray and Morrell at the beginning of this chapter 
fairly representsthe incident described above. We may note:
(i) Conybeare’s letter was criticising ’Layman’, not the editorial 
line, and his own letter carried the same authority as Layman’s.
(ii) Conybeare’s main object was to ’spring to the defence’ not of 
Daubeny (who is defended rather half heartedly and with a 
patronising tone), but of the clerical geologists.
(iii) The sentence Thackray and Morrell quote from Conybeare is
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not by any means claiming that the Bible is accurate only in 
its moral aspects - it is speaking of time dispensations not 
recorded in Scripture.
(iv) The latter position, if it really is 'the epitome of the 
liberal Anglican position’, was actually championed by 
the Evangelicals Chalmers and Faber long before the BAAS 
was formed, and had received consistent support from the 
Christian Observer.
(v) Theie was no ’liberal Anglican position’ if this is supposed to 
include on the one hand Powell and Daubeny and on the other 
hand Sedgwick, Buckland and Conybeare. To one, 
reconciliation is pointless since the Bible is not to be 
credited anyway in its physical statements; to the other
any difficulties of reconciliation are only temporary.'
The following month, June 1834, the Christian Observer reviewed 
Henry Col^ Popular Geology subversive of Divine Revelation! A 
letter to the Rev. Adam Sedgwick. The review is unsympathetic'.
’It is perfectly clear to us that Mr. Cole in his vituperation 
of Professor Sedgwick has not himself mastered the known facts 
of geology, or allowed his mind calmly to pursue them to their 
just and natural results, and then seriously considered in what 
relation they appear to the declarations of the Mosaic record 
as ordinarily interpreted.’
Facts are always facts, however inconvenient, and the editor goes 
on with gentle irony:
’Let it be granted that the Geological Professors at both our 
Universities, with hundreds of pious clergymen and thousands 
of pious laymen who have studied geology, are infidels, either
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directly or constructively, still this does not set aside 
those inferences from undeniable facts which many most 
excellent and sagacious Christians consider wholly irresistable.' 
Comparison is made to Newton’s ideas and the earth’s rotation, 
similar adjustments to interpretation were needed there.
Powell’s approach to the issues is criticised heavily. Quoting 
from Powell, the Christian Observer adds ’all this, we must say, 
borders upon the extreme proclivious verge of scepticism...*^
On Sedgwick, it is not afraid to make some criticisms of his 
theology - though these were based on a misunderstanding of some 
passages which Sedgwick himself was later anxious to clear up 
and over which he consulted the Evangelical Carus. ^ But on the 
question of geology and inspiration, the Christian Observer says:
’... it may be,that, chafed at the vexatious interference of 
men who are too ignorant or too prejudiced to weigh facts - 
contenting themselves merely with the easier task of 
denouncing their neighbours as infidels - he may have declared 
himself respecting the physical statements in the Holy 
Scriptures in a manner not to be commended... But we recollect 
no statement of his which goes any thing nigh the length of 
the passages above cited from the Geometry Professor of 
Oxford. ’
The Christian Observer would not actually commit itself to even a 
mild"criticism of Sedgwick's views on these .issues, and it 
regards it as a complete mistake to suppose that Sedgwick is to 
be placed in the same theological grouping as Powell. It then 
goes on to defend Sedgwick by showing that no less an Evangelical 
than Chalmers is ’even worse’ than Sedgwick on the issues, for 
Chalmers accepts not only the gap theory but the possibility of 
pre-existent matter, thus ’out Sedgwicking Sedgwick’.
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Cole was evidently furious with thé Observer for defending 
Sedgwick, and his attacks brought the journal to defend itself in
the July 1834 number.To show its editorial fairness, 
however, in the August number it inserted a reply from Cole to 
Rev. H. Budd on a separate issue of the Church Service. The gentle 
irony with which Cole’s letter is prefaced is all the more devastating 
for its gentleness:
’In inserting Mr. Cole’s letter we must strongly express our 
regret at some of the epithets which he applies to members of 
the Church of England... If Mr Budd should think that the style 
of Mr Cole's paper is a little sharp towards himself, we would 
console him with the reflection that Mr. Cole has not denounced 
him, in pamphlets and in advertisements in the Times newspaper, 
as an upholder of infidelity and as guilty of other pravities 
manifold, as he has done us, and wiser and better men, in the 
matter of Scriptural geology.
Wilks clearly had great respect for both the piety and the learning 
of Sedgwick, but had scant respect for either in Cole.
The Christian Observer continued to maintain its previous line, 
but we need pursue it no further. Sedgwick would have felt little 
need to fear anti-geological attitudes in the moderate Evangelical 
Anglicanism respresented by the Christian Observer - indeed he 
would have recognised in it a position very similar to his own. 
Moreover, though the Record tended to support Scriptural Geology 
in this period, it did not represent the influence and respect 
of the group associated with the Christian Observer.Scriptural 
Geologists in this period, though -vociferous, were not a 
powerful group.
Let us, nevertheless, look at a number of the Scriptural
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Geologists, understand their positions,■and why in particular '
Sedgwick reacted to various of them as he did.
We can, in fact, make a number of gomeralisations about them, 
or at least about the more'respectable * amongst them:
(a) they were not anti-science, and did not want science as such 
suppressed in any way.
(b) they accepted the reality of the 'facts’ discovered by 
geologists (often speaking respectfully of their work),
but disputed the ’interpretation’ (i.e. that the strata were 
laid down over long periods)
(c) they set up their own ’interpretation’ (which usually 
involved some or all the strata being laid down by a universal 
flood)
(d) they claimed that this interpretation was the most scientifically 
plausible even apart from Scripture, and usually claimed only 
that the right interpretation might be consistent with
(their interpretation of) Scripture - not that all the 
empirical facts could be obtained from Scripture.
Andrew Ure (the first among those named above) exemplifies all 
these points. He was certainly not ’anti-science', for he himself 
(in 1829) had held the Chair of Natural Philosophy in Anderson.'s 
Institution for 25 years, and had been actively involved both in 
teaching science and in scientific research, his special area being 
applied chemistry.^ He was admired by E.D.Clarke, whom he had 
visited at Cambridge, though the general recognition of his talents 
was tempered both by his tendency to extreme polemics and his 
lack of care over assumptions.^^ In 1821 he published a Dictionary 
of Chemistry which went through a number of editions. In short, 
he was personally highly committed to science, and is described
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"by Farrar as * probably the first person in Britain to earn his
living' in the profession of a 'consulting chemist*. He was also
committed to natural theology: 'I have always taken occasion to
point out the benificent design which the whole mechanism of
nature d i s p l a y s U r e  was an F.R.S», and had been a mcimber of
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the Geological Society for longer than Sedgwick. Sedgwick's 
1850 castigation did not prevent Ure from later joining the BAAS 
(in which Sedgwick was a leading light), nor from addressing one 
of its sections in 1833 on 'the Thermostat or Heat-Governor'^
Ure's theological and geological views did not prevent him writing 
respectfully to mainstream geologist Phillips in 1839 asking for 
advice on water hole boring.Ure's commitment to science was
7S
unquestioned - though some might doubt his commitment to religion.
Ure was not a potential supporter of any 'anti-science' 
faction. So why was Sedgwick so critical of him at such length 
in his Presidential Report to the Geological Society in 1830? 
Sedgwick begins:
'.,.. during the past year there has been set forth, by one of
our own body, "a New System of Geology, in which the great
revolutions of the earth and of animated nature are reconciled
at once to modern science and to sacred history;" and to this
title I will venture to add, - in which the worst violations
of philosophic rule, by the daring union of things incongruous,
having been adopted by the author from others, and at the same
time decorated by new fantasies of his own ...
The fact that an actual member of the society could adopt such
unphilosophical methods really galled Sedgwick. The fact that in
doing so he had the temerity to quote one of Sedgwick's favourite
ISpassages of the sacred Bacon made the crime the more heineousi
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Ure explained what were then called 'primitive rocks' in the 
style later adopted by Gosse (Omphalos 1857). God created them 
by divine fiat, looking as though they were old, or as Sedgwick says:
'in mere mockery of our senses'. Sedgwick cannot, of course, 
disprove this — philosophically Gossianism is unassailable but 
is suitably scepticalc
When Ure comes on to secondary rocks, an area in which so much 
research had then recently been done,
'This part of the work appears not to contain one original 
fact or the result of one original investigation: and of this 
we do not complain. We have, however, a right to look to it 
for information which shall not repeat exploded errors; but 
shall make a near approach to the level of recent observations. 
Ure's work 'unquestionably' does not do this. Sedgwick catalogues 
its many errors, its data superseded as much as six years earlier, 
its inconsistencies with itself when different bits have been 
copied from different authors, etc:
'Errors like these are above every thing calculated to mislead 
men who are unpractised in geology ? ... in the conduct of this 
work, the author has shown neither the information nor the 
industry which might justify him in becoming an interpreter of 
the labours of others, or the framer of a system of his 
own.
It is simply not Ure's field, though men might be misled into taking 
his 'facts' as real.
Sedgwick asks:
'Are we then for ever to wander among the mere perplexities of 
details, and never to hope for any system which may combine them?' 
Sedgwick thinks not. The principle of actualism ('Effects similar in
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kind to those which are produced now, must in all (former times have 
been produced by some corresponding power of nature’) will lead 
to such a system.
Sedgwick at this time was in the throes of losing his diluvialism 
(renounced openly at the next Presidential Address.) But he recognises 
that the time for what he calls 'speculative geology' is coming, the 
building of a system using the data of empirical geology. When 
this is done it should be done not by just anyone, but by someone 
with a real grasp of the current facts of geology.
Sharon Turner is similarly respectful to the geologists. He 
accepts the three divisions then current: primitive, secondary and 
tertiary. It might just be noted, however, that at that time the 
old terms primary or primitive, secondary or transitional and 
tertiary (with their overtones of Wernerianism) were being transformed. 
In the early 1830's, as a result both of his conversion away from 
all forms of diluvialism and of his ongoing work in the Palaeozoics, 
Sedgwick was beginning to use the terms purely as a time scale and 
not referring to composition. During the early 1830's, therefore, 
the terms may mean different things to different people. Sharon 
Turner's view was that the primitive were laid down in six literal 
days, the secondary during the 1656 years between the Adamite creation 
and the flood, and the tertiary since the deluge.
Frederick Nolan's work was important because it had the status
of 0ampton Lectures. In fact, Nolan, a graduate of Oxford, was
the first clergyman to be asked to give the Boyle Lectures (1814), and
the Bampton Lectures (1833) and the Warburtonian Lectures (1833-36).
The Dictionary of National Biography states that 'his views were 
evangelical'^ ,^ and is followed in this e.g. by Reynolds.
Thackray and Morrell simply describe him as 'evangelical', giving the 
impression that he was typical of the class. But the 'orthodoxy'
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of his ^ Evangelical position is certainly questionable. Indeed, at a 
time when Simeon and his scientific friends Parish and Clarke were 
risking loss of preferment by founding a Bible Society in Cambridge 
in 1812, Nolan was writing a pamphlet against the establishment of
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such a society as detrimental to the Church of England - a 
viewpoint repeated in his Bampton Lectures of 1833. His 1812 
pamphlet argues that in the early church ’It was their custom to 
instruct the people in short formularies, containing necessary 
points of faith; but to make no further provision for the dispersion 
of the Scripture, than to provide for their being publickly read 
and explained in their churches .. . ’ Nolan objects that the Bible 
on its own will not enlighten anyone - for many have the Bible but 
remain in darkness. It needs to be explained, and so teaching should 
come before its distribution. Nolan attacks the King James version 
in the edition then current for having made alterations to accommodate 
the non-conformists. Most of all he objects to any kind of union 
between churchmen and Dissenters - let the Dissenters go off and 
expend their energies printing Bibles and converting the heathen and 
perhaps they will have less energy to disturb us at home: ’Better
for us that they should thus occupy themselves and some thousands 
of their emissaries, who can never be so harmlessly employed at 
home. It was a mark of Evangelicals generally to support the
British and Foreign Bible Society, and virtually all Evangelical 
leaders did so. Nolan’s view is more like a High Church or a 
Coleridgean position than an Evangelical one. In contrast, we know 
that shortly after this Sedgwick was speaking publicly and eloquently 
at the Bible Society’s Cambridge meetingsNolan also has an 
attitude generally t'o Dissenters which is unlike (say) Wilberforce, 
Simeon, Bickersteth, Shaftesbury or Sedgwick, and more like High 
Churchmen. He says of them: ’Great, therefore as their love is to
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the Bible and all mankind-; still greater is their affection for 
their errours [sicQ and themselves: and yet greater than either their 
hatred to the Church and its power.’ Nolan goes on to argue that 
a common Protestantism is no basis for anything. He defends 
Apostolic Succession: ’... on the demise of the first Apostle,
"one was ordained" directly to be his successor. Through the baptism 
administered by such persons, or those whom they dispute, we are
grafted into Christ’
Nolan undoubtedly did have some ’Evangelical’ views, as witnessed 
by his work The Evangelical Nature of Christianity (1838). He 
was also anti-Tractarian. Yet his Evangelicalism has a distinctively 
’High Church’ flavour. He stands less close to the views of Simeon, 
and the Clapham Sect, Wilks and the Christian Observer, than does 
(say) Sedgwick. In other words, Sedgwick was a more orthodox 
Evangelical than Nolan on a number of issues. This makes it difficult 
to see Nolan’s attacks on the geologists as the attacks of 
’Evangelicals’.
Nolan’s book itself is a peculiar mixture of attitudes. Nolan 
is sometimes accused of outdated geologyj this is not altogether 
fair. To be sure his main reference work was G.S.Greenough’s 
A Critical Examination of the First Principles of Geology (1819).
But he has also read or looked at Lyell’s Principles of Geology (1830). 
Where he is really geologically deficient is in up-to-date general 
grasp of what is going on. The old Cuvier—Buckland type of 
diluvialism is dying away, and this is not the issue between the 
Lyellian uniformitarianism and the new style ’catastrophists 
(though since so many modern writers have misunderstood this, Nolan 
may be in good company). Nolan still refers to ’Neptunists and 
’Vulcanists’ (lecture 3). He thinks that diluvialism is still
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geological orthodoxy. He is slightly muddled, but his geology 
is perhaps only about four years out of date.
More confusing is his approach to science and Scripture. He 
writes :
'When from some imperfection in our information and discernment:,
Religion and Philosophy are found to be opposed beyond the hope
of reconciliation; I trust, that no debate as to which should
give place can arise within these walls, in which I stand the
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unworthy advocate of Revelation.'
This is eloquent, but it is nonsensical. If the apparent opposition 
were really due to imperfection; in our information and discernment, 
then surely neither should give place ? We should then surely (as 
Sedgwick said) simply wait for more perfect information ?
This, really, illustrates the problem of the so called 
'Scriptural GeologistsIt is scarcely possible to deny that the 
geologists are finding something in their researches. To suggest 
that, say, Satan put them there to mislead the faithful would have 
fallen on as deaf ears in the nineteenth century as ours today.
So they were shut up to declaring that the geologists were inter­
preting their researches wrongly. Nolan does this also, though 
in a very scientifically naive way. In Lecture 3, he states that 
the successive cataclysms idea (which he takes for geological 
orthodoxy with the ‘ illustrious exception' of Greenough) cannot be 
conclusively disproved from Scripture, but he himself is unable to 
reconcile it. He refers to the age-day theory, but claims that this
Q
meaning of 'day* is 'philologically unsound*. He refers to
the gap theory,but denies this on the basis that in 
Genesis chapter two the heavens and earth were said to be created
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in one day. He emphasizes (and misunderstands) the supposed
differences between the various schools of geology, and himself
disbelieves the association of age and fossils. Any evidence for
repeated cataclysms is local, the strata themselves are the
evidence and remains of the universal flood. He has then, of course,
I
to deal with objections (made by Fleming in the 1820’s to Buckland s 
theory) that Scripture indicates no major change in landforms during 
the flood, and suggests that ’it would appear that the region
near which the ark floated was in a great measure exempt from 
the violent effects of the convulsion with which .the earth had been 
shaken to its centre . Anyway, with the useful information
that the ’week of Creation ... occurred between Sunday October 23rd 
and Saturday the 29th BC 4004’ it may be best, to leave Nolan’s fcbfiorj.
The British Critic (as we shall see again below) well summarized 
the strange nature of Nolan’s book:
’In short, of Dr Nolan’s volume we scarcely know what to say.
His head seems to contain more thaft he knows exactly how to 
manage. His lectures are learned, but, unfortunately, they 
are almost unreadable; they display large stores of various 
information, but that information seems ill assorted, and 
sometimes almost obsolete; and his views are delivered, for 
the most part, in a style so pedantic and elaborate, that it 
rather tends to confuse the mind with a conglomeration of 
words, than to convey to it any notions clear and precise, 
and accurately defined. If we look to some single sentences, 
we find the vicar of Prittlewell no more an advocate for a 
literal interpretation of the Mosaic record than the Savilian 
professor himself: but then, unless he is an advocate for
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such an interpretation, the general tenor of his discourse 
becomes altogether vague and unintelligible.’
Nolan, for all his confusion, is not anti-science. He speaks 
in terms of glowing respect for Newton, Boyle, Ray, and other 
scientists and their work:
’By the constant survey of the objects of Nature in which the 
scientific are engaged  ^by the patient investigation of the 
laws by which its operations are conducted, our conceptions 
must be enlarged and our admiration heightened of the power 
and wisdom by which the system has been combined...’
He insists, however, that unless we look above the secondary to the 
great first cause, then science is ’baseless and hollow . So 
’the immortal founders of experimental philosophy’ recognised this. 
Nolan, then, wishes neither to reject the miraculous in the name 
of science, nor to reject science in favour of revelation. He 
has no objection to ’natural’ explanations, for God acts in both 
natural and supernatural agencies:
’It may be, indeed, questioned whether the power and wisdom 
of the Creator is not more apparent in importing to the 
machinery of nature a self-acting principle which fits it 
for executing his purposes, than in exerting his continued
, qO
agency in perpetuating its motion, and aiding its operations.
Nolan is not hostile to science, nor, indeed, to geology, for he 
(for example) clearly admired Greenough-and referred to the 'able 
President of the Geological Society.*^ Some of his statements
could, admittedly, be read as though he would like to put constraints 
on the way in which geological study is pursued, though in truth
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he is more concerned that independently reached theories of geology 
be accepted only if consistent with Scripture, than with actually 
(or supposedly) doing the geology with, as it were, Bible in hand.
We have noted for several of the Scriptural Geologists that their 
views, even when accompanved by a Biblical Literalism, were no 
guarantee of Evangelical orthodoxy. Often they differed from 
the Evangelical leaders on other issues, and this is surely the 
case with the bellicose Henry Cole in his book in 1834. He 
linked the evils of geology with the 'tragedy* of Catholic Emanc­
ipation in 1829. Yet the Emancipation of the 1829 Act had the support 
of virtually all Evangelical leaders. In this issue Sedgwick was a 
more 'orthodox' Evangelical than Cole. Cole's book is churlish and 
obscurantist; his book is vituperative and offensive and makes no 
attempt to explain the findings of geologists conformably to Genesis 
(excusing himself from the task on grounds of ignorance of geology).
In this sense he was atypical even of so called ' Scriptural 
Geologists', and it is not surprising that the Christian Observer 
preferred to be vituperated by him (along with men of the spiritual 
and intellectual calibre of Sedgwick) rather than show him any 
sympathy.
In the 1838 BAAS meeting at Newcastle Sedgwick had no office, 
though it was on this occasion that he preached a famous outdoor 
sermon on the sea-beach at Tynemouth to three or four thousand 
colliers, workmen and some employers, as well as delivering a 
concluding address to the BAAS of 'eloquence, astonishing beauty
qxand grandeur' . It was, however, in this year that the Rev. George 
Young D.D. communicated in Abstract to the Geological Section of 
the BAAS his 'Essay' on Scriptural Geology. But again the author 
(who had also written a 'Geological Survey on the Yorkshire Coast') 
was not anti-science, or even anti-BAAS. He did not reject the
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existence of strata, but claimed (as others) that the secondary 
and tertiary rocks were formed by the deluge.
Sedgwick appears to have had no direct contact with Young, 
but in 1838 there also began the dealings with one whose system 
was similar (who indeed cites Young). This was the Dean of York,
William Cockburn, who did have direct communication with Sedgwick.
Like some others placed in this section amongst the 'Evangelicals’ 
his Evangelical orthodoxy might be questioned. In his remarks 
(l842) on infant baptism he takes a more or less Evangelical line' , 
but his early background casts some doubt on this. In 1803 he 
claimed to have shown that 'extemporaneous public prayer by one 
person is a b s u r d , and in 180? calls Catholics 'Christian 
brethren' and says that if those in England would 'inform us more 
exactly of their present articles of faith, I flatter myself, it 
would be found that the two Churches differ much less than is 
supposed.' On both these issues Sedgwick was nearer than 
Cockburn to the Evangelical leaders of the early nineteenth century.
If we question his Evangelical orthodoxy we might equally question 
his importance. Unlike, say, Chalmers (whose authority was ascendant 
and works widely respected) or J.B. Sumner (then a widely respected 
Bishop heading eventually for Canterbury), Cockburn (for all his family 
connections) was a nonentity who would probably have continued in a well 
deserved obscurity but for his controversy with the members of the BAAS,
Cockburn did, however, thrive on controversy, and his objections 
on the science issue may be summarised in two points:
(a) The geologists have got their facts right but thfi r 
interpretations wrong
(b) The BAAS is not a suitable arena for scientific discussion 
and dissemination.
If we begin with the first of these points, it may be useful to
list Cockburn*s relevant articles; 301
(i) Remonstrance to the Duke of Northumberland Upon the Dangers 
Of Peripatetic Philosophy (1838)
(ii) Letter to Professor Buckland (1838)
(iii) The Creation of the World (To Murchison, 1838)
(iv) The Bible Defended Against thé British Association (1845)
(v) A New System of Geology (1849)
At all times Cockburn accepts their geological researches, usually 
notably respectfully. Thus in (i) (which spends much of its time 
attacking the undulatory theory of light) he refers to 'geological 
facts elicited by modern science'^ ^^  In the same year he
writes to Buckland (ii) 'With respect to geological facts concerning
. O ' !
which we are about to reason, I take them from your book ....
and he repeats almost verbatim his point in (i): 'every fact made
known to us by geologists may fairly be explained by minute attention
to the Mosaic history'. In (iii) he waxes deferential to Murchison:
'Too much praise cannot be given to the perseverence and
assiduity with which you have investigated the facts connected
with the subject. But while, with ready deference to superior
experience, I presume not to doubt any of those facts, I
feel myself entitled to affirm that you have offered no
rational or satisfactory account of the probable origin of
c\%
the various formations which you have so well described.'
In (iv) (printed with letters and appendices) Cockburn does under­
take to defend himself against the charge of total ignorance made 
against him by Sedgwick and others. He claims to have been 
'constantly employed for many years in examining all the accessible 
strata in Devonshire and Yorkshire', to have inspected stone 
quarries and to have walked through 'all the tunnels of the railroad
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between Bath and Bristol.* Of the *principal facts made
known by the Geologists* there is *no dispute*^^  ^ He repeats this 
again, and asserts that he feels that all these facts are 
best accounted for by a *literal interpretation of the Mosaic 
history*He feels, also, that the geologists (Sedgwick, Murchison, 
Buckland, etc.) have closed ranks in refusing to debate seriously
with him (though Sedgwick sent him two long polite letters by his
. . . 102\ own admission. )
Article (iv) was the printed version of an address delivered 
to the BAAS in 1844 when it met at York. Because of the Dean’s 
standing he had been given leave to present his paper to the 
geological section, and it was Sedgwick who replied to it. A 
report of the speech in Chambers Edinburgh Journal says
Sedgwick spoke for an hour and a half, charming his audience with 
his vast learning. Clark and Hughes add that, according to an
eye witness, the speech was delivered with a ’scornful bitterness j 
and also add that,at that time, (and Clark and Hughes were writing 
in 1890, nearly half a century later) ’(the Dean) represented the 
feelings of a large majority of his countrymen.’ They base this on 
the number of editions the pamphlets went through. It does need 
to be remarked, in view of the myths propounded even more recently 
about the strength of ’literalism’ at the time, that this is a very 
poor way to judge a theory. Chambers’ anonymous Vestiges of the 
Natural History of Creation was published in that very same year, 
and also went through numerous editions - but this did not prove 
that its readers agreed with its sentiments, any more than with 
Dean Cockburn’s.
The speech of Sedgwick as reported in the Athenaeum (5th October 
1844) contains comment on a number of issues. On the actual details
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of geological knowledge, of course, Sedgwick could make mincemeat 
of the good Dean. The Dean’s objections to orthodox geology’s 
interpretation of the strata are answered, and some of the difficulties 
and absurdities of the Dean’s own system are exposed. But Sedgwick’s 
comments also referred to the purpose of the BAAS:
’Our object is, by the comparison of facts; the sifting of them, 
by kindred spirits meeting together, in the pure love of truth, 
for the advancement of science, and thus ascending to higher 
generalisations, and the knowledge of those laws by which 
individual phenomena are governed ... As we advance in the 
discoveries of science, facts multiply so fast upon us that 
they would become unmanageable, if we could not group them by 
certain resemblances, or include them under some simple law, 
which is merely an expression of a general conclusion der 
from facts which we know to be true, and from which all phenomena 
proceed as necessary and inevitable consequences. The moment 
we arrive.at the knowledge of such a law, we can assume, in 
a certain sense, a prophetic character, and predict events 
with certainty, because we know that the Author of nature is 
unchanging in his operations, and that the same effects will 
follow the same causes in times to come as in times past ... 
the primary object of this Association ... is the furtherance 
of physical science, on the principles pointed out. On this 
ground I hold it as certain, that the discussion of broad 
theoretical questions and cosmogonies, like those now brought 
before us, is utterly unfit for the present meeting ... We 
have nothing to do, as members of the Association, with moral 
or religious or political truths, in which elements of human 
passion are so liable to be mingled.’
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A number of interesting points are raised here. First, 
there is the nature of scientific methodology, a topic to 
which we shall return in the next section. Sedgwick speaks 
of a 'general law' which is 'derived from the facts'. Presumably 
here he is thinking of the age of strata as 'derivable' from 
features of them (crinoids in living place etc.). Yet he shows 
no idea of the hypothetico-deductive methods of Whewell and 
Herschel, let alone the idea of 'theory-laden' observation 
implicit in Whewell. Moreover,Sedgwick himself, in 1829, 
had distinguished 'speculative geology' from 'the facts' much 
as the Dean did in 1844, though Sedgwick thought Ure not the man 
to construct it. Perhaps Sedgwick was meaning to restrict it 
to theories like those of e.g. Elie de Beaumont to explain the 
pattern of the mountain ranges. However his discussion as reported 
by the Athenaeum shows little sophistication on the level 
of methodology, and slurs over an essential similarity between 
the Dean and Sedgwick himself in the distinction between 
'facts' and 'theory'.
The second point is that, though Sedgwick's faith in 
the possibility of science at all is linked to his faith in 
the consistency of God, he assumes that moral and social 
issues have no place. This is strange in view of the 
emphasis on natural theology which existed in many Presidential 
addresses. He also assumes that the BAAS is for the furtherance 
of physical science, but is vague as to how the papers and 
discussion do this.
Indeed, the nature and purpose of the Association was 
another point about which Cockburn, and a considerable
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section of High Churchmen, had doubts. Cockburn had definite 
views about eduction and science. In a Sermon on the 
Evils of Education Without a Religious Basis (29th Sept. 1844) 
he asked the relevant question: '
'What is the use of knowledge ? I mean the knowledge of 
earthly things. If it expands the intellect, and 
leads the mind more thoroughly and readily to appreciate 
the value and importance of Heavenly things, then it 
is indeed, as Solomon says, better than rubies. But 
if it begins and ends - and means to begin and end in 
mere mundane pursuits - it is likely to produce more 
evil than good.
He feels that a 'little progress in science, a little 
pre-eminence in literature fills the mind with a lofty 
notion of its own s u p e r i o r i t y T h i s  is why 'so 
many men of learning and deep thought have been opposed to 
Christianity'. It is not that they have considered the 
evidence and rationally decided against Christ, rather 'it 
was pride - human pride - the pride of superior talents that 
made them refuse to consider proofs.' Cockburn is not
against knowledge, but he fears that it can lead to pride, 
which in turn leads to a rejection of true wisdom.
This applies to his strictures on the BAAS and the 
geologists. He is not against science as such, nor does he 
think it improper in a university:
'If a person who devotes his thoughts to scientific 
investigation, make any discovery of supposed importance -
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or if he find some new proof of any doubtful proposition, 
it is very desirable that he should communicate his 
success to the studious world by printed explanations, 
so that his discovery may be considered and reflected 
on by those engaged in similar investigations, or he 
may with great advantage discuss such subjects at one of 
our universities, or in any place where the sons of 
science are permanently resident^
The BAAS was not, in his view, a suitable setting to discuss 
scientific truth, it was too theatrical and engendered the 
kind of human pride he thought could lead to rejection both 
of evidence and of God. But he was not anti-science as such.
What should we think, then of the assertions by Derek
Orange;
'Cockburn's more fundamental objection was to science 
as an institution, and in this he was supported by 
some of the new and controversial voices from Oxford.
If it was the religiousness of the British Association 
which alarmed the Dean 
Dean Cockburn did not object to science as an institution, 
rather he thought the theatrical nature of the BAAS improper 
to its conduct.
This chapter has given only a summary of some of the issues,
and some more details, and many more references to books on either
side of the 'Scriptural Geology' controversies may be found in 
an article by Millhauser. As usual, however, MillhRuser 
obscures the position of moderate Evangelicals. Thus Chalmers' 
gap theory:
'Chalmers' suggestion was favourably received by theological
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liberals, and encouraged the rise of a more or less 
conscious party of "reconciliation?^
Sumner, amongst those quoted, is not usually called a 'theological 
liberal'.- Moreover, Millhauser notes the connection of the 
Record with Scriptural Geology, but studiously ignores the 
position of the Christian Observer which was indisputably in the ■
. period the mouthpiece of the moderate Evangelical leadership* *** 
Again, it may be argued that Millhauser exaggerates the actual 
power of the 'Scriptural Geology party'; Since the Scriptural 
Geologists often differed over their own pet schemes, it is 
quite difficult to think of them exactly as a 'party' - and in any 
case their actual power in the hierarchy of the Church is very much 
in doubt.
We began this section (6) (in part 6.2#l) citing the view of 
some modern scholars that natural theology in the early BAAS might 
be used to defend the Association against religious critics. We 
shall consider this in the light of all the critics in chapter 6.4 
below, but at this point it may be useful to summarise some 
points relevant to the criticisms made by-the Scriptural Geologists
of the members of the BAAS :
(a) Very few even of Scriptural Geologists were critical 
of science as such. Their criticisms might be:
(i) of scientific education if not included in a 
broader spiritual teaching and context.
(ii)of specific aspects of geological theory 
(not, they claimed, of geological observation) 
which appeared to contradict a literal inter­
pretation of Genesis.
(b) Even moderate Evangelicals were aware that natural
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religion could be either 'an important step in the 
evidences for Divine Revelation' or 'insidious and 
fatal as a substitute for it'. In itself it was 
no guarantee that a person was a Christian rather 
than a Deist or Pantheist.
(c) The nature of BAAS (according to Sedgwick) precluded 
moral and religious questions - and so could not 
include reaffirmations of a belief in certain 
interpretations of Scripture. To affirm natural 
religion without such affirmations could be mistaken 
for substitution.
Natural theology, then, even including the geologists* proofs of 
creation in time, could easily be accompaniments to Deism. The 
Scriptural geologists, for all their differences and confusions, 
are all concerned in their different ways not merely with vague 
piety but with loyalty to (as they saw it) the actual words of 
Scripture. The vague affirmations of natural theology could do 
little to allay suspicions of unorthodoxy on Genesis amongst those 
geologists of the BAAS who might (like Sedgwick) also be Anglican 
clerics. In actual fact, such affirmations might rather increase 
suspicions that such men were really crypto-deists, since (by the 
nature of the BAAS) these affirmations could not be accompanied by 
specific theological statements.
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supported reconciliation both before and after I832, nor would 
one gather from the article the respective positions of the 
Christian Observer and Record in the Evangelical world.
There seems to be a tendency of some scholars to call anyone 
who was not a bigot a 'liberal'. ' Poor Chalmers and Sumner 
(both leading Evangelicals) often seem to come in for this 
kind of treatment. Millhauser also calls John Pye Smith 
a *liberal clergyman* (p. 77) because in the late l830»s he 
reached conclusions of a local flood and local re-creation, and 
published lectures and works on this. John Pye Smith was perhaps 
the leading Congregationalist of his period, and was not a bigot.
He corresponded with Phillips on the geology and Genesis question
(these letters are in the Oxford University Museum Phillips 
collection). But it is questionable whether a 'liberal
clergyman' is a very accurate description of him.
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6,3 Mid and High Churchmen and Science
6,3-1 The Christian Remembrancer
We have noted (in part 2,1.3) the rather 'High' viewpoint of this
publication in the early l830's. What may interest us is its attitude
to (i) natural theology, (li) Scriptural Geology, and (iii) BAAS. Would
Sedgwick and his circle have found any potential threat from it ?
On natural theology it reviewed Whewell's Bridgewater Treatise.
an 'admirable treatise’, and commented 'Mr Whewell has performed the task
assigned him with no less credit to himself than advantage to the
reader.'^  Its review of Chalmers' Bridgewater in the same year makes
2
no criticism of the natural theology as such.
On Scriptural Geology its line is similar to the Christian Observer.
In 1831, for example, it refers to Lyell, Buckland and Sedgwick: 'whose
talents and researches all who have read their writings must
acknowledge,'^  It reviews Scriptural Geologist H. Browne in April 1833,
4
with a bitingly sarcastic review, calling him 'deplorably ignorant'.
In July 1833 it carries two further reviews of Scriptural Geologists
W.M. Higgins and George Fairholme (whose books were published in 1832 -:r
and 1833), depicting Scriptural Geologists in general as dabblers forcing
on the world 'a mass of crude illogical rhodomontade'.^  Compared with
the Remembrancer Sedgwick's comments on Scriptural Geologists seem
positively politei Not that, of course, it saw objective corroboration
for Scripture as valueless - for in I832 it recommended the Evangelical
Bishop Wilson's book on the evidences.  ^ But, like the Christian
Observer, it supported orthodox geology and could not support those
whose analyses it saw as based on ignorance - however laudable their 
motives.
The BAAS is first mentioned in l833^  with an extract from its rules 
without comment. Later in 1833 it commented: 'The first meeting was 
held at York in I83I; -Oxford next had the honour of receiving within
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its walls the many distinguished characters of the Association, and 
Cambridge has now witnassed a combination of talent never before seen
g
within its precincts.’
On natural theology. Scriptural Geology, and the BAAS, the Christian 
Remembrancer was totally supportive of the Sedgwick circle.
6.3 .2 The British Critic Pre-l837
On natural theology, the British Critic reviewed Whewell’s Bridgewater
in July 1833 with glowing praise, calling Whewell à ’mighty master' of
9 10 'conspicuous talent'. The argument from design is applauded , though
11
Paley's ethical system is rejected in favour of Butler's. In
October 1833 Chalmers' Bridgewater is reviewed with only marginally
less enthusiasm, and the British Critic strongly defends the value of
natural theology in its proper nlace - in terms not at all dissimilar
{2.
from those of Sedgwick himself. The review also accepts a mind-matter 
dualism as 'sanctioned by the instant and well nigh universal consent of 
mankind' - another similarity to Sedgwick. In July 1833 Brougham's
13Discourse, and in July I836 Turton's comments on it are reviewed.
Though critical on some aspects (Brougham's lack of“ emphasis on 
both conscience and revelation), the review is positive - finding in 
Brougham an unexpected ally. Then, in I836, Buckland's Bridgewater 
is reviewed with glowing praise, Buckland's name stands 'among the very
14
first' in his science, and this will enlarge his reputation. Finally, 
we may note that Sedgwick's own Discourse was reviewed in 1834.^^  It's 
opinion of both the person and talents of Sedgwick is high, and it 
approves both the tone and content of the Discourse. Its main criticism 
of Sedgwick (which colours the whole review) is that he has departed 
from the logic of his own Discourse in supporting the admission of the 
Dissenters to the University.
On Geology, we note that in January 183I in context of the declinist 
debate, the achievements of both Buckland and Sedgwick are praised.
3 20
Sedgwick being 'acknowledged by all to be as distinguished in 
philosophical views as in activity of observation...'^  ^ The British 
Critic 'rejoiced' at the appearance in 1831 of Lyell's Principles, 
with a perceptive view on the work's role and with reference also to
y, Q
the 'excellent little work' by Cpnybeare and Phillips. A review of 
Sharon Turner's work in I832 brought some general comment on science
19
and revelation. Any apparent discrepancy between the two, it said,
must be based on misunderstanding - though there are dangers in linking
revelation too closely to a science which might later change. The
Christian philosopher should not 'direct his steps in the pursuit of
physical truth by a continual reference to the cosmogony of Moses...
The review is critical both of Turner and lire, and accepts an 'age-day'
theory. A later review of Lyell, in April 1834, makes clear the
British Critic's acceptance of the not 'strictly philosophical' language 
21
of Genesis. This particular review is rather more muddled in its 
actual geology, and seems to be critical both of the age-day and the 
gap theories.
later in 1834 the British Critic carried an interesting review of the 
22
Nolan-Powell debate. Nolan's book is confused (it says) and in fact he is 
he is no more 'literalist' than his opponents. The Bible uses popular 
language, not meant to teach science. On the otbsr hand, it asserts that 
where the Bible does describe events they actually did happen. As for 
geology, it is too early yet to erect a system. Of Powell, then, he 
'is inclined to throw overboard not merely the verbal and literal 
accuracy of the scriptural narrative, but its general and substantial 
truth in an^ intelligible sense of the word.'^^  Thus 'We do not object 
to his cosmological researches, but we enter our decided protest against 
his theological c r u d i t i e s . '^ 4 h^e Christian Observer, it sees
differences between Powell and Sedgwick: 'There may be some sympathy
between Mr. Powell and Mr. Sedgwick; but we should be sorry to think that
3 21
25the views of the two professors were identical.’ The British Critic, 
like Sedgwick, thoughlTultimately revelation and geology would harmonise, 
but that insufficient knowledge was then available to do this. It 
added, however, that Powell was mistaken in supposing either that
26it saw the BAAS as a threat or that scientists need fear persecution.
Finally, we may note that in its review of Buckland5 I856 Bridgewater 
the British Critic, noting Pusey's support for 'his friend", finds 
'highly satisfactory' the version of the gap theory which he proposes.
6.3 .4 The British Critic, Newman and the BAAS
During 1838 the British Critic came under the influence of Newman 
and his circle. In January 1839 it carried a review of the BAAS, 
which has been referred to by modern scholars such as Derek Orange as
28part of a 'thunder of the critics' of the BAAS. It is important,
however, to see wherein precisely the criticisms lay.
The reviewer denies that he deprecates that 'glorious path to
knowledge' opened by the physical universe, and is friendly to science
as a valued part of knowledge.He also denies any alarm 'when the
geologist talks of a virtual infinity of time in our planet's history.
31Scientists need not be timid or fear discovering too much , and he
32recognises their need to meet to discuss and impart discoveries.
He does, however, object to what I have called the razzmatazz, seeing 
it as detrimental to the serious purpose of the BAAS^  ^ though thinking
34that it will in any case disappear with age. More seriously, though,
he feels that Christians should pursue science in a context of their
relationship with God through Christ, whereas in the BAAS there was a
35danger that scientific fellowship might replace Christian and a
'itreligion of 'natural science' be adopted in Universities where Dissenters
37were admitted on the basis of a 'glorious brotherhood' of science. I 
will discuss later whether natural theology might allay such fears.
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6.4 Natural Theology in the Early British Association
6.4.1 Natural Theology and the Defence of the BAAS
We come now to assess the questions asked at the beginning of 
this section (6), concerning the role of natural theology in the 
early BAAS, and in particular in the thinking of Sedgwick as a
leading early member of it.
The Thackray-Morrell thesis that natural theology could be used to 
defend the Association against the religious critics does not seem very 
likely. Against which critics and criticisms might it prove effective ?
As we have seen, various criticisms were made against the BAAS.
Surely, however, writers like A.D. Orange make these criticisms seem 
more unified and orchestrated than they really were ? In considering 
this it is worth quoting in full a passage from OrangeIs recent 
contribution to The Parliament of Science; he wrote:
'The sensitiveness of nineteenth-century Churchmen to 
scientific advance has usually been exhibited in terms of 
their disapproval of some of the propositions put forward 
by the scientists. But Cockburn's more fundamental objection 
was to science as an institution, and in this he was supnorted 
by some of the new and controversial voices from Oxford. If 
it was the irreligiousness of the British Association which 
alarmed the Dean, it was its pseudo-religiousness which 
incensed the Tractarians. In a generation much engaged with 
natural theology, the leaders of the Association were given 
to embellishing its public assemblies with many expressions 
of fulsome homage to God; not to the Christian God of the 
Church's articles and creeds, but to 'that fashionable idol 
of the present time', the Author of Nature. Indeed, the
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British Association most palpably and vocally represented
what the Oxford saints saw as the secularizing, extravagantly
liberal mood of the day: it was only a short step from
claiming that in the cultivation of science,religious differences
could be put on one side to implying that religious convictions
did not matter. The British Critic, the organ of the Tractarians
went on to the charge that there were many in the Association
who would do away with the religious tests which, somewhat
precariously, preserved the Anglican ethos of the ancient
universities. And indeed there were: Adam Sedgwick of Cambridge,
and Baden Powell of Oxford, with the active support of
Babbage, Airy and lesser scientific lights such as James Heywood
of Manchester, all prominently identified with the British
Association, had in 1834 been instrumental in representations
to Parliament on the admission of Dissenters to the universities,
To the traditionally minded it was all of a piece with the
conferring of honorary doctorates on Brewster, Dalton, Faraday,
and Brown (not one of them a member of the Established Church)
,1
during the Association's visit to Oxford two years earlier.
His earlier article, which has had more time to influence other
2
historians of science, was even plainer. In this he headed his 
section 2 'the Thunder of the Critics' and stated: 'the pattern
of the future hostility began to appear when The Times devoted 
a leading article ...etc'. The Times, Nolan, Cockburn and Bowden 
are somehow welded into a unified opposition - with comments taken 
between. 1832 and 1839, a period of seven years. The criticisms 
which Orange describes were certainly made, but there was no
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orchestration,and moderate opinion in the early 1830’s - both 
Evangelical and High Church - did not attack the BAAS. Orange later 
states; ’the early salvoes from Nolan and The Times convinced 
[the BAASl officers that they must now justify the ways of science 
to men.’^  This seems unlikely. Nolan did not attack science as 
such, only its conclusions in geology. His views even on this were not 
share-a' bj Alt C k M W'.tW British Critic - and those
who did share his views would not have been molified by natural 
theology or protestations of piety. The Times did not attack 
science as such, but the social nature of the BAAS. The Presidential 
protestations that science could lead to God rather than to atheism, 
where they did occur, were surely not intended to meet attacks 
from serious critics. I have not been able to find any serious 
critics - even including the Scriptural Geologists - who imagined 
such a thing necessary. But the popular mind may well be a different 
matter - and Presidential addresses were also designed for popular 
consumption. Natural theology, then, might have protected the 
BAAS against anti-science sentiment - but there is no indication 
that such sentiment played an important part in serious criticism.
\'Jhat real criticisms were made therefore?
One was on the specific theories of geology - as Dean Cockburn 
associated the ’unacceptable’ geological theories both with Sedgwick 
and with the BAAS. But natural theology, far from blunting such 
criticism, served only to fuel it by suggesting to critics like 
Cole that natural religion was being set up in place of revealed.
We have seen, moreover, that the threat on this score was not a 
serious one- both moderate Evangelicals and moderate High Churchmen 
supported orthodox geology. What seems to have been felt more, 
by Sedgwick at least, is the danger when such absurd ’flood
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geologies' were actually introduced into the BAAS or Geological 
Society - e.g. by Ure or Cockburn. But, aside from scientific 
rebuttal, the BAAS insistence that religious issues be kept out of 
the affairs was a buttress against this. In actual fact, the 
introduction of natural theology into the proceedings - albeit 
only in the general comments of the Presidents and not in the 
actual sectional proceedings ~ might well have endangered this 
protective policy. And it certainly would not have prevented the 
critics from bringing their cases - for they were concerned with 
Bible based theology not with vaguely deistic pronouncements.
The second line of criticism which might have been feared 
concerned the showmanship and bvst\-e. of it all. Both Cockburn 
and Bowden made such criticisms. But expressions of piety would 
hardly have been likely to allay fears on this score. Presidential 
speeches and pronouncements usually added to the sense of 'occasion , 
and the large and showy gatherings which they entailed would have 
been seen as a hindrance rather than help to the quiet and sober 
scientific discussion which the critics thought endangered by the
BAAS structure.
The third line of criticism, coming particularly from the 
Tractarians, concerned the interdenominational nature of the 
BAAS - associated with the advocacy of leading members like 
Sedgwick of the admission of Dissenters to Oxbridge. Again, far 
from blunting such criticism, the references to natural theology 
within BAAS served to fuel it. We have seen that the exaggerated 
language of some of its Presidents could easily be taken to imply 
that some kind of new more universal teligion was to be set up, 
based on science and natural religion. Certainly Sedgwick and
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probably most of the others did not really intend this or think 
it viable - but their erudition sometimes ran away with them. Had 
no reference been made to natural religion, criticism on this 
ground would have been much less likely. Ifhilst Newman and his 
associates might wish to preserve the Anglican monopoly in 
teaching and training institutions(as they viewed Oxbridge), the 
BAAS was not for such purposes, but rather was for interchange of 
research information. There could be no serious objection to 
such interchanges occuring between men of very different religions - 
the danger came precisely when they sought to find common bases 
of theology. Had the BAAS stuck .strictly to its concern for the 
advancement of science (exchanging research information in a sober 
and non-theological context) it would have been far safer from 
such criticism. We must remember that in this period other 
interdenominational bodies had to be very careful to avoid appearance 
of common worship. Even the Bible Society had no prayers in its 
meetings until 1857 because not all parties to it could be 
pleased. The BAAS would have been safer to leave out the religious 
aspect entirely.
This leaves just one possible 'criticism* which mi^t have been 
'blunted* by natural theology. It would be a religious claim that 
science was somehow of itself irreligious. We need to treat this 
possibility seriously, not least because in so many popular books 
a supposed 'science religion conflict' is regarded virtually as an 
inevitable fact of life. A respected historian can write of the 
'Victorian conflict between science and Religion' and state: 'By 
the second quarter of the nineteenth century substantial developments 
in geology, physics, biology, physiological psychology, and philosophy 
of science challenged or cast into doubt theological assumptions and
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portions of the B i b l e . B u t  is a conflict so obvious a fact that 
we may focus on its facets rather than question its reality ?
It will be useful here to raise some more general points, with 
some suggestions for alternative perspectives in which to consider 
them, before focussing on the much more specific issues of the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century and the evidence already 
presented about it.
It must immediately be admitted that there are difficulties of 
adjustment for any belief system (scientific or religious) in the 
light of new facts or information. But I would like to suggest 
as a working hypothesis that the feeling abroad of the self evidence 
of a 'science religion conflict' arose largely after the conscious 
campaign of a group in the late nineteenth century committed to 
a'positivistic^view of science. The third quarter of that century 
saw the rise of the X-club, with T.H.Huxley as one of its central 
figures, dedicated to eradicate the influence of religion on 
science. One of the group, Francis Galton, published in 1872 
a work also purporting to show statistically a decline in clerical 
involvement in science.^  Around the end of the period, two 
influential books by Draper and White^ traced the supposed history 
of the religion science conflict.
Two distinct elements in this may be identified. Turner's article 
commented on the increasing 'professionalisation' in the period,
n
both of science and of the clergy. At the beginning of the century 
an Anglican clergyman was generally expected to perform little duty 
beyond ensuring that the required services were performed, and a 
curate could be kept to do that. The rise of Evangelicalism and 
then Tractarianism within the church brought more emphasis both on 
the care of souls and the dignity of the church. Thus by the third 
quarter it was becoming less acceptable for a clergyman to regard his
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uosition as a mere sinecure. On the other hand, science was 
for various reasons becoming increasingly professionalised. Indeed 
the word 'science' had for some time meant a study of natural 
phenomena, but the word 'scientist' (first coined by Whewell) 
focussed on the person rather than the activity. Increasingly, 
then, the occupations of scientist and clergyman were expected to be
’full time*ones.
But division of labour is not necessarily the same thing as 
antagonism. In itself it proves neither that a 'religious' mind 
differs from a scientific one, nor that henceforth clergymen 
denigrated science and scientists were irreligious. Propaganda of 
positivists such as those of the X-club, and their modern counter­
parts,^ may portray a rise of 'real science* as a struggle to throw 
off the trammels of religion and metaphysics. But this interpretation 
of history is not self evident. It could, for example, be claimed 
that earlier 'mystics* like Kepler and Newton might have found concepts 
like gravity harder to accept had they been positivists. In the 
nineteenth century, Darwin was religious when he first formulated his 
theory, cuid Wallace (to positivist embarrassment) stayed so until his 
death.9 After the X-club*s demise, it is arguable that the religion 
and metaphysics of figures like Poincare, Eddington, Einstein and 
Heisenberg enhanced their scientific vision and imagination. This 
theme will not be developed here, since it is of a marginal relevance 
to the subject of the thesis, but the point needs making. Huxley's 
vision of science as a kind of crusade, where no soldier could afford 
a divided allegiance, is highly questionable.^^
Turner also quotes Huxley's famous remark: 'Extinguished 
theologians lie about the cradle of every science as the strangled 
snakes besides that of Hercules', but he adds 'But the history of 
science has been more complex and problematical.'^^ Turner notes
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the rather less tidy truth, where science often goes astray, and 
scientific no less than religious communities are unreceptive to 
new ideas. But if Huxley could not be expected to be a good 
historian of science, was he at least ri^t about his own period ? 
Surely the period around the i860 debate epitomises his assertion ?
Two questions need to be asked: (i) were the critics of Darwin 
hostile to science as such ? (ii) did theological opposition put 
Darwin's theory in any real danger of oblivion ? The prima facie 
answer to (i) must be no. Neither Samuel Wilberforce, nor any other 
influential theologian suggested that the study of natural phenomena 
was wrong or harmful.Yet certainly some would not like to see 
science free in the sense in which Huxley wanted. If one were to 
take the actual word 'science' to mean study of natural phenomena 
without metaphysical presuppositions (i.e. a supposedly positivist 
definition), then cf course he was ri^t. But to take it thus would 
be to exclude from 'science' most of which we now accept as epoch 
making in its history. Freedom from metaphysical assumption is 
not a realistic basis to declare a 'science-religion conflict'.
But Huxley was also insisting that science be free and independent 
of Biblical revelation. On this not all would have agreed with him, 
thou^ Sedgwick (as a good Baconian) would have professed to do so. 
More recent experiences of 'Creationism' may be taken as illustrative 
bf dangers at least to science education (if not to science itself), 
and of the general sterility of 'science' kept subservient to 
revelation.
We cannot, of course, directly extrapolate back from American 
'Fundamentalism' of the 1920's or 'Creationism' of the 1980's, to 
England in the i860's. Yet a belief that Darwin's theory was under 
threat is certainly plausible. Men like Bishop Wilberforce were
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well respected leaders in the Anglican hierarchy. Darwin, moreover, 
had presented and illustrated a plausible mechanism for evolution, 
but had little positive proof and many problems to overcome. The 
comments of critics like Wilberforce were not ignorant rantings, for 
Darwin himself admitted that Wilberforce's criticisms (in their 
written form) had real f o r c e . T h e r e  were, furthermore, a number 
of mainstream ajid well respected scientists who joined in the opposition 
to the theory, e.g. Sedgwick, Agassiz, Owen, and Jenkin, speaking in 
their own areas of competence. Many of the objections were 
undoubtedly scientific^ '^ , but Huxley had at least a prima facie 
case for believing that religious beliefs played a part in the 
motivation, even if a simple 'science vs religion* model is too naive.
But if it were granted, with many caveats, to apply to the 
third quarter of the century and the controversies surrounding 
evolution by natural selection, there are great problems in extending 
similar ideas of conflict back to the second quarter. None of 
the Scriptural (geologists had the same church standing as 
Wilberforce.^^ Most were antiquarians, or historians, or at 
best (like Ure) were speaking on subjects considerably removed from 
their own fields. None seem to have been leaders in their 
scientific fields, as were some of Darwin's later critics. We have, 
moreover, seen at considerable length in the previous chapters, that 
they had little support from the mainstream and influential Christian 
journals.For over thirty years their 'flood geology' type 
systems had been rejected by leading mainstream naturalists, many of 
whom were clergymen or men of undoubted personal piety. In short, 
though some Scriptural Geologists may well have wished to keep science 
in a sterile subservience to their interpretations of Biblical 
hevelation, their chances of success appeared mini.mal whether the
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members of the BAAS emphasized natural theology or not. What, then, 
are we to make of Turner's more general assertion that developments 
in geology, physics, biology, etc,etc.etc.were perceived to 
'challenge or at least cast into doubt theological assumptions and 
portions of the Bible.' ? Presumably examples might be found from 
each area he cites where discoveries called into question someone or 
other's theological beliefs or interpretation of the Bible. But 
as a general characterisation of the period it is greatly distorted. 
There is no evidence that in the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century either science felt seriously threatened by orthodox
theology, or orthodox theology felt threatened by science. The 
general 'science religion conflict' in this period is a myth.
It is now time to return to comment on the question of the 
blunting of criticism by the use of natural theology. In this 
period not even the S,criptural Geologists suggested that science 
(i.e. the study of nature) was to be feared or avoided. No one 
suggested that study of science was an improper pursuit for a 
clergyman, provided it did not interfeiE with his religious duties.
Since no such criticisms in general existed, natural theology could 
not have been emphasized to meet them. Any danger there mi^ it 
have been, of wanting to make science subservient to revelation, 
would hardly have been avoided by emphasizing natural theology 
even if the danger had been perceived as a serious one.
The conclusion must be that there seems no particular kind of 
criticism of science which the emphasis in the BAAS on natural 
theology could be designed to blunt. From such criticism as there 
was, an emphasis on natural theology was more likely to open the 
BAAS to attack as setting up natural in place of revealed religion.
It would have been safer to say nothing.
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6.4.2 TheoloCT as a 'Mediating Influence' in the BAASJ
There has been a second suggestion, that this natural theology 
acted as a 'mediating influence' between the members of different 
denominations in the BAAS. This, in fact, is a very difficult 
proposition to assess. Obviously meeting in the social context of 
the BAAS brought together those of different political and religious 
views - as members of the BAAS were well aware. But how far the 
natural theology as such served t o ‘paper over'religious differences 
is far more difficult to ascertain. It will be useful, therefore, 
to make some comment but restrict this to Sedgwick himself.
It has, of course, to be remembered that (then as now) the 
most important theological differences were not always denominational 
To High Churchmen denominational differences were supreme, but 
to Evangelicals or to those of a more 'liberal^ theological position 
(for differing reasons) they were not. Sedgwick's religious views 
were closer to the Church of Scotland Chalmers, the Baptist
Robert Hall, or to some of the Quakers, than to the Tractarians,
But his affinity for Hall and for the Quakers predated his 
involvement in science (and in the case of Hall it was shared by 
the moderate Evangelical Christian Observer - without reference to 
science). His emphatic rejection of Unitarianism was on the grounds 
of the Unitarian mutilation of Scripture - which seemed to Sedgwick to 
undermine the whole of revealed religion. In the instance of 
Evangelicals like Chalmers and Hall (and many Quakers), Sedgwick 
shared with them a Christian belief which went far beyond the 
bounds of natural theology. It may well be that in sharing an 
interest in science, and seeing science as discovering more of the
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world created by the Christian God, Sedgwick and Chalmers felt 
that much closer togëther. But this is not what is usually meant by 
a 'mediating influence'. On the other hand, it may just be possible 
that Sedgwick might feel himself closer to Unitarians (whose 
theology he abhorred) if they shared a view of science as discovering 
a creator God's world — even if that 'God' was not the Christian 
one in the sense that Sedgwick understood it. The corollary would 
presumably be that Sedgwick would have felt more affinity with 
a Unitarian natural theologian than with an atheist scientist.
I have not found any way to test this hypothesis one way or the
other, though it might well be true.
The only question which one would wish to ask is what exactly 
was the nature of the 'mediation' intended. Was there any reason 
why personal animosity should have been felt? Would natural theology 
have helped on purely social interaction? On the other hand, since 
natural theology concerns not the content of science but the
context in which science is seen, would it have helped in the area
of purely scientific exchange? In neither context would it, strictly 
speaking, be relevant. The only point might perhaps be that it 
could aid the 'gelling' of personalities in friendship to realise 
that both saw science as in something like the same context of 
exploring a Creator's world. It would be better to call this a 
'cementing role' rather than (as J.H. Brooke) a mediating role , 
a distinction which is verbal but none the less significant. On 
the other hand it must be recognised that the specific introduction 
of natural theological ideas (and even worse of the eulogising of 
a Unitarian like Priestley, and comment on his theological views) 
could easily have led into discussion of those very contentious 
areas between Unitarians and the orthodox which could breed
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dissention.
Surely Sedgwick emphasized natural theology in his Presidential 
speeches for no other reason than that he genuinely did believe 
that this was the ultimate glory of science; in a Baconian sense 
science was the discovery of God's world and told us more of the 
Creator. But it was a route not an end in itself. To the 
Christian it was a way to understand more of the God he experienced 
in Christian grace, to the non-Christian a route to contemplation 
of the higher truths of revealed religion. It was not seen as a 
protection against critics, but the raison d etre of Sedgwick s 
own life work in geology. It set in context the scientific 
endeavours of a man who was primarily a Christian, but one who 
happened also to be a scientist and saw his scientific work as 
ultimately having meaning only in the framework of his theological 
beliefs.
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See also comment in Thackray and Morrell, Gentlemen of Science, 
and McCleod and Collins, (ref. l).
8. Criticism has already been made of Gillespie’s Charles Darwin 
and the Problem of Creation for a similarly ’positivistic' 
approach.
9. It would, of course, be as naive to suggest that a religious 
orientation is always a help to science as to suggest that it
is always a hindrance to it. Darwin later claimed to be a strong 
theist when he wrote the Origin of Species (Autobiography 1958
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Edition p. 95), and it was apparently not a hindrance. His 
subsequent weakening of theistic belief may have been associated 
(though not in a simple ’cause-effect’ relationship) with an 
increasingly 'materialistic' view of the origins of man and of 
human morality (see comment in S. Herbert, 'The Place of Man in 
the Development of Darv/in's Theory of Transmutation', Journal of 
the History of Biology, 1974, 7., 217-258; also articles by the 
late Dov Ospovat and his interesting and useful book. The 
Development of Darwin's Theory (198I) e.g. ch. 5)» But, on the 
other hand, his weakening belief in a Designer also made Darwin 
doubt the inductive power of his own mind (Autobiography, p. 93 
- though Darwin, possibly without consistency, seems only to have 
directly applied it here to religious induction). V/allace, 
however, remained involved in Spiritualism at the end of his long 
life - to the embarrassment of some of his contemporaries. A 
supreme irony is, that whilst Galton was speaking of the pursuit 
of science being 'uncongenial to the priestly character' (see 
note 10 belov;), he was just missing the breakthrough in genetics 
being made by an Austrian monk whose work would lie unnoticed 
for a couple of decades.
10. Turner (ref. 4), quotes Huxley to this effect on p. 370, but it 
is a metaphor appearing elsewhere in Huxley's writings. Galton 
stated that 'The pursuit of science is uncongenial to the priestly 
character'. (Galton^ ref. 5, p. 24). Doubtless this is true if 
part of the definition of a 'priestly character' includes unques­
tioning acceptance of dogma. But, taken more generally, Galton's 
viewpoint would certainly be challenged from different angles by 
modern writers such as R. Hooykaas, Religion and the Rise of Modern 
Science, R.E.D. Clarke, Science and Christian Belief, and S.L. Jaki, 
Origin of Science and the Science of its Origin.
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1-1. Turner (ref. 4), p. 358.
12. Any opposition to its introduction in education was based on its 
distraction from more essential subjects, not any idea that it 
might be harmful.
15. Philip Kitcher's recent book Abusing Science points out the
sterility of Creationism (ch.5), a point which was also obvious 
to those following the accounts of Creationist evidence presented 
in the recent legal conflict over Arkasas law 590* In Kuhnian 
terms, it gives rise to no 'normal science'. Kitcher's book is 
of value as an expose (if one can accept its sometimes 'Batman' 
style, and obvious lack of empathy with the general Evangelical 
theology of which Creationism is just one version). But its 
understanding of the historical dimension rests with Gillispie 
(p. 132: 'For a lucid account of early nineteenth century Flood 
Geology, see Gillispie'). Differences between modern Creationism 
and the views of Sedgwick and his contemporaries are sometimes 
noted (e.g. p. 125), but elsewhere (e.g. p. 1 and p. 4) obscured.
14. Huxley lated claimed that Wilberforce had 'crammed' his subject 
up, and 'knew nothing at first hand' (The Life and Letters of T.
H. Huxley, 2, p. 185). The Quarterly Review, however, in 186O., 
carried Wilberforce's written up critique, and of it Darwin himself 
wrote in July i860: 'It is uncommonly clever: it picks nut with
skill all the most conjectural parts and brings forward well all 
the difficulties.' (The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, 2,
p. 324).
15. This has been argued already at length for Sedgwick, and is 
true for others collected in Hull's Darwin and His Critics.
160 It is also interesting to note evidence presented first by Hamm's
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The Christian View of Science and. Scripture (Ch. 7) and in 
much more detail J.R. Moore's The Post Darwinian Controversies, 
that evolution found early acceptance with Evangelicalism and 
orthodoxy, until a later reversion under Fundamentalism and 
Creationism.
17. I would include in this Nolan, who for all his recognised 
scholarship seems a singular figure. Wilberforce commanded 
much respect and was a power in High Church circles.
18. This has been shown in the previous chapters. For a contrasting
study on journals and the Darv/inian controversy, see Ellegard,
Darv/in and the General Reader.
19. Turner seems to be much influenced by the X-club version of 
the conflict thesis, although professing some doubts of it.
In a later Essay Review (Isis, 1982, 7^ , 563-5&6) Turner whole­
heartedly accepts the Thackray-Morrell thesis of a liberal 
Anglican domination of science in the period - objecting only to 
the use of the actual term 'Broad Church' as anachronistic.
20. Clark & Hughes, 2, p. 449.
21. Since, however, we are reduced to speculation, I may be forgiven
for suggesting that in ray own personal experience religious 
people are more antagonistic to those whose views appear on the 
surface to be similar to their own, but are perceived by them
to differ on important fundamentals. Heretics are hated more 
than atheists.
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(7) S E D G W I C K  , S C I E N T I F I C  M E T H O D O L O G Y  AND T H E O L O G Y
7.1 Methodological Background to Sedgwick's Work
7.1.1 Introduction and Explanation of Approach
Section (?) attempts to explore the way in which Sedgwick’s own 
perceptions of scientific methodology, together with his religious and 
metaphysical assumptions, interacted with his actual scientific work.
One of the features of his perception of methodology which we 
will consider in particular is the absence from it of any real 
concept of the ’theory laden* nature of all scientific observation.
From a viewpoint of modern philosophy of science this may be seen as 
a ’deficiency* in terms of the kinds of explanations which his 
perception enabled him to make of actual scientific progress .-(and . 
associated changes in paradigm) his own field. My own 
interest and training in the philosophy of science will obviously 
influence the way in which such issues are presented, though they are 
surely of a general interest to historians of science. •
The first chapter of the section begins with consideration of some 
early historical background to methodology, for Sedgwick saw himself 
as very much in the tradition of Bacon and Newton, writing ecstatically 
to Whewell in 184$: ’It delights us all to think that there is a moral 
fitness in having the sculptured figures of Bacon and Newton in our
' I
house of prayer.’ One of my contentions will be that to Sedgwick 
this was more than lip service, and that certain aspects of, and 
difficulties in,his own perceptions of scientific methodology have 
their roots in those of his chosen Mentors. This approach, of 
course, does rest on a particular view of the methodologies of science 
implied by the works of Bacon and Newton as they came down to the 
nineteenth century. A detailed development and defence of these
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particular views of Bacon and Newton has been considered out of place 
here, but they do need briefly stating.
7.1.2. Francis Bacon
Bacon was in fact well aware that the senses can be deceptive^ , and 
experiment and reason feature highly in his system. The inductive 
road is, however, long. In over hasty generalisation the mind: 'flies 
from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and fam 
these principles, the truth of which it takes as settled and immovable, 
proceeds to judgement and to the discovery of üie middle axioms...'^
The right way .'derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising 
by an unbroken ascent, so it arrives at the most general axioms last
if
of all.' Bacon's objection to the Greeks was not that they did not 
use their senses, but that they were too quick to jump to very general 
axioms without the ascent through a series of ever more general 
empirical laws. As we shall see, Sedgwick agreed with him.
There has been controversy over Bacon's attitude to the 'hypothetico- 
deductive method'. On this I can nob with Popper who saw
c
Bacon as attacking the method^ , for what Bacon actually attacks is the
construction of an axiom then 'rescued Shd preserved by some frivolous
distinction...'^ - much as Popper himself would have objected. Neither,
however, can I accept Urbach's recent suggestion that Bacon was actually
n
a kind of precursor to Popper , for having rejected a wrong and dogmatic 
use of conjecture Bacon nowhere goes on to explain a'right'use. He 
rather assumes an inductive build up. There is no emphasis on refutable 
conjectures, unless it is 'read into’ his words. Similarly, whilst 
Ducasse from a modern standpoint argues that Bacon's words are 'tantamount 
to a declaration' that working hypotheses are necessary. Bacon does not 
anywhere in fact say so.^  With hindsight we may find in Bacon a lot of 
hints and materials for constructing a modern theory of scientific
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method - but Bacon himself did not construct one or perceive it in 
those terms.
From a modern perspective Bacon remains lacking on two counts.
First, he (and after him the line of empiricism through Locke and 
Kurae to Mill) failed to take account of the inherently theory-laden 
nature of observation. Secondly, they make it sound as though 
actual discovery is mainly a process of ridding the mind of its 
preconceptions before making observation; in actual fact the 
process of discovery involves not merely accurately 'reflecting' 
reality, but actively creating concepts through which to view it.
Allied to this and arising out of it is a failure to give any 
general description of the role of imagination, speculative 
hypotheses, and corroborated hypotheses, in the methodology of 
science.
Sedgwick's writings show that he had read Bacon, and regarded his 
own science as an application of Baconian principles. But the Bacon 
which he read was not perceived through a modern framework of 
methodology, and Sedgwick did not 'read into' Bacon any of the 
principles which I have described as self evident today but only 
hinted at by a^con. Thus, whilst today we might 'see' the paradigm 
changes in geology during the nineteenth century in (say) Popperian or 
Kuhnian terms, Sedgwick tried to //vlbrpret them using what he actually 
found in Bacon (and, as we shall see, also in Newton).
Finally, some comment might be made on Bacon's views on science 
and religon. Study of nature leads us to magnify the works of God.'° 
God has given us two books: 'the Scriptures revealing the will of 
God, and then the creatures expressing his power.'** This idea, as 
we shall see, was influential on Sedgwick. Likewise was Bacon's 
insistence that we could not 'find the truth of natural philosophy
344
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in the Scriptures...' The Bible is not designed to teach what today 
we calL science. Nevertheless, ultimately nature and revelation must 
concur - and we need not fear the most thorough study of nature!^ He 
did, however, warn against a too hasty synthesis, for such systems 
tended to become conservative and view criticisms of the science as 
criticisms of the religion implicit in them.'*^
7.1.3 Newton
What we are really interested in here is not so much the complex
'ISpicture of Newton emerging after rediscovery of many of his papers 
but the view of him which came down to the nineteenth century. Though 
some other material (like his correspondence with Cotes and Bentley) 
was available, most scientists then judged him on his Principia and
16
his Opticks.
On his metaphysics it is important to qualify statements like those 
of Koyre about the 'unholy alliance of Newton and Locke' which 
'Produced an atomic psychology, which explained (or explained away) 
mind as a mosaic of "sensations" and "ideas" linked together by laws 
of association (attraction)...The reductionism of Lockian 
empiricism as interpreted by Hume achieved a monistic ontology at the 
expense of a coherent or convincing treatment of consciousness. ’ Men 
like Sedgwick and Whewell utterly rejected this, turning effectively 
to a kind of dualism not dissimilar to that of the Cambridge Platonists 
with innate conscience faculties. Yet, having rejected Lockian 
empiricism, Sedgwick was able to idolise Newton. This makes sense only
if we recognise-firstly that Locke himself was concerned with
IBepistemology rather than ontology, and secondly that Newton's was 
fundamentally a.monistic idealistic version of Locke, with all physical
iq
agencies explained as the immediate will of God. In his actual 
science, of course, Newton, like most idealists, treatsd the physical
,'20 345
world as though it were real.
On scientific methodology Newton's famous 'Rules of Reasoning' added
to principles of economy of concept and universality the words:
'In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions
inferred by general induction from phenomena as accurately or
very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that
may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by which
they may either be made more accurate or liable to exceptions.'
This is in a sense hypothetico-deductive, but the way hypotheses are
presumed to come is by 'making experiments and observations, and in
2. \drawing general conclusions from them by induction...' Induction, 
not conjecture, is thejr source - and they are tentative only in view 
of possible 'exception' rather than by paradigm change. Various views 
have been expressed on relationships between Newton and Baconianism,
and Newton and modern falsificatibnism. ‘ Feyeràbend, I believe
rightly, sees him as nearer to a mild brand of Nagelian positivism than
2,3
to falsificationism. This lays WLm open by implication to the same 
kind of criticism - he makes no allowance for a Kuhnian type 'gestalt- 
switch' paradigm chan^ e^  and takes no cognisance of the 'theory-laden' 
nature of observation. This lacuna is, I would argue, reflected in 
the ideas of his follower Adam Sedgwick.
Newton's attitudes to hypotheses have been the subject of much 
discussion, and Koyre especially has followed his cheinging views and 
use of that term. ^ Hypothesis were always to be distinguished from 
laws directly induced from phenomena, and only the latter were certain.^
VJhat we are left with, then, is that Newton’s view is this: 
Experimental philosophy proceeds by deducing causes from effects, 
an induction from observation to produce 'theories’. These are 
extended or restricted by further observations, and in practice may 
be harmonised with apparently refuting evidence by means of ’hypotheses '
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- these hypotheses being used simply to explain apparent discrepancy. 
Empirical theories, once found, are never replaced, only extended 
or restricted. Hypotheses concern concepts which cannot be deduced 
from phenomena; they are used to explain or to suggest experiments, 
but never achieve the certainty of theories.
This is not a Popperian version of a Hypothetico-deductive model, nor 
can it handle Kuhnian 'revolution' - unless one reads this as a change of 
hypothesis whilst preserving the same theories.
7.1 .4  Methodological Heritage
Bacon and Newton were the key figures in conceptions of scientific 
methodology in the era of early Sedgwick. The eighteenth century had 
seen the rise of Hume's reductionist empiricism, and Kant's transcend­
ental idealism. But Hume offered little to the empirical scientist, 
and whilst Kant's philosophy formed a launching point for the Nature 
philosophen (with some parallel's in Coleridge's science), Sedgwick 
abhored any such approach to science. Sedgwick refers seldom to
Kant and (unlike Whewell who w^ rare in this respect) his first
27hand knowledge of Kant is questionable. His perceptions of 
scientific methodology, particularly in his early period, were based 
on Bacon and Newton whom he took for his mentors. Though, moreover, 
he was a man of his times, the marks of this early approach always 
remained with him, and the strengths and weaknesses of their ' 
methodologies as ways of perceiving what was actually happening in 
science are apparent in his own interpretations of scientific 
developments.
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7.1 Notes
1. In the Trinity Whewell collection, Add. Ms. A 68/121 dated 
November ?th l84^ .
2. See e.g. The Great Instauration, see also R.M. Blake, et al.
Theories of Scientific Method, ch. 4.
3» Novum Organum: Aphorisms xix.
4. Ibid.
5- Conjectures and Refutations, p. l4; the most important Baconian 
references are in Novum Organum 1. and the phrase 'antitLi pQtri o,ns 
of nature' referred to by Popper appears in xxvi, xix-xxii, Ixiv, 
cvi, etc.
6. Novum Organum. 2» see also Mary Horton, 'In Defence of Francis 
Bacon', Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science'. 1973,
4, 241-278.
7. P. Urbach, 'Francis Bacon as Precursor to Popper',Brit. Jour Phil. 
Sci.. 1982, 113-132.
8. In Blake (ref. 2.), p. 72.
9. Perhaps one of the clearest passages is: '... by successive st&ps
not interrupted or broken, we rise from particulars to lesser 
axioms; and then to middle axioms, one above the other; and last of
all to the most general. For the lowest axioms differ but slightly
from bare experience, whilst the highest and most general ... are 
the notional and without solidity...' Novum Organum, 1, civ. This 
seems to be the kind of thing meant by Sedgwick in his emphasis on 
the 'inductive track'.
10. See e.g. Valerius Terminus. Cap 1.
11. Ibid.
12. Of the Advancement of Learning. Bk. 11., see also Novum Organum. 2» xv.
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and De Augmentis Scientiarum, Bk. 9» ch. 1.
13.. See Filum Labrinthi, 7j Novum Organum, T. Ixxxix.
14. Npvum Organum, 2» Ixxxix. In this connection Bacon objected not 
only to deriving science from Scripture, but also to using final 
causes as part of the mechanisms of physics (see De Augmentis 
Scientiarum, 3, iv). Ultimately the physical creation pointed to 
a Creator; but natural philosophy should study secondary causal 
patterns without introducing final causes at this level.
13» See e.g. A.R. and M.B. Hall, The Unpublished Scientific Papers of 
Isaac Newton, 1978 Edition, P. and R, Wallis, Newton and . ^
Newtoniana 1672-1975 (published 1977)» etc.
16. The book auction catalogue for Sedgwick's book collection after 
his death lists the second edition of Principia (1713), and
Edleston's edition (I850) of the Cotes correspondance. Sedgwick's 
Discourse (1st Edition p. 85) refers to Newton's Opticks.
17. Koyre, Newtonian Studies, p. 23.
18. See e.g. R.L. Armstrong, 'The Cambridge Platonists and Locke on 
Innate Ideas', Journal of the History of Ideas. 1969, p. 193.
19. See e.g. Westfall, Never At Rest, p. 303, Newton's De Gravitatione
_et Aequipondio Fluidorum (in Hall and Hall, ref. 13), etc.
20. Hall and Hall (ref. 13) make this point, p. 81.
21. Queries 31,
22. See e.g. Koyre (ref. 17) p. 40 and Brewster, Memoirs of the Life.
Writings and Discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton. 2, p. 403, for
opposite views; also Blake (ref. 3), p. l40, Westfall (ref. 19), 
p. 167 n69, Kuhn in Cohen, Franklin and Newton, pp. 37-38, etc.
A further point made by several writers is that Newton quantified.
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25. In R.E. Butts and J.W. Davis, The Methodological Heritage o_f 
Newton, p. l60n (see also Sabra, Theories of Light from 
Descartes to Newton, ch. 2). Nagel strongly distinguished 
'theories' (parallel to Newton's 'hypotheses') from 'laws'
(parallel to Newton's 'theories'). To Nagel 'Laws' concern 
directly observable entities, theories are constructed to 
explain laws. In practice, however, such a system has difficulty! 
accomodating the theory-laden nature of observation, and Nagel 
is reduced to a 'sleight of hand' substitution of 'established
procedures' instead of 'observably identifiable traits' on 
successive pages (pp. 83-84, The Structure of Science). This 
is interesting as we shall see Sedgwick (below on p. 431) having
a similar kind of problem.
24. Koyre (ref. 1?), pp. 30-31 etc, see also Cohen (ref. 22), who 
catalogues uses in an appendix, though Hanson in ch 1 of - 
Butts ^  DavidXref. 23) . critical, of thisi v: ' - -
23. Newton wrote to Fontenelle: 'I cultivate the experimental
philosophy, as that which is worthy to be called philosophy, and
I treat hypothetical philosophy, not as knowledge, but by means 
of queries.' (cited in Westfall (ref. 19), p. 792.;
26. See below p> 4?6 etc.
27. See below p. 463 etc.
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7.2 The Social-Scientific Background to Sedgwick's Work
7.2.1 The Background
Sedgwick, who previously had exhibited no major interest in 
geology, was elected Woodwardian Professor in I8l8. I have 
already given in chapter 5.2 some general background of geology; 
but our interest then was as a background to natural theology 
whereas our present focus is on geological methodology. For
this reason some elements will have here to be expanded.
Lyell, in his Principles, cultivated a view of geological 
history with Hutton as a kind of prophet and himself as a geological 
messiah. Recent historical study, however, has shovm that whilst 
this propaganda has dominated resumes of geological history even 
into the 1970's, it is clearly a distortion.^  Its presentation 
of Wernerianism as a kind of rash and autocratically maintained 
speculation (as against the sober induction of Hutton) is particularly 
misleading^ , but it also obscures a number of important methodological 
distinctions (e.g. actualism vs uniformitarianism).
In fact the relationships between the key ideas in this phase of 
geology are complex. We need to consider them under two aspects; 
their relationships as ideas in the abstract, and the actual historical 
contexts and associations in which they arose. To give the 
discussion a visual focus I have represented these key ideas by 
means of a Venn diagram (Figure 7.1). To this the following comment 
may be added.
One term which is not shown and has no separate circle is 
'actualism'. Rudwick defined this as 'the methodology of inferring 
the nature of past events by analogy with processes observable in 
action at the present'.  ^ Now the early schemes had not always been 
actualist (Woodward, for example, found himself forced into a view
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Figure 7.1
Karly Nineteenth Century Geological Ideas in a Venn Diagram
S^; Sedgwick 1825 
Sg: Sedgwick I83I
“X  L^: Lyell I83I 
Nv Lg: Lyell l86?
\  H: Hutton 
\ (In Lyell's 
\ view)
Directionalist
Wernerian 
(aqueous nature of 
basalt, granite etc)
Smithia n 
(Dating the 
sedimentaries 
by fossils)
Uniformitarian 
(forces always 
operating at 
the same rate)ysDiluvialist 
(Universal flood 
in near past)
Catastrophist
Steady-State 
Earth
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that gravity itself was suspended during the. flood), but by the 
early nineteenth century all serious geologists used actualist 
principles where they could. Sedgwick certainly never ever considered 
anything else. But this is to be distinguished from uniformitarianism, 
which is the view that the levels of forces operating have always been 
approximately the same. • •
The earlier controversy was between the Wernerians and Huttonians.
Tt'TO major issues divided them. First there was the directionalism 
of Werner ys the steady^ state ideas of .Hutton. Secondly there was 
the Wernerian view that virtually all strata were aqueous in origin 
ys Hutton's view that many were igneous. The two were connected.
Werner observed that certain types of rock (e.g. granite and gneiss 
and basalt) did not contain fossils. Both lack of fossils and 
peculiarities of lithology could therefore be explained if these 
were 'primitive' rocks, precipitated out of a deep sea before life 
appeared. Next there followed a period of 'transition' rocks, 
some precipitated and some laid down mechanically, a more stormy 
period where fossils appear showing the existence of life. Then 
in the next period, the 'floetz' period, life teemed in a stormy, 
low standing ocean, and fossils abound. Finally, the most recent 
period is one in which volcanic action and alluvial deposits have 
made local modifications to older rocks. This view sees most rocks 
as aqueous in origin, and it also has 'directionality' or 'progression'. 
We must, in fact, be careful in using such terms, for it lacks the 
strong sense as used by later Darwinians. But Wernerians saw a 
time when there was no life on earth, and later came to recognise 
that higher animals such as vertebrates appeared later in the record. 
Hutton had no clear idea of associating fossil types with stages of 
earth history, and in his much quoted words said: 'In the economy of
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the world I can find no traces of a beginning, no prospect of an 
end.'^  Lyell saw Hutton as a kind of catastrophist, for 'He 
imagined that the continents were first gradually destroyed, and 
when their ruins had furnished materials for new continents, they 
were upheaved by violent and paroxysmal convulsions.' Nevertheless 
it was a steady-state earthy these catastrophic cycles had no 
directionality; they remained cycles. Werner had explained the 
lack of fossils in rocks such as granite, gneiss and basalt in terms 
of his directional system, seeing them as 'primitive'. Hutton saw 
them as of igneous origin, putting igneous action more on a par with 
aqueous in importance.
Neither Wernerianism nor Huttonianism were self evident, and neither 
proved wholly 'correct'. Trap rocks (now recognised as igneous 
intrusions into older beds) could be explained by Wernerians as 
being‘precipitated from above. Wemer had not assumed a uniform 
progression of universal conditions, and what is now 'seen' as 
obvious disproof (the metamorphosis of other beds in contact with
igneous intrusions) was by no means observationally clear and was
5
often not an obvious result of heat.^
Wernerianism had two important implications. The first was that 
geolog}’- involved not only a study of operations going on over the 
earth's surface, but that it offered a genuine study of the history 
of that surface's development. Secondly, lithology and mineral type 
were important in that they provided a key to dating rocks.
The term 'catatrophist' has already been used. It was first 
invented by Whewell, who derived ib thus; 'That great changes of 
a kind and intensity quite different from the common course of events, 
and which may therefore properly be called catastrophe s, have taken 
place upon the earth's surface, was an opinion which appeared to
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be forced upon men by obvious facts.Whewell also uses the term 
'uniformity', in particular of the views of Prévost and Lyell. But 
his treatment shows a consciousness that the distinction is not 
clearcut. At the extremes (in, say, early Buckland and Lyell) 
the distinction is dear enough, but there may be many intermediate 
positions. Diluvialism is a particular kind of Gatastrophism 
- or perhaps one should rather say a genus as there are different 
species of Diluvialism. The work of Cuvier and Brongniart on the 
Paris basin led them to picture alternate states of marine and 
freshwater conditions, with a change of fossil species between each 
horizon. Cuvier pictured these as sudden changes, with a continent-
n
wide catastrophe introducing new conditions. Jameson, who translated 
Cuvier's work, indentified the last of these catastrophes with the 
Noachic flood. In this form it was adapted by Buckland, who from 
1819 pictured a series of world wide floods, the last of which was 
to be identified with the flood of Noah.^  We shall later see the 
inductive base for this; but it is important to recognise that it 
was only one form of catastrophism, and indeed only one form of 
diluvialism. Sedgwick had abandoned it by I83I, and it was dead 
after Buckland himself quietly dropped it in I836. But Sedgwick 
continued to believe in diluvial action on a local level.  ^ Later, 
Aggasiz' glacial theory and the concept of ice ages could be seen as 
a form of catastrophism. One of the practical corollaries of the 
catastrophist-uniformitarian dispute was attitude to epochs of the 
earth's history. Catastrophes would imply widespread discontinuities 
in the stratigraphical records - especially in terms of a directional 
view of fossils.
The role of fossils is, indeed, the last issue represented on 
Figure 7.1. The fact that particular fossil types are associated
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with particular strata was noticed in the eighteenth century by 
some observers.In general, however, neither Huttonians nor 
Wernerians had utilised this fact very much. It seemed inherently 
improbably that the correlation would be universal. The development 
of the assumption of such a correlation as a key tool in identifying 
strata seems to have come from two sources. An English land 
surveyor, William Smith, developed from about 1790 the technique of 
making a major use of fossils to . identify strata.The actual 
degree to which he used fossils alone was a major element of the
12Sedgifick-Murchison controversy, and modem studies have doubted it.
It is also to be doubted whether he in any sense saw the method as
iSdirectionist - most of his fossils were invertebrates. But what 
he did do was to undertake geological mapping in a major way. His 
actual techniques and ideas were disseminated only by word of mouth 
before I815, but in that year he published his beautiful map of the 
strata of England and Wales.
There seems no reason to doubt either that Smith made his discovery 
of the method independently, or the magnitude of his achievement 
in the production of his map. The often quoted eulogy Sedgv-rick 
gave him in his Presidential.Address of I83I was well deserved. But 
the impression sometimes given of this 'father of English stratigraphy* 
is that it was his published work which brou^t a revolution in 
stratigraphical thinking. This is misleading. Cuvier had recognised 
as early as I8OI that the older the beds the greater differences 
between fossil and present species^f, and both Cuvier and Broh^ niarfc" 
had done work on the identification of strata from fossils from 
around 1808.^^  In Cuvier and Brongniart*s work this facet,was 
associated with both directionalism and a form of catastrophism.
In any event, there was no instantaneous acceptance by geologists
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of an invariable correlation of fossils and strata.
A few figures have been tentatively plotted on the diagram.
Sedgwick and Lyell both, though at different times, moved from one 
intersection to another — though their paths did not cross. Hutton 
has also been tentatively placed. Murchison seems to have moved 
over (effectively) to join Sedgifick from an initially less Catastrophist 
position. As we shall see, Murchison was (or became) more extreme 
in what (after Farey) I have called 'Smithian' doctrines. The Venn 
diagram has to dichotomise - and sometimes these issues were a matter 
of degree. Hutton too is seen by Lyell (effectively) as a kind 
of catastrophist - but others have seen him as uniformitarian.
Most visual, devices, however, have some limitations.
Whilst ‘shades of commitment * within each zone might be more . 
accurate it would be impracticable since over-complex. But at least 
the existing diagram is right in leaving a geologist free not to 
have made up his mind on some of the issues. The Geological Society 
of London was, as has often been said, founded in l807 to encourage 
practical work in stratigraphy rather than theory or speculation about 
causes of s t r a t a . I t s  early membership included all parties: 
Wernarians (e.g. Jameson), Huttonians (e.g. Playfair), Smithians 
(e.g. Townsend).Its social nature did discourage the membership 
of engineers and surveyors (e.g. Smith, Farey, and Bakewell), thou^ 
this did not stop a fruitful interchange of ideas. Rachel Laudan 
has actually argued that in its early years it contributed to a 
stagnation and deterioration of geology (though this is strange 
since she also says that in I807 English geology was already 'at a
1 Q
particularly low ebb') She sees the 'Baconian' strictly inductive 
method and opposition to theory as one of the less useful methodologies 
available. According to Laudan its early members dismissed the work
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of such as Werner, Kirwan, Deluc and Hutton as 'idle speculation',
and thought that,since anyone could gather facts,ignorance of geological
principles was no bar to membership. .  Laudan's analysis, however,
seems to rely very heavily on the viewpoint of the Society's first
president Greenough. But Greenough was particularly extreme. He
was not only suspicious of the inevitable correlation of fossils and
strata (as were many geologists), but tried (as Laudan well shows)
to avoid any theoretical assumptions whatever, even when he was forced
to use Smith's map to compile his own. Rudwick has recognised his
singularity (especially as the science advanced) by virtually giving
him a style to himself , and his singularity made him appeal
especially to others with a different interest in debunking existing
geological theory, such as Nolan. But Laudan gives little evidence
22
of so extreme a viewpoint in the Society for others than Greenough,
Soj.MacGullough, for example (an early President and influential on
Sedgwick) suggests causal mec-l^ isms in his l8l? contribution on
the parallel roads of Glen Roy.^^ The Society's widely drawn
membership apparently remained committed to their own views - Wernerian,
Huttohian or Smithian - and Laudan's suggestion that they dismissed
the work of their predecessors as '.idle speculation* is in general
simply untrue. New members such as Sedgvrick (I8I8), Lyell (I819)
and Murchison (1824) are said to have seen themselves in the l830's
24to be in a struggle with the 'old guard'. Laudan, then, sees three 
distinct phases; (i) Theory and Controversy (pre 180?) '(ii) Stagnation 
due to the Society (l807-cl820) in reaction against 'idle speculation* 
of predecessors (iii) Reaction against 'old guard' (cl820-l830*s).
But this ‘catastrophist* view of geological history is too heavily 
based on Greenough. The Geological Society brought a change of 
emphasis - which was surely beneficial in enabling geologists of all 
theoretical persuasions to work together - but there is an essential
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continuity throughout the whole period. Sedgvrick began as a 
Wernerian, always retained some elements of the Wernerian approach, 
and also saw himself as acting on Baconian principles much as the 
Society had always claimed.
A more useful article showing the position of the Society within 
the wider framework of a perceived social and academic structure of
25
geological study has recently been written by Rudwick. There is no 
need here to reproduce his full argument and diagram, but he pictures 
the social topography of geology in the 18]0's as a 'series of 
graduated zones of "ascribed competence, that shade insensibly into 
one another.' A central elite are the big guns (e.g. de La Beche, 
Lyell, Murchison, Sedgwick and de Beaumont) whose opinions are 
treated with great seriousness even in the midst of any controversy.
An outer circle of 'accredited' geologists included men (e.g. Whewell 
or Herschel) whose expertise impinged in an auxiliary way on geology, 
or men with local knowledge (e.g. Phillips ). Outside this, Rudwick 
portrays a zone of 'amateurs', people with purely factual knowledge 
at the local level but whose theoretical views commanded no particular 
respect. The word 'amateur' is unfortunate, for to us today it implies 
a distinction between someone who does c.r does not earn his living 
in the activity; In the early I83O's there were no 'professionals' 
in this sense?'*^  Even after the commencement in 1835 of paid 
workers for the Government Survey the salaries were not sufficient for
P 0
total support. Perhaps 'geologically untrained' might be a better 
phrase, though this in turn conjures up pictures in our modern minds 
of geological degree courses which , would be equally misleading.'^ -^  
Whatever caveats, however, one puts on the terms, Rudwick shows bow 
the Geological Society included people in all the three levels.^^
A more speculative visual schema is given in Rudwick's
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article on cognitive styles in geology.^ ' Again it is impossible 
to reproduce the whole argument here, but the two styles most 
interesting to us are perhaps the 'Abstract' and the 'Concrete'.
The Abstract (e.g. Lyell, Prévost, Scrope, Phillips and Darwin) 
has a weakly classified earth-history with emphasis on the time 
dimension and causal mechanisms and a belief in its ultimate simplicity. 
The Concrete style (e.g. Sroogniart, Buckland, Conybeare, Sedgwick, 
and Murchison) focus on the structure rather than time and causal 
mechanisms, suspecting generalisation and emphasising empirical 
fact-gathering to ascertain the complexities of the system studied. 
These are stimulating ideas, and relate intimately, to generalisation. 
But there must be many exceptions. On'time', for example,
Sedgwick's Third Edition Syllabus (1837) has a section:
'Time during which the above-mentioned physical agents have 
been at work - natural chronometers - difficulties in their
Z  *7
application - examples. '
It was perhaps not disinterest but scepticism which kept Sedgwick 
from thinking in terms of 'Newtonian time'. To take Rudwick's 
analogy, it may not be that (like the Nuer)Sedgwick would have had 
no conception of Newtonian time, but he might instead be compared 
to Robinsai Crusoe marooned in Greenland without a watch. It is 
not the conception but the means of measurement he lacks. Concerning 
generalisation it is strange that tje Beaumont appears in the Concrete 
group. Perhaps it is not so much generalisation, but simplifying 
assumption which splits the two groups. In a sense this associates 
with the search for a chronometer - a man can construct one only if 
he makes simplifying assumptions. Rudwick compares the belief 
in the ultimate simplicity of the world to Popperian bold conjecture,
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but this may be miheading. The point is that with Popper's bold 
conjecture he meant conjecture that makes predictions specific 
enough to risk refutation. But Rudwick has told us that anomalies 
are assimilated - accepted in confidence that ultimately they will 
be resolved. A true Popperian (if there ever has been such a thing 
in science) would consider the theory refuted. Besides, it is not 
clear how (say) Lyell's uniformitarianism or Darvdn's evolutionary 
theory 'stuck their necks out*. Both were rescued simply by ad hoc 
hypotheses when threatened. The question of speculation is, however, 
a key one, and will need reconsideration in the light of more 
specific Sedgwick material.
On causal explanation Sedgwick shows some interest - more 
especially in books of a more general nature e.g. his part in Hudson's 
Guide to the Lakes. Again, chapter III (pages 5-9) of Sedgwick's 
Third Edition Syllabus (also a general introduction) is entibledt 
'On the great agents by which the Earth's surface is modified; and on 
the effect's which have been produced by them during knoim periods'.
Many known modern examples are listed, and Sedgr-Tick evidently 
spoke of past causes (including the parallel roads of Glen Roy).
If he differs from the ‘Abstract Style'here it can only be in degree.
Finally, some question might be raised over Rudwick's assertion 
that the Abstract Style is typically that of the 'Big Men' of 
geology, anxious to secure their own reputations. The difficulties 
of assessing its validity are enhanced by the fact that other more 
general trends interfere. The earlier phase of stratigraphy (say 
up until 1850) in this country was an era of colourful individualists, ' 
a heroic age. Ihe second half of the century was an. era when no 
big systems remained unnamed, and when the accent turned (in stratigraphy
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at least) to more detailed work. The days of the possibility of a 
Murchison were over. So there is a time dimension in the possible 
openings to be a Big l’îan. Secondly, there is a certain amount 
of implied tautology in the association of Big Men with a more 
speculative turn of mind. Apart from the occasional Murchison who 
(as even the loyal Geikie admits) was not the greatest theoretician • 
but was energetic, or possibly the occasional William Smith, the
recognition of a Big Man is likely to go to someone who revolutionises 
theory. To become a Big Man based on actual empirical work one 
has to be 'in' very early - and the work itself is usually soon 
superceded by teams of people. But of those listed, Buckland could 
be seen as a Big Man, Sedgwick might have been if he had ever had 
the time to write his Big Book on the Paleozoics before it was too 
late, and Murchison (as even Rudwick has to admit) is the archtype.
On the other side, Darwin and Lyell certainly were, but Phillips 
surely was not ? The samples, even if we include the foreign geologists, 
are really too small and too inconclusive for us to infer any 
significant difference. There are other possible theories of Big 
Men but it may finally come down to personality, at least if our 
focus is on motivation rather than success in obtaining recognition. 
Whether greater personal ambition is correlated with a more theoretical 
and speculative attitude of mind is difficult to say.
These kinds of cognitive and perceptual frameworks do, however, 
have a useful stimulating function as one considers the life and 
work of.an individual like Sedgwick.
7.2.2 Contexts and Periods for Sedgwick on Methodology
The major concern of the present section is the methodology of 
Sedgwick. We have now see the background both of the ideas which 
he imbued (particularly of Newton and Bacon), and of the science
36 2
in which he was involved. Sedwick comments on his approach to 
methodology in a number of particular contexts:
(i) In general apologetic for and explanation of geology
(e.g. in his lectures and in the Discourse)
(ii) In connection with his own geological development
(e.g. abandoning Diluvialism)
(in.) In geological Controversy
(e.g. the controversy with Murchison)
(iv) In reaction to Scriptural Geologists
(e.g. against Gockburn)
(v) In reaction to evolutionary theories
(e.g. Chambers or Darifin)
At the same time we may also distinguish different periods of 
Sedgwick's life:
(a) 1813-1830: The early period, during which he was a Buckland
Diluvian and (to begin with) a Wernerian. His publications 
included his articles on Diluvialism (I82.5), and also his 
first Syllabus (l82l). The period ends with his public 
recantation of Diluvialism in his Presidential Address of
1831
(b) 01831-01832: A middle period, during which the B.A.A.S. 
was formed, Sedgvrick entered polemics both with Scriptural 
geology and with the Vestiges, and the first edition of his 
Discourse was issued. The Sedgwick-Murchison controversy 
was then developing its first phase, and Sedgwick's specific 
methodology for stratigraphical recognition was not settled.
(c) CI833- ? : A last period of active life. . The stratigraphical 
facts of Wales were now established (with the mistakes
McCoy and Sedgwick himself exposed in I8j2), and the Sedgwick 
Murchison controvery was about principles and personalities.
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Sedgwick's fifth edition Discourse was published (with its 
vast Introduction and Appendices). Sedgwick entered controversy 
over Darwinism.
His general attitude to methodology remained remarkably undeveloped 
during this time. One might point out also that Herchel's Preliminary 
Discourse was published in 1331, and the much more sophisticated 
Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences was dedicated to Sedgwick in 
1340 by Whewell. Neither seem to have much affected Sedgwick's 
philosophy of science.
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7.2 Notes
1. Rudwick, in 'The Strategy of Lyell’s Principles of Geology', Isis, 
1970, §1^  4-33, states that: 'Lyell's highly "V/higgish" inter­
pretation of the history of geology naturally entails distortion
and oversimplification of the theories of his predecessors,' (p. 10). 
Michael Bartholemew's work on Lyell has tended to expand on this, 
and see also Roy Porter, 'Charles Lyell and the Principles of the 
History of Geology', BJHS, 1976, 9» 92-103.
2. Even the recent (I982) biography of Sedgwick by Colin Speakman 
(in spite of its credits to Porter and Morrell and
some well researched comment on Sedgwick) presents Wemer 
(apparently on Geikie's authority) as a poorly travelled 
'Pope* who tau^t neptunism and whose ideas were abandoned by 
'the younger more radical scholars'. For the explosion of the 
myth see Ospovat in^ îhe Distortion of Werner in Lyell's'
Principles of Geology, 6JHS, 1976, I9O-I98 and also in the
Dictionary of Scientific Biography.
3. Rudwick: Ihe Meaning of Fossils p. 110; the confusion between 
actualism and uniformitarianism in the work of Lyell has 
already been indicated; Rudwick, in a pioneering chapter in 
Perspectives in the History of Science and Technology (Ed. D.H. 
Roller, 1971) identified several different meanings to the term 
'uniformitarian' ali confused in Lyell. Rudwick also utilised 
the term 'directionalist' in preference to 'progressivist* 
because of its more neutral implications.
4. Lyell cites this approvingly in Principles ^ p. 63, and Rudwick has 
argued that it was central to Lyell's concern. For some recent
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comment on Hutton's methods see J.E. O' Rourke/A Comparison 
of James Hutton's Principles of Knowledge and Theory of the Earth' 
Isis, 1978, 89, 5-20.
5« See Rudwick, 'Hutton and Werner Compared: George Greenough's 
Geological Tour of Scotland in 1805*, BJHS, 1962, 117-135»
6. Whewell;History of the Inductive Sciences ^ iii,p. 506,
7. Cuvier's work with Brongniart began to be published in I808, 
and the more general Recherches.sur les ossemens fossiles 
on palaeontology in 1812. The preliminary discourse to the 
latter appeared in Jameson's English translation in I813 as 
Essay on the %eory of the Earth. Sedgwick was not,,of course, 
reliant on this translation, and referred to the French original.
8. This was particularly in Buckland, Vindiciae Geologicae (1820). 
Buckland is much less circumspect in his language than Sedgwick, 
speaking of 'the proofs of the Mosaic deluge presented by 
natural phenomena' (Op Git p.36). Buckland does believe the 
physical evidence stands independently of the Mosaic account, but: 
'the grand fact of an universal deluge at no very remote period
is proved on grounds so decisive and incontrovertible' that physical 
grounds alone would be sufficient.'(p. 23),
9 . Sedgvrick T-rrote to Murchison in I837 expressing incredulity
at Buckland's apparent continued attachment to diluvialism although 
it had been dropped in the I836 Bridgewater. He added: 'I am 
still a Diluvialist in a certain sense. But every (?) of 
drift must be referred to its own cause.' (Unpublished letter 
in the Murchison correspondence in the Geological Society.).
10. This was known to Sedgwick's contemporaries as Whewell (re-Ç.. fej 
iii, P;. 443) cites Fonelle pre 1770.
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11, Smith himself dated it from 1790 (see Philosophical Magazine, 1035» 
1, p. 58 etc.; see also the Dictionary of Scientific Biography entry 
and citations there),
12, See particularly Rachel Laudan, 'William Smith: Stratigraphy 
Without Palaeontology', Centaurus. 1976, 210-226; Laudan 
argues that Smith first used lithological characteristics,
13, V,J, Eyles (Dictionary of Scientific Biography p, 489) and Olroyd 
'Rise of Historical Geology', Hist, Sc,. 1979, 17» P* 4^l) take 
different views on this. The word 'directionalist' has been used 
here in preference to 'progressivist' for reasons already indicated. 
Peter Bowler (Fossils and Progress p. 35) also discusses this, 
arguing that 'progression' was never an important part of the 
concept and explaining Sedgwick's apparently inconsistent 
argument for directionalism against Lye11's steady state, but 
against it when confronting the Vestiges evolutionary schema.
14, See e.g. The Meaning of Fossils, p, 127.
15, This was referred to in their essay on the mineral geography of 
the Paris region (1808); c,f. The Meaning of Fossils p, 128-29 
where it is suggested that Cuvier and Brongniart may have been 
influenced by a notice of Smith's work, Rudwick also shows
('A Visual Language for Geology', Hist, Sc.. 1976, l4, p. I70 
etc.) that 'the visual conventions of Cuvier and Brongniart's 
sections were quickly adopted by the Geological Society of London' 
in preference to those of William Smith,
16, H,B. Woodward's classic history, The History of the Geological 
Society of London (1907) made this point, and in general it 
has been supported by recent scholarship, (e.g. Rudwick,
'The Foundation of the Geological Society of London; Its
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Scheme for Cooperative Research and Struggle for Survival,
BJHS. 1963, 1, 323-335.)
17. See Rudwick (ref. I6, p. 329); the neptunist Kirwan also joined.
18. Laudan, 'Ideas and Organisations in British Geology; A Case 
Study in Institutional History', Isis. 1977, 327-338.
19. Laudan, Ibid.. p. 331.
20. Greenough, A Critical Examination of the First Principles of 
Geology in a Series of Essays (1819) - c.f. pp. 287-8.
21. Rudwick, 'Cognitive Styles in Geology', in Essays in the Sociology 
of Perception, (Ed, M, Douglas I982),
22. Though Laudan states that, unlike other groups who paid lip 
service to Baconian principles, in the Geological Society 'the 
members actually acted on their principles' (p, 330), No actual 
evidence that this was a general trait is produced,
23. Transactions of the Geological Society. I817, 4, 314-92,
MacCulIough was certainly active throughout this period, and 
since Sedgwick later acknowledged his influence (as we shall 
see)n@cCullough's influence should not be underestimated,
24. Laudan (ref, 18), p, 337.
23. Rudwick, 'Charles Darwin in London: The Integration of Public 
and Private ScienceJ Isis. 1982, 73  ^ p. 190 etc.
26. Rudwick emphasizes the gradation of the zones. Some might 
surely see Phillips as approaching the elite (for most,even 
of the elite,specialised on some age of strata e.g. Lyell on 
the Tertiary and Sedgwick on the Palaeozoic). Others, like 
Otley and Lewis (classed by Rudwick as amateur) might border
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between accredited and amateur*
27. There may have been some (like Mary Anning) who made a living 
collecting and selling fossils - but these would be classed as 
'amateurs* in Rudwick*s schema*
28* Roy Porter makes this point in his article* 'Gentlemen and 
Geology', (Historical Journal, 1978* 809-836)*
29* Colin A. Russell gives some interesting comment on the
multi-faceted meaning of 'professional* in his recent Science 
and Social Change 1700-1900. p* 220* See also e.g. D.M. Knight 
'Science and Professionalism in England, 1770-1830', Proc* XIVth 
Int. Congress Hist* Sci. Tokyo,. 1974, _1# 33-67.
30. His portrayal of the Scrîp.tural Geologists as mutually exclusive 
to the Society is not 100% accurate, for in 1830 Andrew Ure 
was a member - to the scandal of Sedgwick who was President 
that year. But Ure is an interesting special case: a man who 
had edited a dictionary of chemistry, was an early participant 
in the BAAS and had one of the earliest visions of a fully 
automated factory.
31* Rudwick (ref. 21).
31* Sedgwick, Syllabus* p* 7.
33* Rudwick actually says: 'The focus of attention is the concrete 
order of strata and other rocks, rather than the temporal earth 
history they represent'* Taken in a strong sense this would be 
at odds with the fact thai it was these very geologists who 
emphasized the appearance of new species as a proof that God 
continued to act in his created world in periods after the creation, 
It is surely the question of whether a ratio rather than an
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ordinal scale of time measurement could be constructed. Both 
groups thought in some sense temporally, Lyell himself (in the 
10th edition of his Principles in the late 60's) admitted it 
was hopeless to 'assign a chronological period to any period 
but the latest' though still prepared to speculate (see the 
references in Rudwick, and especially 'Lyell's Chronological 
Model: Published Year Values for Chronological Time*, Isis.
1977, 2^, pp. 440-30
3^ . Hudson, Guide to The Lakes, p. 214, states:
'Before I attempt any sketch of the older slate rocks of the 
Cumbrian mountains, let me endeavour to translate into common 
language that chapter in the strange old chronicles of the 
earth, of which we have been turning over the leaves from the 
end to the beginning.
First then, we have the record of an ancient revolution 
given by the old conglomerates - Secondly, the great scar 
limestone tells us of a long period of repose. Its coral 
reefs were formed in a shallow sea (for in such seas only do 
corals grow) but in course of time it sank down, and a sea 
many hundred feet deep floated over it, and spread out upon it 
banks of sand and mud,,,'
Before saying he will not leave the 'slippery ground of hypothesis* 
Sedgwick adds several more scenario. He also says later (p, 243): 
*The great formations of geology, however varied in their 
features or imposing in their combination, derive their chief 
interest from being the monuments of successive periods of 
time .,.'
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,3 Sedgwick's Early Work
7.3.1 Sedgwick and the ideas of Werner and Smith
We may begin with some of Sedgwick's own later comment on his 
early work. In an unpublished autobiographical fragment he wrote: 
'The Wernerian controversy was then [l82lj at its height... I 
took McGulloch for my guide and saw much under his point of 
view. j. became therefore for the time a firm adherent to the 
Wernerian doctrine and in I8I9 1 published a uaner declaring 
my belief that granite veins were aqueous. I went to Cornwall 
with a somewhat guilty conscience; and yet believed it. And 
I continued to uphold it for many years, nor do I think that it 
is wholly shaken nowadays, but rather has received fresh 
illustration from the modem discovery as to the origin of 
granite...'^
In 1854 he wrote of his 1822-4 trips through the Lake district:
'I had good eyes when I worked Lakeland; but at that time 
vfe knew not of the Old Red fishes; and I therefore never looked 
for them... No fossils have, as yet, been seen in the slates 
&c which alternate with the porphyries between the Skiddaw 
slate and the Coniston Limestone; but if you cross them keep 
your byes open; and possibly you may find some rare fossil.
For when I crossed them again and again (30 years since) I 
was looking for sections rather than for fossils...'^
Similarly, in I856 he wrote:
'When you are looking for Skiddaw slate fossils... hammer well 
the gritty rocks which appear in several deep ravines...
I never examined them for fossils in 1823 and 1824, because I 
foolishly thought that they were all below the region of animal 
life. At that time I had not quite learned to shake off the 
Wernerian nonsense I had been taught...
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Clark and Hughes record a further letter to Lyell in 1843, in which 
Sedgwick says that in I8I9 he was 'eaten up with the Wernerian
notions - ready to sacrifice my senses to that creed - a Wernerian
_ ,4slave.'
Sedgwick's recollections are not very reliable in some ways. In 
this instance (and as we shall see it was a pattern followed elsewhere) 
he does not blame his Baconian assumptions. Fish scales in rocks 
are by no means obvious. A part of geological field work - especially 
in old rocks - involves 'seeing' sometimes ambiguous patterns as 
particular objects because of a geologist's training. Observation 
itself is theory-laden. But Sedgwick never ever really grasped 
this point (even though it is certainly there in his friend Whewell's 
philosophy of science). Thus,whenever he looks back on a past 
failure of induction, instead of admiting any problem in the Baconian 
concept of induction from 'facts', he rationalises that the method 
was improperly applied. This is the first of three major examples 
we shall consider. Simple Baconian induction would imply that any 
impartial observer would see fossils. Sedgwick manifestly did not, 
so he 'post-rationalises' that he was 'ready to sacrifice his senses 
to the Wernerian creed’. His senses (as any good Baconian would know) 
would clearly have told him that there were fossils - but he ignored 
his senses because of his creed.
A further point from the above is that he states that he was 
'looking for sections rather than fossils'. This needs noting in 
the context of his attitude to Smithian ideas. Some further general 
comment on this may be made here. Almost the first geological work 
Sedgi-rick undertook was in I8I9 around Bristol and in the West 
country. He did so for part of the time in company with a 
certain Dr W.H.Gilby, who had already published papers on the
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geology of the areas. In one of these, in I8l4, Dr Gilby 
wrote to the Editor:
'Some time after I had commenced my inquiries, I saw for the 
first time Mr Townsend's very valuable book 'On the Character 
of Moses established for Veracity as a Historian,' wherein 
I found interspersed throughout the body of the work much 
important information respecting the structure of this 
quarter...'^
His object, he says, is to supplement this. In spite of its 
improbable title, Townsend's book was later called by Woodward 
'the best English work on stratigraphical and topographical geology' 
at the time of its publication. It is known for bringing to light 
much of Smith's work, Gilby, then, cites Townsend, and also cites 
Farey who was another leading Smithian. Gilby's article uses the 
terms 'lias' and 'Oolite' which they used. Paradoxically, however, he 
says nothing about fossils until the very last paragraph, when he adds: 
'Organic Remains After the very elaborate manner in which Mr 
Townsend has treated this subject, I should only be repeating 
his observations were I to attempt to add anything...'
Yet the lithological details are listed» and.this shows the kind of 
geological environment in which Sedgwick first met the serious study 
to be his life's work.
Others at that time recognised the particular approach which 
might be expected from a Cambridge Mathematics Tutor. Thus 
when J.J.Conybeare (brother to W.D. and one of the Buckland circle) 
met him in I8I9 he wrote soon after:
'Having been for some time head Mathematical Tutor of Trinity 
he brings to the study of Geology all the subsidia that a thorough 
knowledge of mathematics and natural philosophy can give him.'^
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A most interesting retrospect on Sedgwick was given as an obitualry
by John Phillips. Phillips was the nephew and early helper of
William Smith, mixing in scientific circles at the time of Sedgwick's
appointment in I8I8. Of that period he wrote;
'At this time the importance of organic remains in geological
reasoning, as tau^t by Smith,* was not much felt at Cambridge,
where a new born mathematical power opened out into various lines
of physical research, and encouraged a more scientific aspect of
mineralogy, and a tendency to consider the phenomena of earth
structure in the light of mechanical philosophy. This is very
apparent in the early volumes of the Cambridge Philosophical
Society, established in I8I9, with Sedgwick and Lee as secretaries.
Accordingly, the earliest memoirs of Sedgwick, which appear in
the Cambridge Tiransactions for 1820-21, are devoted to unravel the
complicated phenomena of the granite, killas and serpentine
7
in Cornwall and Devon...'
Phillips was corresponding with Sedgwick over their geological papers 
in the late 1820's, and sent historical information to Sedgwick in 
1831 concerning Smith to whom Sedgwick was shortly to present the 
Wollaston medal. Their correspondence continued as Phillips 
rose to eminence as a Professor of Geology, and Sedgwick's many letters 
to him during the Murchison controversy are in the Ashmolean in Oxford. 
Phillips' comments on Smith are not necessarily always to be taken at face 
value (he would naturally wish to his uncle's originality and
importance). Nevertheless, his comments on Sedgwick do have a unique 
significance. Had Phillips been able to claim that Sedgwick 'early 
grasped the key teaching given the world by Smith' he would surely have 
wished to do so in his obitu&py; But, although Sedgwick did not deny 
a place to fossils, what Phillips in fact emphasizes i& the mathematical
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approach of Sedgwick to his science - and that he was 'devoted to 
the Newtonian philosophy',
7.5.2 Sedgwick's 1821 Syllabus
We have some more direct evidence of Sedgwick's approach at that 
early period from copies of his Syllabus of a Course of Lectures 
published in 1821. This was printed with blank pages for notes, 
and a copy of the Syllabus with Sedgwick's own notes is in the 
SedgTfick Museum at Cambridge. The University also has a copy 
with notes by a student A. Patterson of St Johns. No dates are given, 
but Patterson's copy may be fairly reliably dated. One of the books 
recommended in the notes was 'MilK^'s new work'. This must refer 
to J.S.Miller's A natural history of the Grinoidea published in 1821.
It also says;
'Of the books that Professor Sedgwick recommended to those who
are desirous to become Geologists - There was a small work of
Philips [sic] called "Facts concerning the Geology of England"
a very good work; partly written by Mr Conybeare...'
This is actually confusing, but makes no clear reference to
Conybeare and Phillips' 1822 Outlines of the geology of England 
8and Wales. Parkinson's 1804-1811 wcrKs are mentioned but not 
his 1822 Outlines of Oryctology; an introduction to thestudy of 
fossil organic remains. This, with reference to Miller's 'new* 
work of 1821, places the no^ es around 1822.
Sedgwick actually began ( as do many lecturers) with a 
book list. For our purposes, however, we may begin with the 
general introduction which he gives. For simplicity of presentation 
I will put all quotations from the actual printed syllabus in capital 
letters. Thus he begins;
'GEOLOGY - ITS OBJECTS - PRACTICAL AND SPECULATIVE'
Patterson's note appears around this point;
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'...as the speculative part of Geology, the less that is said 
the better; [? illegible] are too much accustomed to speculate 
and this is a dangerous subject to speculate on. rather let us be 
practical Geologists more especially as so much to be done in 
Geology.*
We note that Sedgwick here sees speculation and 'practical* work as
separate, and whilst not saying that speculation is to be always
forbidden emphasises the enormity of the practical task first.
'2. MATERIALS COMPOSING THE SURFACE OF THE EARTH - ORGANISED - 
UNORGANISED*
Patterson's note is;
’All physical knowledge must be referred to the surface of the
earth - important therefore to become acquainted with the surface
of the earth - now Geology is the account of the structure of
the earth with regard to mineral masses their structure, formation
and relative situation as to the surface of the earth.'
'Geology embraces ^  the study of the globe in general and of
the various relations that the different masses of which it. ■ is
composed to each other [sic]. Mineralogy is as it were the
alphabet of Geology. The globe we inhabit is 8000 miles in
diameter & 25000 in circumference. Its surface has two grand
divisions land and water. Geology may be said to embrace little
more that an enquiry into the Present history & surface present
state of the surface or crust of the globe.
5©dg«ick*£ own notes are,much more sketchy (as one might expect) but
on this he states that geology;
'makes us acquainted w^ the structures, relative situation &
mode of formation of the great mineral masses w^compose the
crust of the ■© - Jam; Geol.'
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A number of points here are of interest. First, though Patterson's 
notes first state it in terms of structure, they then add that it 
is a study of its 'history and present state'. The time dimension 
is introduced. Secondly, Sedgwick's notes refer to the formation 
of the mineral masses - so he interested in the causal mechanisms. 
Thirdly, the subject is introduced as a study of 'mineral masses'
- not of 'strata'. Perhaps in an introductory lecture Sedgwick 
wished to use language they understood, but it is significant that 
mineralogy is seen as the 'alphabet', and fossils are not even 
mentioned.
'3. DIVISION OF PHYSICAL SCIENCES - NATURAL PHILOSOPHY - .
NATURAL HISTORY.'
Patterson's note reads:
'In natural Philosophy we become acquainted with the laws of
nature - we see things à  often are able to imitate them, but in
Natural history we cannot do this - here we see physical materials
& the vital principles - now Geology is a branch of Natural
History -'
Sedgwick's note at this point is partly illegible, and no clear idea 
emerges of the implications of the distinction as Sedgwick taught it. 
The next few parts may be taken together:
'4. ORDER IN WHICH THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES HAVE BEEN STUDIED 
NOT THE RESULT OF ACCIDENT.
5. ANCIENT SPECULATIONS ON THE THEORY OF THE EARTH INADEQUATE, 
BECAUSE FORMED
(1) WITHOUT AN EXTENDED ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE LAWS OF NATURE
(2) WITHOUT ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTERIOR STRUCTURE OF THE 
EARTH
6. INDUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY - ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF
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NATURAL AND CHEMICAL PHILOSOPHY.'
Patterson’s note reads;.
•Geology as defined above not known to the Ancients- Intellectual
knowledge preceded physical knowledge - and this knowledge is 
to a degree detrimental to physical. Among the Grks the former 
was in vogue, the rapid deductions, the strides that fancy might 
make as in the one pleased them better than the facts & minute 
investigations that were necessary for the other - The Platonists 
held "that all knowledge consisted in Generals" with such a dogma 
impossible for them to know much. It is necessary to know things,
to distinguish separate things, to obtain facts & from 
individual facts & circumstances acquire knowledge - 
The night of darkness seems to have had this good effect that 
on the revival of learning men learnt to reason from facts 
not from theories - Bacon began this new order of reasoning & 
Newton con....'
Sedgwick's notes read:
'(4) No attempt at y® Hist  ^of Geology 
accërd to Def* . only of Y^present day - 
But necessarily a late science. 
order 1^  ^Study of Nature from reality 
2^  Speculation, soon carried to per 
faction -
Greeks excelled in the 2^ . but the dog- 
-mas of "f- schools unfavourable 
to induction in physics.
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Thus Platonists held that 
all real knowledge was conver 
- sant with general truths, & 
that particular phenomena could 
only be properly understood as conse­
quences of the general
(5) Speculations inadequate 
But they prove that traditions 
were extant agreeing w^  our sacred • 
records -
(6) Night of Y^  human understanding & 
sleep of science - Revival under 
Bacon - & perfection under Newton
[This note on a 
separate page - 
starred as shown”)
Theory of universal gravitation a 
Generalisation
Corresponding advance in Chemical 
Philosophy 1 dreams of the 
Alchemists . 2^  Chemical knowledge
founded in experimental induction.
all Y^  r ? 1 on Y^0 composed of a few ele-
- ments - .
These combined according to fixed laws 
laws - Definite .  ^ aggreg^^’ [?]
analysis & synthesis . The latter 
explains the operations which have
(7) Hence the 3 conclusions stated as 
examples
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Hence Geology late in order - n of 
less interesting - perfection of science 
for a few(?) -
Retarding causes - Sacred Hypotheses 
late also physical facts widely scattered
((9) Order of strata - appearance of 
■ organic remains in them - diluvium 
quote D' Aubisson p.33) 
and not to be easily examined except 
in cultivated & civilised countries.
This gives us quite a good picture of what Sedgwick must have said. 
Early Greek Platonism is caricatured as a kind of rationalistic 
speculation. There are, of course, various connections which 
can be made between early Platonism and Newton, the most obvious 
being the seeing of nature in mathematical terms. Plato 
did not expect the actual physical world to totally conform to 
perfect mathematical laws - and a parallel might be drawn to 
the vacuous truth of Newton's abstracted laws.^^  It would be 
foolish to press these comparisons too far, or to deny the real 
differences between Newtonian science and Platonism. But the 
point being made here is that Sedgwick sees Newton through 
particularly 'Baconian' eyes. The adequacy or inadequacy of his 
actual treatment of the Platonist philosophy is of less interest 
to us than the implications his view of it had for his own philosophy. 
The Platonic doctrine of ideal forms is very much related to the 
understanding that in order to observe at all the mind must be 
able to form general concepts. Sedgwick shows no grasp of this at 
all. He sees generalisation as a second step after first making 
particular observations.
380
Sedgwick’s reference to the ’night of human understanding’ (which 
appears in Patterson’s notes as well) presumably refers to the 
’dark ages’ (as we now call them) during which science all but 
disappeared in Western Europe. In Sedgwick’s evidently 'whistle 
stop' treatment, he saw the reawakening of science as coming under 
Bacon. Earlier science and Cartesianism are both discounted.
The key phrase is 'Revival under Bacon and perfection under Newton'. 
The theory of gravitation is not a 'hypothesis' in a hypothetico- 
deductive system but a 'generalisation', made from particular 
and theory-free observations. This, as has been argued earlier 
in this thesis, is much in line with the view Newton himself tried 
to take. But Sedgwick seems to miss out the other half of Newton's 
philosophy of the study of nature - i.e. the use of speculation 
not to dogmatise but to stimulate. Sedgwick did in fact have some 
grasp of this as appears elsewhere, but it is absent here.
Sedgwick sees this pattern as applying to other sciences.
He is presumably unaware of Newton's strong alchemical ties, as 
the extent of these has only really become known in the present 
century. Sacred hypotheses are seen as actual hindrances, but 
the late development of geology is also explained by the difficulties 
of actually gathering the required inductive base.
These introductory sections of Sedgwick’s syllabus and notes 
have shown us in general terms how he saw the science of geology in 
1821, and how he related it to scientific methodology as he understood 
it. The views of Phillips and Conybeare are confirmedf he saw it 
very much in Newtonian terms and in a context of natural philosophy.
We may return now to the more specific item of the books he apparently 
recommended and what they can tell us about his geology at that time. 
Sedgwick's own notes are very sketchy as one might expectî
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Books
Geol^
Phillips - Cuvier - Jameson -
Bakewell - Greenough - Playfair
- De Luc - Geol I^ ans - McCulloch
Breislak D'Aubuisson -
Mineral^
Phillips - Cleaveland - Hauy
Chemistry
Conversations -
Fossils
Parkinson - Martin - Sowerby - 
Miller.'
This, of course, does not tell us anything about what he said 
about each book, but the omissions may be significant. Smith 
is unmentioned, either his map or his Strata identified by 
organised fossils. Townsend's book, one of the best showing 
Smith's actual methods, is also unmentioned. Sedgwick, however, 
has not neglected fossils, for no less than four books are mentioned. 
Again, there is no indication that any book recommendation is later 
than 1822 (Buckland's Reliquiae diluvianae of 1823 for example, would 
surely have been mentioned at a later date ?). This may indicate 
the date of the notes,
Patterson's notes are more detailed, and may be taken one by one: 
'Professor Sedgwick recommended the following books in the 
study of fossils, Parkinson's organic remains, Sowerby's 
conchology and Millar's [sic] new work on Zoophyta, particularly 
Enchrinites.'
Parkinson's Organic remains of a former world was published in 
three volumes, 1804-1811. During this period the work of Smith
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and Farey (who refers to his approach as 'Smithian') were becoming 
known, and by the third volume these views are expounded with 
appropriate acknowledgement. ' Sowerby's Mineral conchology 
of Great Britain (1812-26) used Linnaean names and Challinor 
has said of it that these were 'beautifully and accurately figured 
and not inadequately described.' Martin's Petrificata Derbiensia; or 
figures and descriptions of petrifactions collected in Derbyshire 
and Outlines of an attempt to establish a knowledge of extraneous 
fossils on scientific principles (both I809) are unmentioned by 
Patterson though one or other or both must have been referred to as 
Martin's name appears in Sedgwick's notes. One is an engraved volume 
on Derbyshire fossils classified on Linnaean principles, and the 
other a book on principles of palaeontology, J,S,Miller's 
Natural History of the Grinoidea (1821) was a pioneering treatment 
of a particular group of fossils using lithographed reproductions. 
Though it has been claimed in a study by David Knight that 
'Careful illustrations of typical fossils' in particular stratum 
'on the whole, came later than 1830'^^  nevertheless Sedgwick was 
making fairly full reference to illustrated works on palaeontology. 
Neither his Wernerianism nor his mathematical approach made him 
to either ignore palaeontology or deny its place in a study of 
geology, Phillips comments, however, are corroborated. The most 
glaring omission from either Sedgwick or Patterson's lists is the 
work which perhaps embodied Smithian principles the most clearly.
The Character of Moses established for veracity by Townsend in I813 
was a pioneering work on stratigraphical palaeontology, having 
21 plates of fossils characteristic of the successive formations, 
Townsend had been studying the subject for forty or fifty years 
when introduced to William Smith and his ideas in 1799^ *^ Convinced
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of both the originality and importance of Smith's discovery, he 
framed his own work on Smithian principles and it became the first 
major printed channel for these views to be dissimulated, Sedgwick 
also fails to mention Smith's own works - either map or his 
Stratigraphical System of Organised Fossils of 181?. Some suggestions 
for the reasons for the omissions may be made later,
Pa.fcber5o A continues :
'He also recommended Macculoch's account of the Hebrides; but 
it is so elaborate & contains so many facts, it makes one 
head ache to read it - and Brisac who has written largely on 
volcanoes: and from that reason perhaps he is too fond of his the 
theory you cannot fone line cut off and illegible],'
Macculoch's A description of the western islands of Scotland including 
the Isle of Man was published in I8I9. Challinor here agrees 
with Geikie in saying of this: 'few single works of descriptive 
geology have ever done so much to advance our knowledge of the 
geology of Britain/H» MacCuloch was Wernerian in sympathy, and 
SedgTTick claims in his autobiographical fragment to have been much 
influenced by him,^^
The work referred to as 'Brisac' is Breislak (spelt correctly 
by Sedgwick - Patterson's many spelling errors on the names show 
that Sedgwick did not write them up as he spoke). No title 
given by either Sedgwick or Patterson, and Breislak's main phases 
of writing were I798-I802 and 1822 (in Italian, French and German 
but not English), He was a plutonist, hence Sedgwick's comment:
'he is too fond of his theory'Breislak's pioneering claims 
for the igneous nature of Basalt were later accepted for the 
Trap rocks studied by Sedgwick in the later 1820's. But (rather
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after the fashion of Koyre's comments on Newton and 'Hypotheses')
'theory' was a word Sedgwick applied to other people's assumptions.
He does, however, mention the plutonist work.
Patterson continues;
'Of the Books that Professor Sedgwick recommended to those 
who are desirous to become Geologists - There was a small 
work of Philips called "Facts concerning the Geology of 
England" a very good work; partly written by Mr Conybeare 
who lives near Bristol, one of the most famous geologists 
living - Cuvier's geology in 4 vols - a very useful work - 
Jamieson has translated the preliminary discourse to this 
work, and this is a very good book for a beginner. Greenough's 
is a clever work, but his turn of mind is so sceptical that he 
creates so many difficulties as to frighten any one who reads 
him from pursuing this study: however if any one who is about
to study of Geology is too fond of conjecturing & of giving 
loose to his imagination then let him read this book.'
Phillips book A selection of facts from the best authorities arranged 
so as to form an outline of the geology of England and Wales was 
published in I8l8. It was a pioneering attempt to gather together 
accounts of the geology of the parts of England and Wales so far 
studied. Buckland provided a table of strata, though on the lower 
strata it was, of course, very sketchy. The four volume work 
of Cuvier'a must be the Recherches sur les ossemens fossiles 
(4v Published Paris 1812). This contained Cuvier's completed 
theory of the earth in its Discours préliminaire which was translated 
with notes by Jameson as Essay on the Theory of the Earth (I817). 
Cuvier's approach to stratigraphy had been much affected by his 
association with Brongniart in work on the Paris basin, Rudwick
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describes four important features of this work;
(i) it demonstrated that the time scale must be greater than
previously supposed;
(ii) the alternating strata showing marine and freshwater conditions
disproved any idea of a gradually shrinking ocean,
(iii) this alternation could be interpreted (as Cuvier tended 
to) as a result of a series of cataclysmic events, each 
marking a new epoch of animal life',
(iv) Brongniart used fossils for the detailed correlation of 
strata.
On the last point Rudwick writes that previously it had been 
the normal practice to use the lithology, physical position, and 
fossil content of a formation, with varying relative emphases, as 
criteria for recognising it in'Widely separated^areas. But
Brongniart's work, according to Rudwick, demonstrated the value of
precisely collected and identified fossils as criteria for tracing
a detailed series of strata, which might differ little in either 
lithology or physical position, across an extensive area. It was
the precision which.was original.
Rudwick notes that Smith had used fossils similarly some years 
earlier, but that although Smith's work was known to English 
geologists its validity could not be assessed by the scientific 
community as a whole until some years later than Brongniart, for 
his map was issued in 1815 and the fossil illustrations in I816-I9. 
Strictly speaking Smith had priority, but Brongniart's independent 
discovery was first published and so had the greater influence on 
the direction of geological research. His method was rapidly - 
applied elsewhere.
Rudwick's■views have been given here at length because there are 
still questions of detail to answer about the relative influence of
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Smith and Brongniart. Smith's followers (especially his nephew
John Phillips) have not unnaturally wished to magnify his importance.
No one needs to doubt that Smith had worked out and applied his method,
essentially by himself, by 1800, and confided it to his naturalist
friends Rev B^ Richardon and Rev J. Townsendi: But Richardson also
wrote to Sedgwick in I83I:
'In consequence of Mr Smith's desire to make so valuable a
scientific discovery universally known, I without reserve
gave a card of the English strata to Baron Rosencrantz, Dr
19
Muller of Gristiana, and many others in the year I8OI.*
There was always a hint of suggestion from the Smith camp that the 
idea (even though no details had been published) might have spr&ad 
around Europe. But the first actual printed details of Smith's, 
method were in Parkinson's third voluiîX^ (l8ll) and Townsend's work 
(1813), both after Brongniart had begun to publish. In connection 
with Sedgwick two main points need to be made. The first concerns 
the presence of Cuvier rather than Smith or Townsend in his book 
recommendations. It is not difficult to imagine why Cuvier would 
appeal. Cuvier had the winning combination (as far as Sedgwick 
would be concerned) of a strongly structured theory whilst at the 
same time denying (in a way which in England would have been called 
Baconian) that he had anything beyond inductive observation. To
Cuvier geology Was 'une science positive' and throughout his life 
he played down theoretical ideas in favour of 'positive facts'.
At the same time Cuvier and Brongniart had a wider conception of 
natural philosophy and the place of geology within it than did 
William Smith. Unlike Smith, Cuvier and Brongniart worked and 
wrote, like Sedgwick, as academics. To some extent, of course, 
the ascription of particular motives to Sedgwick must be speculative.
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Yet the fact remains that he mentions Cuvier but not Smith.
A second main point needs to be made, relating to this. Sedgwick
first became acquainted with Smith (together with his nephew) in
1822,^ '^  It is not hard to imagine the reaction of Sedgwick,
whose own roots were with the rugged statesmen of the Dales and
whose rooms carried a picture of his old teacher John Dawson.
But the personal contact appears to have nevertheless been minimal.
When, in I83I, the Council of the Geological society awarded the
Wollaston medal to Smith, Sedgwick knew that he would have to make
a speech on the occasion as President. To prepare for this he had
22to write to Phillips afc York early in February asking for details of
23
Smith's discoveries. Phillips was only too pleased to oblige , and 
when Sedgwick gave his address on l8th February he had Phillips' 
version of the facts (relayed from Smith himself) at his fingertips.
The fact that he did not already know them says something about his 
professional relationship with the work of Smith.
In his address Sedgwick, as might be expected, waxed eloquent on 
the life and work of Smith. But all that he could find to declare ef 
his own personal debt was that he had used Smith's maps when studying 
the Oolitic strata in the field; he cannot refer to any theoretical 
influence.'^ Sedgwick's claims for Smith's originality and priority 
are correct; it is his direct influence we are questioning.
Part of what might be called 'the Smith myth' may have been helped 
by Sedgwick's own eulogies - even though eulogies are right and proper 
on such occasions. We may consider the following passage from 
Clark and Hughes:
'When Sedgwick began to work, geology was still in its infancy. 
Until recently, theory, rather than induction based upon the 
observations of facts, had held undisputed sway; and, after the
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publication of such works as Woodward's Theory of the Earth 
the rival opinions of the Wernerians and Huttonians had 
divided the so called geologists into opposing camps. VIhile 
these profitless battles were proceeding, William Smith, whom 
Sedgwick rightly called "the Father of English Geology," had 
shown that the proper sequence of the strata might be readily 
ascertained by observation'of the fossils characteristic of 
each, and that by this means the composition of the crust of 
the earth might be arrived at - a pursuit likely to lead to 
more valuable results than theories of the forces by which 
that composition had been moulded. This discovery - the 
importance of which it is difficult to realise at the present 
day - worked a revolution. Theory was abandoned - the mineral 
composition of the rocks, together with the whole science of 
mineralogy, ceased to be studied by geologists pure and simple 
- but instead a number of accurate and painstaking observers 
set to work in different parts-of England to note the sequence of 
the strata, their relations to each other, and above all.their 
characteristic fossils. Sedgwick became an ardent member of 
this band of explorers..'
'Though Clark and Hughes admit that Sedgwick's early work was 
Wernerian it is dismissed as a temporary aberration. The account 
reflects the myths propagated so well by Lyell, and its worthlessness 
as a factual account is obvious even in the light of the facts 
presented so far in this thesis. -The positive and lasting effects 
of Wernerianism on Sedgwick's methodology are here denied, the 
theory/induction distinction is simplified and greatly exaggerated, 
and the influence of Cuvier and Brongniart rather than Smith is 
completely ignored. But Clark and Hughes contribution to the myth 
may still have some influence.
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The other point of Cuvier's work which we know appealed to Sedgwick 
in this period was the catastrophism, as soon to he interpreted by 
Buckland. Consideration of this will be deferred until later in the 
present chapter.
Returning now to Patterson's notes, we see that Greenough is 
mentioned much as we might expect from Sedgwickv . as a kind of 
antidote to the over theoreticaljbut otherwise too extreme about 
'induction' for Sedgwick's taste. Sedgwick recognises, in practice, 
that for all his adulation of Bacon, assumptionless research into 
stratigraphy would simply lead to confusion in a welter of detail.
With Whiggish hindsight we might expect that a recognition of the 
futility of the Greenough approach would stimulate him to take a more 
hypothetico-deductive approach, but he apparently did not do so.
Patterson's book list concludes;
'Playfair's book is a most interesting and entertaining one. he 
is a great Huttonian and the grace and elegance of the language 
in which he speaks has rendered at Edinburgh the Huttonian 
theory quite popular. And it has done this good, it has made 
many think about Qeology who would not otherwise have done so: 
Jamieson published in opposition to this he being an anti-Huttonian 
an elaborate dry and generally uninteresting work, valuable 
however for containing the dogmas of the Wernerian school of 
which Professor Jamieson is a most decided partisan and defends 
through every difficulty. The English are quite equal to the 
Geologists of other countries - however Duboissons & Brisacs 
works are valuable ones, particularly Brisacs on Volcanoes - 
as mineralogy & Ghemistry are in a great degree connected with 
geology I should recommend a person to read Philips Mineralogy 
& the Conversations on Chemistry... [last line illegible]'
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At this time Sedgvfick evidently did not see himself as a Wernerian 
partisan. Presumably Wernerian (like 'theorist') was a word applied 
to others. At this time Sedgwick saw himself simply as inductive - 
only in retrospect did he call himself a Wernerian, though Werner is
27in fact referred to more than any other author in Patterson's notes. 
Pl-aj-fair, Jameson, Breislak and d'Aubuisson all correspond to Sedgwick's 
own notes, and have been mentioned earlier. Phillips' two books 
also correspond, and illustrate again Sedgwick's approach to geology. 
Various other names appear in Sedgwick's list, . but as we have no way 
of inferring what he said about them the mere names tell us nothing.
One name mentioned is that of Bakewell, of whose An introduction 
to geology (1813) Challinor wrote: 'the author makes clear statements 
on geological structures particularly on the outstanding ones of
slaty cleavage and unconfozrmity, and moreover uses modern terminology
28in doing so.' Sedgwick's unpublished autobiographical fragment 
(quoted above) goes on further down to speak of his 1822 work in 
the Lakes:
'I learned the true lesson of all appearances of the origin of 
the rocks., often puzzling myself a long time with joints and 
cleavange planes... in that year, 1822, I had learned to 
distinguish the slanting cleavage from the joints and bedding.'
If Sedgwick's reflections are here reliable, we may perhaps see 
him following out in the field ideas found in Bakewell's text.
We come now to the syllabus proper. Both Sedgwick and Patterson 
wrote voluminous notes, and though it would be interesting to see 
published a complete transcript of both, considerations of space forbid 
anything like such an attempt here. What we may do is to consider 
some leading points. The style of both sets of notes is concrete, 
containing many examples (not given, of course, in the printed
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Syllabus). The general structure of the syllabus is as follows:
(1) The Objectives and Nature of Geology 
Basic features of the earth to explain
(2) Internal Structure of the Sarth
Werner's theory - advantages & disadvantages 
Elements and Minerals
(3) The Primitive Rocks
(Granite, Gneiss etc, all described)
(4) Transition Rocks
General Type’s' "
Organic Remains - nature and types 
Descriptions of Rock lypes
(5) Secondary Rocks
Description of Types & Organic Remains in Each
(6) Tertiary Deposits
Description and Organic Remains
(7) Alluvial Formations
1. Diluvian Detritus
2. Detritus formed by the causes now in action
(8) Volcanic Rocks &c
(includes felspathic, basaltic and porphyritic lava)
(9) Metalliferous Repositories
(10) Theories of the Earth
1. Theories formed without any knowledge of the Earth's
structure
2. Theories invented to explain the phenomena presented by 
the Earth. De Luc - Hutton - Werner - &c
3. Sacred Theories founded on false interpretations of 
Scripture
4. Woodward's theory - connected with the opinions of 
hife own time...
5 . Conclusion
Though Sedgwick is sometimes critical of Wemer the actual system 
is basically Wernerian. Patterson summarises:
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'The oldest called the Primitive rocks are of a crystalline texture
and therefore of a fluid nature: & so agree with what we might
expect them to be, by considering the laws of gravitation -
then we come to more mechanical deposits. Transition rocks -
& here organic remains - then secondary rocks - after the
transition class there are marks of some great catastrophe,
of which we cannot give any account - afterwards tertiary rocks -
and then generally chalk, in basins - full of organic remains...'
He has already noted that:
'The lowest & most level parts of the earth when penetrated to
a great depth, exhibit nothing but horizontal strata, composed
of various substances.'
Later again we read:
'Primitive rocks never contain animal or other organic remains, they
are the oldest - have a crystalline appearance and are therefore
chemical deposits...'
Very clearly here, Sedgwick believes that he has a good inductive
basis for his conclusions about granite, gneiss, etc., and he does
not see this as part of the 'Wernerian theory'. Thus in the
introductory section of the printed chapter 2 we read:
'6. Theory of Werner - examples of structure agreeing with that 
theory - other examples at variance with it.
A
7. Divisions of formations - (l.) Primitive. (2.) Transition
(3.) Secondary. (4.) Tertiary. (5.) Alluvial. (6.) Volcanic.'
Obviously he did not fully follow Werner - unlike Wemer, for example,
SedgT-rick places Basalt neither in the Primitive nor the Floetz (or
secondary)y but deals with it only under volcanics. But equally
obviously he sees the basic Wernerian arrangement (even if not all the
explanations of that arrangement in terms of receclmg seas) as
inductive. Putting together the three points:
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(a) its even layers - as one would expect from a liquid-covered 
sphere,
(b) its lack of fossils,
(c) its crystalline structure^
â primitive precipitate seems a very obvious conclusion. Sedgwick's 
later reference to 'Wernerian nonsense' and 'water on the brain' 
are what I have called a 'post-rationalisation' of the failure of his 
presumed inductive method.
Patterson's note near the reference to Werner's theory reads;
'A good theory must explain all the phenomena that are exhibited 
and at the same time ought to be agreeable to the laws of nature.' 
But there is no elaboration, and this must presumably refer to the 
suggested mechanisms of Wemer, not the basic stmcture.
Patterson records some of Sedgwick's comments on his catastrophism: 
'Vallies excavated by causes not now in action, that at no very 
remote period the great catastrophe happened...'
After describing the ordinary erosion activity of water, air and 
volcanos, Patterson adds :
'The reason that Professor Sedgwick has dealt so long upon this 
part of his subject is to show the futility of j supposti... 
vallies are excavated by rivers - An hypo.,. which would at once 
subvert the Bible, it is hod... a false one: for there is 
physical proof that the world has not existed long as it now is, 
not above ^000 or 6OOO years at most now upon Mr Playfair's 
hypothesis it would have taken myriads of years to have executed 
these excavation of vallies through rocks,..'
If Patterson actually has his notes right here then this is the 
only instance known to me in which Sedgwick really came near to using 
Biblical arguments against physical hypotheses. But there is no 
indication of this in the corresponding printed syllabus:
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•S. Vallies not excavated by the rivers, Inference established 
by lakes, gorges, and alluvia in the principal vallies 
9. On the destructive causes by which the surface of the earth 
is principally affected. The time during which these causes
have been in action.'
Sedgwick's notes go all through these , referring to examples (e.g.
Lake Geneva) concluding that no existing causes are adequate to 
explain the pattern '.'. Must have recourse to a catastrophe - and 
at no very remote period'. His notefcontain no reference to the 
Bible.
Taken as a whole the evidence of Patterson's notes must be read 
as denoting Sedgwick's satisfaction that physical proof had offered 
independent corroboration of the Bible. It should, however, be 
noted that when, within a decade, Sedgwick ceased to believe in the 
universal flood, he did not believe that this at once subverted 
the Bible.'
In an earlier reference to the flood, Patterson's notes show a 
typically Sedgwickian apologetic for geology - mixing the natural 
theology with the pragmatic:
'The flood is well supported as to the evidence of its having taken 
place by the state in which we find the primitive rocks: but 
the latter catastrophe, be it of what nature it may, is neither 
as it were wholly supported to be of one kind, or contradicted 
of so being - Examine & establish facts then reason on the facts - 
Geology extends over the world - it is very extensive & a very 
interesting subject, it is connected with the best parts of history: 
it teaches us to observe how wonderful is the order which pervades 
all the works of the Almighty. To the scholar & gentleman it 
is a pursuit of considerable interest: it may arouse his 
curiosity and he may hope to discover something where so much
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is yet to be discovered. And even to the merchant, to the 
- cui bons man we have an answer as to its use - in Lincolnshire 
they are throwing pecks of gold into the earth digging for coals 
where they never can find them...'
The last point which needs to be made is that (with the exception of 
the primitive rocks in which none were to be found) Sedgwick introduced 
the idea of organic remains into each section of strata. The 
syllabus gives some indication of the detail, in particular on p . 26 
in dealing with the Oolitic series he says:
'9. Organic remains - Characteristic.
(1.) Of the whole formation.
(2v) Of the several subordinate beds.'
Sedgwick's own notes show that he exhibi both rock specimens
and fossils at this stage in his lecture.
7,3 ,3  Sedgwick and the Flood
A number of references have been made to the 'flood* in the
context of Sedgwick's Syllabus, In 1820 Buckland had published
his inaugural lecture for his newly established Readership in
Geology at Oxford.Cuvier's series of catastrophes was taken
by Buckland as universal, and he wrote:
'Again, the grand fact of an universal deluge at no very remote
period is proved on grounds so decisive and incontrovertible,
that, had we never heard of such an event from Scripture, or
any other authority. Geology of itself must have called in the
assistance of some such catastrophe, to explain the phenomena of
diluvian action which are universally presented to us, and which
are unintelligible without recourse to a deluge exerting its
ravages at a period not more ancient that that announced in the 
32Book of Genesis.'^
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Now Buckland did not argue his geology from Moses-he claimed that 
the physical evidence was independent, as the above quotation shows.
In ah Appendix he gave a summary of 'the Proofs afforded by Geology, of 
the Mosaic deluge'. In actual fact nearly all the proofs . 
may be explained by the glaciation theory (to which Buckland quietly 
switched in the late l830's)^^. The actual universality of the 
flood was 'proved' thus:
'8. The analogous occurrence of similar phenomena in almost all 
the regions of the world, that have hitherto been scientifically 
investigated, presenting a series of facts that are uniformly 
consistent with the hypothesis of a contemporaneous and diluvian 
origin.'
This was, of course, the weak link. Few inductivists could doubt that 
some agency other than existing ones on the areas was needed to explain 
the evidence,and (without hindsight) water seemed the only logical 
one. But either one universal flood or a number of local ones could 
explain the widespread nature of the phenomena - and Buckland gives 
no real evidence that it was a single universal flood.
Nevertheless, it seems to have convinced Sedgwick. In 1825 
he wrote a two part article for the Annals of Philosphy defending 
the diluvialism of Buckland. The immediate occasion for this 
was the attacks being made on Buckland's theory by Rev John 
Fleming. Fleming was at that time Church of Scotland minister in a
small Fifeshire parish, and in religion associated himself with the 
Free Church of Scotland breakaway in 1843 led by the Evangelical 
Chalmers. He was also, however, recognised as an important 
zoologist, was at that time a disciple of Jameson, and in 1834 
was given the chair of Natural Philosophy in Aberdeen. Ironically, 
Fleming was if anything slightly more inclined to Scriptural geology
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than Buckland and Cuvier - though this may perhaps appear more so 
in his articles than was really the case, as a device to nullify the 
criticism of those who had called his view 'infidel'. His full 
views were actually best laid out in an article in 1826 after Sedgwick's 
had appeared in l82j.^ Fleming was not very happy with the way in 
which Cuvier had treated the Mosaic account as derived from Egyptian 
tradition rather than revelation, nor was he convinced that all this 
assumption of rushing torrents which completely changed the landforms 
was consistent with the actual Mosaic description. Thus his article 
begins with his objections from Scripture - he himself advocating a 
gentle flood which left no trace. But the second part of the article 
is a frontal attack on Buckland's theory from a scientific point of 
view. Basically, Fleming argues that the shape of the valleys and 
the kinds of detritus which Buckland invokes his rushing torrents 
to explain are very implausibly explained by it; moreover, Fleming 
also questions the plausibility of Buckland's explanations of the
35animal remains in the Kirkdale cave.
Sedgwick, even on the basis of Fleming's earlier more fragmentary 
articles, clearly saw him as the main scientific critic of Buckland.
The basic thrust of Sedgwick's article is the essentially different 
natures of the diluvial formations (i.e. flood remains) and alluvial 
ones (i.e. remains of regular activities e.g. rivers). In contrast 
to Fleming, who after all was a fellow Wernerian, Sedgvrick finds the 
fossil evidence of secondary importance;
'When the order of superposition has once been made out, we may 
then proceed to examine the zoological phenomena of each successive 
deposit. Before that time, organic remains, however interesting 
in themselves, convey little information respecting the revolutions 
to which the earth's surface has been subjected.'
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The point is whether alluvial always follow diluvial. The other 
basic methodologicalj&mphasis with which Sedgv^ ick begins is that:
'The truth of any physical phenomena can only be made out by 
physical evidence, and no appeal ought to be made to any other 
authority before that evidence has been completely investigated.' 
Thus it is a purely physical question (says Sedgwick) as to whether 
all the diluvial formations refer to one flood.
Sedgwick proceeds to look at various alluvial formations, and 
at those which he calls diluvial (which we would now largely refer 
to glaciation). He concludes:
'We may therefore conclude on an induction founded on a very 
wide range of consistent observations: 1. That alluvial 
deposits include a large class of formations which have 
originated in causes as are now in daily action; 2. That the 
same causes have acted during a long period; 3» that during that 
period the deposits have not been interrupted by any catastrophe 
which has interposed any other deposits of a distinct character;
4. That diluvial deposits possess a distinct character from 
the preceding- class, never alternate with them, and, from their 
position, evidently belong to an older epoch; 5» That during 
the epoch in question, the diluvial gravel was produced by , 
extraordinary inundations; 6. That the disturbing forces which 
produced these inundations acted upon the earth's surface after 
the deposition of all the regular strata with which we are 
acquainted.
The separation of the incoherent materials, which are heaped 
bn the regular strata of the earth into diluvial and post-diluvial 
detritus, is, therefore, a natural separation, which is at once 
descriptive of the things designated, and founded on the constant
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relations which they bear to each other. Moreover it is 
unconnected with any hypothesis whatsoever, and is independent of 
any argument drawn from the nature of the organic remains 
contained in different parts of the several deposits.'
Sedgwick more than hints that, unlike Fleming, he does not 'view 
all things through the distorting medium of a hypothesis.
Sedgwick rejects the suggestion of a series of partial catastrophes, 
such as lakes bursting their banks. This could not account for 
the patterns of detritus. In his second article he proceeds to a 
detailed examination of 'the materials which have been torn up by 
diluvian currents, and scattered over different parts of our island; 
and from the position and extent of these materials I shall endevour 
to prove that they cannot be accounted for by the ordinary operation
<0Q
of any known physical agent.' In his conclusion he asserts that 
the floods which produced the diluvial detritus swept over every 
part of England in an epoch posterior to the depositions of all the 
regular strata of the earth. 'The facts which have been detailed
seem to make it probable that the floods which produced the diluvial ? 
gravel were sudden and transient.' On the universality of the 
flood he is cautious:
'in the present state of our information, we have certainly no 
evidence to prove that all the highest elevations of the globe 
were submerged by the diluvian mountains; for the form of the great 
mountain chains may have been produced by some more ancient 
catastrophe, and we have no right to assume the existence of 
diluvial detritus in parts of the world which have not been 
examined, or which are inaccesible. We have, however, direct 
evidence to prove, that the diluvian floods acted on some of the 
highest points of Europe, and it is probable also that they have
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acted on some of the highest parts of Asia.'^ ^
Sedgwick sees his conclusions as without doubt 'confirming the 
general argument' of Buckland's schema, but adds;
'In the preceding speculations, I have carefully abstained from 
any allusion to the sacred records of the history of mankind; 
and I deny that Professor Buckland, or any other practical 
geologist of our time has rashly attempted to unite the 
speculations of his favourite science with the truths 
of revelation.
The authority of the sacred records has been established 
by a great mass of evidence at once conclusive and appropriate; 
but differing altogether in kind from the evidence of observation 
and experiment. It must, therefore, at once be rash and 
unphilosophical to look to the language of revelation for any 
direct proof of the truths of physical science. But truth must 
at all times be consistent with itself. The conclusions based 
on the authority of the sacred records may, therefore, 
consistently with the soundest philosophy, be compared with 
the conclusions established on the evidence of observation and 
experiment; and such conclusions, if fairly deduced, must 
necessarily be in accordance with each other.'
Thus the sacred records speak of a time when 'the fountains of the 
great deep were broken up', and 'thg- investigations of geology tend 
to prove' a great catastrophe not many thousand years ago;
'Between these conclusions, derived from sources entirely 
independent of each other, there is, therefore, a general 
coincidence which it is impossible to overlook, and the 
importance of which it would be most unreasonable to deny.
The coincidence has not been assumed hypothetically, but has 
been proved legitimately, by an immense number of direct
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observations conducted with indefatigable labour,..*
These passages have been quoted at length verbatim, because it will
be important to note later that Sedgwick is here much more cautious
than might be supposed in the conclusions he draws. On the evidence
he concludes that the diluvial torrents were widespread, but not
necessarily universal. As far as concerns the Mosaic account he
claims no more than a 'general coincidence'- The hinted conclusion 
that the flood was worldwide is not followed by an explicit statement.
Indeed, the words in which he interprets Genesis: 'the earth's
surface was submerged by the waters of a general deluge', may or
may not be intended to definitely imply a literally universal flood.
Nevertheless, the hint is very strong.
7.3 .4  Sedgwick's Early Research
During this period, of course, Sedgwick was undertaking some 
actual geological work. One of his interests (which we may find 
illuminating as it could be seen as a kind of Achilles* heel of strict 
Wernerianism) was in the trap rocks. Sedgwick was early convinced 
that at least some were definitely igneous, Conybeare and Phillips, 
in their standard work: The Geology of England and Wales in 1822. 
themselves maintained a somewhat unaligned position, but noted: 
'Professor Sedgewick [sic] also has lately examined the Trap of 
Northumberland, and considers the evidence of its igneous formation 
as complete.'^ In his paper of 1822, later also published in the 
Philosophical Magazine in I826, Sedgvdck said of the dykes under 
consideration: 'All these phenomena so exactly resemble the effects 
produced by fire that I am unable to describe them without using
language which may be thought hypothetical by those who deny the
4ligneous origin of trap dykes.' He describes the transformation 
of coal to soot or cinder along points of contact, and concludes;
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'the igneous origin of a large class of trap dykes seems to be 
established by evidence which is almost irresistible.' He 
adds that the dyke must have been injected from below, and was once 
in a fluid state. 'The materials of which it is composed are the 
same with those which abound in a great many varieties of recent 
lava.' In his conclusion Sedgwick states clearly his principles 
of actualism:
'By supposing such phenomena the effects of volcanic action we
bring into operation no causes but those which are known to
exist; and are adequate to effects even more extensive than
42
those which have been described.'
But this shows that as early as 1822 Sedgwick was prepared to make
much more definite conclusions about igneous rocks than some of his
contemporaries. Sedgwick's later*claim to have been under the
influence of MacCullough evidently did not extend to caution about
T 43the origins of trap rocks.
7,3 ,5  Sedgwick. Dilivialism ,V/ernerianism and Theory
In the late l820’s Sedgwick evidently changed his mind on two 
key geological issues. These have sometimes been confused, though 
in fact they are separate matters. The first concerns the Wernerian 
interpretation of rocks like granite, gneiss, etc - which we now 
recognise as igneous. The second concerns the question of 
diluvialism, and the extent of a worldwide single flood within 
recent history. In practice the two questions were associated 
in so far as the more igneous tradition of Hutton tended to 
be associated with a steady state view of the earth without any 
catastrophes. But as ideas the issues are separate.
Sedgwick made a well known and dramatic 'recantation* as the 
President of the Geological Society in I83I, but his change of view
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on both these issues was rather less abrupt than has sometimes 
been inferred. We may to some extent trace through his shifting 
beliefs on both Issues up to that famous speech. Around (say)
1827 we find that Sedgwick (as I have shown) had already reached a 
definite conclusion that some at least of trap rocks and dykes were 
igneous _ though leaving it to some extent open that others might 
not have been. On diluvialism he still stood as supporting 
Buckland, but was aware of the criticisms of such as Fleming.
Prévost had also written to him in March I828, referring to his 
articles on diluvialism and referring to a memoir of his own read 
to the Academy of Sciences in June. Prévost tells Sedgv;ick hov; 
he had fought against Cuvier’s conclusions on his findings of 
mixed marine and freshwater shells in the Paris basin, and suggests 
other possible expDaiations of the observations. Pi4vost noted 
Sedgwick's explanations of the terras ’alluvial’ and ’diluvial’, but 
cannot see why local floods or various other explanations might not 
serve to explain the phenomena as well,. - , and adds 'Neither do I see 
how always to distinguish the diluvial and the alluvial'. The work
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of Buckland Prévost sees as 'the pursuit of a hypothetical idea*.
In February I829 Sedgwick assumed the Presidency of the Geological 
Society for a two year term of office. By this time he had evidently 
Suffered some change of view on diluvialism, for there was a debate 
on the issues between Lyell and Buckland/Conybeare. After it Lyell 
wrote to Fleming:
'Sedgwick, now president, closed the debate with a terribly
anti-diluvialist declaration. For he has at last come round,
45and is as decided as you are...'
Lyell was prone to exaggerate (few were Ojuite as 'uniform!tarian* 
as Fleming) but the point is made.
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In June 1829 Sedgwick went to London ready to embark on a tour 
of the Continent with Murchison. In a letter to Whewell dated 
10th October 1829 Sedgwick describes their visit to Hartz, Eisleben, 
Halle, etc., and proceeds:
’This is the focus of Wernerian geology, and to ray infinite 
surpri.se it is the most decidedly volcanic secondary country 
I ever saw. The granite bursts though on one side, sends out 
veins, and along the whole eastern flank the secondaries are 
highly inclined and often absolutely vertical. Near Goslar 
they are absolutely heels over head. From Halle we had a long 
run to Berlin...
The idea that granite implies an early date was dead, and,as we shall 
see,Sedgwick's Presidential speech the following year reflected this. 
But Sedgwick's views on diluvialism were also evidently developing. 
Lyell, again, wrote to Fleming in October soon after Sedgwick's return:
'Sedgwick and Murchison are just returned, the former full 
of magnificent views. Throws overboard all the diluvian 
hypothesis; is vexed he ever lost time by such a complete 
humbug; says he lost two years by having also started a 
Wernerian. He says primary rocks are not primary, but, as
Hutton supposed, some igneous, some altered secondary,
4?
Mica schist in Alps lies over organic remains...'
Lyell again exaggerated, for Sedgwick could still call himself 
in some sense a diluvian later in the l830's, but Sedgwick's -
rejection of the whole concept of 'primary rocks' recognisable by 
rock type was real enough.
Sedgwick indicated his move of position rather more soberly in
his Presidential speech of 19th February the following year:
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'Each succeeding year places in a stronger point of view the
importance of organic remains, when we attempt to trace the various 
periods and revolutions in the history of the globe. Crystalline 
rocks are found associated with the strata of almost every age; and 
the constant laws of combination which have produced a certain 
mineral form in rocks of one era, may produce it again in 
another. Nearly all the modifications of structure in rocks 
called primary are also found in secondary formations: and among 
tertiary deposits we sometimes find millstone-grit, red marl, 
with fibrous gypsum, red conglomerates, compact, subcrystalline 
and oolitic limestone; in short, all the distinguishing characters 
of secondary formations. The great barriers, which the fancy or 
ingenuity of geologists has at different times set up between 
the mineral productions of successive periods, have been thrown 
down, one after the other. I do not deny the importance of 
raineralogical characters; I only mean to assert that, taken by 
themselves, they are no certain indications of the age of any 
deposit whatever.
In reasoning from organic remains, by the succession of large 
groups alone can we establish any safe induction. Positive rules 
founded on the presence of particular genera or species are of 
comparatively small value. But the mind becomes wearied 
and bewildered by the endless succession of individual forms, 
and delights to take refuge in some generalisation; and generali­
sations would be excellent things if we could be persuaded to part 
with them as easily as we form them. They might then be used like 
the shifting hypotheses in certain operations of exact science, 
by the means of which we gradually approximate nearer and nearer 
to the truth.
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This is a very important passage. Sedgwick expressly renounces the 
typically Wernerian approach to using rock type as an indication of 
age, though lithological and mineralogical considerations were 
still important for local stratification. Sedgwick is also 
anxious that the correlation of organic species with time not be 
taken too far; only large groups are a real indication.
The last part of the quotation given above shows his attitude to 
hypotheses to be more than pure Baconian induction. But to Sedgwick 
they are heuristic devices. Possibly he may be intending to use 
them in a similar way to Newton in the 'exact sciences', though (as 
we have seen) Newton himself was not altogether consistent. But 
Sedgwick's words reflect a very Newtonian dichotomy between 'facts' 
(which Newton called 'theories') and 'hypotheses' which are conjectural 
and should be abandoned or altered as required. Sedgwick's words 
about parting with them as easily as they were formed were ironical
in the light of his later controversy with Murchison. As Secord 
has shown, throughout the earlier part of the controversy (in the 
l84o's) Sedgwick was wanting to show a flexibility and dynamism in 
the nomenclature of the palaeozoics which other geologists generally 
found unacceptable.
Earlier in the same presidential speech Sedgwick had indicated 
his abandonment of the Bubklandian form of diluvialism. He first
summarised the work of various individuals during the previous year
on the formation of vallies. He then continues: 'If I might give
my ovm opinion on this debated question, I should say that the 
existing river drainage of every physical region is a complex result,
depending upon many conditions...' Evidence shows elevation in 
different areas to have occurred at different times, and:
407
'every great elevation of the land... must have produced, not 
merely a rush of the retiring v;aters of the sea, but a destruction 
of equilibrium among the waters of inland drainage. Effects like 
these must have been followed by changes in the channels of rivers, 
by the bursting of lakes, by great debacles, and in short by 
all the great phenomena of denundation. In comparing distant 
parts of the earth, we may therefore affirm that the periods of ' " 
denundation do not belong to one, but to many successive epochs; 
and by parity of reasoning we may conclude that the masses of 
incoherent matter- which lie scattered over so many parts of the 
surface of the earth, belong also to successive epochs, and 
partake of the same complexity of formation.
Valley formation has been complex, Sedgwick concludes, there are 
oceanic valleys, valleys of denundation, valleys formed by two sets of 
parallel elevations, and those of simple river erosion. Denundation 
is one mechanism explaining some features, but is no longer the single 
key explanation of landforms; he had ceased to believe (even if 
his belief had always been a strong implication rather than a 
statement) in a universal flood. The loss of a uA#versai flood, 
of course, also meant the loss of the former strong distinction of 
'alluvial' and 'diluvial' - Sedgwick now emphasizes instead the 
complexity of causes producing any given formation.
Before leaving the I83O Address two further points are of 
interest. First, that in spite of the emphasis in both Sudwick .and 
Secord-^ ,^ Sed^ick used the language of time and epochs as well as 
that of positions of strata: Thus, for example:
... Great lacustrine formations, of the same age with the rock 
-marl of the Isle of Wight are there (i.e. in Cantal and Auvergene) 
proved by their organic contents to have been formed and
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solidified at a time anterior to the trachytuc eruptions which 
upheaved and desolated the whole surface of the country. How 
long these great eruptive forces were in action it is useless 
to conjecture; but they were followed by ages of repose, during 
which the surface of the land was reformed, and deep valleys 
were excavated by the erosive power of water* A new period of 
volcanic agency succeeded, marked by domes of cinders and 
scoriae remaining to this day almost unchanged, and by streams 
of lava which may be traced from them into the existing valleys. 
And even these last operations, however recent in the order of
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geological events, were anterior to the records of history.,.’ 
Though he feels it ’useless to speculate’ (In the manner of Lyell) on 
the actual time periods, the dimension of time and the inferences to 
causal mechanisms are both present here.
The final part of his address is an attack (already looked at
in chapter 6.2) on the New System of Geology by Andrew Ure. In 
doing so Sedgwick also made some comment on general methodology.
As already commented, Sedgwick seems particularly upset that not 
only is .Ure one of their own number, but that he has.quoted the 
sacred Bacon:
’This vanity merits castigation and reproof the more, as from 
the mischevious admixture of divine and human things, there is 
compounded at once a fantastical philosophy and an heretical 
religion.
Sedgwick applies the censure to Ure himself. He goes on to castigate 
Ure for the many wrong or out-of-date details of actual strata. It 
is obvious that Ure knowë nothing first hand, and has copied out parts 
of different books put together without real understanding. But 
Sedgwick does not reject speculative geology as such:
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’Are we then for ever to wander among the mere perplexities of 
details, and never hope for any system by which we may combine
54them ? ... I am not the advocate of any such sterile sentiment.'
It is true that even in the 've^classification of our facts and of 
our phenomena' there remain difficulties requiring great industry and 
skill (Sedgwick has no illusions about a supposed simple Baconian 
'fact- gathering'). But the guideline for this work is the rule of 
the 'father of physical astronomy', Newton's second rule of 
reasoning: 'to the natural effects of the same kind are assigned the 
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same causes'. Sedgwick takes this as the beisis for his actualism:
'Effects similar in kind to those which are produced now, must in all 
former times have been produced by some corresponding power of nature.' 
V/e may note in passing that it is interesting Sedgwick never applied 
this rule to (say) the production of Basalt trap in the l820’s. Having 
decided that some was cfe^ finitely igneous, he should have been less 
open to the idea that some might be aqueous.
Having, however, cited both of his 'guiding stars' (Bacon and Newton) 
Sedgwick felt secure to allow some reign to speculative geology. But 
'The very commencement of the task of speculative geology requires 
a wide and philosophic knowledge of the physical world as it now 
is, and of all the great phenomena exhibited by the fragments of 
its former history.'
In other words, a thorough knowledge of facts must precede any 
speculation. But he knows where the emphasis should be:
'Ldbus, therefore, go on as we have begun; giving up our best 
efforts to the search of new facts and of new phenomena, and 
using them like men who have no higher passion than the love of 
truth.'
Just as one could read Popperian hypothetico-deductive falsificationism
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into either Bacon or Newton, it is tempting to read into this more 
sophisticated ideas than Sedgwick in fact possessed on methodology.
His comments abouo 'perplexities of details' comes near to recognising 
that observation without paradigm is at best barren and at worst
impossible. It could be seen as implying that all observation must be
theory laden. But in fact Sedgwick does not recognise this. He 
remains, finally, in the Newtonian position with a dichotomy between 
fact (or 'theory' and 'phenomena' in Newtonian terms) and hypotheses.
By this time, then, in I83O, Sedgwick has abandoned any Bùcklandian-' 
diluvialism,(though still convinced of the diluvial origin of some
local formations) and has abandoned Wernerian ideas on the origins of
granite and gneiss (though remaining convinced of the importance of 
lithology in stratification). On February l8th I831 he made his 
final Presidential Address to the Geological Society after his two 
years in office. We may best begin with the famous 'recantation' 
which refers to the diluvial issues already discussed. Sedgwick says:
'All the noble generalisations of Cuvier, and all the beautiful 
discoveries of Buckland, as far as they are the result of fair 
induction, will ever remain unshaken by the progress of discovery.
It IS only to theoretical opinions that my remarks have any 
application... diluvial gravel shot off from the flanks of a 
mountain chain during one period of elevation, and [sic - can ?J 
become so confounded with the detritus of another period, that no 
power on earth can separate them... there is, I think, one great 
negative conclusion now incontestably established _ that the 
vast masses of diluvial gravel, scattered almost over the 
surface of the earth, do not belong to one violent or 
transitory period. It was indeed a most unwarranted conclusion 
when we assumed the contemporaneity of all the superficial
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gravel on the earth. We saw the clearest traces of diluvial 
action, and we had, in our sacred histories, the record of a 
general deluge. On this double testimony it was that we gave a 
unity to a vast succession of phenomena, not one of which we 
perfectly comprehended, and under the name of diluvium, classed 
them all together.
To seek the light of physical truth by reasoning of this kind 
is, in the language of Bacon, to seek the living among the dead, 
and will ever end in erroneous induction. Our errors were, 
however, natural, and of the same kind which led many excellent 
observers of a former century to refer all the secondai^ ?- 
formations of geology to the Moachian deluge. Having been 
myself a believer, and, to the best of my power, a propagator of 
what I nov; regard as a philosophic heresy, and having more than 
once been quoted for opinions I do not now maintain, 1 think it 
right, as one of my last acts before I quit this Ohair, thus 
publically to read my recantation...'
Sedgwick proceeds to deny any contradiction between geology and 
Genesis, but for our present purpose the only sentence of interest 
is:
'...we have, at least, shown that paroxysms of internal energy, 
accompanied by the elevation of mountain chains and followed by 
mighty waves desolating whole regions of the earth were a part 
of the mechanism of nature... We have therefore taken away 
all incredibility from the fact of a recent deluge...'
These very important passages have been quoted in full to 
facilitate easy comparison %rith the earlier ones (also quoted 
in full above on pp. 400-401), to see how Sedgwick has again 
reconstructed the actual history of events in order to
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disallow any suggestion of a defect in his Baconian/Newtonian 
methodology, and to claim rather than it was incorrectly 
implied. The actual wording of the two sets of passages, when 
juxtaposed, illustrates this clearly. Here, then, he begins by
strongly contrasting 'discoveries,.• the result of fair induction' and 
'theoretical opinions' in Cuvier and Buckland. He also implies that 
it was the Genesis account which (contrary to the aphorisms of the 
sacred Bacon I) influenced the physical theorj'-. Yet in Buckland ' s 
work, as we have seen, the diluvial conclusions were claimed to be 
both inductively certain and independent of any biblical account. 
Sedgwick also tends to gloss over his o\m careful caution in 
concluding that the flood was universal. His former sharp division 
between alluvial and diluvial was not, in fact, associated with 
this assumption in his articles, but based (as he then supposed) 
on induction.
The basic point is that stratigraphical geology was inevitably 
paradigm-based. At one level, the phenomena of stratification, 
jointing and cleavage in an outcrop, are presumed to indicate 
a certain history for that area. Causes are deduced from effects; 
but this is Baconian enough, even if mistakes could be made. At 
another level, however, the aim is to 'map' a wide area, and this 
means assuming that between outcrops rock formations follow a 
particular pattern though it remains unseen. Finally, in trying 
to establish a common time horizon for rocks in widely separate 
geographical areas some presumptions must be made.
Sedgwick had started with an assumption that rock type implied 
age, and diluvium implied a single flood. This enabled rocks in 
widely separated areas to be correlated. By 183O the deficiencies 
of both assumptions were apparent. So we find Sedgwick (as especially
41^
seen in the I830 Address) switching instead to an alternative 
assumption - the assumption that organic remains are important in 
correlation. It is interesting to conjecture what he might have 
done had this alternative not been available, but of course we have 
no means of knowing. But the assumption of similar organic remains 
implying a similar epoch remained an untestable assumption ~ and what 
is more the natural theology arguments then asfioctated xilHi % prisoned 
progressive creation,form a direct analogy with the association of 
the Genesis flood with diluvialism. In neither case was the physical 
theory based on religious considerations, but in both cases they were 
associated after the physical theory was formed. In other words, 
the methodology adopted by Sedgv;ick in I83O, complete with assumptions, 
was essentially analogous to that in I823. Had organic correlation 
later proven illusory Sedgwick would (presumably) again have made a 
post-rationalisationj and blamed a departure from Baconian/Newtonian 
principles rather than prob\e/\s in them.
One other question on this may be asked: what led Sedg\-;ick to 
his change of views 1 On Wernerianism it does not seem to be sudden. 
The existence throughout the period of the alternative Huttonian 
interpretation of the rocks as igneous must surely have been a factor, 
but it seems to have been Sedgwick's own observations first of the 
basaltic and then the granitic traps and dykes which led him to his 
nev7 view. It is actually a classic case of the same observed 
phenomena (i.e. lack of organic remains) being e:qjlicable on two 
contrasting hypotheses (i.e. early pre-life horizon or igneous nature). 
But Sedgwick did not see it in these terms; rather he contrasted 
Wernerian delusions with good induction.
On diluvialism, following his speech of I83I Fleming wrote to 
him. He coraplainèdthat though Sedgwick's views in 1831 were
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similar to those he himself (Fleming) proposed in l824:
*Yet in the Address there is not the slightest allusion to the 
accuracy of my earlier views, or the keen opposition which I 
experienced when avowing them, even from yourself - though the 
'noble generalisations' of a Cuvier and the 'beautiful 
discoveries' of Buckland be not overlooked.'
Fleming proceeded to point out that Sedgifick was now calling 
'shifting hypotheses' what seven years earlier he had said were 
'completely demonstrated'.
Sedgwick evidently did not like this very much, for a second letter
58from Fleming several weelcs later says that he was 'annoyed by 
perceiving from the style of your letter that my communication had
produced a greater degree of excitement in your mind than I had
anticipated.' He also adds:
'I can easily conceive, as you have stated, that your change of 
opinion was not produced by any "facts or reasonings" of mine, 
yet I feel myself entitled to credit for the efforts which I 
made to stem the current of error... You may have approached 
the Temple of truth by a path of your own, and regardless . - 
altogether of the hints I had offered on the subject, yet it 
cannot be denied that I had reached the porch before you, and 
even furnished you with the means of profiting by my experience...' 
Around the same time Sedgi-;ick v/rote to Murchison:
* it was not by any of the writings of Fleming but by my 
ovm ... In speaking of my change of mind (which I was anDcious 
to do in consequence of having been quoted by Brongniart and 
others as a diluvialist) would it not have been out of a~l 1 
keeping for me to have given a list of those who never embraced 
the theory - Fleming was not solitary in his opposition to
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the doctrine. HumboMC ridiculed. <■. Prévost lectured against 
it...
... So old Fleming is in a fury with mei This does a little 
surprise me. The possibility of his taking offence never 
entered my head for an instant..* If I have been converted 
in part from the diluvian theorj^  (which by the way I never 
held to the same extent with Buckland^  as you may see if you 
read the last page of the only paper I ever v/rote on the 
subject) it was... by my oim gradual improved experience, and. 
by communicating with those about me. Perhaps I may date my 
change of mind (at least in part) from our journey in the 
Highlands, where there are so many indications of local diluvial 
5^
operations... ’
Sedgv;ick here is dating his change of mind (’at least in part’) as 
early as l82?. The Prévost correspondence raised some ideas on 
the complexity of valley formation, and alternative explanations 
of valleys, which resemble some of Sedgi-zick’s own comments of 1830. 
The final stage to which he reached was not a uniformitarianism of 
Fleming or Lyell, for even the NoacV^ic flood was still associated 
by him with with rushing torrents in a catastrophe (unlike Fleming 
who objected theologically to such an arrangement and thought the 
flood gentle). Perhaps, then, as Sedgifick indicates, the process 
was gradual, and attributable to no single cause, as, his change of 
view progressed. The Murchison;letter does at least' èxplain Why 
so late as I83T - and two years after his first statements Against 
Bucklandian diluvialism - he found it necessary to make a public . 
recantation. Xc seenvs the news of his changed view had not clearly 
reached all the continental geologists such as Brongniart, and he 
wished to make the break absolutely clear so as not to be quoted for
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views he no longer held. But the change of view was already public 
by 1830, and this is the most convenient stopping point to distinguish 
his early from later work» All such points are merely * bench marks', 
but useful none the less. His attitude to Lye11 and Elie de 
Beaumont's respective theories are also dealt with in the 1831 Address, 
but properly belong to attitudes in the second phase of his work.
Before leaving the early work of Sedgwick one final point may be 
made. In the earlier parts of this thesis we considered the 
suggestion of a link in a '.Cambridge Network' of the Sedgwick circle 
and that of Coleridge. The question arises as to how far the 
approach to methodology of science in Sedgwick resembles that of 
Coleridge. The answer is that it does not resemble it much at all, 
but the discussion of this will be left to the next section when 
we may utilise the richer material of Sedgwick's Discourse on the 
Studies of the University to supplement the attitudes already 
established. On the basic issues of methodology. Bacon and Newton, 
Sedgwick always reaffirmed his commitment. As we have seen, the 
mistakes into which he fell were later 'rationalised' as mistakes 
in application of the method rather than any deficiency of the method 
itself.
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7.3 Notes
1. The fragment is in the Cambridge University Library, apparently 
written around I863. What the ’fresh discovery about granite* 
signifies is not elaborated. Sedgwick did not, in fact, publish 
any paper in I819, but his memory of such historical detail is 
often suspect. James A. Secord, in his recent PhD Thesis on the 
Sedgwick Murchison controversy (1981), has drawn attention to 
the considerable unreliability of Sedgwick’s historical accounts 
of his early work.
2. Letter to P.B. Brodie, September 10th 1834, in Clark & Hughes, 1, 
p. 230. Fleming was apparently the first to see fish in the Old 
Red.
3. Letter to Professor Harkness 29th August 1834, in Clark & Hughes, 
i» P* 231*
4. Ibid.. p. 231.
3. Phil Mag. I8l4, #, p. 241.
6. Clark & Hughes, 1, p. 213.
7. Phillips in Nature. 6th December I873, p. 237.
8. The confusion arises because the 'small book' named was by Phillips 
alone in I818. The joint 1822 work, however, was larger (D.M. 
Knight in Natural Science Books in English I6OO-I9OO, p. 173, calls 
it the 'standEurd introduction to geology in the l820's') auid was 
not merely 'partly' but 'mostly' by Conybeere. Perhaps the joint 
work WEIS so newly on the scene that Sedgwick had not yet got to 
grips with it.
9. These comments are actually on separate pages, but evidently refer 
to the same point. Perhaps Sedgwick repeated himself.
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10. Even after a number of years trying to decipher Sedgwick's 
handwriting^ it can still baffle. He also uses in these notes 
a shorthand:^ means the earth, and a has been used for a 
nondescript squiggle something like .
11. His first law states that 'Every body continues in its state of 
rest or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled 
to change that state by forces impressed upon it.' As has often 
been pointed out, according to Newton there are no such bodies, 
so whatever his law is, it cannot be a result of strict Baconian 
induction.
12. J. Challinor, The History of British Geology, a Bibliographical 
Study, p. 83. Challinor has also produced earlier studies, 
e.g. 'The beginnings of scientific palaeontology in Britain*,
Annals of Science, 1948, 6, 46-53 in which e.g. Parkinson and 
Martin are discussed.
13. D. Knight, Zoological Illustration, p. 129*
14. Phillips relates this in Memoirs of William Smith Lid (l844)
p. 31 in a printed copy of a letter from Richardson to Sedgwick 
(dated I83I), and also in a letter of Phillips to Sedgwick 
(3th February I83I in the Cambridge collection) quoting Smith 
to this effect.
13* Challinor (ref. 12), p. 89 was quoting from the early work 
Geikie, The Founders of Geology (1897)*
16. See quotation above.
17* One must, of course, be cognisant here, that we are relying on
the skill of Patterson at note-taking. Presumably he is summarising 
Sedgwick's rather more detailed comment.
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18. These details are from the entry for Brongniart in the Dictionary 
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7.4 Methodology and Sedgwick*s Later Geology
7.4.1 Contexts of Sedgwick*s Methodological Comments
We have seen how Sedgwick modelled his methodological ideas 
on Bacon and Newton, and this was repeated throughout his life.
On geological paradigms, however, he underwent a major change; 
and we have seen how this was completed (both on diluvialism and 
Wernerianism) by I83O. Thus, whilst 'catastrophist* models of 
the development of scientific ideas are seldom appropriate and are 
inappropriate with Sedgwick, there is a sense in which I83O stands %
as a kind of geological watershed for Sedgwick. The present 
chapter deals with his statements on methodology in the post 
1850 period. There are four basic contexts in which he made 
comment on methodology. Firstly, there were comments made on 
the general methodology of geology. In particular, there were 
the issues raised by Lyell, by de Beaumont, and later by Agassiz, 
on uniformity, orogeny, and glacial inference. Secondly, there 
were comments made during the course of the work on the Cambrian 
system, and the unfortunate controversy which arose with Murchison 
over nomenclature. The work began in the early l830*s, and the 
controversy continued from about 1843 until Sedgwick's death.
The issues here were much more specifically technical and 
geological, as one might expect, and in particular centred on 
the correct method for discovering and establishing a nomenclature 
for geological systems of stratigraphy. The third area in which 
Sedgwick made comment was that of a general description of the 
place and nature of science. Sedgwick's sermon which was 
published as A Discourse on the Studies of the University in
1833 (second and third editions 1834, fourth 1835, fifth I850) 
contained much comment on these issues. Fourthly, Sedgwick
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made various commants on methodology in controversy with non­
geologists over basic scientific issues relating to geology.
He commented on the scriptural geology (e.g. of Ure and Cockburn), 
on Chambers* Vestiges, and on Darwin * s Origin of Species. Of 
these, only Darwin was 'scientifically respectable', but similar 
general comments were made on all three.
These four, of course, overlap, and in particular the first two 
may be paired (both concern geological method), and the last two 
also paired (the 5th Edition Discourse used a general framework to 
mount an attack on Chambers.)
7f4.2 Sedgwick's Presidential Addresses and General Comment
Regarding I83O as a watershed, Sedgwick's 183I Presidential 
address summarized some of the ideas on which he had changed his 
mind prior to I83O, but also discussed hew issues raised since I83O 
by works of Lyell and de Beaumont. In June I829 de Beaumont had 
presented to the Académie des Sciences his first ideas on tectonics, 
showing that mountains have been elevated in chains in different 
epochs, with each chain having a characteristic strike. Sedgwick 
referred enthusiastically to these new ideas in his 183I Address, 
and shortly afterwards de Beaumont wrote to him expressing profuse 
thanks. In May of the same year de Beaumont forwarded to de la. 
Beche (secretary of the Geological Society) an extract of his ideas, 
in which Sedgwick's Address is quoted repeatedly, and de Beaumont's 
own theories might almost without exaggeration be viewed as an 
interpretation of Sedgwick's empirical researches and sumnaries 
thereof.^  Lyell's first volume of the Principles of Geology
was published in July I83O, and immediately achieved some 
popularity. The three volume set (published I83O-I833) was a 
general introduction to the history, methodology, and accumulated 
findings of geology.
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A number of comments on the work of Lyell have already been made 
in the present thesis, but we need to remind ourselves of 
Sedgwick’s basic objections to two ideas in the Principles and 
the reasons for them. These objections must be set against the 
background of a stated approval for 90% of the work^ , and that 
Sedgv/ick evidently recoin mended it after 183O in his annual 
course of lectures,^  He objected to two basic points:
(i) the arbitrary assumption of uniformity in levels of 
forces operating geologically throughout history
(ii) the Huttonian 'steady state* view of the earth which saw 
literally neither trace of a beginning nor direction in the 
development over time of the earth.
On the former Lyell actually presented little ’evidence', but 
appeared to be habitually confusing the issues of uniformity and 
actualism. Sedgwick accepted the constang of prinary laws:
'I believe that the law of gravitation, the laws of atomic 
sTfinity, and, in a word, all the primary modes of material 
action are as immutable as the attributes of that Being from 
whose will they derive their only energy..,*^
With this he also accepted actualistic approaches - himself coming to 
(e.g.) views of the igneous origins of basalt and granite by some 
considerations of known contemporary volcanic phenomena. But the 
uniformitarian assumptions he rejected:
'To assume, then, that volcanic forces have not only been called 
into action at all times in the natural history of the earth, 
but also, that in each period they have acted with equal 
intensity, seems to me a merely gratuitous hypothesis, unfounded 
on any of the great analogies of nature... The theory confounds 
the immutable and primary laws of matter with the mutable results 
arising from their irregular combination...'^
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Sedgwick admits that to the Creator what we see as 'interrupt/onS 
may be necessary results of some simple laws, but to find out the 
scale and kinds of changes in the past we must proceed inductively© 
The limits of such mutations;
'never have been and never will be fixed by any guesses of our 
own, or by any trains of a priori reasoning from the threshold 
of our argument; end the language of theory can never fall 
from our lips with any grace or fitness unless it appear as the 
simple enunciation of those general facts, with which, by
7
observation alone, we have at length become acquainted.'
Lyell has presented himself as the champion of Huttonian doctrines 
(says Sedgwick) and sometimes 'in the language of an advocate' (Lyell 
having recently practised at the Bar) he foz^ gets the character of a 
historian. Sedgwick comments;
'An hypothesis is indeed (when we are all agreed in receiving it) 
an admirable means of marshalling scattered facts together, and
g
exhibiting them in all the strength of combination.'
But too often «t.* can become 'like a false horizon in astronomy'. 
Lyell's assumption that 'the physical operations now going on, are 
not only the type but the measure of the intensity of the physical 
powers acting on the earth at all anterior periods' cannot simply 
be assumed a priori. If it is to be established, it is only 'by 
an appeal to geological phenomena', and Sedgwick finds that these in 
fact indicate the oppPsite.
9Sedgwick's attitude to hypothesis is not easily characterised , 
for it bears marks of basic problems in the attitudes of Bacon and 
Newton on whom he modelled his ideas of method. The word 
'hypothesis' is used in two distinct senses: to mean an a priori
assumption, and to mean the end product of an induction not yet
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finally established. Newton did, of course, make a, priori 
assumptions - but called them 'rules of reasoning'. In this 
connection Sedgwick is prepared to adopt an actualistic approach.
But Lyell's assumption of uniformity appears to him to be purely 
gratuitous - and one might compare it to the Cartesian assumption 
that all force is impact force. It is possible but cannot be 
assumed. Again, analogously to Newton, Sedgwick sees the actual 
evidence as against the truth of uniformity (just as Newton showed 
that actual phenomena could not be explained by vortices).
Before turning to the positive reasons for accepting catastrophism, 
we may consider the second aspect of Lyell which SedgwicK found 
unacceptable; the steady state earth. He saw two main objections 
to this. Thé first was that the spheroidical shape of the earth 
indicated an originally more fluid s t a t e . T o  back this up, 
differences between early and later fossils 'seem to indicate' a gradual 
cooling of the earth. This objection is ironical in the light of 
Rudwick's assertion that Sedgwick is a member of the 'concrete' 
school who 'are relatively closed to ideas from outside what they 
self-consciously refer to as a 'discipline'Sedgwick's other 
objection is based on the observation that 'there has been a 
progressive development of organic structure subservient to the 
purposes of life'. He applies this to the major classes of creatures 
rather than development within classes, but believes it refutes 
Lyell.
Sedgwick did not have an 'aversion' to hypotheses, but a 
suspicion (in the baconian-Newtonian tradition) that they might be
wrongly used in replacing or subverting observation rather than being 
induced from it.
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Elie de Beaumont's system involved two main elements, as
already mentioned. The first concerned his 'catastrophism' (he
12
himself using the word 'catastrophe'. ). Sedgwick says:
'Every observer is aware that we often pass, without any 
intermediate gradations, from systems of strata which are 
horizontal, to other systems which are highly inclined.
This is a fact independent of hypothesis; but it is now 
almost universally admitted, that the highly inclined 
strata have undergone a movement of elevation. Using then, 
the language of this hypothesis (to say the least of it a 
convenient mode of describing the phenomena) - we affirm that 
the inclined strata have been elevated at a time anterior to 
the horizontal strata which abut against them, or rest upon 
their edges...
De Beaumont spells this out even more clearly. If all the forces 
of nature were really progressing slowly, steadily and without 
change, then this kind of unconformity would not be expected. 
Sedgwick also believed that catastrophism was the only view able 
to explain both diluvial remains and erratic boulders.
This bears out his words quoted earlier,' he is using a 
'hypothesis' to marshal and exhibit facts in combination - the 
hypothesis of elevation being also universally received. But he 
is not gratuitously assuming it, rather he sees it as the most 
obvious way to unite the phenomena observed.
Similarly with de Beaumont's innovative addition to Catastrophism: 
the idea of mountain chain elevation. De Beaumont has shown:
'each of these great systems of mountain chains, marked on the 
map of Europe by given parallel lines of direction, has also 
a given period of elevation, limited and defined by direct
430
geological observations. The steps by which he reaches 
this noble generalization are so clear and convincing, as
14to be little short of physical demonstration.•.'
Sedgwick does not here follow any of the mechanisms suggested by 
'de Beaumont in the development of his theory; he is speaking of the 
•facts* of parallel chains and strike for contemporaneous ranges.
Thus one must be careful in calling him a follower of de Beaumont.
He is characteristically cautious:
•Greatly as I admire the generalisations of M. de Baaumont, 
they have, I think, been already pushed too far. We may 
follow them as our guides, but they must never take the place 
of direct observations...*^^
How far, then, did the theory affect Sedgwick's actual fieldwork ? 
Secord in his recent study claims that it did affect him, calling 
him a 'follower' of de Beaumont , and stating:
'Months before leaving for Wales in I85I Sedgwick hailed the 
transformation that Elie de Beaumont's discovery of a "new 
faculty of induction" had worked in his geological vision. 
Henceforth he would take to the field with different eyes, 
and his field notebooks from the l830's are filled with 
information on strike, dip and geological structure, precisely 
the information requisite for dating the rocks of Wales by 
the principal episodes of mountain uplift.'
Whilst in general agreement with Second's comment on Sedgwick's 
method,% believe that this over simplifies. Murchison's notebooks
l7also contain information on strike and dip' , and their observation 
was a normal part of stratigraphical research irrespective of de 
Beaumont's theories. Sedgwick may well have had 'different eyes' 
but . the evidence is less strong that it radically changed his actual
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field practice. Sedgwick certainly emphasized the three- 
dimensional structural aspects of approach to stratigraphy, and 
may have been encouraged in this by the theories of one of Ki& few 
fellow-mathematicians in geology. But this is not to say that
Sedgwick presumed the theory to hold and to enable dating.
Some of the same questions remain for Sedgwick's work as for 
his models Bacon and Newton. Newton's strong division between 
phenomena and theory set against hypotheses cannot ultimately be
maintained, and Sedgwick's analogous attempts to divide 'facts' from 
'hypotheses' similarly exhibit problems. At what point, for 
example, does the presumption of fossil correlation become a 
'fact of observation' rather than a hypothesis ? Implicitly 
Sedgwick gives the same kind of answer as we found in Nagel - i»-e. 
when it is universally received. But Wernerian perceptions of (say) 
granite might have been similarly universally received had Hutton 
not controverted them.
At this point it may also be appropriate to question some of the 
externalist interpretations of geology in this period. Secord again 
has asserted that;
'Stratigraphy... had powerful supports from the established 
social order of nineteenth century England; for all its 
internal quarrels, geology spoke to the public as a science 
that established order and place,
Presumably had the identical catastrophist theories been developed 
in revolutionary France they would have been seen as being 
supported by the revolutionaries because they pointed so graphically 
to the principle of the necessity of a total upheaval before 
progress' could be made. The very terms could then be read as
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an aberrant projection into the scientific realm of the politics 
of the period; apparent catastrophes are necessary for progress.
There is no doubt that Sedgwick did believe in a kind of order and 
harmony in the creation, and he also believed in a kinj^  of • 
providence in the way the worlds resources were available for 
human use. But his philosophical roots exerted more discernable 
influence on his geology than did his views of the social order.'^
Shortly after his Presidential Address, in I832, the second 
edition of his Syllabus was published. The books he recommended
in this period differ radically, as might be expected, from those
previously suggested.Bakewell is still suggested 'for a 
beginnner', but Lyell's Principles (volume 1 especially) is at the 
head of the list. De la Beche (presumably A Geological Manual,
1831) is noted to be 'dry'. %ameson's version of Cuvier is
listed, and so is Parkinson, and finally des Hayes.
The actual syllabus begins with a general introduction, as before,
but the whole Wernerian structure is, of course, gone. The
separation rather than the connection of mineralogy and geology
is apparent, and the second edition evidences his dissatisfaction
with the very term 'Transition' though still extant in geology.
The influence of Lyell's Principles may perhaps be seen in parts of
the syllabus, especially the early sections, and some of Sedgwick's
21own notes may refer to it.
By the third edition of his Syllabus, in 1837, the work has a 
decidedly modern look about it, and remained unchanged until his 
death. It begins, as before, with the distinction between natural 
history and natural philosophy, and the location of geology in 
the sciences. It speaks of the 'separation' of geology and
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mineralogy. It is critical of such as Burnet and Woodward, noting*
'Ancient Speculations on the theory of the Earth false and
defective', but goes on to speak of the 'True mode of conducting
22
Geological Speculations.' Sedgwick then looks at agents in
the development and modification of the earth's surface. Rock
types and classification of organic remains are both discussed.
The strata are divided into 'Primary', 'Secondary' and 'Tertiary'. 
The Tertiary includes all deposits superior to the chalk. The 
Secondary includes an Upper Division (deposits from chalk down to 
lias), a Middle Division (New Red, Carboniferous, Old Red), and 
a Lower Division (Silurian and Cambrian). The final 'Primary 
Class' seems to be simply those which are below the others - but 
'often metamorphic, and of very obscure relations'. Much detail 
is given on these sections, but chapter vi is headed;
'Successive periods of elevation - metalliferous veins - 
theories of the earth'
Sedgwick seems not to doubt the fact of periods of orogeny, but 
says ;
'Geological connexions of some of the principle mountain chains
of Europe - manner of investigating their several periods of
elevation - sketch of the theory of M. Elie de Beaumont.'
His final point is;
'Present condition of Geology, considered both as a practical
and speculative science.'
The basic point of this is that he is presenting 'speculation'
(including that of de Beaumont) as logically after the inductive
'facts' earlier in the work. Needless to say, the earlier parts
contain 'hypothetical' elements - such as reference to 'raised
beaches' but the grander schemes are left until the end, Lyell
23
is not mentioned by name.
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7.4.3 The Sedgvâck-Murchison Controversy
We may now turn to consider the second main area in which 
Sedgwick made methodological comment: his work on the
Cambrian system. Comment here will be much more brief than 
originally intended, as the Cambrian-Silurian controversy between 
Sedgwick and Murchison has recently been the subject of an 
exhaustive study.
A table giving a basic framework for the issue is given in 
Table 7.1. Sedgwick began work in August I831, accompanied 
for the first few days by the young Charles Darwin. At places 
their two journals may be compared, e.g.:
Darwin: 'At Henlian rock almost composed of Producti and
Madrepores. Dip NE-Jn Half mile NW of Henlian Grey 
Wacke dipping N by E.
Sedgwick: 'Thence to Henlian; at several places the dip is about
NE by N about I6 or 18 - an obscure escarpment 
W of Foxall etc etc. At Henlian dip = NE-^  point N,
therefore the limestone is rounding to the W. and
at the great escarpment where the Henlian rivulet
joins the Elwy dip = N23E It is an ordinary Mountain
Limestone and in several parts has an obscure .
concretionary structure.
Care must be taken in drawing too much from this, for Sedgwick was
an established geologist whilst Darwin was really still a beginner
in the subject as such. Nevertheless, the greater detail of
Se«^ick is apparent, though it is Darwin who mentions the organic
types. In a letter to Darwin following his appointment to the
Beagle expedition, Sedgwick mentions various books. These are
Daubeny (A Description of Active and Extinct Volcanoes... l826).
435
d'Aubuisson, An Account of the Basalts of Saxony..tr. l8l4
(though Darwin is warned it is 'full of Wernerian nonsense);
Bakewell Cl don't think Bakewell a bad book (for a beginner)');
and Humboldt, Personal Narrative (Humboldt's journeys were not
unlike those of Darwin himself in his early days). Sedgv/ick
remarks ' - for fossil shells what is to be done' and recommends
Darwin to ask Lonsdale. From this Barrett concludes:
'Sedgwick's weakness in palaeontology is shown by his inability
27to propose books on fossils.'
This, however, is an exaggeration. Sedgwick was, as we have seen, 
recommending books on fossils to his geology classes both before 
and after this 1831 letter to Darwin. But Darwin has apparently 
enquired as to a specialist area of palaeontology, and Sedgwick 
therefore suggests further counsel.
Barrett's characterisation of the religious natures of the 
two men seem to be misinformed, and his suggestions about their
28personal relationship are implausible. But the factual
content of his article, and the publication of Darwin's journal 
for the trip are both useful. Barrett rightly makes the comment: 
*A comparison of Darwin and Sedgwick's field notes and letters 
reveals a marked contrast in their scientific philosophies. 
Sedgwick's notes are mainly descriptive and in the best 
tradition of inductive science; they are almost entirely 
restricted to geological "facts". Darwin's ,notes are not 
only descriptive, but deductive and speculative. He introduces 
hypotheses, queries, and personal anecdotes. He draws 
empirical generalisations and relates broad areas of one 
discipline to another...
Care must be taken here, however, to draw the right conclusion. It
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was not that Sedgwick objected to speculation or to generalisation; 
it was just that he saw these as separate from actual empirical 
observation. Thus Darwin’s notes record:
’Sedgwick supposes these great valleys were caused by the 
rocks being stretched & the fact of there not being 
Limestone pebbles in the diluvium seems to countenance
this.'30
But Sedgwick did not put such speculation in his field notes.
Barrett also comments^ "' on Sedgwick's method that he had 
developed a system for attacking a new area: first he made
a preliminary survey, getting the lay of the land, noting 
general topography, strike and dip, and establishing a base 
line of main rock types. Then he made traverses, during which 
detailed observations were made. Data collected during the 
traverses were next compiled, and profile sections finally drawn, 
showing anticlines, synclines, uniformities, rock layers, etc. 
Unlike some geologists, says Barrett, such as Murchison for 
example, Sedgwick did not concentrate on a single formation 
and folWw exclusively the stratigraphie relations of 
alone. We might illustrate something of'what Barrett says 
from Sedgwick's letter to Murchison on 13th September I83I:
*I have nearly completed one base line to work upon, the rest
■52must be done by traverses.'
He does not say what this base line is, but on 23rd July I832 he 
ga've^ a base line thus:
'These bands of black limestone are absolutely identical with 
the transition lime which separates the greywacke of 
Westmoreland from the great system of greenslate and porphyry
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of the central mountains of Cumberland. They form a very 
grand base line, which I have now traced from Glyn-Diffwa 
(five miles N.W. of Corwen) to Dinas Mowddy, a distance, as
33
the crow flies, of about 30 miles.’
The Ashgill and Caradoc rock, correctly identified with its 
Lakeland equivalent, is marked on Figure 7.2. Around this 
time Sedgwick seems aware that it does not extend south, though 
he was not aware of its SW curve.
This kind of approach differs from the later approach of the
Government Survey teams, which tended more to follow particular
strata throughout their area. But an approach which could be
used by a team of men working slowly was unsuited to a single
man trying to fit geologising in between other academic and
34social commitments. Sedgwick’s skill was remarkable but 
if even the Government Survey could miss (as we shall see) an 
important faunal and lithological discontinuity, one need not be 
surprised at Sedgwick’s fallibility.
It may be best to give here a brief outline (and relating it to 
Table .1) of the work and controversy which arose with Murchison. 
Sedgwick’s early work was mainly in the N.W., whilst Murchison’s 
was in the S.E. In 1834 they made a joint traverse together 
during which (apparently at Murchison’s suggestion) Sedgwick 
reversed an earlier identification of the Meifod rocks with 
the Caradoc, and the friends decided that the basic pattern was 
for the N.W. to be older than the S.E. (as in Figure 7.3a-). This 
was one of two basic errors which confused the early picture. But 
at this time, when the great thicknesses of the older rocks was 
known, neither of the two friends seem to have doubted that
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their respective systems which they named the ’Silurian' and 
'Cambrian' around this time would turn out to have distinct 
fossil fauna. Sedgwick, during this period, did identify fossils 
(as his journals show) but made no systematic study of his 
specimens because they remained largely unpacked due to lack of 
suitable museum space. In the meantime, the two friends had 
discovered that the Devonian area (previously thought contemporary) 
was on a horizon above the Silurisin. Thus it gave no dist>/:dZ 
Cambrian fossils. Then, when Sedgwick's fossils began to be 
examined from l84l, there came the discovery that they were in 
fact identical to Murchison's Silurian ones; there was no distinct 
Cancbrian set. To Murchison the issue seemed clear, without a 
distinct set of fossils the Cambrian system could not exist. Thus" 
it was only rational to 'Silurianise' the whole of Wales - which 
he proceeded to do. Sedgwick, however, saw this as a retrograde 
step for a number of reasons, and adopted a flexible approach, 
looking for some rational system on various bases. By l846 he 
had hardened to call for a distinct Cambrian system, and was still 
arguing for this in a debate of early I832 at the Geological 
Society. By this time the Government Survey had brought to light 
the mistake over the Meifod rocks, which Sedgwick blamed on 
Murchison during their joint trip of 1834. Yet Sedgwick remained 
something of a singular figure in the dispute; without a distinct 
set of Cambrian fossils he could get little support from other 
geologists - however unfortunate he may have been in losing credit 
for his work. Then, in November I832, Sedgwick and McCoy were 
able to announce to the Geological Society that during the summer 
they had confirmed a suspicion aroused by McCoy's examination of the 
fossils - that Murchison had confounded two distinct Sandstones.
443
Between the May Hill and the Caradoc Sandstones there was actually 
a lithological and fossil discontinuity. During the next few 
years the Government Surveyors re-examined the region, and found 
thaufc the unconformity had in fact been missed throughout the whole 
area. Sedgwick now claimed the lower group as 'Cambrian’, putting 
the blame for the confusion on Murchison's mistake^  Murchison 
continued to call the whole series 'Silurian', ignoring the new 
break which would give Sedgwick the distinctive fossils he required. 
Eventally, after the death of both Sedgwick and Murchison, the 
s'jigg0st j'On of Lapworth was adopted to call the middle group by 
the new name 'Ordovician'. The boundaries of Ordovician/Cambrian 
remained a subject of dispute well into the present century.
As Rudwick and others have pointed out, the Sedgwick-Murchison 
controversy can be studied at a number of levels. In particular 
we might ask;
(a) How did Sedgwick and Murchison respectively perceive ^
the correct method to be for determining the superposition 
and nature of strata in the series ?
(fe) How were the 'facts' perceived at each stage, of the pattern 
of strata and of fossils. Subsidiary to this we might also 
ask who was responsible for the way in which the facts were 
perceived, and also how that perception differs from that 
eventually arrived at.
(c) How did Sedgwick and Murchison at each stage regard the
principles upon which a nomenclature was most rationally to 
be decided on the basis of the facts as perceived ?
(ci) How did each protagonist perceive his own and the other's 
various actions and reactions, and in what kind of personal
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regard did he hold the other ?
The main points of (b) have already been outlined, and Dr Secord's
35thesis gives considerable detail which need not be repeated here.
In the work of the l850*s two major errors were made, for both of
which Sedgwick blamed Murchison, The first was the placing
of the Meifod rocks above the Bala series. The second was the 
confounding together of two distinct ages of sandstone: the May
Hill and true Caradoc sandstone under the single title of Caradoc. 
The Figure 7*3 illustrates the effects of this. Murchison had 
taken the Caradoc area, and the Meifod and Glyn Ceiriog, as being 
solidly 'Silurian' strata, and the placing of the Bala series 
below located Sedgwick's Cambrian as a separate system. Sedgwick
had, in fact, tentatively placed Bala and Meifod on the same
level in 1832, and blamed Murchison in their joint trip of 183  ^
for the reversal of this 'true' section. The subsequent 
history of changing views on these three areas (i.e. Bala, Meifod 
and Caradoc) is complex. In 1843 Sedgwick's view was:
'[Sedgwick] then notices the undulating country east of the 
Berwyns, extending from the Severn, near Pool, through the 
ramifications of the Vyrnwy and the Tanat. Calcareous 
slates, with many fossils nearly resembling those of the Bala 
limestone, are repeated again and again by rapid undulations.. 
Part of the system here noticed has been described by Mr
37Murchison, and is classed in the Caradoc sandstone...'
In 1846 Sedgwick asserts:
'the lower fossiliferous rocks east of the Berwyns between 
the Dee and the Severn - the Caradoc sandstone of the typical 
country of Siluria... considered as a whole their affinities
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connect them more nearly with the fossils of the lower group 
of North Wales.
By February 1832 The Government Survey had shown the similarity 
of level in the Bala and Meifod rocks, though at that time the 
Bala series were still seen as below the Caradoc. So Sedgwick 
Speaks of his reluctance in the l830*'s at Murchison’s identification 
of Caradoc and Meifod. He claims that:.
'From 1834 to l842 I had accepted Sir R.I•Murchison's 
conclusion, and made the Meifod beds Caradoc or Silurian, and 
the Bala beds Cambrian; but the only hypothesis on which this 
conclusion could be maintained was dissipated at the first so- 
called Caradoc quarry which I examined in 1842...'
The subdivision of the sections was to be decided by fossils and 
Salter was with him for this purpose:
'He concluded on fossil evidence, and the conclusion was borne 
out by the sections, that the Meifod and Glyn Ceiriog and Bala 
beds were nearly on one parallel. Hence, if the Meifod beds 
Were Caradoc, the Bala beds must also be Caradoc, or very nearly 
on its parallel...'^ 9
At this time Sedgwick speaks of the 'erroneous identification of 
the Upper Bala and Caradoc groups in 1843', the upper Bala is not 
(he says) Caradoc.
Secord calls this an 'elaborate technical myth' and states:
'Sedgwick reunited Bala, Glyn Ceiriog, and Meifod as tteBala beds 
not in 1846, but rather in the early 1830' s . Y e t  Sedgwick was 
not a character given to direct lying, so how could this happen ? 
Reading the earlier articles one sees that Sedgwick does refer 
to the palaeontological similarities of Meifod and Bala. His 
retrospect in 1832 reinterprets his words'considered as a whole
their affinities connect them more nearly* with 'the... beds were
nearly on one parallel', and Sedgwick forgets that he hah
specifically denied in his earlier piece what now seems an
4l'obvious' corollary of his earlier words. Perhaps 'myth', 
though, is a rather harsh description of this.
In February 1832 the Caradoc beds are placed above the Bala, 
though still in fact in the Cambrian system. But Sedgwick also 
inserts a note:
'...the Caradoc sandstone of the well known Horderley section 
contains numerous fossils of the Bala group, and none of the 
characteristic Wenlock species; while the so-called Caradoc 
sandstone of May Hill contains the Wenlock fossils in 
abundance, and none of the characteristic Cambrian types.
But is there a single section in which these two distinct 
groups of fossils appear together at one stage ? If no 
such section can be found, why may we not suppose that the 
Caradoc sandstone of May hill is a group superior to the 
Caradoc sandstone of Horderley ? ... The statement here givem 
is drawn from the fossil evidence supplied by the Cambridge
4 2 -
Museum. *
It is in the Caradoc that Sedgwick recognises the overlap of the 
Cambrian and Silurian (as he then conceives them) to consist. This 
is why he has been forced to create a 'middle group'•- though on 
balance wants to call the Caradoc Cambrian if forced to choose.
But if an actual division could be shown in the Caradoc Itself 
'the ambiguity referred to in the text would be at an end'.
During the summer Sedgwick and McCoy visited May Hill, and in 
November were able to aj\nounce that the division was both 
lithologically and palaeontologically valid. The true Caradoc is
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still placed above Bala, but is nov clearly Cambrian separated by 
a clear unconformity from the overlying Silurian including the 
May Hill group.
Later, fej 18^ 4, the Government survey had shown the parallelism 
of the Meifod and Caradoc beds, and Sedgwick accepts this. This 
might seem to tell against his earlier insistence that much of the 
confusion arose from Murchisons wrong identification of the two.
In a sense this is true, but on the other hand the division of the 
Caradoc into two distinct horizons had by then made the implication 
of such an equation (with the ’true' Caradoc) rather different.
Secord emphasizes the inconsistency and inaccuracy of the later 
historical reconstructions, and clearly they cannot be taken at face 
value. Nevertheless, usually one can see why Sedgwick in his own 
mind may have thought that he was correctly representing the facts.
Turning back to the question (a) concerning methodology, the 
geological world always recognised a difference betwean both the 
training and abilities of the two men. Sedgwick, as we have seen, 
started with the training of a Wernerian in mineralogy, and his 
tendency in this respect to structural stratigraphy would have been 
enhanced by his mathematical training in Cambridge. Murchison, 
on the other hand, was educated at a military college, and not in 
mathematics, and had never been a Wernerian. Soon after starting 
geology Murchison came under the influence of William Smith:
'From the moment I had my first walk with William Smith (then 
about sixty years old) I felt that he was just the man after my 
own heart; and he, on his part, seeing that I had, as he said.
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'an eye for a country', took to me and gave me most valuable 
lessons. Thus he made me thoroughly acquainted with all the 
strata north and south of Scarborough. He afterwards 
accompanied me in a boat all along the coast, stopping and 
sleeping at Robin Hood's Bay. Not only did I then learn the 
exact position of the beds of poor coal which crop out in that 
tract of the eastern moorlands, but collecting with him the 
characteristic fossils from the calcareous grit down to the 
lias, I saw how clearly strata must alone be identified with 
by their fossils, inasmuch as here, instead of oolitic 
limestones like those of the south we had sandstones, grits, 
and shales, which, though closely resembling the beds of the old 
coal, were precise equivalents of the oolitic series of the 
south...'4^
This was in 1826, and we must be careful to see exactly what he 
was saying. At that time, Wernerians still identified ages of 
some rocks by the rock types rather than fossils, and it is to 
this he basically refers. Coming into a new area of similar 
age to one already explored, strata may be identified by the use 
of well defined fossil sets. Sedgwick would have agreed with 
this by 1831 - though would probably have put more emphasis on the 
use of dip and strike on a local basis even whilst using the 
fossils. But in any case this was not the situation in Wales. 
Sedgwick and Murchison were exploring areas without known age 
parallels having well defined fossil sets. Part of the object of 
the exercise was, indeed, to define such sets. Both Sedgwick and 
Murchison had to rely on structural three dimensional stratigraphy 
(using dip and strike and defining sections) at the same time as 
fossils, in exploring these new areas. Ironically, it was precisely
4 4 8
because Murchison assumed that two apparently mineralogically similar 
sandstones were similar in age that he confounded the two 
horizons of fossils from May Hill and Caradoc.
Clearly fossils cannot be used to determine the ages of rocks 
or levels of rocks unless the fossils typical of those ages or 
levels have already been defined from elsewhere; where this is 
not so they cannot be used as a primary factor. Sedgwick is
always clear on this; e.g. in l846:
'In every country which is not made out by reference to a
pre-exusting type, our first labour is that of determining
the physical groups, and establishing their relations by 
natural sections. The labour next in order is the 
determination of the fossils found in the successive 
physical groups; and, as a matter of fact, the natural groups 
of fossils are generally found to be nearly co-ordinate with 
the physical groups - each successive group resulting from 
certain conditions which have modified the distribution of 
organic types. In the third place comes the collective 
arrangement of the groups into systems, or groups of a higher 
order. '
This, he claims, was the approach of William Smith, and it was 
applied in Wales. In February 1832 Sedgwick makes a similar 
point in denying that Murchison has followed Smith's method:
'Smith never gave the name to a group first, and made out 
its place in the sections afterwards. In every instance in 
which he gave us geological names, his actual sections had 
the priority of his names by many years: and he never gave
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a name to any group until he had determined its relations to 
the groups above it and below it... He used palaeontology as a 
principle of identification only where a typi group had 
been already well established: but palaeontology v;as not the
foundation of h'is 'nomenclature, for his names were local or 
provincial...’
By 1834 Sedgwick is in a little more 'chastened*'mood, for by 
then it had come t) light that both he and Murchison had missed 
unconformities in their sections:
'...in the actual state of our information, we have done well 
constantly to use both kinds of evidence; and on both together 
has our best, and our only consistent and secure nomenclature 
been founded. If it be true that experienced geologists 
have sometimes, from the neglect of palaeontology, blundered 
in the arrangement of physical groups, it is equally true 
that very expert palaeontologists, from some mistake of 
arrangement among the physical groups, have sometimes blundered 
in their palaeontology. The double kind of evidence above 
described, has seldom been lost sight of with impunity.
But he still later comments:
"... such fossils have comparatively small geological value 
before their real sectional position (in the general sequence 
of our palaeozoic rocks) has been determined; and, until that 
point has been cleared, they are of no value in helping us to 
a true nomenclature of our palaeozoic groups...'
Sedgwick, in fact, was fairly consistent on this. Fossils were one 
element in working out an initial order of stratification for an 
epoch. Only after well established could fossil groups be the sole
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means of correlating with distant areas. Murchison did not always 
speak as though this were so, but Sedgwick did. Perhaps, however, we 
we may detect in the 185  ^article a tendency to emphasize rather 
more the equality of palaeontological with physical considerations 
than in earlier articles. The May Hill/Caradoc episode may have 
illustrated this. The physical considerations perhaps raised the 
initial question about the ambivalent horizon of the supposed 
Caradoc. Yet it was McCoy’s cataloguing of the fossils which first 
raised the serious possibility of a division. Even then, Sedgwick 
would conclude nothing beyond a questioning footnote until he had 
examined the physical sections in the field. Only when he was 
sure that physical and palaeontological considerations pointed to 
the same thing would he proceed.
In none of this, of course, does Sedgwick drawn any conclusions 
(alien to his Baconian-Newtonian methodology) about the theory-laden 
nature of observation. Missed unconformities are due to 
carelessness or to being misled.
The third question we raised concerned the principles of 'right' 
nomenclature. Murchison's attitude went through three basic 
atages. From 1834 to 1843 he believed the Bala series to underlie 
the Caradoc, and never seems to have doubted that it would yield 
a distiActCambrian fauna. From l843 to 1832 he argued basically 
that without any distinct fauna there could be no internationally 
recognised Cambrian - and in any case the Silurian system was 
already established. After l8$2, when Sedgwick had produced a 
potential fossil break, he argued simply from established use - 
both groups had been given in his original Silurian so both should 
stay Silurian.
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To Murchison the situation in 1845 was straightforward. Soon
after Sedgwick’s fossils were unpacked and identified he wrote
to him (in l6th October l842):
’...But the question is, if there are no rocks containing
fossils differing from those published ^ s Lower Silurian
in South Wales, are there such in N. Wales...*
In a postscript Murchison suggests that he may, with Sedgwick’s
permission,be prepared to write something like:
’Judging from their... great thickness and distinct lithological
character it was presumed (when the Cambrian System was so
named) that these greatly developed inferior slaty rocks
would be found to contain a class of organic remains peculiar
to themselves, the more so as the few forms then discovered in
them seemed to differ from the Lower Silurian types.
Subsequent researches have however decided otherwise. In
the Slaty region of the N.West of England, of which by his
labour he had so long ago rendered himself the master,
Professor Sedgwick has now satisfied himself that the lowest
organic remains which can be traced are no others than
those published as Lower Silurian whilst ...-he has come to
similar conclusions respecting the oldest fossiliferous
48tracts of N. Wales...’
Murchison’s restrospect in January l84?^^  presents a virtually 
identical picture. From his own research in Snowdon and from 
Sedgwick’s responses^ ,^ by 1843 Murchison was sure that the 
supposed Cambrian region had only Lower Silurian Fossils, and 
so coloured the whole area as Silurian in a map of l843. Nearly 
all geologists would have agreed with him - without a distinctive
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group of fossils the Cambrian was doomed. However much Sedgwick 
might be right about fossils playing a secondary part in establishing 
the order of superposition in the field, few doubted that a distinct 
nomenclature require distinct fossils. Murchison affirms: 'No modern 
geologist can sustain, that peculiar lithological features or 
extraordinary thickness can constitute any claim for the 
establishment of a new nomenclature.' As for the idea of renaming 
the 'Lower Silurian' as Cambrian, Murchison objects that the 
use of 'Lower Silurian' is already well established inte*nationally, 
and besides,, to do so would rename large portions of the geological 
map.^^
Sedgwick's reaction to the news in 1842-3 that there was no 
distinct fossil fauna for Cambrian was initially to experiment 
with terms like 'Protozoic', being prepared to abandon Cambrian
cp
altogether. In 1846 Sedgwick advocated a return to use of the
term Cambrian. His arguments against Murchison were two main ones. 
First, to call everything 'Silurian' would be to return to the 
old situation of calling everything 'Grauwacke' - a retrograde 
step. Secondly, calling everything 'Silurian' would imply that 
'great groups of rocks not found in Siluria' were included in it. 
Distinction between the systems of 'Silurian' and 'Cambrian* is 
admittedly not absolute, but Sedgwick tries to develop some limited 
palaeontological basis based' on fossil frequencies.
In February 1832 the argument is not substantially different.
Again Sedgwick argues:
'•... it is surely an axiom in geological nomenclature, that 
if we give a new geographical name to any group of strata, that 
name must refer us to a spot near which we find the group well
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developed.'
This is, says Sedgwick, so in Cambria but not in Siluria for the 
oldest palaeozoic rocks. Moreover, the name also had priority. 
Whilst some might find the name used unimportant, Sedgwick argues 
that scientific names ought to be 'the at t^râ&t representations of 
the highest conceptions of the human mind' - and should follow not 
precede the exploration of the phenomena. Moreover the word 
'system' in the strict sense is inappropriate unless a true 
palaeontological base is found - to construct a 'Silurian system' 
and then arbitrarily extend it downwards indefinitely is a bad 
scientific practice.
After the division of the May Hill and Caradoc in November 
1832, Sedgwick continued to use the same arguments, but he now 
had the additional asset of a clear palaeontological and lithological 
break, which for the first time gave a 'true base' for the Silurian 
system i.e. a clearly defined starting point.
The final point (labelled (d) above) concerns the purely 
personal aspects of the affair. Even before the controversy, the 
relationship between the two men had sometimes been stormy.
Sedgwick was inclined to fly off the handle if he thought that 
some injustice had been done - even though he later usually 
apologised. Unpublished letters reveal at least three little ? 
'misunderstandings' in the later l830's.^  ^ Now the general 
background to the controversy with Murchison has been well 
described by Secord. Sedgwick had failed to produce his big book 
om the Palaeozoics, whilst Murchison's works on Silurian had 
received much acclaim. Sedgwick had foregone any possibility of 
a career elsewhere, for the status offered by his Professorship
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- where part of that status must inevitably be invested in his 
work.^ Sedgwick had a general sense of injustice, but he also 
brooded over several particular incidents, A number of these are 
listed in a letter to Murchison in October,l8th l853«^^  • The'first 
Was the shock he had when he happened to see a copy, some time after 
its publication, of the geological map published by the Society 
for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in 1843 under Murchison’s 
guidance. Murchison had taken the step (which seentôd only 
logical to him since he then knew there was no distinct Cambrian 
fossil set) of Silurianising most of Wales. Sedgwick's letter 
does not state this but we know from extant contemporary letters 
that Murchison had actually consulted Sedgwick at the time about 
areas on this map - but apparently did not inform Sedgwick of his 
intention to spread the Silurian c o l o u r s . A  second issue was 
that Sharpe, in a paper of l843, had implied that Sedgwick was 
to blame for wrongly assuming the Cambrian to underlie the 
Silurian. Sedgwick had expected Murchison as the then President 
of the Geological Society to set the record straight and admit 
the fault was his own - and Murchison had said nothing. The 
third issue was an error in Warburton's editing of Sedgwick's 
1845 article for the Geological Society.^^ At the time Sedgwick 
was suggesting a nomenclature of Protozoic = Lower Silurian + 
Cambrian, but Warburton altered the map key to read 
Silurian (Protozoic)* making the two equivalent terms. This had 
misled others into believing that Sedgwick accepted the Silurianising 
process - and unfortunately Sedgwick himself did not notice the 
alteration until I832 on re-reading the paper. Finally, there was 
the blundering attempt to recall Sedgwick's February 1832 paper
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from the Geological society.Sedgwick also objected at this
time to the verses by Forbes implying that Sedgwick had lagged
b e h i n d . Yet during this time Sedgwick and Murchison
remained on reasonable terms. In 1854 Sedgwick had some further
difficulty when he found the cuts demanded by the Geological Society
in one of his papers unacceptable, and thereafter published instead
in the Philosophical Magazine. T h e r e  was no break with
Murchison, but Sedgwick apparently found it increasingly galling
that Murchison refused to confess to what Sedgwick thought were
mistakes due to him, and that he continued to try to disguise these
with the device of the 'Llandovery' nomenclature.^  ^ Murchison
published his Siluria in I854. Sedgwick admitted that Murchison
did not exactly claim that the mistakes of 1834 were due to Sedgwick
but Sedgwick thought that he had written in such a way as to give 
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this impression. In Sedgwick's introduction to the Cambrian 
and Palaeozoic fossils (1855) he calls for the retraction of 'a 
misstatement injurious to myself on an unequivocal point of fact.'^^  
Sedgwick wanted Murchison to openly admit sole responsibility for 
the separation of Meifod and Bala horizons. Murchison, however, 
was not the kind of man to whom eating humble pie in public came 
naturally, and in any case to his mind the separation of the two 
beds was simply the logical result of a fairly general belief in 
the early thirties that the N.W, beds were older than the S.E.
In reality both men were reinterpreting actual events to be more in 
their own favour. Sedgwick exaggerated both his reluctance to adopt 
the change and the authority of Murchison, whilst Murchison preferred 
to obscure the issue by speaking in terms of general beliefs. Yet 
Sedgwick waited, in vain, for some word from Murchison. ■ On 25th
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February 1856 he wrote to Murchison:
*I continue to address you as an old friend, but this is the 
last time I shall have it in my power to do so, unless you 
fully and unequivocally retract what I have in the Introduction 
to the Cambrian and Paleozoic Fossils (pp. 75 and 90) called a 
"misstatement injurious to myself on an unequivocal point of 
fact." If you do not make this retraction (for which 
I have already waited too long) it will be impossible for 
me to regard you as a truth loving man...*^^
In late February or early March (the letter is undated) Sedgwick 
wrote thanking Murchison for his reply, adding:
‘The point upon which I especially insisted was this: that the 
order of superposition among the lower Silurian groups given 
in your various papers, in your Siluria map and quarto volume, 
was your own, and that it was not suggested by myself and 
adopted by you on my authority. D.Sharpe tells me now that 
this was the 'general belief' when he wrote his first paper,
I think in t842. This is to me passing strange for no one can 
know as well as yourself that from Welshpool to the W. End of 
Pembrokeshire, there was not one hairs breadth of the 
demarcation of your Silurian base, as laid down in your map, 
that was suggested by myself...'
Sedgwick went on to another reconstruction of events, but felt 
that the difference had finally been more or less pafched up.
On 6th March he reread the last Murchison letter and:
*I find that yours of the 26th last month is less satisfactory 
than I thought it when I sent my answer...'
The blame for the mistake, says Sedgwick, was clearly Murchison's, 
and he should have corrected Sharpe in 1842 when he laid the blame 
on Sedgwick.
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Sedgwick adds that it is not enough;
*... to "Apologise to me in all sincerity for having attributed
an opinion to me which I did not entertain." I did entertain
an erroneous opinion but on your authority.'
Murchison has written 'NO' at the side of the last statement, and 
Geikie (later Murchison's apologist and disciple) claimed that 
'The fact was that both men originally believed Sedgwick's Cambrian 
to underlie all Murchison's Silurian and it is impossible to say 
who first, in actual fact, came to this conclusion.'
Murchison wrote to Sedgwick on 9th March. He claimed that it 
would have been impossible for him in 1834 to give a definitive 
judgement on the contemporaneity of Bala and Meifod, as he had 
hardly examined the Bala area and his responsibility did not 
extend beyond the Glyn Ceiriog area (i.e. Meifod). He had put 
the relationship in the Silurian System believing it to be 
Sedgwick's view - but indeed that it was the general view that the 
N.W. was older.
Sedgwick glanced at Murchison*^ s letter and wrote a mote in 
which his expression of delight was sincere- but on 13th March 
again had second thoughts and again wrote putting sole blame on 
Murchison for the sections.
The relationship rumbled on uneasily in this fashion. There 
was a debate that year in the British Association, and later 
Sedgwick wrote;
'...It was his policy never to acknowledge a mistake, and on 
the matter of fact whether he had made a great mistake or 
had adopted it from me, he never spoke out till I wrung
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an answer from him at the last Cheltenham meeting of the 
British Association, He then, at length, but far too late 
to save his credit as a fair dealing man, did acknowledge 
that the blunder, the actual inversion of the order of 
super-position from Denbighshire to Carmarthenshire, was 
his own, and not in any way borrowed from me.'^ ^
From this time forth the estrangement between the two was 
personal as well as professional. Murchison would have liked to 
patch up the quarrel, but not at the price of admitting himself 
a 'great blunderer'. Sedgwick would not renew the friendship 
whilst he felt himself wronged by a Murchison who had neither 
admitted the blame for the 'key* errors (as Sedgwick saw them) ocr 
aIterecL his nomenclature to readmit the Cambrian. The personal 
dimension hinged on questions of integrity and justice, not on 
scientific issues.
Nevertheless scientific issues of methodology did separate 
the two. In one of his most perceptive passages Secord writes:
'As Woodwardian Professor of Geology at Cambridge University 
Sedgwick presented his subject as part of the cultural 
equipage of the Christian gentleman. In his view, science 
provided a route to moral enlightenment through the practice 
of a soundly based and philosophical method, and a historically 
just and properly founded classification —  such as he 
believed the Cambrian to be ^  was a sign that this method 
had been followed... Where Se(%wick saw his Cambria in 
delation to the moral sciences, Murchison considered his 
Silurian 'territories from hie position as President of the 
Geographical Society... geological classification was 
sanctioned as much by utility and past practice as by any
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philosophical justification..
This is, perhaps, exaggerated. Sedgwick saw correct science as
a way to truth and to find out more about God's world - but
'a route to moral enlightenment* is rather strong. But the
Silurian nomenclature enshrined a poor scientific method in which
68'systems* were defined without a proper base^ and fossils were 
exaggerated in importance compared with sections in defining a new 
system which could lead to a confusion of fossil horizons. This, 
at least, was how Sedgwick saw it.
We may turn now from the more technical side of Sedgwick's 
methodology to consider some of the comments on methodology 
which he made in more general contexts.
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7.4 Notes
1. The lètter, dated 21st April 1831, is in the Sedgwick collection 
in the Cambridge University Library.
2. De Beaumont sent a copy of an extract from his * Researches on some 
of the Revolutions which have taken place on the Surface of the 
Globe* to Sedgwick. It is bound (though not annotated) in one of 
Sedgwick's volumes which remains in the Sedgwick Museum, Cambridge.
3. Presidential Address, Proc. Geol. Soc. Lond.. I83I, 1, p. 311.
4. An annotated version of the second edition, annotated by
R. Birkett of Emmanuel College, is extsint in the University 
library. The book recommendations are:
'Lyell's Geology Volume 1 especially 
De La Beche (dry)
Bakewell for a beginner 
Cuvier's theory of the Q by Jamieson 
Parkinson's Synopsis of Oryctology 
Deshayes'
5. See ref. 3, p. 300.
6. Ibid.. p. 304.
7. Ibid.. p. 302.
8. Ibid.. p. 303.
9* To simply say, for example, that he had an aversion to hypotheses
or a reluctance to indulge in them is an oversimplification.
10. The word 'indicated* is as strong as Sedgwick himself puts it 
(ref. 3, p. 298).
11. See Rudwick, 'Cognitive Styles in Geology* in Essays in the 
Sociology of Perception, Ed. M. Douglas; though Rudwick does in
fact put in a qualifying clause excepting the .earlier geologists.
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Wilson, Lyell's modern biographer, says: 'Lyell sought to 
separate geology from cosmology and refused to consider the 
origin of the earth or its state when first formed.* (Dictionary 
■O f  Scientific Biography, p. 568). Analogously, Darwin and his 
circle refused later to take any notice of apparently strong
refutations of his time scale by Kelvin and Jenkin Abased- on
. established paradigms of physics.
12. De Beaumont (ref. 2), p. 246.
15* Address, p. 507*
14. Ibid., p. 308.
15. Ibid.. p. 512; Clark & Hughes* statement (l, p. 370), that it 
was the study of de Beaumont which led Sedgwick to reject
the idea of a universal flood seems highly unlikely as he was 
already expressing doubt of it by I829, and had renounced it in 
his 1830 Presidential Address in which absence of any reference
to de Beaumont makes it probable he was unaware of de Beaumont * s
theories.
16. Secord, Cambria/Siluria: The Anatomy of a Victorian Geological 
Debate, p. 83. In a footnote Secord does admit that the name of _ 
de Beaumont does not appear in Sedgwick*s actual notes *nor
would one expect it to*. He adds that his account of de Beaumont*s 
influence is *an interpretation based both on the use of strike 
in the notebooks and on Sedgwick*s general acknowledgement of his 
indebtedness to the theory of parallelism at this time.* (chapter 
3 note 48). He calls Sedgwick a 'follower'of de Beaumont on p. I3I.
17* Murchison*s notebooks for the early l830*s (in the Geological 
Society) show e.g. on p. 28 for I832 a tentative section from
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the Stiper Stones to the Longmynd having four or five notes 
each of dip and strike.
18. Secord (ref. I6), p. 44. In fact, of course, all science is the 
discovery of order and structure, and it is hard to see why geology 
should appeal more than (say) astronomy or chemistry. Obviously 
(as Hooykaas and others have illustrated) a belief in a rational 
Creator goes naturally with a belief that science can discover 
rationality and order in nature - and it presumably also goes 
naturally with a view that God has given such order in social
or religious affairs. But Secord is surely saying something more 
than this, concerning the particular form of geological theories.
19. It would, of course, always be open for (say) a Marxist historian 
to argue that Sedgwick's science was affected by an ideology 
based on the concrete economic relationships between the 
Establishment (of which he was a member) and the working classes.
It would be very hard to either demonstrate or disprove this, 
but we would at least be entitled to ask for indications either 
of a different kind of methodology which he might have applied
or a different specific theory he might have espoused, had he 
adopted an alternative ideology. As I have indicated, Sedgwick's 
Catastrophism could equally well be associated with a revolutionary 
creed, and his methodology was consciously based on the ideas of 
two men who lived in a social order of more than a century earlier. 
His methodology certainly did affect his geology: in, for example,
the kinds of assumptions to be made and evidence to be accepted.
I have not been able to discern any analogous specific implications 
of his social or political views - other than a basic belief in a 
rational universe. The detailed exploration of those views, as
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indicated in the Introduction to this thesis, is not undertaken 
in the present study and would merit further work.
20. See ref. 4 above.
21. The notes on Sedgwick's own copy in Cambridge are, however, not 
in much detail.
22. 3rd Edition Syllabus, p. 4.
23. Raised beaches are mentioned on p. 9» and p. 10 refers to the 
proofs of former action of great denuding currents. Sedgwick 
does mention the systems of Burnet, Woodward, Hutton, Werner, 
and Elie de Beaumont (all p. 66) sind his failure to mention Lyell 
is interesting. Lyell's uniformitarianism was, of course, not
a distinct system as such but an over strong presumption - but 
his steady state view is not mentioned either.
24. There was, of course, much contemporary comment, and the 
controversy continued after the deaths of both Sedgwick and 
Murchison. In recent times, historians such as Thackray 
('The Murchison-Sedgwick Controversy', Jour Geol. Soc. Lond.,
1976, 132, pp. 367-372) and Rudwick ('Levels of Disagreement in 
the Sedgwick-Murchison Controversy', Jour Geol. Soc. Lond..
1976, 132. pp. 373-373) have made comment. The detailed study 
is that of James A. Secord, (ref. I6).
23. The Sedgwick journals are in the Sedgwick Museum, Cambridge.
26. The Darwin journals for the period of the tour are published in'"
Paul H. Barrett, 'The Sedgwick-Darwin Geologic Tour of North Wales', 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. 19?4, II8.
146-164.
27. Ibid.. p. 133.
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28. Barrett's material on the actual journal content is useful, but 
his suggestions regarding the religious and personal relations 
of the two men in the period sure extraordinary if not absurd.
From the extreme of the Winstanley-Cannon tradition of seeing 
Sedgwick as a 'Broad Churchman', Barrett goes to the other extreme 
of transporting him to twentieth century America and making him a 
'religious fundamentalist' (p. l46). He was (says Barrett) 
'authoritarian' and 'patronising', and was a 'domineering 
religiously orientated geologist' (p. 149) whom Darwin with his 
freethinking background would have found hard to bear. This is 
highly implausible for a number of reasons. First, Darwin himself 
spoke with evident pleasure of the trip (as Barrett admits) and 
later retained an affection for Sedgwick even through their 
controversy. Secondly, Sedgwick was not given to pious pontificating, 
and his sense of fun made him a generally sought after companion 
when his spirits were good. Thirdly, Darwin at this time would 
have undoubtedly shared in Sedgwick's natural theology and views 
on a Designer (a point reinforced by recent work by Herbert and 
others). Murchison, incidentally, admitted in a letter to 
Sedgwick in I838 (which is published in 'Letters Concerning the 
Cambrian-Silurian Controversy' of I852 by C.R, Craie. Jour, Geol.
—OG*» .19711 127< 483-500) that he believed in natural theology and 
was a theist but not a Christian - though he had evidently enjoyed 
their joint trips and had not felt pressurised by Sedgwick's 
beliefs. Barrett also introduces a couple of supposed inconsistencies 
in Sedgwick's thinking. One Barrett creates by misquoting 
Sedgwick's words: 'We constantly find (fossils) passing into each 
other (in a series of formations in contact with each other)'. The
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parenthesized word 'fossils' is not in Sedgwick's text and he is 
speaking of formations not fossils. Neither here nor anywhere else 
does Sedgwick imply that fossils show a gradual change, and Barrett 
finds inconsistency between this and Sedgwick's rejection of 
transmutation only because he misinterprets Sedgwick. Similarly 
Barrett sees inconsistency in Sedgwick's desire to remove 
denominational barriers to Cambridge University degrees and his 
belief that the finger of God is seen in nature - though Barrett 
does not explain what the inconsistency is supposed to be and to 
many of us it may appear perfectly consistent.
At base, Barrett finds Sedgwick inconsistent because he 
misunderstands his methodological and religious position.
29. Barrett (ref. 26), p. l4l.
30. Ibid.. p. 158.
31. Ibid.. p. 151.
32. Clark & Hughes, 1, p. 379.
33. Clark and Hughes, 1, p. 391.
34. I was able to spend a week in company with a geologist tracing a 
route near Snowdonia which Sedgwick galloped through in an afternoon 
during his tour. His ability to pick out at such speed the main 
lines of dip and strike were surely remarkable.
33. Secord (ref. I6), p. 337. Some of my own earliest work for this
thesis was on the Sedgwick/Murchison controversy, but the publication 
of Dr. Secord's thesis in I98I has covered much of the material, 
and my own treatment necessarily has contracted. I would not 
dissent fundamentally from any of his conclusions, though in my 
view he exaggerates the falsity of Sedgwick's later accounts;
Sedgwick generally bent the truth rather than falsified it.
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56, Secord claims that Sedgwick later greatly exaggerated both his 
reluctance to accept this and his reliance on the supposedly 
irrefragible authority of Murchison. In a letter to Murchison on 
November 7th I832 Sedgwick did refer to the system around Meifod 
plunging under the Berwyns and reemerging 'to the East of Bala 
Lake' from whence he had traced it down to Dinas Mowddy. But 
at that time he equated it with the Long Mountain (actually on a 
higher level). Both men seem later to have accepted that the 
Meifod and Bala were separated at Murchison's instigation - 
though most geologists felt that Sedgwick should share the blame.
37. Sedgwick, Proc. Geol. Soc. Lon.. June 1843, 4, p. 217; the 
area so designated is, of course, the area around Meifod.
38. Sedgwick, Quart. Journ Geol. Soc. Lon.. December l6th l846,
5, p. 139.
39. Sedgwick, Quart. Journ. Geol. Soc. Lon.. February 23th I832,
7f the Second Facilus of July I832 also puts Caradoc in Cambrian 
but above Bala. In a letter to Murchison of November 20th 1842, 
however, Sedgwick asserts: 'I do not, however, believe the 
Limestone to be the same bed with the Caradoc limestone on the . 
east side the Berwyns. For if so, the chain of the Berwyns must 
overlie your Caradoc... which seemed to me a reductio ad absurdum ., 
He says it is possible that the Meifod may be low, but he will 
still 'stick to my old opinion of 1834 - that the Meifod limestone 
is ... many thousand feet over the Bala Limestone...' He says, 
however, that apart from 13 or 20 new species, all are published 
Lower Silurian in the Bala. Perhaps this seemed more significant 
to him by the 1843 resume.
4d. Secord (ref. 16), p. 304.
468
41. Elsewhere in the February I852 article (ref. 39) Sedgwick gives 
the earlier conclusion that Meifod beds were 'a part of the 
Cambrian system series and the fossils seemed to sanction this 
conclusion; for the Meifod fossils and Bala fossils seemed to 
be almost identical in species.* (p. 149)
42. Sedgwick (ref. 39), pp. 149-130.
43. Clark & Hughes, 1, p. 131.
44. Sedgwick (ref. 38). In view of such words, borne out by Sedgwick's 
own practice, it is surprising to read in a thesis by B. Hamilton 
the following: 'Earlier though[pre 1830'sjthe strength of a 
biblically based theology in an interpretive role of geological 
phenomena tended to stress the palaeontological side of geology 
rather than the unfossiliferous stratigraphie aspects.' (The 
Development of Hard Rock Geology, p. 38). Ironically, here it is 
Sedgwick (who was fully committed to an Evangelical faith and to 
the Bible) who espouses structural aspects, against Murchison
(who admitted a lack of Christian faith) who emphasizes fossils.
43. Sedgwick (ref. 39), p. 158.
46. Sedgwick, Phil. Mag.. November I834, 8, p. 36I.
47. Ibid.. p. 369.
48. The letters between Murchison and Sedgwick, unless otherwise stated, 
are either in the University of Cambridge Sedgwick collection, or 
in the Murchison collection in the Geological Society of London 
Library.
49. Murchison, Proc. Geol. Soc. Lon., January 6th 1847
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30. Sedgwick's letter, dated 20th October, has already been quoted 
above - and it confirms the identity of the fossils.
31. In an article, 'King of Siluria: Roderick Murchison and the 
Imperial Theme in Nineteenth Century British Geology, Victorian 
Studies, 1982, 413-443) Secord has emphasized the territorial
factors with Murchison in relation to his military past (see 
also Secord (ref. I6), p. l4-l6).
32. This intention was obscured by the editorial alteration of his 
l844 map for the Geological Society Proceedings to make Protozoic 
equal to Lower Silurian.
33. Letters in early I836 carried Sedgwick's criticisms of Murchison's 
introduction. On March 2?th I838 Sedgwick wrote apologising for 
the 'violent language' he had used in objecting to parts of the 
proofs of the Silurian System, and accepting Murchison's own 
apologies. On 19th April I838 Murchison wrote explaining circum­
stances relating to "B's memoretto" which had angered Sedgwick.
34. Secord seems to imply that Sedgwick had 'failed' in his career 
in the church, and Murchison had in his career with the military. 
But there is no evidence that Sedgwick was ever 'ambitious' to 
rise in the church in this sense - and Secord adopts a scale of
values relating to the church which a man with Sedgwick's family 
background may not have accepted.
33. Clark & Hughes, 2, p. 230.
36. A transcript of a letter dated 24th February 1843 states: 'The 
enclosed is a part of a very wee map of England about to be 
published by the Society of Useful Knowledge ...' Murchison asks 
Sedgwick for advice on igneous rocks and non-fossiliferous slates.
37. See Clark & Hughes, 2, p. 23I; the article was*On the Older
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Palaeozoic rocks of North Wales', 1845, 1, 5 - 22.
58. Clark & Hughes* account is on 2, p. 2l6; Phillips* account 
(as the referee in the case) is in letters of l6th February and 
20th February I856, in the Sedgwick papers at Cambridge University.
59. Clark & Hughes, 2, p. 255.
60. Clark & Hughes, 2, p. 262.
61. See e.g. Clark & Hughes, 2, p. 324.
62. Sedgwick states this in a letter dated 6th March I856.
6 3 . Sedgwick's Introduction to the Cambrian and Palaeozoic Fossils, 
p. 75 and p. 90.
64. The Sedgwick/Murchison letters are in the collections stated in 
note 48. Also in the Cambridge collection is a letter to Jukes 
dated 2nd November I855 in which Sedgwick wrote; 'Murchison has 
had my introduction for many weeks, but no notice of it has come 
from him. If he does not do me justice so far as to withdraw all 
surmise or implication (direct or indirect) that I misled him - 
there is an end to our friendship. I knew he was a vain man; and
I knew that his own reputation was his darling idol, but I was
very loath to think that he was ready to sacrifice historic 
truth to this miserable worship.'
65. Sedgwick believed that Murchison in his anniversary address of 
1843 should have corrected the 'general view' as Sharpe saw it.
66. To Lyell on 28th April 1857 (Clark & Hughes, 2, p. 324).
67. Secord (ref. I6), p. l4.
68. As early as a letter of 23rd December 1834 Sedgwick wrote to 
Murchison: 'In short you have no good base line srnd an immense 
thickness of older transition rocks are below your series.*
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7,5 Methodological Comments in Non-Geological Contexts
7.5»1 Introduction
We have considered comments on scientific methodology which .
Sedgwick made in the context of his actual geological work, and have 
compared him on this with other geologists of his generation. There 
werej,- however, a number of other, more general contexts in which 
he made comments on methodology, and several contemporary non-geolgists 
whose approaches to science may be usefully compared with that of 
Sedgwick. The present chapter, then, will begin with a compaurison 
of Sedgwick and his contemporaries, Whewell and Herschel. It will 
continue vrith an expansion of Sedgwick's own comments on general 
scientific methodology. Then, after a brief comparison with 
Coleridge, it will look at the further particular areas of scientific 
education and of evolution and explore Sedgwick's methodological 
comments in each of them.
7.5.2 Herschel, Whewell and Sedgwick
As we have seen, during the l830's those newly named as 'scientists' 
became more self-conscious as a group. Knowledge, in these a-^ rly 
years, was still regarded as a unified whole. But the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science had more or less explicit 
views on what 'science' was, as distinct from other kinds of 
knowledge. In view of this, it is really no surprise to discover that 
scientific methodology was itself under discussion amongst those 
recognised as leaders in science. Two of the most important of 
these were Herschel and Whewell, and We may now consider briefly 
their methodologies, and compare them with those of Sedgwick.
John Herschel had published his Preliminary Discourse on 
Natural Philosophy in 185I. Whewell's interest in methodology, 
already indicated in his Bridgewater in 1833, showed in the
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methodologically orientated History of the Inductive Sciences 
in 1837, and his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (dedicated to 
to Sedgwick) in 1840. The importance of both in general, and 
to men like Darwin, has been emphasized by modern historians of 
science.^ On a personal level Sedgwick was closer to Whewell, 
but his ideas are closer to those of Herschel. Herschel is 
ontologically naive. He says that we experience 'signals' from 
real objects;
'As the mind exists not in the place of sensible objects, and
is not brought into immediate relation with them, we can
only regard sensible impressions as signals conveyed from
them by an... inexplicable mechanism to our minds, which
receives and reviews them, and by habit and association
connects them with corresponding qualities or affections in 
2.the objects...'
The naif vit^ of this is fairly obvious in that, since we never 
experience objects 'directly', it cauinot be that it is by habit 
auid association that we associate qualities in them with the 
qualities of the signals we receive. The analogy Herschel uses 
(of a telegraphic signal heralding the arrival of a ship) iS 
invalid because whilst we do actually experience the ship and so 
can 'associate' the signal with the ship, we never actually 
experience objects directly. Nor is this criticism mere 
for any reading of Kant, even allowing for the controverted 
nature of ' things in themselves ^ would have revealed the fallacy.
Methodologically, however, Herschel owed little to Kant; 
like Sedgwick his main mentor was Bacon, followed by Newton. To 
Herschei,however, Galileo also shared the honours, and he speaks of: 
'...that great eclipse of science which was destined to continue
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for nearly eighteen centuries, till Galileo in Italy and Bacon 
in England, at once dispelled the darkness; the one by his 
inventions and discoveries; the other by the irresistible force 
of his arguments and eloquence.'^
The tenor of this is highly reminiscent of Sedgwick's syllabus, 
both in content and turn of phrase. Bacon is supreme in 
philosophy of science:
'It is to our immortal countryman Bacon that we owe... the 
development of the idea that the whole of natural philosophy 
consists entirely of a series of inductive generalisations, 
commencing with the most circumstantially stated particulars, 
flnri carried up to universal laws or axioms, which comprehend 
in their statements every subordinate degree of generality, 
from generals to particulars, by which these axioms are traced 
back into their remotest consequences and all particular 
propositions deduced from them; as well those by whose immediate 
consideration we rose to their discovery, as those of which 
we had no previous knowledge.'^
Herschel's more specific methodological comment is also 
Baconian, speaking of 'prejudice of opinion' and 'prejudice of 
sense' in the style of Bacon's idols, and suggesting 'ten rules of 
philosophising' which resemble the Ideas later taken up by Mill. 
Newton is seen as applying the Baconian ideas:
'Whatever department of science he touched, he may be said to 
have formed afresh. Ascending by a series of close compacted
inductive arguments to the highest axioms of dynamical 
science, he succeeded in applying them to the complete 
explanation of all the great astronomical phenomena, and many 
of the minuter more enigmatical ones. ' ^
Herschel sees geology as of great importance (next to astronomy ^ )
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and as involving inductive generalisations in the manner of 
Bacon as he understands him.
Sedgwick cites Herschel in his Discourse^ , but other 
references arc rare and then usually made to Herschel*s scientific 
work rather than to his ideas of science.^ There is no evidence 
that Sedgwick derived anything significant from Herschel which was 
not common to the heritage of Bacon and Newton which they both shared.
The names of William Whewell and John Herschel have sometimes
been linked, and yet in fact Whewell*s approach to the philosophy
and methodology of science is far more sophisticated. His
approach to the history of science was philosophical, and yet
he also believed a history of science was necessary in order to
9develop a proper’philosophy for it. To anyone interested in
the philosophy of science, Whewell is one of the most interesting
writers ever, and it would be tempting here to launch into an
attempt at a full summary of his i d e a s . T h i s  temptation,
however, will be resisted, for there seems little evidence that
Sedgwick (for all the flattering dedication of the Philosophy of
the Inductive Sciences to him) shared Whewell*s sophistication;
thus the merest sketch of his ideas here must suffice.
Whewell began his work on the philosophy of science by making
various fundamental antitheses. Amongst these are 'things and
thoughts’: 'thoughts are something which belongs to ourselves'
whilst 'things ... are something different from ourselves and
11independent of us.' Kant-like, Whewell concludes that
'knowledge implies a combination of Thoughts and Things...
Without Thoughts, there could be no connection; without Things,
12there could be no reality.' But although they are inseparable in 
the mind in any act of apprehending knowledge, philosophy (he says) 
requires their conceptual separation. Whewell then speaks of the
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difference between deduction and induction: 'In the former, we
proceed at each step from general truths to particular applications 
of them: in the latter, from particular observations to a general
truth which includes them.'^^ This sets the background for the 
next fundamental antithesis: Theories and Facts;
'General experiential Truths, such as we have just spoken of, 
are called Theories, and the particular observations from which 
. they are collected, and which they include and explain,are 
called Facts.'
This may sound like a good basis for a distinction between facts
and hypotheses such as Sedgwick and the Geological Society might
have approved. But he goes on to speak of Ideas and Sensations,
in a way which reflects far more the active nature of mental
states and acts. Kant-like he sees space and time as Ideas
because they are general relations among our sensations, apprehended
15not merely by senses but by an act of the mind. The mind is 
active, and not merely a passive recipient of sensations; this 
(again like Kant) forms a starting point for Whewell's critique of 
empiricism. In Section 7 Whewell makes clear his debt to the 
German philosophers, e.g. Goethe and Schiller, and his familiarity 
with that school of philosophy. In Section 9 he reaches the 
often quoted words:
'Man is the Interpreter of Nature, and Science is the right 
Interpretation.'^  ^
But to Whewell this 'interpretation' is literal, not figurative, 
and the import of his aphorism has not always been noted even by 
those who have cited it. If all scientific observation is 
interpretation, then how can there be a distinction between objective 
fact and inductions based upon reasoning ? Whewell passes 
immediately to ask this very question. He concludes:
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'•••in Theory the Ideas are considered as distinct from the 
Facts: In Facts, though Ideas may be involved, they are
not, in our apprehension, separated from the sensafcfon^ . In 
a Fact, the Ideas are applied so readily and familiarly and 
incorporated with the sensations so entirely, that we
17do not see them, we see through them. '
Whewell is aware that there is a close interrelation between
the concepts through which we view and interpret experiences, and
the language (in particular technical scientific language) with which
the concepts are expressed. Here, again, familiarity makes us
forget the difficulties seen when the terms were first introduced,
and scientific terms themselves 'carry with them, in their import,
the results of deep and laborious trains of research.
Those who have emphasized, the ' theory-laden' nature of
observation"*^  have two particular questions to face concerning
the nature of ' truth'. The first is whether theories can ever
be more than mere instruments for prediction,, that is, be true' in
a more literal sense; the second is whether one can ever be
certain that a particular theory is 'true' in whatever sense of
that term one arrives at.^® Whewell denies that there is
21
'any ground of general scepticism with regard to truth'. He 
asserts that 'Geometry and Arithmetic' are areas in which we have 
certain knowledge - though it is not clear as to whether he means 
areas within these which later he tells us contain necessary truths 
(i.e. truths the denial of which would be self contradictory). He 
adds, however, that: 'The doctrines of Astronomy are examples of 
truths not less certain respecting the Facts of the external world.'
This is not very convincing and Whewell gives no elaboration of what 
facts are supposed to be certain. Since he has just admitted that the 
supposed Fact of the stationary earth had at one time the strongest 
apparent evidence, astronomy is a particularly strange area to choose.
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At certain points Whewell parallels Sedgwick. He accepts much 
of Bacon's criticisms of Greek p h i l o s o p h y B u t  his analysis is 
very careful, and distinguishes in detail between different 
Greek schools and philosophers. There may also seem to be a 
parallel in the idea of science as a series of inductive and 
ascending generalisations. Thus Whewell says:
'And thus, beginning with the facts of sense, we gradually 
climb to the highest forms of human knowledge, and obtain from
experience and observation a vast collection of the most wide
24and elevated truths.'
Criticising the Vestiges. Sedgwick says that the author:
'...Is intensely hypothetical... without having any just
conception of the methods by which men, after the toil of
many generations, have ascended step by step to the higher
elevations of physical knowledge - without any even glimmering
conception of what men mean when they tell us of Inductive
25Science and its sober truths.*
Both men saw science as an ascent to higher generalisation,, and 
both saw it ultimately as based on induction: neither had a strong
conception of the hypo the tico-deductive model. Yet the apparent 
similarity may cloak a basic difference in the way that similar 
language is perceived. To Whewell all observation involves 
interpretation, and concepts and theories become 'facts' by 
familiarity. None of Sedgwick's %rritings make any such point, and 
this in spite of a great deal of comment on observation and science. 
Neither Sedgwick nor Whewell were ultra-empiricist, both rejected 
the extension of Lockean empiricism into the moral field. Both 
also rejected the utility approach to morals which correlated with 
empiricists such as J.S.Mill in their era. Yet, at base, Sedgwick 
stood much closer to the true Baconian inductivist-empiricist tradition 
than Whewell. Whilst both Sedgwick and Herschel saw the 'ascent'
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of knowledge in Baconian terms, to Whewell it was very much mediated
by Kantian thinking. Sedgwick actually refers very little in his
writings to Kant. He refers to his idealism^^, and says that
27Kant is not to blame for his followers. He also refers to a
2 8paper by Whewell on Kant • He gives a very Kantian reply to 
Locke - though without mentioning Kant's name.^^ But, and this 
in spite of Whewell's flattering dedication of his Philosophy of 
the Inductive Sciences to Sedgwick, he is not saturated with Kantian 
thinking in the way that Whewell is.
There are certain paradoxes about Whewell. His reputation 
during his lifetime was immense, and extended to all factions in 
the church as well as to the scientific community.^ Yet even 
contemporaries like J.8.Mill failed to understand his position^ "*.
After his death the lack of understanding seems to have continued 
with few exceptions ^  , and his works fell into a strange obscurity 
whilst the less sophisticated and original works on science by 
J.S.Mill continued to be better known.^^ With the apparent 
reinvention of some of his ideas in the twentieth century^^, perhaps 
the scene was set for the partial renaissance in appreciation of 
Whewell which has come since the 1960's,
Though surprising in itself, the apparent lack of understanding 
of Whewell's philosophy, and its obscurity after his death, at least 
reduces our surprise that the writings of Sedgwick (who is so often 
linked with Whewell) not only make few references to Whewell, but 
contain little or nothing distinctively‘Whewellian'in philosophy.
7.5*3 Sedgwick. Generalisation and Theory
What I have called the 'later* period of Sedgwick dates from 
around I83I. In I833 Sedgwick published the first edition of his 
A Discourse on the Studies of the University. This, as one might 
expect, contained some comment on the nature and place of science.
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Bacon, Newton, Ray and Barrow are all eulogised, with a particular
Zlf
accent on Newton. The study of.the laws of nature, says Sedgwick, 
is arduous:
t
"Before he can reach that elevation from whence he may look 
down upon and comprehend the mysteries of the natural world, 
his way is steep and toilsome, and he must read the records of 
creation in a strange, and to many minds, a repulsive language, 
which rejecting both the senses and the imagination, speaks 
only to the understanding. But when this language is once 
learnt, it becomes a mighty instrument of thought, teachixig 
us to link together the phenomena of past and future times. 
Sedgwick was not a naive inductivist.
Sedgwick's appendices also contain comment on science. Picturing 
Newton's work on celestial mechanics as a series of assumptions and 
deductions Sedgwick concludes:
'Nothing can be conceived more perfect than this induction; 
which, starting with laws ascertained by observation, ascended 
by successive demonstrations, and proved that the most striking 
phenomena of the solar system were necessary truths involved in 
the operation of one single mechanical law.
Sedgwick goes on to quote at length Newton's words on hypotheses 
and the method of analysis.Sedgwick applies Herschel's words 
'induction' and 'deduction', and states that in the method of 
induction and analysis Newton is unrivalled, r _ /
For deduction Sedgwick sees two roles:
(i) 'in deducing from first principles truths already known
by observation'
(ii) 'in deducing consequences hitherto concealed in the
unexplored regions of nature.'
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He finishes the section by asserting that, of course, such methods 
only apply to physical phenomena, not to moral or psychological 
ones. But in any context there is no concept of the hypo the tico- 
deductive method. Deduction only operates on truths already 
known from induction. The inductive process led Newton to 
'necessary* truths about the operation of nature. In other words, 
Newton continues to be seen as a supreme exemplification of Baconian 
induction.
Sedgwick's first edition of the Discourse was in I833, two more 
editions followed in 1834, and a fourth in 1835. None added anything 
significant on the nature of scientific methodology. The l840's, 
however, saw Sedgwick entering further controversy in which he 
commented on the nature of scientific method. In l844 Sedgwick 
replied to a paper by William Cockburn, Dean of York, in the British 
Association. As reported in The Athenaeum. Sedgwick said:
'Wherever truth can be expressed in language, it is done as a 
generalization. As we advance in the discoveries of science, 
facts multiply so fast upon us that they would become unmanageable, 
if we could not group them by certain resemblances, or include 
them under some more simple law, which is merely an expression 
of a general conclusion derived from facts which we know to be 
true, and from which all those phenomena proceed as necessary 
and inevitable consequences. The moment we arrive at the 
knowledge of such a law, we can assume, in a sense, a prophetic 
character, and predict events with certainty, because we know 
that the Author of Nature is unchanging in his operations, and 
that the same effects will follow the same causes in times to come 
as in times past.' ®^
Sedgwick has here, of course, an answer to the Humean problem of
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the 'law of uniformity'. Unlike, say, J.S.Mill, who sought
to support such a law through a process of a widebased inductive
argument, Sedgwick sees it as an implication of the nature of a
consistent God. To those of the religious persuasion of
%g
Hume or Mill such an option was not available.
Within his own intellectual framework, Sedgwick's belief in 
the law of uniformity is sound. But what is (by modern standards) 
inadequate, is his picture of the way in which generalisations are 
made. Facts are 'grouped together by certain resemblances', and 
a general law is 'derived from facts which we know to be true'.
Netther elements of the hypothetico-deductive approach, nor a 
concept of paradigm-change, are present here. Sedgwick goes on, 
however:
'We meet together here to extend our generalizations by new 
facts, or to modify those laws at which we had previously 
arrived by embodying all the new truths we have attained, so 
as to bring our generalizations up to the condition of present 
knowledge. In some cases we have tested our general 
conclusions so often that we are as certain of their truth 
as we are of our own existence. There are others in which 
we have not arrived at any such certainty, and it is exactly 
such conclusions, and the facts connected with them, that we 
meet here to discuss. Even in astronomy there are still certain 
residual phenomena, at present not fully explained; but in a 
new science like geology ... it is most advantageous that 
collections of facts, brought-here by observers with different 
views, should be closely examined, in order that one may check 
another, and that laws of phenomena be made out, before anyone 
presumes to put forth any theory of the earth and its formations.'
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Sedgwick here speaks of 'modifying* laws, and of 'testing' them.
However much in theory a scientist of Sedgwick's calibre might 
believe in Baconian induction, he must in practice be aware that 
the process is fallible. Yet his words may still be read (in 
view of his attitudes to earlier 'mistakes' in his geology) as 
seeing such modifications as being needed not because observation 
involves interpretation and a better interpretation might be 
found, but because mistakes are made in impe^ f^ectly applying the 
inductive process.
A further aspect is indicated in the last sentence of the 
quotation. Sedgwick sees the process as climbing to ever wider 
levels of generalization. Theories of the earth's formation are 
at the widest possible level, and can come only after the lower order 
laws are known. He goes on;
'...the discussion of broad theoretical questions and cosmogonies, 
like those now brought before us, is utterly unfit for the 
present meeting.'
He is especially concerned that anyone might (say) try to overturn 
the whole basis of established geology without 'any pezfional knowledge 
of the subject, or a single new fact to offer'. The BAAS purpose 
is 'the examination of facts, either to modify our theories and 
generalizations if we have gone too far, or to bring into harmonious 
order our new facts, by some new and noble generalization.' Again 
we note the phrase if we have gone too far - if the inductive process 
has been imperfectly applied. Although the change from (say) 
Wernerianism to later geology, or Diluvialism to his later views, 
were both clear paradigm changes, both would be seen by him as 
necessary because he had 'gone too far' before. Moreover, to Sedgwick, 
(although he was not in fact totally opposed to theory) facts suid 
theory were sharply defined:
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'Everyone who brings a statement of facts to this meeting, 
asserts his willingness to abide the test of observation and 
experiment; and when a paper is brought here which deals not 
with facts, but with theories and cosmogonies, we should reject 
it altogether, as in its nature unfit for our notice... At the 
same time we are willing to show, on all proper occasions (though 
this be a very improper one), that we are not afraid of facing 
any of the difficulties with which the speculative part of 
our subject may be surrounded.'
This is, of course, totally at variance with Whewell's philosophy 
(published four years earlier) in which facts are seen as familiar 
theories. The context in which Sedgwick sees this (as the rest 
of the article shows) is one of geology. The facts of the types 
and levels of strata are there -actually Cockburn was clear about 
accepting them as the geologists claimed them to be. Now Cockburn 
was putting forward an alternative theory to explain them. Sedgwick 
goes on to totally demolish Cockburn's theory, showing that it simply 
cannot account for the phenomena known. But why does he object to 
the presentation of such a theory per se ? What is the difference 
between a Bucklandian general theory and a Cockburnian one ?
Sedgwick's answer to this is not clear, for he was struggling to 
deal with methodological elements which his Baconianism did not really 
equip him to deal with. Suppose we grant that there are 'facts', 
is there a difference betweoi Baconian inductive generalisation and 
making theories or speculations ? In any event, are such 
speculations jn general improper for the BAAS, or just those which 
are ill informed ? Later Sedgwick says:
'In determining the succession of the strata, or any other 
problem in our science, we must be content to ascend, step by
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step, from small assemblages of facts, to higher generalisations, 
until we obtain the whole sequence.'
Is this a ruling out of speculation per se, or is it just ruling 
out speculation which is made in ignorance of particular 'facts' 
already known ? His actual criticisms of Cockburn turn around 
the point that Cockburn's theory itself contradicts known facts 
- unlike mainstream geology his theories have not 'called in the 
aid' of other specialists such as zoologists, botanists and chemists 
in order to 'regulate our conclusions by their evidence'., Yet Sedgwick's 
own earlier comments seemed to be objecting to speculation or theory 
of any kind, not just ill informed ones. Finally, I regard this
t
question as unresolvable, because the evidence seems to be that 
Sedgwick himself was not sure exactly where his objection lay. He 
had what we might call a 'gut reaction* against certain types of 
theory, but his Baconianism did not provide him an adequate framework 
to formalise his objections into a systematic and consistent position.
Similar comment might be made about Sedgwick's reactions to the 
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (published 1845). We 
have already seen how, in both published and unpublished material, 
Sedgwick reacted violently both to its materialism and to its 
unscientific nature. In a letter giving virtually his first reaction 
on 10th April 1845 Sedgwick spoke of its 'utter ignorance of what 
is meant by induction.' In the actual review he wrote:
'The author is intensely hypothetical, and builds his castles 
in the air, misconceiving the principles of science, or 
misunderstanding the facts with which it has to deal; or, what 
is worse still, distorting them to his purpose. He does «11 
this, apparently, without having any just conception of the 
methods by which men, after the toil of many generations, 
have ascended step by step, to the higher elevations of
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physical knowledge - without any even glimmering conception 
of what men mean when they tell us of Inductive Science
ifl
and its sober truths.*
... the ascent up the hill of science is rugged and thorny...
and ways must be passed over which are toilsome to the body,
and sometimes loathsome to the senses. And every one who has
ventured on these ways, has learned a lesson of humility from
his own repeated failures. He has learned to appreciate the
enormous and continued labour by which every new position has 
42been won;...'
Chambers is also misled by superficial resemblences, is hypothetical,
and is credulous. Sedgwick adds:
'A hypothetical spirit is a good spirit, if it be properly
tempered with knowledge, honesty and sagicity. It is but a
perpetual upward tendency, and a craving for some higher
principle, to bind together new phenomena and disconnected
facts. When thus tempered it leads us not to worship our
first imaginations, and to make all nature bend to them, but it
makes them bend to nature... This has been the governing
principle of the two Herschels, father and son, of Black, of
43Davy, of Dalton, and other great names in modern discovery.*
The erudition of Sedgwick sometimes may mislead us into thinking 
that he has actually been more specific than he really has. His 
words on hypothetical spirits could be read as reflecting a 
Whewellian position - but it really does not. He has no idea of 
hypotheses becoming 'facts' by familiarity. Rather, he may be 
thinking more of what we might call 'conjectures', which we then 
seek to check and verify. He describes in detail his views of the 
nebular hypothesis, concluding:
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'It is a splendid vision, and may vanish in mid air; or, after 
five hundred years of continued observations, it may pass 
into a good substantial theory.' At present, it is utterly 
unfit to form the basis of any system of nature, such as our
44author presumes to erect on it...'
The nebular hypothesis, as put forward by the Herschels, was a 
conjecture, but Sedgwick thought observation would decide it.
We may also note that he is not hesitant in inferring geological 
agents. 'Igneous matter has during many periods been protruded
45
from below - that mountains have risen in succession from the sea. '
Gigantic boulders 'have been driven by floods across our continents,
or drifted by icebergs over our vsuLleys, and perched sometimes on our
mountain tops... There were enormous changes of level; and glaciers
as well as floods played their part in producing these strange 
,46phenomena^..'
Perhaps at base Sedgwick objects again (as with Cockburn) to 
the attempts to erect grand hypotheses by someone who is woefully 
ignorant of the basic accepted 'facts' which that hypothesis seeks 
to explain. This is his point both about the arduous road to 
knowledge and on bending theory to fact and not vies versa. He 
does not object to conjecture or hypotheses if they lead to further 
observation and are made in accord with known relevant facts.
In 1850 Sedgwick published the fifth edition of his Discourse 
on the Studies of the University of Cambridge. It contained the 
text of the original Discourse, sandwiched between a gigantic preface 
and a huge, set of appendices. Both of these show a preoccupation 
with the issues of the Vestiges, seen by Sedgwick in a context of 
much wider issues. Both ramble seemingly haplmzardly through 
numerous tenuously connected topics, with much repetition and 
overlap. Yet, during the course of the work, Sedgwick does make a
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number of statements about the nature of science.
As with earlier Sedgwick works, Bacon is seen as the maestro of
lf7
thinking on the nature of scientific induction, and is often quoted.
As before, Sedgwick*s inductivism gives him no clear guide on what
attitude to take to theory or hypotheses. He asserts:
'All natural knowledge is based on inductive reasoning. We have
learnt to comprehend the mechanical movement of the heavens by
first learning the laws of motion upon the earth. In like-
manner we have learnt to speculate securely on the functions of
■ organised being, during the old conditions of the earth, by first
studying the laws of organic life among the phenomena of living
nature. In every instance we must begin with what is known and
present to us, before we can speculate about what is unknown and
4aremote. To this rule we know of no exception.*
Sedgwick does not use the word 'speculate* here pejoratively. Shortly 
after he adds:
*A good theory embodies in verbal propositions our conceptions of 
natural laws; and these conceptions are all based on observation, 
experiment, or good analogy... A hypothetical spirit may do good 
service; provided it urge us on to make new experiments; but if we 
rest content with it, and, above all if it lead us, as it has too 
often done, to shut our eyes against facts, and to take from 
nature no response but such as suits our fanatical belief of what 
nature ought to be, it must do deadly mischief to the cause of 
inductive truth.*
It is not clear in what sense a theory is 'based on* observation etc.
But in any event Sedgwick sees the role of hypotheses as heuristic not 
as an end product. His idea of progress comes out again later:
*In an advancing science, our theory may be true or false, perfect
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or imperfect; but as it professes to start from ascertained 
phenomena, so must it continue to be in co-ordination with 
such facts as come before us during our progress, or it is good 
for nothing.
By the iS^ O's, one can detect a certain tension between Sedgwick's 
underlying Baconianism, and his recognition as an intelligent 
scientist (perhaps with some effect from Whewell ?) that speculation 
Is an important part of creative science. On the one hand he wants 
to say that theory simply 'embodies' facts, but on the other he 
recognises that theory can be both speculative and yet heuristically 
useful even if later modified. This tension is reflected in his 
later words ;
*A theory must be based on well-observed facts, or it is worse 
than nothing. For theory is but the embodying of facts and 
phenomena under the form of general propositions, drawn out 
in accordance with the laws of our intellectual nature: and as 
our knowledge advances, whether we be led to extend or limit 
the meaning of our first propositions, by the test of observation 
or experiment moat they stand or fall.
A second tension exists between again his acceptance of the importance 
of speculation, but his deep-seated Baconian fear that it will harden 
into unscientific dogma. Thus he says:
'...the best experimenters have ever been the most successful 
speculators. Theory is not the idol, but the animating soul of 
advancing knowledge; and is then only mischievous when it is set 
up that it may be worshipped, as if it contained the highest truth; 
though it be built on an untried foundation, and raised only to the 
level of our shallow knowledge...
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Associated with good speculation are imagination and the use of 
analogy:
'Kepler, by some strange notions of celestial harmonies, was led 
onwards to very great discoveries... The wildest physical notions 
have sometimes led to truth: and we may, perhaps allow that a 
theoretical notion springing up in the mind of man must have 
some suggestion from nature - either as she dwells within himself, 
or communicates with him through his senses. No one can tell 
where analogies are to cease, such as Nature's riches. Let us, 
then, not despise mere analogies; but let us not worship them.
Let us test them honestly; and never pretend to build upon them 
till they are brought into accordance with material facts, and 
under the domain of material law.
According to Sedgwick, Kepler may be contrasted with the Ideal School 
in that the former was prepared to follow inductively ascertained facts, 
whilst the latter 'conjure up analogies... affirm them without proof, 
and build upon them as if they were the accepted principles of 
positive material science. ' Speaking of the Idealists (as we may see 
later) Sedgwick is on reasonably sure ground. But one cannot help 
but feel that some of his applications of praise or stricture to the 
use of speculation and theory have been much informed by hindsight.
One precondition is clear: 'A theory is worse than nothing if it 
reflect not back the present condition of our k nowledg eB ut his 
strictures on past geology go beyond this as he says that geologists'
' besetting sin has too often been a rash and intemperate spirit of 
speculation.'^^ Later he is more specific:
'Of all material sciences. Geology offers perhaps the wildest 
field for speculation; yet, in its true history and progress, no 
science is more practical and inductive. I believe that the 
premature theories of Werner's school retarded its progress by
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more than twenty years.
Yet he does not tell us how at that time they could have been recognised
as premature. His picture of contemporary geologists is suitably
rosy for presentation to the world:
'They are not anxious to form any theory: and if as a matter of
speculation thgr do construct a theory, they profess to base it
on allowed facts and not on vague assumptions, which the progress
of knowledge may prove to be untrue; and at every moment of their
progress they are ready either to modify it, or to abandon it
57altogether, as new phenomena rise up before them.'
At times, indeed, he seems to see in this light even things he 
appears to assert dogmatically. The author of the Vestiges and 
Explanations has argued that linking species may be found to subst­
antiate the theory of evolution, but Sedgwick asserts that (as they 
stand) the organic phenomena of geology do not suggest transmutations. 
'And it is no reply to tell us in return, that other facts may 
hereafter be brought to light so as to modify the nature of the 
evidence before us. This is the inevitable condition of every 
advancing science, and is an excellent reason for using much 
caution in the propagation of any positive dogmatic theory.
This is ambiguous. It could be read as stating that all scientific 
law is tentative. Yet, elsewhere, Sedgwick makes statements like:
'in jNewton's^  hands Kepler's laws ceased to be empirical laws, and 
passed into the highest grade of deductive laws. They became 
necessary truths involved in the very highest and most exact 
conception of a physical truth that man has ever reached.
Kepler's laws were, in a sense,'deductive* given Newton's basic 
assumptions about gravity and given a set of initial conditions. But 
in what sense Newton's assumptions were necessary truths Sedgwick
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nowhere clarifies.
He does speak of how observation may lead to inductively derived 
abstract generalisation, which in turn forms a base for deduct! on:
'Facts, at first apprehended by sense, may in the end pass, by 
successive acts of the mind guided by successive experiments, 
to the side of abstract or ideal truth, comprehended under our 
conception of a physical law. In this new condition they 
become the root of deductive truths - not now in the way of 
experiment, but by the efforts of pure reason.
'We confound not the discoveries of pure reason with the discoveries 
brought out by experiment; but we affirm that in all physical 
reasoning the two are bound together, and that the former cannot 
have any existence without the latter.
Laplace is there used as an example, and in a later place Sedgwick 
cites also the discoveries of Airy on modifications to Newton's rings,
62and of Adams and LeVerrier of Neptune. But Sedgwick is at pains
to emphasize that this use of deductive reasoning begins from inductively 
established laws - the observation and induction come first. He has 
no time at all for pure rationalism.
7.5.4 The Methodologies of Sedgwick and Coleridge Compared
Methodology is one final context for consideration of the hypothes­
ised 'Coleridge* connection. Coleridge was very interested in science, 
and iiaA diose connections with Davy. Like Sedgwick, he praised prantis 
Bacon, but his perspective of Bacon differed radically from that of 
Sedgwick. To Sedgwick, as we have seen. Bacon heralded a new age 
of enlightenment, far removed from the Greek rush to generalise which 
had led to 'idols'. To Coleridge, Bacon was the 'British Plato', 
and his view of Bacon was distinctly rationalistic. Levere has 
explained this:
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'Francis Bacon had stressed that’ the "foretWughtfnl theory 
was "the prior half of the knowledge sought," and insisted that 
experiments, planned in advance, were decisive. Coleridge made 
much of this aspect of Bacon, describing him as the inventor of 
the view of "Experiment, sis an organ of reason." With Bacon, 
Coleridge announced, "sæ with us, an idea is an experiment 
proposed, and experiment is an idea realised." ^
Coleridge could therefore be contemptuous of the Hookean programme 
for 'fact g a t heringand emphasize the active participation of 
the mind in an emphatic Kantian manner. We have already seen how it 
is possible to 'read into Bacon' all kinds of things, and it is most 
doubtful that Bacon would have recognised Coleridge's version of his 
system. Certainly he emphsusized experimentation as the 
interrogation of nature, rajther than passively observing what 
nature might chance to show us, but this is not the same s ub 
recognising the role of imagination in concept formation and the 
theory-laden nature of concepts. Even the experimentation issue 
forms little common ground in a comparison with Sedgwick. In 
chemistry, which wsus Coleridge's own particular interest, the use 
of experiments is psiramount^  but in early nineteenth century 
geology the word has to be used in a specieüL sense to make it 
important. Thus Sedgwick and Coleridge took different aspects 
of Bacon to emphasize.
On Newton they again differed radicsuLly. Levere explains:
'Ksmt smd Laplace had built their evolutionary cosmologies on 
the foundation of Newton's physics. Coleridge, however, saw 
the laws of the planetary system as Kepler's discoveries, . 
believing that Kepler was a far greater genius than Newton.
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This wsus a viewpoint widely shsired by the Naku rphilosophen
in Germany, who admired Kepler's dynsunism, his search for
unity and hsurmony, his recognition of the active role of the
mind in natural science, and even his efforts to deduce a
priori the idesQ. geometric structure of the solar system*
Coleridge saw Newton as tainted with Lockean materialistic
empiricism, and might be described as ' damning him with faint
praise'. On this, as also on the respective systems of Kant
and Laplace on the solar system, Coleridge felt that the imagination
or idea of the system was paramount, the mathematics was clever
stuff but mostly routine. This is in sharp contrast to Sedgwick,
who respected Kepler and saw him as a precursor of Newton, but
rejected any Hegelian or Na b Mr philosophie interpretation of his
work.^^ In truth, the whole basic sympathies of Coleridge and of
Sedgwick were different. Levere states:
"Coleridge's Theory of Life drew on Oken, Steffens and Schelling,
66who in turn were indebted to Kant.'
Sedgwick mentions Schelling in a context of general disaproval of the
school^^, and a criticism specifically of Coleridge for being 
68influenced by it. Oken is mentioned a great deal, and in great
detail by Sedgwick^^, But in Sedgwick's view, although some of
OKen's actual biology was useful, a study of Oken's work reveals: 
"... the depths of mysticism, pantheistic profanity, and arrant 
nonsense, into which a very clever, inventive, emd well informed 
physiologist may sink, when he deserts the track so nobly 
delineated by Bacon, and so gloriously trodden by men like 
Galileo, Newton, La Place and Cuvier. By casting away the
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lessons of inductive truth from the ample stores of his mind,
and taking on himself to spin a web of creation out of his own
brain, by a priori reasoning, he has not illustrated the ways of
truth - he has not honoured nature, but most shamefully disfigured
70and distorted her...'
Coleridge may have had his criticisms of Oken, but one can hardly
imagine him using such language as this. The differences between
the two men, on this as on most other issues, is profound.
Though Sedgwick at times gets near to a very dynamic view of the
role of speculation or theory, he always felt in his heart (in a way
in which, say, Whewell did not) that it was sharply defined from
inductive law. Thus in the most full version of his views on
the Nebular Hypothesis Sedgwick states:
'It is not brought before us as a sure induction from fact or
observation; but rather belongs» to a class of speculations, which,
whether true or false, go beyond our material knowledge...
It is at present nothing better than a splendid vision; and
before it can be received as a physical reality, it must be
71supported by better evidence...'
Sedgwick seems to distinguish three types of entity. In an appendix 
dealing with 'Laws', Sedgwick states:
'When we tell of the union of dead gelatinous matter with the 
galvanic fluid as the beginning of organic life, and call this a 
law of nature, we violate the integrity of language. We are not 
describing a law made out inductively, but we are starting an 
' hypothesis.
A hypothesis may become an empirical law if evidence later supports it# 
*•.. to be a good hypothetical law, it ought to be suggested by the 
accepted facts of nature, and tested by them; so that it may pass 
into the form of an empirical law, or be rejected altogether.
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An empïdcal law *a mere law of observation', admits of degrees:
'but in its best form it irresistably compels our belief.' But 
Sedgwick seems to conceive a yet higher form of law. He states:
'A material law may be a demonstrative consequence of an 
accepted law about which no one doubts; in which case it is a 
representative of the very highest form or material truth, and 
admits not of degrees.*
Sedgwick applies- this to Kepler and Newton. In Newton's hands:
'Kepler's laws ceased to be empirical laws, and passed into the 
highest grade of deductive laws. They became necessary 
t r u t h s . . . •
It is a mystery how so strict an induetivist as Sedgwick could somehow 
derive a more certain and necessary truth than 'ar\ empirical law», with 
only an empirical law upon which to base itself.
7.5.5 Sedgwick. Methodology and Examinations
Around the time of the publication of the 5th Edition Discourse, 
changes were taking place in Cambridge education. In 1845 Whewell 
had published Of a Liberal Education. Amongst its various comments, 
the book suggested the possibility of an alternative Tripos for 
the 'progressive sciences' - amongst which Whewell included geology.
Both Oxford and Cambridge at this time could be said to be 
failing to provide any real incentive to the study of the sciences. 
Attendance at Sedgwick's lectures was purely for interest, it led to 
no qualification - and Whewell was suggesting that henceforth Professors 
would examine. In 1848 Whewell's suggestions bore fruit, and Natural 
Sciences Tripos were established. Sedgwick supported this introduction. 
Though:
'Our highest prizes will still be carried off by those who reap 
their honours in the Mathematical and Classical fields... 
we are bound to produce good intellectual food for all our sons;
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and if they make good progress, even in what we regard our more 
humble and less exact studies, to give them a commensurate regard 
and a public honour.
This was how Sedgwick saw the Natural Science Tripos, Mathematics wsus 
still the queen, but other sciences might take a lesser place. This 
attitude is well in accord with the general attitude at Cambridge in 
this period, as D.B.Wilson has recently commented.^^ Roy Porter, 
in an interesting paper, has examined the effect on Cambridge geology
* 78of the coming of the Natural Sciences Tripos. As well as commenting 
on Sedgwick's discursive but highly stimulating style of lecturing. 
Porter gives some comment on Sedgwick's style of examinations. He 
refers to the unique 'breadth, freshness and intellectual vigour' 
in Sedgwick's early examination papers. The 1855 paper has a note 
appended;
*If in any instance you think you differ in opinion from the 
proposer of the above questions, you are requested to state your 
own opinions without hesitation and to give your reasons for 
them.'
Porter comments on the flow of Sedgwick's papers, working from cosmology 
through physical geography into stratigraphy and palaeontology, and 
usually climaxing with a question on evolution or creation.^^ This 
was a test of the general grasp of natural science and the place of 
geology in it - rather than a technical test of details of geological 
strata or fauna. The papers, as Porter remarks, show an interest in 
methodological patterns of thought, the evaluation and testing of 
alternative theories, and the proper methods of induction. In short, 
the paper concerns itself with methodology more than detail. Some 
of us, indeed, may regret the gradual demise of methodological and 
philosophical elements in scientific examinations which later occuned.^^
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But, rightly or wrongly, Sedgwick did not see himself as educating 
technicians - but having the twofold aim of giving a liberal education 
and at the same time opening a perspective on scientific discovery 
and inductive research methodology.
7,5.6 Sedgwick, Evolution and Scientific Methodolo^
The final topic around which Sedgwick made interesting methodological
comment concerns Darwinian evolution. On a personal level, Darwin was 
introduced to Sedgwick by Henslow in 1831^^  and later that year joined 
Sedgwick for a tour of Wales. Darwin always afterwards spoke 
warmly of this, and later told one particular story of an occasion 
when he was disposed to believe a local labourer that a tropical 
shell had been found in a gravel pit. He continues:
•I told Sedgwick of the fact, and he at once said (no doubt truly) 
that it must have been thrown away by some one into the pit; but 
then added, if really embedded there it would be the greatest 
misfortune to geology, as it would overthrow all that we know 
about the superficial deposits of the Midland Counties... I was 
then utterly astonished at Sedgwick not being delighted at so 
wonderful a fact as a tropical shell being found... Nothing before 
had ever made me. thoroughly realise, though I had read various
scientific books, that science consists in grouping facts so that
-  " 02 
general laws or conclusions may be drawn from them.'
Whilst Darwin was on the Beagle. Sedgwick, along with Henslow, was
83
one of the main instruments in making his name known. Darwin
relates in his autobiography that towards the close of the voyage his
sister wrote that Sedgwick had called on Darwin's father 'and said
■ 84
that I.should take a place among the leading scientific men.' _ The 
later*'controvêrsy'âla hot destroy their friendship, and in 18?0 
Darwin recorded that Sedgwick was 'most cordial and kind' on his visit
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to Cambridge.
Some personal feelings, however, did appear. In Darwin’s 
Origin of Species the following passage appeared:
'Although I am fully convinced of the truth of the views given 
in this volume under the form of an abstract, I by no means expect 
to convince experienced naturalists whose minds are stocked with 
a multitude of facts all viewed, during a long course of years, 
from a point of view directly opposite to mine. It is so easy . 
to hide our ignorance under such expressions as the 'plan of 
creation," "unity of design," etc., and to think that we give an 
explanation when we only restate a fact. Anyone whose disposition 
leads him to attach more weight to unexplained difficulties than 
to the explanation of a certain number of facts will certainly 
reject the theory. A few naturalists, endowed with much 
flexibility of mind, and who have already begun to doubt the 
immutability of species, may be influenced by this volume; but 
I look with confidence to the future, - to young and rising . 
naturalists, who will be able to view both sides of the question 
with impartiality. Whoever is led to believe that species are 
mutable will do good service by conscientiously expressing his 
conviction; for thus only can the load of prejudice by which the 
subject is overwhelmed be removed.
From a philosophical point of view this passage could be aeen as 
extraordinarily prefiguring the Kuhnian concepts of what is involved in 
a revolutionary paradigm change. But, on the other hand, to an 
'inductivist' like Sedgwick, it was not very flattering. The implication 
was that men like Sedgwick were partial and had inflexible minds. Though 
modern critics may have accused Sedgwick of this^ ?, it is interesting 
to note that in I868 (at the age of 83) Sedgwick changed his mind on
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88the antiquity of man. Whatever the truth or otherwise of Darwin’s 
statement, however, Sedgwick did not like it. . Writing to thank 
Darwin for sending him a copy of the book, Sedgwick commented:
’Lastly, then, I greatly dislike the concluding chapter - not as 
a summary, for in that light it appears good - but I dislike it 
from the tone of triumphant confidence in which you appeal to 
the rising generation (in a tone I condemned in the author of 
the Vestiges) and prophesy of things not yet in the womb of 
time, nor (if we are to trust the accumulated experience of 
human sense and the inferences of its logic) ever likely to be
89found anywhere but in the fertile womb of man's imagination.* 
Sedgwick objected not merely to Darwin prophesying (for after all he 
goes on to make his own prophecy), but to the triumphalism associated 
with it. Darwin tried to explain away his words thus:
'My mention of young men being best judges of new theories [?1 was 
not intended for scientists, for however erroneous I remember 
nearly twenty years ago laughing with Lyell over the i d e a . . . ' ^ ^
This reply is totally unconvincing, as even a cursory glance at the 
original passage will reveal. But Darwin seems to have had a genuine 
affection for Sedgv/ick - even in letters to third parties in the height 
of controversy he refers to him as 'dear old S e d g w i c k - and may have 
felt some qualms at having written a passage which few scientists in 
Sedgwick's position would have failed to find insulting.
Sedgwick's letter to Darwin states his methodological objections to 
the book:
'You have deserted -after a start in that tram-road of all solid 
physical truth - the true method of induction, and started us in 
machinery as wild, I think, as Bishop Wilkins's locomotive that 
was to sail with us to the moon. Many of your wide conclusions 
are based upon assumptions which can neither be proved nor
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disproved, why then express them in the language and arrangement 
of philosophical induction ?’
This is a key accusation made by Sedgwick. He repeats it in 
private letters, e.g. to Ov;en:
'Darwin has deserted utterly the inductive track - the narrow but 
sure track of physical truth,- and taken the broad way of 
hypothesis, which has led him (spite of his great knowledge) 
into great delusion, and made him the advocate instead of 
the historian...'
Around the same time, both versions of his review in the Spectator 
carried the following:
'Darwin’s theory is not inductive, - not based on a series of 
acknowledged facts pointing to a general conclusion,- not a 
proposition evolved out of the facts, logically, and of course 
including them...
Darwin made no direct response to this point in his reply to Sedgwick, 
but he did refer both to Sedgwick’s letter and his review in a letter 
to Henslow - who was, of course, a close friend of both men:
’In a letter to me, & in the above notice, he talks much about 
my departing |!about del1 from the spirit of inductive philosophy 
I wish,' if you ever talk on subject to him, you would ask him 
whether it was not allowable (& a great step) to invent the 
undulatory theory [of light addedj - i.e. hypothetical undulations, 
in a hypothetical substance, the ether. And if this be so, why 
may I not invent hypothesis of natural selection (which from 
analogy of domestic productions, & from what we know of the 
struggle of existence & of the variability of organic beings, is 
in some very slight degree, in itself probable) & try whether this 
hypothesis of natural selection does not explain (as I think it
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does) a large number of facts in geographical distribution - 
geological succession - classification - Morphology, embryology 
etc etc, - I sh really much like to know why such an hypothesis 
as the undulations of the ether may be invented, & why I may not 
invent (not that I did invent it, for I was led to it by studying 
domestic variaties) any hypothesis such as natural selection...
I can perfectly understand Sedgwick or anyone saying that nat. 
selection does not explain large classes of facts; but that is 
very different from saying that I depart from right principles of 
scientific investigation.-»^^
A number of suggestions have been made as to the real basis of
the rejection of evolution by men like Sedgwick. Hull, for example,
criticises Alvar Ellegard for viewing the controversy as a ’conflict
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between empiricist and idealist philosophies of science.’ Yet 
Hull’s own unsympathetic approach to Sedgwick leads him to the 
conclusion:
’As is often the case when proper scientific method is invoked, 
Sedgivick was highly inconsistent in its application. Darv/in’s 
reasoning was just a string of bubbles, but his own alternative 
explanation in terms of creative powers which he could not 
comprehend was ’’a legitimate conclusion of sound reason drawn 
from the lav;s and harmonies of nature".. the man was incapable 
of disinterested inquiry.
So in what way did the undulatory theories of light, and Sedgwick’s 
own creation theory, differ from Darwinian evolution ? Whilst, with 
hindsight, we may all accept that broadly speaking Darv/in was right 
and Sedgwick wrong on the scientific issue, is it also true to say 
that Sedgwick was being inconsistent to his own principles of science ?
5 0 2
Few people in history, and even fewer who cared passionately about 
anything, might plausibly lay claim to total consistency at all times. 
Nevertheless there is an underlying consistency, in Sedgwick’s attitude, 
given his own views concerning induction and hypotheses. These 
views were presented above, with quotations, jn parC di\d .
we might summarize them thus;
(a) An inductively known ’theory’ is an embodiment of, or 
generalization from, known facts.
(b) Hypothesis or Speculation may be a useful stimulus to further 
experiment and observation - it is an ’animating soul’.
(c) But such hypothesis should ’reflect the present state of 
knowledge, and at the least not contradict known facts'
(d) Until inductively demonstrated, such hypothesis must never be 
presented as though it were the known and certain product of 
induction.
What Sedgwick was particularly adverse to was the rationalistic 
approach (of Hegel and the German school), of a priori reasoning to 
decide what ’must be’ the case. To Sedgwick it was both unscientific 
(for science was based on observation and induction) and impious (in 
saying what God 'must have’ done in creation).
How, then, did he see Darwin’s theory ? He begins by saying that 
’Darwin’s theory is not inductive’. Surely few could doubt that,in 
any meaning of that term which would make sense to Sedgwick, this is 
simple fact ? If Darwin could have pointed to a number of actual 
observed cases of evolution, and from these generalized, then his 
theory would have been inductive. But both Darwin and Sedgwick knew 
that he could do no such thing. We might contrast this, for example, 
with the hypothetical explanation of a rock formation as a ’raised 
beach’. In such a case, we see similar structures now being created 
by shorelines, generalise to an inductive law, and from that deduce
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the cause of a structure presently far from the sea. But what facts 
could Darwin 'pretend to adduce, as true elements of proof' ? The 
only ones, says Sedgwick: 'are the varieties produced by domestication, 
or the human artifice of cross-breeding.' But, objects Sedgwick, we 
are still speaking of varieties; however dissimilar the animals are in 
appearance 'they are of one species'. Human artifice has not produced 
new species, and left to themselves the animals in any case revert. 
Sedgwick is, of course, exactly right. The only positive evidence 
in any sense of the word is the varieties (not species) under 
domestication. Darwin begins his book with this. To it he adds not 
any observed laws, but a rationalisticaUy deduced 'secondary consequence 
of supposed, or known, primary facts' (Sedgwick's letter); natural 
Selection. Sedgwick does not deny that natural selection takes place, 
but he argues that it must have the raw material of organic development 
to work upon. Not only does Darwin have no observed facts concerning 
the source and nature of variations, but he expressly professes 
97ignorance of them. On most, in fast, of the complicated mechanisms 
Darwin calls into action to save his theory from implausibility,
q O
he professes ignorance of the workings.^ Surely no nne, not even 
T.H.Huxley himself, could have claimed in 186O that Darwin's theory 
was inductively demonstrated ? So, suppose that it is a speculation 
or hypothesis ? Surely Sedgwick allows these to have a use in 
science ?
The answer is that he does, as we have seen, but that he le.s
conditions. Firstly, speculation must not be mistaken for inductive 
truth. If it is,then fact will be bent to hypothesis instead of vice 
versa. Yet, in the passage already quoted, Darwin states: 'I am 
fully convinced of the truth of the views given in this volume.*
Darwin does not suggest his theory spéculâtively, he is 'fully
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convinced’ of its actual truth. So Sedgwick objects:
’Many of your wide conclusions are based upon assumptions which 
can neither be proved nor disproved, why then express them in 
the language and arrangement of philosophical induction ?' 
Speculation on untestable hypotheses should be recognised as such - 
not disguised as inductive truth.
A further condition on hypotheses is that they should be in accord 
with known facts. What were the known facts ? Sedgwick admits that 
"the evidence is scanty’, but evidence nevertheless exists, and:
'So far as it is positive, it seems to me point blank against 
them. As we ascend in the great stages of the Palaeozoic 
series... we have in each a characteristic fauna; we have no 
wavering of species.'
The actual facts of geology are that species are almost always well 
defined. Darwin had explained this away by suggesting enormous 
time gaps between strata. Sedgwick is willing to allow 'millions 
or billions' of years on each epoch but:
'I see no proofs of enormous gaps of geological time... in those 
cases where there is a sudden change in the ancient fauna and 
flora.'
In other words, Darwin has to assume in order to save his hypothesis
99gaps which are against all evidence. On both points (c) and (d) 
above, the Origin of Species fails miserably.
But what of Sedgwick's own theories of creation ? We remember his 
words concerning Chambers:
'I advance no dogmatic theory; I simply appeal to facts, and 
affirm that they do not suggest the theory of development.
On the contrary, they oppose to it, in the present condition of 
our knowledge, and evidence as strong as can be expressed in 
words. The whole blame of a rash hypothesis rests with my
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opponent. A theory is worse than nothing if it reflect not 
back the present condition of our knowledge.
The facts as Sedgv/ick saw them, were that species appeared suddenly 
in the fossil records. He could see no analogous present process by 
which such a thing could be seen to be happening today. On the other 
hand he could see sound reasons on another level for believing in a 
Creator-God. The most logical explanation, therefore, to Sedgwick, 
was that new species were created by a process outside our present 
experience.
Two points need to be emphasised about Sedgwick's viewpoint. First, 
whilst it appeals to beliefs beyond the physical, it is in accord with 
(and no k^ere contradicts) known physical laws. The evidence is that 
appearance of species is beyond present physical explanation, and that 
no hypothetical 'time gaps' exist, and this is exactly what his theory 
assumes. Secondly, however, it is a form of explanation which a 
'materialist'would find unacceptable. A‘materialist'in this context^  
is one who concentrates exclusively on material causes, and forgets 
or denies the larger framework of beliefs within which Sedgwick 
believed science to fit. A materialist, then, would be forced to
accept some kind of theory of evolution — however much its 
'explanations make demands on our credulity, that are utterly beyond 
endurance.' The fact, that Darwin and his associates are willing to 
believe so improbable a theory indicates to Sedgwick an underlying 
materialistic thinking.
Finally, concerning the undulatory theory of light, Sedgwick noted 
elsewhere that it is 'considered, by some of those who have most 
deeply studied it, as well established as the theory of gravitation.
Now Sedgwick was not a physicist, and Darwin was not only no physicist 
but was generally suspicious of mathematicians and physicists.
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But even a brief consideration reveals differences between the 
undulatory theory of light and the Darwinian theory of evolution in 
the l860's. The undulatory theory had been put forward 
to explain known facts about the behaviour of light. It had 
not contradicted any known facts, and it had suggested further work 
to test it, as done in the work of Young and Fresnel. Sedgwick has 
not objected to theories or hypotheses per se, but to any which, 
like Darwin’s, contravene his conditions for their use so c l e a r l y . '•^ 3 
Sedgwick was not ’highly inconsistent’ in his application of 
scientific method.Certainly there were tensions within his 
methodology, but (whatever we think of its deficiencies with present 
hindsight) his comments on Darwin’s theory are essentially consistent 
with his modified Baconian inductive approach to understanding science.
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among the naturalists of Europe.'
85. F. Darwin (ref. 8I), 2, p. I25.
86. Origin of Species (not removed even from the 6th edition - p. 456).
87. Hull, Darwin and His Critics, says: 'After abandoning Wernerian 
geology, Sedgwick remained highly conservative throughout the rest 
of his life ...' (p. 127).
88. Clark & Hughes, 2, p. 440.
89. Extracts of this letter are printed in Clark & Hughes, 2, p. 358, 
and it is given in full in F. Darwin (ref. 81), 2, p. 247-50 and 
in D. Hull, Darwin and His Critics, p. 157-58. All give its 
date as 24th December I859. This date, however, would imply
that Sedgwick (according to the letter) was lecturing in Cambridge 
on the 23rd December (though intending to be in Dent over 
Christmas, and presumably without students), and that Darwin replied 
to the letter on the 26th November, exactly a month before it was 
written. The clearly written date on Darwin's letter to Sedgwick 
would appear to be the correct one, and the date printed for 
Sedgwick's an error, the true date being 24th November.
90. An extract of this letter is given in F. Darwin (ref. 81), 2,
p. 251, but this passage is omitted. The letter is in the British 
Library*
91. The same expression is used in two letters in F. Darwin, (ref, 81), 
(to Lye11, 24th March i860; to Asa Gray, 3rd April I860). It is 
also usèd in two further letters in F. Darwin, More Letters of 
Charles Darwin (to W. Miller, 1st December 1859; to T.H. Huxley,
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25th November 1859).
92. Clark & Hughes, 2, p. 36l, (dated 28th March).
93. Spectator, 24th March and 7th April.
94. N. Barlow, Darwin and Henslow. Letter ll4 (May l4th i860).
95. D.L. Hull ’Charles Darwin and Nineteenth Century Philosophies
of Science', in Foundations of Scientific Method: The
Nineteenth Century (Ed. E.N, Giere and R.S. Westfall), p. 122.
Hull is criticising A. Ellegard's Darwin and the General 
Reader.
96. Hull/(ref. 87), p. 169.
97. We should: 'acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the cause of 
each particular variation' (Origin of Species. 1st Edn. p. 173,
6th Edn. p. 128). 'Our ignorance of the laws of variation are 
quite profound. Not in one case out of a hundred can we pretend 
to assign any reason why this or that part differs, more or less,
from the same part in the parents.' (1st Edn. p. 202; 6th Edn. p. 154).
98. Darwin admits we do not know why hybrids are infertile (1st Edn. 
p. 276, 6th Edn. p. 270), why sexual elements of species have 
become modified to make them mutually infertile (6th Edn. p. 290, 
not in 1st Edn.), why we find no records of the swarming living 
creatures which must have populated primordial periods (1st Edn. 
p. 313, 6th Edn. p. 315), what conditions are most favourable for 
the multiplication of new and dominant species (1st Edn. p. 328, 
omitted from 6th), 'how profoundly ignorant we are with regard to
the many and curious means of occasional transport' (1st Edn. 
p. 393, 6th Edn. omits 'profoundly'), and the causes of new features 
arising in embryos (1st Edn. p. 426).
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99» Though few practising biologists today would doubt evolution, 
the continuing failure to find evidence for the large time gaps 
in the geological record which Darwin wanted, led Niles Eldredge 
and Stephen Jay Gould to formulate their theory of punctuated 
equilibria - evolutionary change in a series of jumps. For 
some general references see the report of a historic Chicago 
Conference (Science, 21st November 1980, 210), and for a 
particular application, Tom Kemp, 'The Reptiles that Became 
Mammals', New Scientist, 4th March 1982, 93, 381-384^ ^
100. 3th Edition Discourse, Ixxi.
101. Ibid.. p. 103. I
102. See F. Darwin, More Letters of Charles Darwin. 1, p. 134-3.
103..Interesting,concerning hypotheses, is the 'Glen Roy' episode.
In 1838 Darwin spent some days examining the apparent 'parallel 
roads' along the sides of Glen Roy, and in 1839 published
'Observations on the Parallel Roads of Glen Roy'. (Phil. Trans 
Roy. Soc. Lon., l839). He suggests they are raised beaches, 
rejecting the idea of an inland lake. The Royal Society 
submitted the paper to Sedgwick as a referee, and his report is 
printed as Appendix B in Rudwick's, 'Darwin and Glen Roy: A 
"Great Failure" in Scientific Method?', (Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci.. 
1974, 98-183). Sedgwick remarks that it: 'contains much
original research, much ingenious speculation, and some new and 
very important conclusions.' Sedgwick recommends printing it - 
his criticisms are almost all stylistic ones. Sedgwick had no 
objection to 'speculation' provided (as Darwin's made its case) 
it was based on facts and did not actually conflict with other 
known facts - and provided too that it was recognised as part
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speculation. Later, in 1847, Darwin stuck to his theory against 
a glacier theory in a letter never published (given in Paul 
Barrett, 'Darwin's "Gigantic Blunder"'^  Journal of Geological
Education, 1973, 19-28). Later, he finally had to admit
that his theory was wrong and the glacier theory correct - seeing 
his early paper as a 'great failure'. Rudwick's paper contains 
a very useful discussion of the various methodological and 
psychological pressures operating in the incident. From our 
present viewpoint there are two interesting corollaries. First, 
it shows Sedgwick was not adverse to speculation - and from 
Darwin at that - provided it was of a particular kind. Secondly, 
it shows that Darwin could (from Sedgwick's viewpoint) be in 
too much haste to dogmatise over hypotheses - and later turn 
out to be completely on the wrong track. When, with hindsight, 
we see Darwin as one of the 'super heroes' of science, he may 
become invested with an aura of scientific surety. But he may 
not have appeared so to his contemporaries. Could not the Origin 
of Species have turned out as the Glen Roy paper ?
1q4. Hull, (ref. 87), p. I69. Poor Fleeming Jenkin has even worse
treatment. His review is actually a model of scientific caution, 
but in it he rightly points out that the evolutionary theory has 
little positive evidence, needs a lot of ad hoc assumptions, and 
is in direct conflict on the time issue with apparently well 
inductively based and tested physical laws. For this, Hull 
places him with the 'arrogant physicists' on p. 349»
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7.6 Sedgwick's Ideas on Revelation and Geology
7.6.1 Science, Religion and Materialism
A major theme of this thesis has been the interplay of religious 
and scientific ideas. This final chapter will contain a certain 
amount of recapitulation and drawing together of themes, but will 
also look more specifically at the actual relationship as perceived 
by Sedgwick between Genesis and his geology.
Scientific methodology might be affected by religious ideas in 
the following particular ways:
(i) By a mixing of 'moral' and physical concepts. This could 
be: (a) by using teleological and moral arguments to decide
what physical structures 'must be' (arguing from 
moral to material) 
or (b) by 'reduction' of moral concepts to material ones 
(arguing from material to moral)
(ii) By assuming that Divine revelation (i.e. the Bible) could 
actually teach us scientific facts.
All three of these were unacceptable to Sedgwick, but unfortunately 
he did not always separate them clearly from other issues. The 
matters are also further complicated by the fact that (i)(b) is not 
at all the same issue as that of revelation. The materialism of
(i)(b) effectively denied the reality of a 'moral' sphere, perceived 
in a Sedgwickian dualism; yet that moral sphere was not known only 
through Scripture but also through the natural theology of conscience, 
More was at stake, in Sedgwick's view, than Biblical literalism - or 
even than Christian doctrine. Thus, whilst (i)(b) did conflict with 
Scripture as Sedgwick saw it, it also conflicted with a belief in 
the reality of a whole sphere of human experience.
Further complication arises because to Sedgwick the term
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’materialism’ implied more than one aspect. The fundamental 
meaning of the term is a denial of ultimate reality to anything 
other than the material, but it has two facets:
(1) A reductionism of type (i)(b) above - regarding ’moral’ 
phenomena as by-products of material causes. Effectively 
this denies ultimate reality to human experiences of will, 
volition, right and wrong.
(2) A denial of ’final cause’, or ultimate design behind the 
universe. Effectively this denies any reality to Divine 
will, volition, and legislation of right or wrong for a created 
world.
These two facets are explicitly linked by Sedgwick in the passage 
quoted above on p. 14.3 of this thesis. That passage also makes clear 
the fact that early defenders of spontaneous generation and evolution 
(in Sedgwick’s view) were all materialists in both aspects of that 
term. But he nowhere says that they were ’rank materialists’ 
because they believed in evolution. Evolution is a necessary 
part of materialism, but does not necessarily imply it. Thus 
Sedgwick immediately continues:
'But a doctrine may be true and yet may be turned to evil 
2purposes.*
Sedgwick nowhere implies that evolution in itself conflicts either 
with the concept of final cause or with Biblical revelation.^  Both 
his reviews (of Vestiges and of Origin of Species) reject the 
doctrines of evolution as 'little better than a phrensied dream’ on 
scientific and geological grounds. Nevertheless, Sedgwick is 
suspicious of evolutionists, because of the association of the 
doctrine with materialism. He does, moreover, detect different
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aspects of materialistic thinking behind both books. The Vestiges 
did accept final causes, and saw a Creator as behind all the 
development; but, on the other hand, it very clearly adopted 
a materialistic reductionism - as described in point (1) above.
As we have seen, in both his review and in the lengthy comments in 
the 3th Edition Discourse, Sedgwick focussed mainly on this 
reductionism in his moral indignation against the Vestiges. He 
attacked the evolution scientifically because he believed it to 
be scientifically untenable and he wished to remove the cloak of 
apparent scientific respectability from a schema he regarded as 
pernicious and materialistic. But the evolution was not the essence 
of what made Vestiges a 'dish of rank materialism'.
Chambers had shown the facet of materialism shown in (1). Darwin,
in contrast, did not make any significant comment in the Origin of
Species on this kind of reductionism. On the other hand, Darwin
did seem, to Sedgwick, to be showing signs of (2) and denying final
cause. So Sedgwick wrote to him:
'There is a moral or metaphysical part of nature as well as a
physical. A man who denies this is deep in the mire of folly.
'Tis the crown and glory of organic science that it does through
final cause, link material and moral; and yet does not allow us to
mingle them in our first conception of laws, and our classification
of such laws... You have ignored this link; and, if I do not 
mistake your meaning, you have done your best in one or two
pregnant cases to break it...'
Sedgwick puts this more strongly in his review: He 'utterly detests' it,
(original version) or has a 'deep aversion' (revised version) to the
theory, because:
'... it utterly repudiates final causes, and thereby indicates a 
demoralised understanding on the part of its advocates. By the
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word ’demoraliiSed' I mean the want of capacity for understanding 
the force of moral evidence, which is dependent on the highest 
faculties of our nature. What is it that gives us the sense of 
right or wrong, of law, of duty, of cause and effect ? What is 
it that enables us to construct true theories on good inductive 
evidence ?... By gazing only on material nature a man may easily 
have his very senses bewildered... he may become so frozen up, by 
a too long continued and exclusively material study, so as to lose 
his relish for moral truth...* 4 
There are two basic issues here. Firstly, Sedgwick reasserts the 
reality of the ’moral' sphere. If we are no more than highly developed 
animals, then our sense of right and wrong, duty, God, and indeed 
our belief that our minds can comprehend truth, arê prestiBablY all 
a*cheati Sedgwick asserts that we cannot speculate on man's position 
in nature if we 'keep his highest faculties out of our sight.' It 
is not that evolution in itself would imply this (though naturally 
Sedgwick does not state this strongly). It is that he detects a 
materialist undertone in the work. One aspect of this was explored, 
for example, in part 7.5.6 of this thesis: the materialist
refusal to consider explanations other than material ones. But there 
may be another aspect of it - an indication that Darwin has 
perhaps '-gazed too long on material nature ', he has lest his sense
of wonder and what we might call 'God-consciousness'. Sedgwick, 
in his Discourse, had recommended a study of the Newtonian philosophy 
because:
'It teaches us to see the finger of God in all things animate and 
inanimate.''
This did not mean that Sedgwick inserted pious pronouncements in the 
middle of sober scientific accounts, but it did mean a certain sense
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of wonder at nature. He evidently finds it lacking in Darv;in's 
Origin of Species, and illustrates this by referring to Darwin's 
'natural selection' explanation of the hive bees' skill in construction 
of honeycomb. Not only does Sedgwick find Darwin's actual 
explanations incredible, but he adds in his letter that the passage 
has offended his ‘moral taste'. Darwin, for example, had written:
•By such modifications of instincts which in themselves are not 
very wonderful ... I believe that the hive-bee has acquired, 
through natural selection, her inimitable., architectural powers.'
But to Sedgwick it was all very wonderful, and he could see the hand 
of a Creator behind it whatever the mechanism. In point of fact he 
finds Darwin's suggestion physically incredible, but even if he had notî 
'Take the case of the bee cells. If your development produced 
the successive modification of the bee and its cells (which no 
mortal can prove), final cause would stand good as the directing 
cause under which the successive generations acted and gradually 
improved.'^
Evolution itself would not says Sedgwick - even if by natural selection 
necessarily negate final cause. But Darwin, to whom it was 
apparently not very wonderful, has no vision of it. Yet Darwin 
does not realise (Sedgwick would have said) that once the theistic 
framework is removed, • the rational base for all that is truly human 
(including confidence in our inductive powers) will crumble with it.
Sedgwick, then, was not objecting to evolution per se, sus 
materialistic, though he sees Darwin's book as so. Darwin lacked the 
intense 'God-consciousness' of a Sedgwick (or a Miller, a Kingsley, or 
even a Gray). There has been considerable debate both over whether 
Darwin was or was not actually a theist when he wrote the Origin,
8and over whether he perceived natural selection as excluding design.
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If natural selection is said to be by 'chance* is this word being 
used inductively and scientifically or metaphysically ? To Sedgwick, 
in any case, the word had no mesuiing when applied to the supreme 
prescient intelligence of God^ . Darwin's contemporary supporters 
did not all agree on it, and neither do modern evolutionary biologists/^ 
In any event, it is this question which makes Sedgwick see the Origin 
as a 'dish of rank materialism' - not the evolution as such. As we 
have seen, God could very well have directed a process of bee evolution, 
so presumably the same applies to a whole process of organic 
development.
Now that we have reached this point in our recapitulation it 
niay be well to set out in a set of short statements the various 
aspects of Sedgwick's views on these related issues. Most have 
already been dealt with, but putting them together may help (in the 
face of the various modern writers who accuse Sedgwick of various 
forms of absurd inconsistency) to demonstrate his basic consistency:
(A) Teleological arguments from final causes may have some use 
in biology, but none in physics or geology.
(B) Experience of the moral and volitional sphere cannot be 
reduced to the material.
(C) Though 'moral' and 'material' cannot be mixed at the level of 
immediate cause (as in (8) or (B)) yet they may ultimately
be linked 'at the top' since reason finally leads us to believe 
that the same personal divinity experienced in the moral and 
personal sphere is the person who has designed and who sustains 
the physical laws. Thus knowledge is ultimately unified/^
(D) Though natural theology (working both from the conscience and 
from physical observation) indicates a Creator-God, it cannot
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teach us the details of God’s way of redemption. These are
1 4given us by revelation in the Bible. '
(E) The Biblical revelation is a moral and spiritual guide, and is 
not intending to teach us physical truth. The latter rests 
on observation and induction, not revelation.
(F) Nevertheless, since it is the same God who both wrote the Bible 
and created the world we may expect the two sources of knowledge 
ultimately to be in harmony.
As this thesis has already emphasized, many of these points are 
in line with the tradition established by Francis Bacon, and Sedgwick 
often explicitly refers to him. Thus, e.g., on point (R)‘
'Of organised beings we know the beginning and the end, and we 
know the leading purposes to which their organs are subservient. 
Hence, in speculating about the functions of organic structure 
we may often use the doctrine of Final Cause as the foundation 
of our reasoning and the source of true induction. This we cannot 
do in questions that are purely physical: for while we contemplate 
any great physical law we neither know its beginning nor its end; 
neither do we comprehend its whole purpose. Thus, while analysing
the properties of light by direct experiment, we should only 
desert the true road to discovery were we to turn aside to 
Consider the adaptation of light to our wants; or to the anatomy 
of the eye, and its fitness to convey the impressions of light 
to the vi5Vid- sense. Bacon saw this distinction clearly, and 
wrote well upon the misapplication of final causes... "The handling 
of final causes, mixed with the rest in physical enquiries, hath 
intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and 
physical causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon these
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satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice
If f
of further discovery...
The exception made for biology is perhaps in reference to the work of 
Cuvier and those who followed him. In such work, the assumption is 
made that each organ has a function, and this assumption has proven 
fruitful rather than sterile to scientific discovery.
Does Sedgwick violate his own principle in his comments on 
evolution and creation ? He would be violating (l) if he were 
to argue that because the world was made to God's design therefore 
we know a priori that species must appear suddenly by creation and 
without any genetic descent. But I know of no place in which 
Sedgwick makes any such assertion. Rather, he claims that the 
sudden appearance of new species by creation is a fact known by 
strictly scientific induction from the fossil record. Rtfcar having 
failed on a scientific basis to see any way of accounting for such 
phenomena on the basis of present known scientific laws,
Sedgwick turns to a higher level of knowledge and claims(true to his 
strictly empiricist theology) that there is no a priori reason - given 
a creator - why that creator should not have used a different 
principle of action at different times. It is Chambers, not' 
Sedgwick, who makes pronouncements on what God 'must have' done; 
and it is Darwin, not Sedgwick, who argues a priori for the truth of 
natural selection;
18On point (D), as on a number of other issues , Sedgwick follows 
his Mentor Bacon fairly directly:
'But if the Bible be a rule of life and faith - a record of 
our moral destinies - it is not (I repeat), nor does it pretend 
to be, a revelation of natural science. The credibility of 
our religion depends on evidence internal and external. Its
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internal evidence is seen in the coherence of its design from 
its first dawning to its day spring from on high " in its 
purity and moral dignity  ^in its exalted motives fitted to 
call forth man's highest moral and intellectual energies 
Its external evidence mingles itself in a thousand ways with 
the internal- but finally resolves itself into the strength 
of human testimony, proving that God has at many times made 
a visible manifestation of his power on earth; promulgating 
among mankind a rule of like, enforcing it by the terror of 
penal sanctions, and confirming it by miracles publicly 
wrought in attestation of its truth. Physical science on 
the contrary, derives no support from internal evidence or 
external testimony; but it is based,on experiment alone, is 
perfected by induction, and is drawn out into propositions by 
a rational logic of its own. To confound the ground works of 
philosophy and religion is to ruin the superstructure of 
both: for the bases on which they stand, as well as their 
design, are absolutely separate; and we may assume it as an 
incontrovertible truth, that the inductions of philosophy 
can no more be proved by the words of revelation, than can 
the doctrines of Christianity be established by the investiga­
tions of natural science .
'... if there be religious truth, as there assuredly is, it 
must be in its essence different from physical truth, and 
must rest on a different foundation: - and that if there be, 
as there is, a real demonstrative body of physical truth, 
it must also rest on its own foundations, which are in no 
wise to be confounded with moral evidence. But truths.
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though distinct, are not therefore in conflict; and though ' 
resting on different foundations they may give help and 
support to one another.
This was written in 1849, and it essentially agrees with his views 
in 1825:
'The authority of the sacred records has been established by 
a great mass of evidence at once conclusive and appropriate; but 
differing altogether in kind from the evidence of observation 
and experiment: by which alone truth can ever be established.
It must, therefore, at once be rash and unphilosophical to 
look to the language of revelation for any direct proof of 
the truths of physical science. But truth must at all times 
be consistent with itself. The conclusions reached on the 
authority of the sacred records may,therefore, consistently 
with the soundest philosophy, be compared with the conclusions 
established on the evidence of observation and experiment; 
and such conclusions, if fairly deduced, must necessarily be 
in accordance with each other ...' *
Sedgwick was explicitly following Bacon when he viewed revelation 
and science as based on different foundations, and involving 
different approaches to the discovery of truth. Yet, as the last 
quoted sentence shows, he also followed Bacon in believing that 
the two would ultimately be in harmnny:
'It is an assured truth, and a conclusion of experience that 
à little or superficial knowledge of philosophy may incline 
the mind of man to atheism, but a further proceeding therein 
doth bring the mind back again to religion: for in the entrance 
of philosophy, when the second causes which are next unto
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the senses, do offer themselves unto the mind of man, if it 
dwell and stay there, it may induce some oblivion of the highest 
cause; but when a man passeth on farther, and seeth the 
dependence of causes, and the works of Providence, then according 
to the allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that 
the highest link of Nature's chain must needs be tied to the 
foot of Jupiter's chair. To conclude, therefore, let no 
man upon a weak conceit of sobriety, or an ill-disposed 
moderation, think or maintain that a man can search too far, 
or be too well studied in the book of God's word, or in the 
book of God's works; divinity or philosophy; but rather let 
men endeavour an endless progress or proficence in both ; only 
let men beware that they apply both to charity, and not to 
swelling; to use and not to ostentation; and again, that they 
do not unwisely mingle or confound those learnings together.
Consistentlyjthroughout his life, Sedgv;ick reaffirmed that there was 
nothing to fear from advancing knowledge. The knowledge produced by 
true scientific induction would always ultimately harmonize with the 
right interpretation of Scripturet
'No opinion can be heretical but that which is not true. 
Conflicting falsehoods we can comprehend- but truths can 
never wage war against each other. I affirm, therefore, that 
we have nothing to fear from the results of our enquiries, 
provided they be followed in the laborious but secure road of 
honest induction
7,6.2 Sedgwick on Revelation. Creation and the Flood
Sedgwick, as we have seen, was confident that the findings of 
science would ultimately harmonise with revelation. How, then, did 
he himself see the harmony of the Biblical accounts of (i) the
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creation, and (ii) the Noachic flood, with scientific findings ?
Before commencing consideration of these issues, it needs to be 
said that the material for determining Sedgwick's views on them is 
scanty. He usually refused to commit himself on any kind of detail, 
both in published work and in private letters. Nevertheless what 
materials there are may be set out here.
To begin with the creation issue, there are actually two 
questions of interest. One of these concerns the way in which 
the Genesis creation accounts might be harmonised with the geological 
records as Sedgwick understood them. The other concerns whether, 
in his view. Genesis contradicted evolution as such.
Before ever Sedgwick began his geological work, geology had
begun to suggest great periods of time before man appeared on the
25
earth. As we have already seen the two main ways in which harmony 
with Genesis was sought, were forms of the 'gap-theory' and the 
'age-day' theory. In his 1st Edition Discourse in 1833, Sedgwick 
Wrote:
'The Bible instructs us that man, and other living things, have 
been placed but a few years upon the earth; and ' the physical 
monuments of the world bear witness to the same truth. If the 
astronomer tells us of myriads of worlds not spoken of in the 
sacred records; the geologist in like manner proves (not by 
arguments from analogy, but by the incontrovertible evidence of 
physical phenomena) that, there were former conditions of our 
planet, separated from each other by vast intervals of time, 
during which man, and the other creatures of his own date, bad 
not been called into being. Periods such as these,belong not, 
therefore, to the moral history of our race; and come neither 
within the letter nor the spirit of revelation. Between the 
first creation of the earth and that day in which it pleased
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God to place msm upon it, who shall dare to define the interval ?
On this question Scripture is silent: but that silence destroys
not the meaning of those physical monuments of his power that
God has put before our eyes...'
Sedgwick then goes on to say that whatever difficulties there may be
in geology, the answer is not to fabricate a fanciful 'Scriptural
geology' but to stick to inductive facts,sure in the knowledge that
ultimately scientific and theological truths will harmonize. But
the actual schema put forward here is the gap-theory. It depends
upon two assumptions. The first is that man is relatively recent
(which Sedgwick assumes), and the second is that some kind of
catastrophe separates the periods of previous fauna from those of
today. In this case, Sedgwick argues, just as the Bible tells us
nothing about beings on other worlds (which from analogy based on
astronomical discoveries we may believe exist), so it tells us
nothing about beings or fauna prior to our own era. This was
much in line with Evangelical thinking on the issues, and the
passage closes with a word from Chalmers (who espoused the gap-theory)
that Christianity has nothing to fear and everything to hope for
from the advance of 'philosophy' (i.e. of science).
Later in his Discourse Sedgwick added the comment:
'Another indiscretion (far different however from the egregious
27Tollies I have just noticed ) has been committed by some 
excellent Christian writers on the subject of ©eology. They 
have not denied the facts established by this science, nor have 
they confounded the nature of physical and moral evidence: but
they have prematurely (and therefore, without an adequate 
knowledge of all the facts essential to the argument) 
endeavoured to bring the natural history of the earth into a
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literal accordance with the book of Genesis - first, by 
greatly extending the periods of time implied by the six days 
of creation (and whether this may be rightly done is a question 
only of criticism and not of philosophy) - and secondly, by 
endevouring to show, that, under this new interpretation of its 
words, the narrative of Moses may be supposed to comprehend, 
and to describe in order, the successive epochs of Geology.
It is to be feared that truth may, in this way, receive a double 
injury; and I am certain that the argument, just alluded to, 
has been unsuccessful. The impossibility of the task was 
however (as I know by my own experience) a lesson hard to learn: 
but it is not likely again to be attempted by any good Geologist. 
The only way to escape from all difficulties pressing on the 
question of cosmogony has been already pointed out. We must 
consider the old strata of the earth as monuments of a date 
long anterior to the existence of man, and to the times ; 
contemplated in the moral records of his creation. In this 
view there is no collision between physical and moral truth.
The Bible is left to rest on its appropriate evidences, and its 
interpretation is committed to the learning and good sense of 
the commentator: while Geology is allowed to stand on its own
basis, and the philosopher to follow the investigations of 
physical truth, wherever they may lead him...'
Sedgwick, then, is highly critical of the age-daÿ theory, in favour 
of a gap-theory. Which of the two theories was 'really' more 
exegetically and geologically convincing in the period is not our 
concern. But Sedgwick seems to favour the gap-theory because it 
(for the time being at least) left him free to take a very Baconian
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approach, with both exegesis and geology each resting on their 
separate bases, neither interfering with the other. The age-day 
theory, on the other hand, requires the expositor to read, 'yoo^ \ (day) 
as a long time period, and requires the geologist to find the 
actual epochs to match those of Genesis.
Unfortunately even the erudition of a Sedgwick cannot make this 
sound plausible. The gap-theory equally requires the expositor 
to allow a large gap somewhere in Genesis 1.1-2, and (presumably) 
to allow '’tohu and bohu' (without form and void) to imply a derivative 
state of catastrophe. On the other hand it tells the geologist that 
he must expect ultimately to find traces of a world-wide catastrophe 
and complete new start to fauna. It is pure wishful thinking to see 
the gap theory as leaving science and rPlevation as independent.
In the mid l840's we have a glimpse that Sedgwick is holding to
the same views. One side of a correspondence is extant between
Sedgwick and Richard Gwatkin, who also wrote to Whewell on scientific
and religious matters. On 10th May 184-2 Gwatkin wrote to Sedgwick:
*I did. not misunderstand you to say that Moses could not be
reconciled with the facts of Geology. You have expressed
yourself tjuite well on this point, viz that all collision is to
be avoided by placing the Mosaic account at the end of the
geological period instead of considering it as you once thought
to be descriptive of that period. Your opinion is so strongly
expressed as to be enough to stagger a mere book geologist
who inclined to the latter view. On that account I felt a wish
that you had more fully expressed the grounds of your present 
29position.-..*
The latter wish is one which others of us may share. But we learn 
from this (and perhaps it is strongly hinted in Sedgwick's words
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'as I know by my own experience' in the passage quoted above) that 
Sedgwick had formerly espoused the age-day theory himself. He was 
often the most vehement against views once held himself but later 
rejected^
In January 1845 Gwatkin wrote again, commenting on a tract on 
the age-day theory which he had published. Sedgwick has (he says) 
'allowed much more than I was prepared to expect', though has said: 
'every attempt must at present fail'.
According to Clark and Hughes it was 'soon after 1844' that 
Sedgwick wrote on the issues to 'a friend'. The imprecision and 
abridgement in this instance are irritating to us, since so little 
material is available on this aspect of Sedgwick's thinking, but 
in default of the original letter, the Clark, and Hughes extract 
is produced below:
'The first two verses (of the first chapter of Genesis) are 
an exordium, declaring God the Creator of all material things, 
and I believe it means, out of nothing, at a period so 
immeasurably removed from man as to be utterly out of the reach 
of his conception. After the first verse there is a pause 
of vast and unknown length, and here I would place the periods 
of our old geological formations, not revealed because out 
of the scope of revelation. We are then told that 'the earth 
was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of 
the deep.' Who can dare to say that he comprehends these 
short and mysterious words? They may, perhaps describe the 
condition of the earth after one of the many catastrophes 
by which its former structure had been broken up, and of which
we can, on its present surface, find so many traces. But 
these are speculations. I value them not, for they are,
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perhaps, worse than nothing. After the word 'deep' there is 
a pause. The work of actual present creation now begins.
The spirit of God broods over the dead matter of the world,
and in six figurative days brings it into its perfect fashion and
fills it with living beings.
Why may He not have manifested His power while His spirit 
moved on the waters in ten thousand creative acts never 
revealed (because unconnected with the moral destinies of 
man), yet recorded in clear characters on stony tablets to 
be read and admired in after-times by the descendents of the 
last created being, to whom faculties were given whereby 
they might comprehend the laws of th- material world, and 
rise from them to some faint, glimmering perception of their
3 0
Creator's glory?'
In 1830 the fifth edition of his Discourse was published. In
spite of Sedgwick’s friendly correspondence with Hugh Miller from the
mid-forties, and his evident respect for Miller as a geologist, the
passages quoted from the earlier edition above were reprinted without
change. Since Miller was developing an age-day theory this may 
52seem surprising.
Elsewhere in the 3th Edition 1 tK wrote i
'Revelation tells us that God created the heaven and the earth 
- that man was the last created of living beings - and that 
God then rested from His labours. Many learned heathens 
held that the order of nature, animate as well as inanimate, 
had been from eternity. Modern science ... proves that the 
the order of Nature has not been eternal, and that man is 
a creature of the last and latest period. Science also tells
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US, that since the appearance of man, creative power in 
Nature appears to have been at rest. That there are difficulties 
in the interpretation of the opening words of the Book of 
Genesis, we do not deny. To bring them into a literal 
accordance with all the phenomena in the past history of
Nature would imply, on our part, a perfect knowledge of the 
past history of Nature; but such a knowledge we have not.
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The progress of science may clear up these difficulties ..’
In 1838 he wrote on the subject of creation and the flood to 
Mrs Cropper of Lowestoft, who apparently had a clergyman friend 
preparing to give a short lecture course on these topics. Clark 
and Hughes again irritatingly abridge this letter, but a further 
part (also incomplete) is in a copy in the Sedgwick collection in 
Cambridge University. Sedgwick implies much caution - admitting 
that he himself would not like at this stage to give a public lecture 
on the subjects - lest he mislead. In this he refers specifically 
to Miller;
'Before your friend lectures on the subject, you might mention 
he ought to familiarise himself with Hugh Miller's last work. I 
believe he had corrected the concluding proof sheet at the time 
of his most melancholy death. It is a very clever work, 
written with perfect sincerity, and written with an ample 
knowledge of the leading facts and discoveries of Geology.
Many persons think its reasoning satisfactory, I am compelled 
to say that I am not of their number. , Many parts of it are,
I think, far too imaginative and there are a myriad difficulties 
he has not overcome. Still, some parts of his work are excellent. 
In regard to my own opinions it would be foolish to say they had 
undergone no change since the discourse to which you allude was
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54published,'
The published letter states:
'Another opinion I formerly held was this: viz, that the modern 
W85 more distinctly separable from the anterior period than it 
proves to be on further investigation,,. I have no fear of the 
ultimate result, but we have ample work for another half 
century before we can be prepared to draw our lines of demarcation 
correctly, and till that is done I should think it premature 
to talk of comparing the geological days (or periods) with the 
Mosaic days. That this will be .done one day I have very confident 
expectation, because we have already done much, thou^ a few 
blots remain to be removed by the honest scrubbing-brushes of 
the rising generation of geologists.
In a footnote Clark and Hughes say: 'The omitted passage contains a 
discussion on the meaning of the days of creation. Sedgwick's views 
on this question have already been stated. See above pp.?6-80'. This 
is extraordinary, for the Cropper letter contains two references to 
ways in which his views have changed since the Discourse (185O ?).
The separation of the modern from the emterior period (essential 
to the gap theory one would think) proves less distinct than he had 
supposed. Moreover, the last sentence quoted above could be taken 
to imply that the word 'this' refers back to an age-day theory. Was 
Sedgwick saying that Miller had not yet succeeded but that one day 
some age-day theory would ?
I have.not located any material to give further insight into 
Sedgwick's ideas smd their development. In reality he leaves us 
with little concrete advice on harmonising Genesis and Geology. In 
1868, aged 83, Sedgwick decided that man was 'of a far higher 
antiquity than that which I have hitherto assigned to him.
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What, if any, difference this made to the gap-theory we are not told.
All that we are left with is his hope of the future - one day we
shall have knowledge to harmonize . Genesis and Geology.
37Concerning the flood, we saw in an earlier chapter how Sedgwick 
changed his mind between 182$ and 183I about its universal nature.
We also considerd the passage in in 1823 paper in which, true to his 
Baconism principles of separate foundations for science and 
revelation, he asserted that the evidence for the flood stood 
independently of revelation. Yet, he had then written, we 
nevertheless know that all truth is ultimately in accordance and it • 
would be 'unreasonable to deny* a 'general coincidence* of science 
and revelation on the issue.
In the same section, however, we saw how in his later recantation
in 1831, Sedgwick tried to pretend that the *mistake* had arisen
from a failure to apply the Baconian separation of science and 
revelation. On the specific fl&od issue, however, his 1831 comments 
on his new views are of sufficient interest in themselves for us to
quote here the passages verbatim;
'Are then the facts of our science opposed to the sacred 
records? and do we deny the reality of a historic deluge? I 
utterly reject such an inference. Moral and physical truth 
may partake of a common essence, but as far as we are concerned, 
their foundations are independent, and have not one common 
element. And in the narrations of a great fatal catastrophe 
handed down to us, not in our sacred books only, but in the 
traditions of all nations, there is not a word to justify 
us in looking to any mere physical monuments as the intelligible 
records of that event: such monuments, at least, have not 
yet been found, and it is not perhaps intended that they
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38ever should be found ...'
Here, then, is his first suggestion. It is, ironically, not 
dissimilar to the view John Fleming had been espousing in the 
Edinburgh Journal since about 1824:
'... the simple narrative of Moses permits me to believe, 
that the waters rose upon the earth by degrees ... that the 
flood exhibited no violent impetuosity, displacing neither 
the soil nor the vegetable tribes which it supported 
With this conviction in my mind I am not prepared to witness 
in nature any remaining marks of the catastrophe . and I 
find my respect for the authority of revelation heightened,
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when I see, on the present surface, no memorials of the event.
The irony is that in his 1825 articles Sedgwick had defended 
Buckland against John Fleming's criticisms - though thinking Buckland 
'far too secure in his position' to need such defence.
Sedgwick does not, however, rest content with this. His 1831 
Address continues :
'But the facts recorded in history may sometimes, without 
confounding the nature of moral and physical truth, be brought 
into a general accordance with the known phenomena of nature: 
and such general accordance I affirm there is between our 
historical traditions and the phenomena of geology. Both 
tell us in a language easily understood, though written in 
far different characters, that man is a recent sojourner on 
the surface of the earth. Again, though we have not yet 
found the certain traces of any great diluvian catastrophe which 
we can affirm to be within the human period; we have, at least, 
shown that paroxsms of internal energy waves desolating whole
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regions of the earth, were just a part of the mechanism of 
nature. And what has happened, again and again, from the 
most ancient, up to the most modern periods in the natural 
history of the earth, may have happened once during the few 
thousand years that man has been living on its surface.
We have therefore, taken away all anterior incredibility from 
the fact of a recent deluge ...'
Sedgwick, as may be seen, continued to be a catastrophist, though 
his ideas were now altered more in line with the theories of 
Elie de Beaumont on mountain chain elevation (as his Address 
makes clear). Lyell, writing in 1837 to Whewell, doubts that 
Sedgwick by then believes more than a small part of de Beaumont's
system-'^  though Sedgwick himself seems to make no direct reference 
to a change of view. He continues, however, to refer to Catastrophes 
(e.g. in the 1844 letter quoted above on Genesis). In the 1858 
letter to Mrs. Cropper he writes:
'Land and sea have changed place. The tops of our highest 
hill have been under water. Therefore the fact of an historic 
deluge is not impossible or improbable .. . ’
This leaves a lot of unanswered questions. Did Sedgwick have in 
mind a limited flood? The idea was not new (lyell traced it to 
Quirini in 1676) but he gives no indication of this. If it were 
still a universal flood, where did the water come from to cover 
the mountains? If it were a universal flood why had he not found
evidence in the fossil record? To remove the anterior incredibility
!
of a flood on the grounds that there was evidence for previous 
floods, only increased the posterior incredibility if there were 
no evidence for the one supposedly the most recent. The whole
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argument seems to be poorly thought out. But it is all we have
in his published works to indicate his views.
In theory, then, Sedgwick followed the Baconian viewpoint that 
the interpretation of revelation, and the inductive methods of 
science, rested on different bases, emd should be attempted 
independently.. There is no evidence that any kind of Biblical 
'literalism' ever influenced his geological practice. The stories of 
creation and the flood did not make him try to fit geology into a 
particular mould, nor did he ever (in spite of the C»-vpr«..s5 \ 
by to the contrary) msüke a basis of such literalism to
object to evolution. On the other hand, however, he could not 
really insist that (on the issue of geology and the creation and flood) 
one did not impinge on the other. In this he always, throughout his 
long life,beHdved that they would ultimately harmonise. When it 
came to details, however, apart from a brief early period when he 
did link the Noachic flood with geology (and afterwards recanted), 
he was very wary of committing himself to any detail. He simply 
asserted that it vas yet too early to tell. There may, however, be 
some evidence that (in spite of his unshaken confidence in ultimate 
harmony) his changing views about the distinctness of the epochs and 
the antiquity of man may have led him to perceive increasing 
difficulties in the gap-theory tentatively adopted. What his 
final views were, in default of more detailed material, we cannot 
tell.
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7.6 Notes
1. The word 'moral' here has the special sense explained by Sedgwick 
in the passage cited below on p. 52.0: 'demoralised' does not mean 
either debauched or disheartened.
2. See p. above (5th Edition Discourse, xix).
3. Letter to Darwin - see Chapter 7.5, note 89.
4. This section is only in the revised version (April 7th I86O) in 
The Spectator.
5. 1st Edition Discourse, p. 12.
6. e.g. 6th Edition, p. 246, etc.
7. See ref. 3.
8. See e.g. John Green, The Death of Adam, p. 10-13, 282-84 and 
'Reflections on the Progress of Darwin Studies', Journal of History 
of Biology, 1975, 8, p. 246; Maurice Mendelbaum, 'Darwin's 
Religious Views', Journal of the History of Ideas, 1958, 19,
563-378, and History, Man and Reason, p. 85-87; Howard Gruber and 
Paul Barrett, Darwin on Man, p. 208-213; Edward Manier, The Young 
Darwin and His Cultural Circle, p. 68; Silvan Schweber, 'The Origin 
of the Origin Revisited', Journal of the History of Biology, 1977,
10, p. 233-34, 297 and 304-8; J.R. Moore, The Post Darwinian 
Controversies, p. 307-526; Dov Ospovat, 'God and Natural Selection', 
Journal of the History of Biology, I980, 13, 169-194; C. Gillespie, 
Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation. Another theme of some
of these (e.g. in Mendelbaum) is over Darwin's attitude to materialism.
9. See 5th Edition Discourse, cxlviii.
10. Controversy surrounds the ideas e.g. of J. Monod, Chance And 
Necessity, etc. ,
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11. See the quotation on following page,
12. This has been emphasized earlier in this present chapter and in 
chapter 5*6» '
15. See chapter 4.% and also later in the present chapter.
14. See above e.g. p^, IS1- I6I&
15. See below in present chapter.
16. See below in present chapter.
17. 5th Edition Discourse, xiv; Sedgwick also says that Bacon would 
perhaps have qualified his censures if he had been aware of 
modern physiological discoveries. The quotation (from Bacon's 
Advancement of Learning, Bk. ii) applies the censures to Plato, 
Aristotle and Galen.
18. See above p^«
19. The third and subsequent editions have 'fulness of its glorious 
light' instead of 'day spring from on high', but are otherwise 
unaltered.
20. 1st Edition Discourse, p. 104, 3rd Edition, p. l46, 5th Edn»p«
21. 5th Edition Discourse, cclvii.
22. 'On Diluvial Formations', Annals of Philosophy, I825, 10, p. 54.
23. 5th Edition Discourse, p. 142-43.
24. From the I83O Presidential Address, p. 20?.
25. See above purt 6*( t Z
26. 1st Edition Discourse, p. I05.
27. Sedgwick's reference is to the Scriptural Geologists.
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28. 1st Edition Discourse, p. 107-8.
29. The letters to Sedgwick are in the Cambridge University Library,
those to Whewell in the Trinity College; Gwatkin also corresponded 
with Henslow.
30. Clark & Hughes, 2, p. 79»
31. See 5th Edition Discourse, p. 115*
32. Gwatkin, writing to Sedgwick on 30th December 1854, takes it amiss 
that on p. 115 the new edition of the Discourse prints the passage 
about 'no good geologist' attempting an age-day theory, without 
any note or comment. Gwatkin may feel grieved for his own efforts,
but he does mention Miller's lectures.
33. 5th Edition Discourse, cccv-cccvi.
34. This is the manuscript letter - whether or not this was the version
sent, it may at least indicate Sedgwick's views.
35» Clark & Hughes, 2, p. 344-45*
36. Ibid.. p. 44o.
37* See above chapter 7*5*
380 1831 Address. p. 314.
39. Edinburgh Journal (April 1826).
40. : Life, Letters and Journals of Sir Charles Lyell Bart, (Ed.K.M.Lyell)
, 2, p. 4.
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(8) A B R I EF  E P I L O G U E
Adam Sedgwick was an important man in his own generation. As 
a geologist, he was one of the leaders in his field for some twenty 
yeairs between about 183O and the mid 1850's, and did a great deal 
to stimulate the stratigraphical discoveries then being made. In 
science in general, he was a founder of the Cambridge Philosophical 
Society (in I819), and an early leader in the BAAS in the l830's.
In science education, his Discourse arguing for the value of 
what we would call science as a part of a liberal education helped 
pave the way for the introduction of the Natural Science Tripos 
by his friend Whewell in the l850's.
His interest to us is in the fact that he is representative of 
a particular kind of scientist of the nineteenth century. His 
interests reflect the interests of many in his age, and he presents 
a particular view of science and scientific discovery which is 
within a total vision of a unified knowledge.
Yet, within the last twenty or so years, various wild statements 
seem to have been made about him, and many which are misleading.
He has been called a 'liberal Anglican'. He has had the two extreme 
terms 'Broad Churchman' and 'Fundamentalist' both applied to him (and 
both anachronistically since neither had been invented in the period 
concerned). He has been called a semi-deist, and yet on the other 
hand accused of objecting to the Origin of Species on a basis of 
its 'open conflict with Scripture'. With one writer he narrov/ly 
escaped being classed in with the Scriptural Geologists. He has 
been pictured as a religious fanatic given to pious pronouncements, 
from whom Darwin must have been only too glad to escape during a
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geological tour. He has been seen as a fabricator of elaborate 
technical myths. He has been accused of all kinds of very basic 
inconsistencies - in his scientific methodology, in his supposed 
religious bigotry, and in his mixture of the two.
Certainly Sedgwick was not without his faults, and to write a 
hagiography of the man would be as misleading as to load him with 
all the weight of the above statements. Nevertheless, the present 
thesis has shown that all the above are arguable, most are 
misleading, and many are more or less demonstrably incorrect. 
Sedgwick, viewed within the framework of his own times and his own 
beliefs, had a basic consistency running through his ideas and 
pronouncements. If at times he was liable to exaggerate during 
heated controversy, this does not negate that basic fact. I will 
conclude with some words about him which are perhaps not too far, 
at least, from the truth. These are from his epitaph:
ADAM SEDGWICK
A MASTER AMONG PHILOSOPHERS 
THE FRIEND OF PRINCES, THE DELIGHT OF LITTLE ONES 
AS ONE WHO 
EXTENDED THE FRONTIERS OF SCIENCE 
AND WAS FIRED WITH A RIGHT ROYAL LOVE OF TRUTH 
WHOSE CHARACTER WAS A GRAND SIMPLICITY 
AND WHOSE ROCK WAS THE FAITH OF CHRIST
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(9) MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS USED
A number of libraries and museums hold one or two letters 
of Sedgwick's, and where appropriate these have been referred to 
to in the text. Seven main manuscript collections, however, 
have been used for this thesis. Brief descriptions of these 
are as follows; .
(1) The British Library, London
A number of different collections in the British Library 
contain letters to and from Sedgwick; in particular, the
papers of Gladstone, Sherbourne, Butter, and Macvey Napier
contain many such letters.
(2) Cambridge University Library
This holds a large sollection of letters, mainly to rather 
than from Sedgwick, with some copies of his letters to others.
($) Cumbria County Archives, Kendal
This holds the parish records for Dent, and also some letters 
from Sedgwick to those of his home region.
(4) The Geological Society of London
The library of the Society holds a collection of Murchison 
notebooks and journals, letters from Sedgwick to Murchison, 
and copies of letters from Murchison to Sedgwick.
(5) The Sedgwick Museum, Cambridge
This houses the specimens collected by Sedgwick, his 
notebooks and journals, and some annotated books from his 
personal library.
(6) Trinity College Library, Cambridge
A collection known as the 'Whewell Manuscripts', containing
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some 10,000 items, is held here, including many letters from 
Sedgwick to Whewell and to Whewell's second wife Lady 
Affleck.
(7) University Museum, Oxford
This holds a collection of letters to John Phillips, 
including many from Sedgwick.
At the beginning of this thesis my thanks were expressed to 
the archivists, curators, and librarians of the above 
institutions, for granting access to their collections and 
providing help in effective use of them. Thanks are also due 
for permission to cite from their sources as credited in the 
relevant notes, and in this respect it_may that
items from (l) are quoted by permission of the British Library, 
items from (2) by permission of the Syndics of Cambridge 
University Library, and items from (6) by permission of the 
Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge.
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(10) BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PUBLISHED SOURCES 
10,1 Introduction
This bibliography contains the full details of all the published 
primary and secondary books and articles referred to in the thesis. 
Places of publication will be stated only if the work was not 
published in London.
A list of Sedgwick's works is given in a separate chapter 10.3. 
In addition, the following are standard works to which reference 
may have been made without necessarily citing editors or authors 
of individual articles;
The Dictionary of National Biography, Eds. Stephen, 1. and 
Lee, S., Oxford, 1883 (Compact Edition 1975 used).
The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Ed., N. York, 1910-1911, 
and 13th Edn. Chicago, 1973.
The Shorter Oxford dictionary; on historical principles
Eds. Little, W., Foweler, H.W. and Coulson, J., 3rd Edn., 
Oxford, 1956.
The Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Ed. Gillespie, C.C.,
N. York, 1970-1980.
It may also be noted that in the thesis The Life and Letters of 
the Reverend Adam Sedgwick..., by Clark, J. and Hughes, T., is 
referred to as 'Clark & Hughes'. Sedgwick's own works are also 
referred to in shortened form, e.g. Discourse, Syllabus, Memorial.
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The paper was completed iG May ( Ib id ) .
1826 On the Classification of the Strata which appear on the Yorkshire
Coast. A Letter to the. Editors of the Anna/s of Philosophy, 
dated 20 Feb., 1826, followed by a Memoir. Issued with 
separate title-page, as above, and “ London ; printed by C. Bald­
win, New Bridge-Street, 1826.” Read to Phil. Soc. Camb., 2 May,
16 J/hjp, 1825.
A n n a ls  o f  P h ilo so p h y . N .  S .. 1826, xi. p p . 339—362.
“ A paper was read by Prof. Sedgwick ‘ on the Geology of the Isle
of Wight
M in u t e s ,  P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 8 M a y , 182(1.
“ Rev. Prof. Sedgwick exhibited to the Society a pair of large horns 
of some species of the genus Bos found near Walton in Essex.” 
M in u te s , P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 13 N o i'e m b c r, 1826.
1826-28 On the Geological Relations and Internal Structure of the Magnesian
Limestone, and the lower Portions of the New Red Sandstone 
Series in their Range through Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, 
Yorkshire, and Durham, to the Southern extremity of North­
umberland. Read 17 Nov., 1826 ; 30 April, 18 May, 1827;
7 March, 1828.
T r a n s . G col. Soc. L o n d .,  S e r . 2, iii. p p . 37— 124.
1827 “ After the meeting Professor Sedgwick gave an account of the
peculiarities of the Coal Strata in the neighbourhood of White­
haven.”
M in u te s ,  P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 14 M a y , 1827.
1828 On the Geological Relations of the Secondary Strata in the Isle of
Arran. By Rev. A. Sedgwick [etc.], and R. I. Murchison. 
Read 18 fam tary and i February, 1828
T r a n s .  G col. .Soc. L o n d .,  S c r . 2, ii. ,//. 21— 36.
“ After the meeting Prof. Sedgwick gave, an account of the Geo­
logical Structure of Scotland as collected from the observations
made by himself and Mr Murchison during the preceding 
summer.”
M in u te s , P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 3 M a r c h , 1828.
On the Structure and Relations of the Deposits contained between 
the Primary Rocks and the Oolitic Series in the North of 
Scotland. By the Rev. A. Sedgwick [etc.], and R. I. Murchison 
[etc.]. Read 16 May and 6 June, 1828.
T r a n s , Geol. Soc. L o n d . ,  S e r . 2. iii. p p . 125— 160.
1829 Letter to Right Hon. H . Goulburn. 3 June. Signed : A Resident 
Member of the Senate.
“ After the meeting Professor Sedgwick gave an account of the 
Geological Structure of the Alps, illustrated by a section passing 
from the plains of Bavaria to those of Trieste.”
M in u te s , P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 30 N e w ., 1829.
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[829-30 A Sketch of the Structure of the Eastern Alps ; with sections through 
the Newer Formations on the Northern Flanks of the Chain, 
and through the Tertiary Deposits of Styria, etc., etc. By Rev.
A. Sedgwick [etc.] and R. I. Murchison [etc.]. Read 6 Nov.,
20 Nov., 4 Dec., 1829 ; 5 March, 1830.
With Supplementary Observations, Sections, and a Map. By R. I. Murchison,
[etc.] R e a d 19 J a n .  a n d 2 Fe b ., 183 t. ’
T r a m .  Geol. Soc. L o n d .,  S e r , 2, ii. p p . 301—420.
1830 Address delivered [as President] at the Anniversary Meeting of the
Geological Society of London, 19 February, 1830. 8vo. ^  
London, pp. 28.
P ro c . .G eol. Soc. L o n d ., i. p p . 187— 2r2.
A Sketch of the Structure of the Austrian Alps. By Rev. A. Sedg­
wick and R. I. Murchison. Read 21 May, 1830.
P ro c . G eol. Soc. L o n d ., i. p p . 227— 231.
1831 Introduction to the General Structure of the Cumbrian Mountains;
with a Description of the great Dislocations by which they have 
been separated from the neighbouring Carboniferous Chains.
Read '^  January, 1831. With an Appendix. Read 6 November,
1833.
T r a m ,  Geol. Soc. L o n d .,  S e r . 2, iv. p p . 47—68 *.
Address on announcing the first award of the Wollaston Prize. ^
Delivered 18 February, 1831.
P ro c . Geol. Soc. L o n d ., 1831, i. p p . 270— 279.
Address to the Geological Society, delivered on the evening of ^
the 18th of February, 1831. on retiring from the President’s
Chair.
P ro c . Geol. Soc. L o n d ., 1831, i. p p . 281— 316.
Description of a Series of Longitudinal and Transverse Sections 
through a Portion of the Carboniferous Chain between Penigent 
and Kirkby Stephen. Read 2 March and 16 March, 1831.
T r a n s . Geol. Soc. L o n d ., S e r . 2, V o l. iv. p p . 69— 102.
Address to Senate in opposition to the claims of M r Goulburn and 
Mr W. Y. Peel (2 May). Signed : A Resident Member of the 
Senate.
“ After the meeting Professor Sedgwick gave an account illustrated 
by sections, of the geological structure of Caernarvonshire.”
M in u te s , P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 14 N o v . , 1831. P h i l .  M a g . 1832, 69.
1832 On the New Red Sandstone Series in the Basin of the Eden, and 
North-western Coasts of Cumberland and Lancashire. Read 
I  February,
T r a n s . G eol. Soc. L o n d . ,  S e r . 2, iv. p p . 383— 408. P ro c . G col. Soc. 
L o n d . i. p p . 343— 345 , e n t it le d :  O n  th e  deposits o v e r ly in g  th e  c a rb o n ife ro u s  
series in  th e  vcilley  o f  th e  E d e n , a n d  on the  north-7oestern coasts o f  C u m b e r la n d  
a n d  L a n c a s h ire . P h i l .  M a g . , xi.//. 283— 285.
“ After the meeting Professor Sedgwick gave an account, illustrated 
by maps and sections, of the Physical Geography and History 
of the Fens of Cambridgeshire.”
M in u te s , P h i l .  Soc, C a m b ., 7 M a y , 1832.
On the Geological Relations of the Stratified and Unstratified Groups 
of Rocks composing the Cumbrian Mountains. Read 16 May, 
1832.
P ro c . Gcol. Soc. L o n d ., i. 399— 401.
Verbal account of the Geology of Caernarvonshire.
■ R e p o rt, B r i t .  A ss , (O xforcP), J u n e 1832, /. 583.
Remarks on Mineral Veins.
I b id .  p . 579.
5 9 4
Note on certain fossil shells overlying the London clay in the Isle of 
Sheppey. Read 21 November, 1832.
P ro c . G eol, Soc. L o n d , , i. 409.
A Syllabus of a course of lectures on Geology. 2nd Edition. 8vo. ^  
Camb., 1832.
J833 “ After the meeting Professor Sedgwick gave an account, illus­
trated by representations of sections, of the Geology of North 
Wales.”
M in u te s , P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., n M a r c h , 1833. P h i l .  M a g . , 1833, i. 381.
“ Professor Sedgwick described the leading features in the Geology 
of North Wales, the lines of elevation, the relation of the trap 
rocks to the slate-system, the cleavage of the slnte ; pointed 
out the relations of this tract to that examined by Mr Murchison : 
and drew a general parallel between the slate formations of 
Wales and Cumberland.”
R cpoi-t B r i t .  . Is s . {C a m b rid g e ), 1833. p. xxxiii.
Professor Sedgwick gave a general account of the Red Sandstones 
connected with the Coal-measures of Scotland, and the Isle of 
Arran.
Ib id .
• A Discourse on the Studies of the University. 8vo. Camb., 1833. ^
The preface is dated 5 November, 1833.
On a Band of Transition Limestone, and on Granite Veins, appearing 
in the Greywacke Slate of Westmoreland, near Shap Wells and 
Wastdale Head. Read 6 November, 1833.
P ro c . Geol. Soc. L x m d ., ii. 1.
On Charnwood Forest, Leicestershire. Read Phil. Soc. Camb.,
5 December, 1833.
P h i l .  M a g . , iv. 1834, p p . 68, 69.
1834 Remarks on M r Beverley’s Letter to H. R. H . the Duke of
Gloucester. First Letter to the Editors of the Leeds Mercury
U January).
T h e  Leeds M e r c u r y , 18 J a n u a r y , 1834.
Remarks on Mr Beverley’s Letter to H. R. H . the Duke of
Gloucester. Second Letter to the Editors of the Leeds
Mercury. No date.
T h e  Leeds M e r c u ry , 8 F e b r u a r y , 1834.
Letter to the Editor of The Times in support of the Cambridge 
Petition for the Abolition of Tests on proceeding to degrees.
Dated Trin. Coll. 8 April.
Published in T h e  T im e s , 10 April, and reprinted in T h e  C a m b rid g e  C h ro n ic le ,
11 April, with a few corrections.
Letter addressed “ To the Resident Members of the Senate.” Dated
Trin. Coll. 16 April, in defence of Professor Hewett.
Printed in T he  C a m b rid g e  C h ro n ic le , 18 April.
Seventeen Reasons for adopting the Prayer of the Petition signed ^  
by sixty-two resident Members of the Senate.
T h e  T im e s , probably about 18 April.
Letter to Editor of Cambridge Independent Press, dated Trin. Coll.
18 April, in reply to a letter signed A Member of the Senate 
[Dr French], printed in The Canibridge Chronicle, 11 April.
Remarks on Mr Beverley’s Letter, etc. Third Letter to the Editors 
of the Leeds Mercury. Dated Trin. Coll. 15 May.
Remarks on M r Beverley’s Letter, etc. Fourth Letter to Editors 
of Leeds Mercury. Dated Trin. Coll. 2 June.
Letter “ To the Members of the Senate,” in reply to Mr Selwyn.
Dated Trin. Coll. 9 June.
Printed in T h e  C a m b rid g e  C h ro n ic le , 13 June.
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“ Professor Sedgwick on the Geology of Cambridge.”
M in u te s , P h i l .  See, C a m b ., 24 N o v . 1834.
• A Discourse on the Studies of the University. Second Edition.
8vo. Camb., 1834.
do. do. Third Editiop.
8vo. Camb., 1834.
1835 Remarks on the Structure of large Mineral Masses, and especially
on the Chemical Changes produced in the Aggregation of 
Stratified Rocks during different Periods after their Deposition. 
Read 11 March, 1835.
T r a n s .  Geol. Soc. L o n d ., iii.//. 461— 486. K a r s tc n ,  A r c h iv ,  x .p p . 581— 6 2 6 .
Account of a field-lecture.
T h e  C a m b rid g e  C h ro n ic le , 10 A p r i l , 1835.
On the range of the Carboniferous Limestone flanking the primary 
Cumbrian Mountains ; and on the Coal-fields of the N. VV. coast 
of Cumberland, etc. By A. Sedgwick and Williamson Peile, 
Esq. of Whitehaven. Read 10 June, 1835.
P ro c . Geol. Soc. L o n d ., ii.//. 198— 200.
On the Silurian and Cambrian Systems, exhibiting the order in 
which the older Sedimentary Strata succeed each other in 
England and Wales. By Professor Sedgwick and R. I. 
Murchison.
R e p o rt, B r i t  A sg . { D t t h l iu ) .  P a r t ii. pt>. 59—6p
Extrait d’une lettre à M. Élie de Beaumont' sur le Développement 
des Roches stratifiées anciennes dans le Cumberland et le Pays 
de Galles.
B u l l .  Soc. Gcol. de F ra n c e , vii. p p . 152— 155.
, A Discourse on the Studies of the University. Fourth Edition.
8vo. Camb., 1835.
1836 “ Professor Sedgwick gave an account of the system of formations
inferior to the Carboniferous Series, as illustrated by his own 
researches in Wales, and those of Mr Murchison in the same 
country.”
M in u te s ,  C a m h . P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 18 A p r i l , 1836.
On the Coal-fields on the North-western coast of Cumberland. By 
A. Sedgwick and Williamson Peile, Esq. of Whitehaven. Read 
8 June, 1836.
P ro c . Geol. Soc. L o n d . , ii.//. 419—422.
A Classification of the old Slate Rocks of the North of Devonshire, 
and on the true position of the Culm Deposits in the central
portion of that County. By Rev. A. Sedgwick and R. I.
Murchison.
R e p o rt, B r i t ,  A ss . { B r is to l) ,  P a r t  W -p p . 95, 96.
Description of a Raised Beach in Barnstaple or Bideford Bay, on 
the North-West Coast of Devonshire. By A. Sedgwick and 
R. I. Murchison. Read 14 December, 1836.
T r a n s . Geol. Soc. L o n d .,  y .  p p . 279— 286.
Four Letters to the Editors of the Leeds Mercury in reply to
R. M. Beverley, Esq. [Not published.]
8vo. Cambridge, 1836. pp. 64.
1837 On the Physical Structure of Devonshire, and on the Subdivisions
and Geological Relations of its older Stratified Deposits, etc. 
Part I. By A. Sedgwick [etc.], and R. I. Murchison [etc.]. 
Read 14 June, 1837.
T r a n s .  Geol. Soc. L o n d ,,  y . p p . 633— 687.
Notice of an Incursion of the Sea into the Collieries at Workington.
R e p o rt, B r i t .  A ss . { L iv e rp o o l) ,  P a r t ii.//. 75, 76.
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“ Professor Sedgwick gave an account of the Geology of Charnwood 
Forest, and the neighbouring coal-fields.”
M in u te s , P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 13 N o v . 1837.
A Syllabus of a course of Lectures on Geology. 3rd Edition.
1838 Petition to the House of Commons against a Bill to carry into effect
the Fourth Report of the Commissioners of Ecclesiastical 
Duties and Revenues.
[Undated: but sealed at a meeting of the Dean and Chapter of Norwich held 
14 May, 1838. It was then printed and circulated among members of the 
House of Commons.]
A Synopsis of the English Series of Stratified Rocks inferior to the 
Old Red Sandstone— with an attempt to determine the suc­
cessive natural groups and formations. Read 21 March and 
23 May, 1838.
P ro c . Geol. Soc. L o n d ., i. p p . 675—685.
1839 Classification of the Older Stratified Rocks of Devonshire and
Cornwall. By the Rev. Professor Sedgwick [etc.] and R. I. 
Murchison [etc.]. Dated 25 March, 1839.
P h i l .  M a g .  S e r . 3, V ol. 14, p p . 241— 260.
Postscript to the communication of Prof. Sedgwick and M r Mur­
chison in the present number at p. 241. [n. d.]
I b i d . p . i i ' i .
Supplementary Remarks on the “ Devonian ” System of Rocks. By 
the Rev. Professor Sedgwick [etc.] and R. I. Murchison [etc.]. 
April 19, 1839.
P h i l .  M a g .  S e r . iii. V o l. 1 4 , p p . 354-358-
“ Professor Sedgwick on Geology of Cornwall and Devon.”
M in u te s , P h i l .  Soc. C a m b . 22 A p r i l , 1839.
“ A Communication respecting the Geology of Northern Germany East 
and West of the Rhine.”
M in u te s , P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 25 N o v . 1839
On the Physical Structure of Devonshire etc. Part 11. By A. Sedgwicl 
[etc.] and R. I. Murchison [etc.]. Read 24 April, 1839.
P ro c . Geol. Soc. L o n d . , ii. pp. 121 — 123. T r a n s .  Geol. Soc. L o n d . , v. p p . 688-
703*-
1840 On the Distribution and Classification of the older or Palæozoii
Deposits of the North of Germany and Belgium, and thei 
comparison with Formations of the same age in the BritisI 
Isles. Read 13 M ay and 27 May, 1840.
By A. Sedgwick [etc.] and R. I. Murchison [etc.]. Followed by ; 
Description of the Fossil Mollusca, by Viscount D ’Archiac ant 
M. E. de Verneuil, Members of the Geological Society o 
France, etc. etc.
7ra n s . Geol. Soc. L o n d ., vi. pp. 221— 410. Issued with separate Title-page 
as above, and “London, printed by Richard and John E. Taylor, Re< 
Lion Court, Fleet Street, 1842.”
1841 Two letters to the Editor of The Norfolk Chronicle in answer to .
correspondent signing himself Miles. 27 April and 10 Ma\ 
1841.
Supplement to a “ Synopsis of the English Series of Stratified Rock 
inferior to the Old Red Sandstone,” with additional remarks o 
the Relations of the Carboniferous Series and Old Red Sane 
stone of the British Isles. Read 3 Not>ember and 17 Novembet 
1841.
P ro c . Geol. Soc. L o n d ., ii. P t . ii. p p . 545— 35.
“ Professor Sedgwick gave an account of the comparative classificatio 
of the older strata of the British Isles.”
M in u te s , P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 15 N o v . , 184
Circular to Members of the Senate soliciting subscriptions to bu 
the Whitby Plesiosattrits. 19 November, 1841.
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1842 “ Professor Sedgwick gave an account of Professor Owen’s memo
on the skeleton of the M y l o d o t t , and on the structures an 
habits of certain extinct genera of Fossil Sloths.”
M in u te s , P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 2 0  M a r c h , 184
Three letters on the Geology of the Lake District addressed l 
W;' Wordsworth, Esq. (23 May, 24 May, 30 May). Printe 
in A Complete Guide to the Lakes, by John Hudson, Kendal.
1843 Outline of Geological Structure of North Wales. Read 21 June, 184.
P roc. Gcol. Soc. LxstuL, iv. P i .  \ .  p p . 212— 22.
“ Professor Sedgwick gave an account of the structure and relations 
of the slate rocks of North Wales.”
M in u te s , P h i l .  Soe. C a m b ., 13 N o v . , 1843.
On the Older Palaeozoic {Protozoic) Rocks of North Wales. Read
15 No"oembcr, and 29 November, 1843.
[A continuation of the paper on Geological Structure of N. Wales, read 21 June,
'843]
Q u a r t .  J o t i m .  Geol. Soc. L o n d .,  \ . p p . 5— 22.
•1844 Notes appended tq Notice on the Occurrence of Land and Freshwater 
Shells with Bones of some extinct Animals in the Gravel near 
Cambridge. By P. B. Brodie, F.G.S., Emmanuel College. The 
notes arc dated 8 March, 1844.
T r a n s . P h i l .  Soe. C a m b ., viii. 139.
“ Professor Sedgwick gave a sketch of the progress of discovery 
among the older stratified geological deposits of Britain.”
M in u te s , P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 11 N c rv ., 1844.
A communication on the geology of North Wales in continuation of 
the Memoir read 15 November and 29 November, 1843.
(29 May). No abstract of this paper is given.
Q u a r t .  J o u r n .  G eol. Soc. L a n d . , i. 214.
1845 On the comparative Classification of the Fossiliferous Strata of
North Wales, with the corresponding deposits of Cumberland, 
Westmoreland, and Lancashire. Read 12 March, 1845.
Q u a r t ,  f o u r n ,  Geol. Soe. L o n d . , i. p p . 442— 450.
On the Geology of the Neighbourhood of Cambridge, including the 
Formations between the Chalk Escarpment and the Great 
Bedford Level. Read at Cambridge Meeting of Brit. Ass. June,
1845.
B r i t .  A s s . R e p . { f o r 1845) P t .  1 , p p . 40—47.
“ Professor Sedgwick gave an account of the fossiliferous slate rocks 
of the Lake Mountains.”
M in u te s ,  P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 24 N o v . , 1845.
1846 On the Classification of the Fossiliferous Slates of Cumberland,
Westmoreland, and Lancashire (being a supplement to a paper 
read to the Society, March 12, 1845). Read 7 January and 21 
January, 1846.
Q u a r t ,  f o u r n .  Geol. Soc. L o n d .,  W. p p . 106— 131.
Supplemental letter to Wordsworth on Geology of Lake District.
Cambridge, 30 May [Letter iv]. Published in Hudson’s ^  
Guide.
On the Classification of the Fossiliferous Slates of North Wales, 
Cumberland, Westmoreland, and Lancashire (being a supple­
ment to a paper read to the Society, March 12, 1845). Read
16 December, 1846.
Q u a r t ,  f o u r n .  G eol. Soc. L o n d ., iii. 133— 164.
Geology of the Lake District, in four letters addressed to W. Words- ^  
worth, Esq.
Printed in ' A  com plete G u id e  to th e  L a k e s ,’ edited by the publisher.
1847 “ Professor Sedgwick made a communication on the geology of
North and South Wales.”
M in u te s , P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 15 M a r c h , 1847.
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1848 On the Organic Remains found in the Skiddaw Slate, with some 
Remarks on the Classification of the Older Rocks of Cumber­
land and Westmoreland, etc. Read 2 February, 1848. ,
Q u a r t .  J o u r n .  G eol. Soc. L a n d . , iv.//. 216— 225.^
“ Professor Sedgwick gave a lecture on the structure of the southern 
mountain chain of Scotland, compared with that of the neigh­
bouring parts of Cumberland.”
M in u te s , P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 12 F e b ., 1849.
1850 A Discourse on the Studies of the University of Cambridge. The ^
fifth edition, with additions, and a preliminary dissertation.
8vo. Camb. 1850. The preface is dated 30 November, 1849.
8vo. C a m b ., 1850.
On the Geological Structure and Relations of the Frontier Chain of 
Scotland.
R e p o rt, B r i t .  A s s . (E d in b u r g h ) ,  P a r t ii. p p . 103— 107.
“ Professor Sedgwick gave a lecture on the Gulf Stream, and its 
effects on the climate of the British Isles.”
M in u te s , P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 25 N o v . , 1850.
1851 Reply to Sir Charles Lyell (President of the Geological Society) on
receiving the Wollaston Medal, 21 February.
Q u a r t .  J o u m .  G eol. Soc. L o n d . , vii. XX.
A Synopsis of the Classification of the British Palæozoic Rocks.
First Fasciculus. Advertisement dated May, 1851.
Letter to the Editor of the Morning Chronicle on the case of the 
Rev. Philip Bland (17 May).
A second letter on the same subject (28 May).
On the Slate Rocks of Devon and Cornwall. Read 5 November,
1831.
Q u a r t ,  f o u r n .  G eol. Soc. L o n d , , viii. p p . i — 19.
“ Professor Sedgwick gave an account of certain phenomena ob­
served at the junction of the carboniferous chain of Yorkshire 
and Westmoreland with the Cambrian and Silurian rocks.”
M in u te s ,  P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 24 N o v . , 1851.
On the Lower Palæozoic Rocks at the Base of the Carboniferous ^  
Chain between Ravenstonedale and Ribblesdale. Read 3 
December, 1851.
Q u a r t ,  f o u r n .  G col. Soc. L o n d ., viii. p p . 35— 54*
1852 On the Classification and Nomenclature of the Lower Palæozoic ^
Rocks of England and Wales. Read 25 February, 1852. D
Q u a r t ,  f o u n t .  Geol, Soc. L o n d . , viii. p p . 136— 168.
Reply to an article by Sir R. I. Murchison (Lit. Gazette, 20 March, fk  
p. 278).
L i t e r a r y  G azette, 10 April, p . 338.
Second article on same subject (in reply to a second letter by Sir R. ^  
i  I. Murchison, Lit. Gazette, 24 April, p. 369), dated Norwich,
May 8.
L i t e r a r y  G aze tte , 15 May, p . 417.
A Synopsis of the Classification of the British Palæozoic Rocks. ^  
Second Fasciculus, Advertisement dated July 16, 1852.
On a proposed separation of the so-called Caradoc Sandstone into . 
two distinct groups ; viz. ( i )  May H ill Sandstone ; (2) Caradoc ^  
Sandstone. Read 3 November, 1852.
Q u a r t ,  f o u n t .  Geol. Soc. L o n d . , ix. p p . 215— 230.
Answers from the Rev. Adam Sedgwick, M.A. Woodwàrdian 
Professor of Geology.
R e p o rt o f  H e r  M a je s ty 's  C om m issioners  a p p o in te d  to in q u ir e ,  in to  the S ta te , 
D is c ip l in e ,  S tud ies , a n d  Revenues o f  the  U n iv e r s ity  a n d  Colleges o f  C a m b rid g e ,
Fol. Lond. 1852. Evidence, pp. 115— 121.
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Recollections of Henry Bickersteth, afterwards Lord Langdale, while 
at Cambridge.
Printed in M e m o irs  o f  the R ig h t  H o n o u ra b le  H e t i r y  L o r d  L a n g d a le . By Thomas 
Duffus Hardy. 2 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1852. i. 231 — 234.
1853 Supplemental letter on Geology of Lake district [Fifth of the series],
addressed to Mr J. Hudson, Bookseller, Kendal. [Letter v.] 'ifc
Cambridge, 23 June, 1853.
On the Classification and Nomenclature of the older Palæozoic 
Rocks of Britain.
R eporiy  B r i t ,  A s s , P a r t i. p p . 54—61.
Geology of the Lake district of Cumberland, Westmoreland, and 
Lancashire, in [five] letters addressed to W. Wordsworth, Esq. 
i2mo. Kendal, John Hudson, 1853.
Printed in A  complete G u id e  to the  La ke s , edited by the publisher.
1854 A Reply to two Statements published by the Palæontographical
Society, in their volume for 1853 ; one appearing to accuse the 
University of Cambridge of illiberality in the administration of 
its Museum ; the other reflecting on the character of Professor 
McCoy. [A letter dated 4 March, 1854 ]
A t m .  a n d  M a g .  N a t .  H i s t . ,  S e r . 2, V o l. xiii. p p . 280— 292.
On the May H ill Sandstone, and the Palæozoic System of England. ^
[Letter dated 20 August, 1854, followed by a memoir.]
The paper read to the Geol. Soc. Lond. 3 May, (854, but not published in their 
J o u r n a l .
P h i l .  M a g . ,  .^er. 4, viii. p p . 301— 317 ; 359—370-
Rejoinder to Professor Milne-Edwards and Mr Bowerbank. [A 
letter dated 21 August, 1854.]
A n n .  a n d  M a g .  N a t .  H i s t . ,  S e r . 2, V o l. xiv. p p . 195— 197.
On the May H ill Sandstone and Palæozoic Systems of England.
[Letter dated 31 October, 1854.]
This is the paper read to the British Association at Liverpool, September, 1854.
Brit. Ass. Rep. Sections, p. 95.
P h i l .  M a g . ,  S c r . 4, viii. p p . 472—506.
>855 “ On the classification and nomenclature of the Palæozoic rocks.”
M in u te s ,  P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., 12 N o v . 1855.
A Lecture, delivered at The Athenæum, Bury St Edmund’s, 
December 19th, 1854, on the natural affinities and habits of 
the extinct Gigantic Sloths, by Professor Sedgwick.
Bury St Edmund s : Printed for the Bazaar, by W. P. Jackson, Angel Hill.
8vo. Lond. p p . 38.
A Synopsis of the Classification of the British Palæozoic Rocks, by 
Rev. A. Sedgwick: with a systematic description of the British 
Palæozoic Fossils in the Geological .Mttseutn of the University 
of Cambridge, by Frederick McCoy, F.G.S. etc. 4to. London 
and Cambridge, 1855.
1856 Letter to the Members of the Senate soliciting subscriptions for the
purchase of a collection of fossils formed by Rev. T. Image.
(10 January.)
Letter to the Editor of The Cambridge Chronicle on the same 
subject (20 February).
1857 Remarks on a passage in the President’s Address delivered at the
Anniversary Meeting of the Geological Society of London, on 
the 15th of February, 1856. [Letter dated 9 January, 1857, 
followed by memoir.]
P h i l .  M a g . ,  S c r . 4, V o l. xiii. p p . 176— 182.
Description of a series of dislocations which have moved the 
Cambrian and Silurian Rocks between Leven Sands and 
Duddon Sands. Read to Phil. Soc. Camb. 9 Nov. 1S57.
P h i l .  M a g . ,  S c r . 4., V o l. xvi.//. 155— 158. P ro c . P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., \. p p .
187 — 190.
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1858 Farewell Letter to Dr Livingstone (10 February).
Printed in T h e  P e rs o n a l L i f e  o f  D a s d d  L h i in g io n e . IJy \V. G. Bl.iikie Ü Ü
8vo. Lond. 18S0,/. 238. ’ ' f S
On Faults in Cumberland and Lancashire.
P j o r i ,  B r i t .  A s s . (A b erd e en ) P a r t ii.,/. 265. T i t le  o n ly .
i860 Article on The origin of Species, originally written in the form of a ^  
letter to the Archbishop of Dublin. Not signed.
T h e  S p ec ta to r, 24 March, p. 285 ; revised, with some additions, 7 April, /. 344.
On the Succession of Organic forms during long geological periods ; 
and on certain Theories which profess to account for the origin 
of new species. Read 7 May.
P ro c . P h i l .  Soc. C a m h . i. 223.
A synopsis, supplied “by the courtesy of the Professor" is printed in T h e
C a m b rid g e  C hron ic lcy 19 May.
i\ Lecture on the Strata near Cambridge and the Fens of the Bedford 
Level, delivered to the members and friends of the Working 
Men’s College, and of the Young Men’s Christian Association, 
at the Town Hall, Cambridge, i June, i860. Not published.
With map and supplement.
The preface is dated i December, t86i. The lecture was really delivered 2; May 
i860, not I June. ^
On the Geology of the Neighbourhood of Cambridge and the Fossils 
of the Upper Greensand.
R e p o rt, B r i t .  A ss. (O x fo r d ) ,  P a r t ii. /. joi. ( T i t l e  o n ly ) .
1863 Letter to the Editor of The Cambridge Chronicle describing the 
career and death of Mr Lucas Barrett. Dated Norwich, 10 
January, 1863.
1865 A Sketch of the Geology of the Valley of Dent, with some account 
of a destructive Avalanche which fell in the year 1752. Read 
13 November, 1865.
P ro c . P h i l .  Soc. C a m b ., i. //. 236— 238.
1867 Report on the Woodwardian Museum.
F i r s t  A n n u a l  R e p o rt o f  M u s e u m s  a n d  L e c tu re  Room s S yn d ic a te , i A p r i l , 1867.
Impressions of the character of Prince Albert: in a Letter to 
General Grey. See Preface to The Early Years of His Royal 
Highness the Prince Consort. 8vo. Lond., 1867.
1868 Report on the Woodwardian Museum.
S e c o n d ^ A ^ in u a l R e p o rt o f  M u s e u m s  a n d  L e c tu re  Room s S yn d ic a te , 24 F e b r u a r y ,
A Memorial by the Trustees of Cowgill Chapel, with a preface and 
appendix, on the climate, history, and dialects of D< .it. 8vo. 
Cambridge, 1868. [Printed fo r  'private circulation.'\
Letter of condolence on the death of Rev. H. V. Elliott Printed 
m Life of Rev. H. K  Elliott. Bv Jos. Bateman, M.A. 8vo 
Lond., 1868, p. 374.
1869 Report on the Woodwardian Museum (9 March).
T h i r d  A n n u a l  R e p o rt  o f  M u s e u m s  a n d  L e c tu re  Room s S y n d ic a te , d a te d i6 M a r c h .
Prefatory Notice (dated 20 August), to Index to the Fossil Remains 
of Aves, Ornithosauria, and Reptilia...in the Woodwardian 
Museum. By Harry Govier Seeley. 8vo. Camb., 1870.
1870 Supplement to the Memorial of the Trustees of Cowgill Chapel, with
an Appendix, etc., printed in 1868. Printed for private circu­
lation only. 8vo. Cambridge, 1870.
Report on the Woodwardian Museum (29 March).
F o u r th  A n n u a l  R e p o rt o f  the  M u s e u m s  a n d  L e c tu re  R oom s S y n d ic a te , d a te d 21 M a y .
Rep.ort on the Woodwardian Museum (11 March).
F i f t h  A n n u a l  R e p o rt o f  th e  M u s e u m s  a n d  L e c tu re  R oom s S y n d ic a te , d a te d 31 M a r c h .
ft
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iSyi Printed circular soliciting subscriptions for the purchase of the 
Leckenby Collection (23 November).
1872 Report on the Woodwardian Museum.
S ix i / i  A n n u a l  R e p o rt o f  th e  M tts c u m s  a n d  L e c tu re  Room s S y n d ic a te , d a te d 21 M a r c h .
1873 A Catalogue of the collection of Cambrian and Silurian Fossils
contained in the Geological Museum of the University of 
Cambridge, by J. W. Salter, F.G.S. With a preface by the 
Rev. Adam Sedgwick ; and a table of genera and index added 
by Professor Morris. Cambridge, 4to. 1873.
Sedgwick’s preface is dated 17 September, 1872.
The items marked with a star are those of especial interest 
for this thesis. Clark & Hughes only significant omission 
is the anonymous review of Vestiges of the Natural History 
of Creation, which appeared in the Edinburgh Review. July 
18^5, 165, pp. 1-85. As there is no doubt that Sedgwick was 
its author, no particular note has been taken in ny thesis 
of its anonymous nature, and it its referred to simply as 
'Review of the Vestiges'. The following other abbreviations 
have also been adopted:
Syllabus: A Syllubus of a course of lectures on Geology
(1821, 1832, 1837).
President's Address: Sedgwick gave two importsmt addresses 
to the Geological Socieiy, one in I830 (Proc. Geol. Soc, 
Lond„ 1, 187-212) and one in 1831 (Proc. Geol. Soc. Lond..
1, 281-316).
Discourse: A Discourse on the Studies of the University.
(1833, 1834, 1834, 1833* 1850).
Memorial: A Memorial by the Trustess of Cowgill Chapel,
(1868, Supplement 1870).
